



Recollection, Indian and Platonic

*Punar ehi vācas pate devena manasā saha
Vasoh pate ni ramaya mayy evāstu mayi śrutam*

AV 1.1.2¹

Cathedram habet in caelo qui intus corda docet.

St. Augustine, *In epist. Joannis ad Parthos*

My Lord embraces all things in His knowledge; will you
not remember?

Koran vi.80, tr. A. J. Arberry

In the following article, the doctrine that what we call "learning" is really a "remembering" and that our "knowledge" is by participation in the Omniscience of an immanent spiritual principle will be traced in Indian and Platonic texts. This corresponds, in the same Perennial Philosophy, to the doctrine that the beautiful is such by a participation in Beauty, and all being a participation of Being absolutely.

The omniscience of the immanent spiritual principle, *intellectus vel spiritus*, is the logical correlative of its timeless omnipresence. It is only from this point of view that the concept of a Providence (*prajñā*, πρόνοια, προμήθεια) becomes intelligible. The Providential Self (*prajñātman*) does not arbitrarily decree our "Fate" but is the witness of its operation: our Fate is merely the temporal extension of its free and instant act of being. It is only because we think of Providence as a foreknowledge of the

[This study was first published as Supplement No. 3 to the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LXIV (1944). The abstract that prefaced the article has been retained.—ED.]

¹ AV 1.1.2: "Come thou again, O Lord of Speech, with the divine mind, infix it, O Lord of Weal, in me, yea in me let thy lore abide." Cf. AV 1.1.4, *sam śrutena gamemahi*, "May we be familiar with thy lore," where *sam gam* corresponds to *anubhū* in other contexts. Cf. also AĀ 11.2.7, *Āvir āvir me edhi . . . mā śrutam me pra hāsīt*, "Do thou (Ātman, Brahma) be revealed to me, may thy lore not forsake me" (Keith's rendering).

St. Augustine: "His throne is in heaven who teaches from within the heart." Cf. BU III.9.23, "the support of Truth is in the heart."

future that we are confused; as if we asked, What was God thinking in a time *before* time was! Actually, Providential knowledge is no more of a future than of a past, but only of a *now*. Experience of duration is incompatible with omniscience, of which the empirical self is therefore incapable.

On the other hand, to the extent that we are able to identify ourselves with the Providential Self itself—Γνώθι σεαυτόν, That *art* thou—we rise above the sequences of Fate, becoming their spectator rather than their victim. Thus the doctrine that all knowledge is by participation is inseparably connected with the possibility of Liberation (*mokṣa*, λύσις) from the pairs of opposites, of which past and future, here and there, are the pertinent instances in the present context. As Nicholas of Cusa has expressed it, the wall of the Paradise in which God dwells is made up of these contraries, and the strait way in, guarded by the highest spirit of Reason, lies between them. In other words, our Way lies through the now and nowhere of which empirical experience is impossible, though the fact of Memory assures us that the Way is open to Comprehensors of the Truth.

THE Gāyatrī (RV III.62.10) invokes Savitṛ to “impel our intellections” (*dhiyo yo naḥ pracodayāt*), or better, “our speculations.”² AĀ II.3.5 tells us that “the self that is in speech (*vāc*)³ is incomplete, since one intuitively (*erlebt, anubhavati*)⁴ when impelled to thought (*manase*) by the Breath (*prāṇena*), not when impelled by speech.”⁵ “Breath” is to be understood here in its highest sense, common in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, that of Brahma and immanent solar Self, and as in BU II.5.19, *ayam ātmā brahma*

² MU VI.10 explains *dhiyaḥ* by *buddhayaḥ*; the *dhira* is “contemplative” rather than merely “wise.” With *pracodayāt*, cf. MU II.6 *pratibodhanāya* and *pracodayitr*.

³ The powers of the soul are called “selves” in CU VIII.8.12.4 ff. and Kauṣ. Up. IV.20. That is to say, “the self of speech” means the man considered as a speaker. In this sense, man has as many selves as he has powers.

⁴ *Anubhū* (cf. “gleichkommen” and *accognoscere*) is literally “to come to be along with,” or “adapted or conformed to, or identified with” the object of knowledge, whether in the epistemological or the erotic (JUB I.54.7) sense; cf. *adaequatio rei et intellectus*. [Cf. *anu . . . vid* in RV IV.27.1 = *σύνεσις* as defined in *Cratylus* 412.] We have tried to suggest this content by using the word “intuit,” and sometimes “experience” (with implied “immediacy”), reserving “know” for *jñā*.

⁵ This hardly differs from Keith’s version. On *Manas* (and *Vāc*), cf. Coomaraswamy, “On Being in One’s Right Mind,” 1942, p. 11; and CU VIII.12.5, “Now he who knows, ‘Let me think this’—that is the Self (*ātman*, Spirit). The Mind is his ‘divine eye’ (*daiva cakṣus*); he, verily, with that divine eye, the Mind, beholds these objects of desire, and is content.” Mind is the “prior” and the “overlord” of the other powers of the soul (ŚB X.5.3-7, XIV.3.2-3).

sarvānubhūh, “this Self, Brahma, experient of all.”⁶ The sense is, then, that it is not by what we are told, but by the indwelling Spirit, that we know and understand the thing to which words can only refer us; that which is audibly or otherwise sensed does not in itself inform us, but merely provides the occasion and opportunity to re-cognize the matter to which the external signs have referred us.

While these texts unmistakably present us with the notions of illumination and inspiration, we should not propose to deduce from them alone a fully developed theory of “Recollection” (*smara, smṛti; sati*) without further support; we cite them first by way of introduction to other texts treating directly of Memory.

The doctrine is simply stated in CU VII.26.1: “Memory is from the Self, or Spirit” (*ātmataḥ smaraha*). For “the Self knows everything” (*sarvam ātmā jānīte*, MU VI.7), “this Great Being is just a recognition-mass” (*viñānaghana*, BU II.4.12), or “precognition-mass” (*prajñāna-ghana*, BU IV.5.13, cf. Māṇḍ. Up. 5). Brahma, Self, is “intuitive of everything” (*sarvānubhūh*, BU II.2.19) because, as Śaṅkara says, it is the “Self of all” (*sarvātman*); He, indeed, is “the *only* seer, hearer, thinker, knower, and fructuary in us” (BU III.8.11, IV.5.15; cf. AĀ III.2.4) and therefore, because of His timeless omnipresence, *must* be omniscient. Memory is a participation of His awareness who never himself “remembers” anything, because he never forgets. “Memory,” as Plotinus says, “is for those who have forgotten.”⁷

CU VII.13.1 echoes and expands AĀ II.3.5 as cited above: “Memory (*smara*) is more than Space (*ākāśa*, the medium of hearing). Accordingly, even were many men assembled, not being possessed of Memory, neither would they hear any one at all, nor think (*man*), nor recognize (*viñā*), but if possessed of Memory, they would hear and think and recognize. By Memory, assuredly, one recognizes (*viñānāti*) children, recognizes cattle. Revere Memory.”

The power-of-the-soul that remembers is the Mind (*manas = voûs*),⁸ undistracted by the working of the powers of perception and action. “There, in ‘clairvoyant-sleep’ (*svapne*)⁹ that divinity intuits (*anubhavati*)

⁶ *Sarvānubhūh* states rather the basis than the bare fact of omniscience. The Self is necessarily “omniscient” because it is “the only seer, hearer, thinker, etc.” in us (BU III.4.2, III.7.23, etc.). The empirical self is its instrument.

⁷ *Enneads* IV.4.7.

⁸ Cf. MU VI.34.6–9.

⁹ *Svapna* here, as often elsewhere, is not ordinary sleep or dreaming, but a state of contemplation (*dhyāna*). The “divinity” is the “Recognitive Person” (*viñānamaya puruṣa*) of BU II.1.17, 18, “who is said to be ‘asleep’ (*svapiti*) when he controls the

Greatness. Whatever has been seen (*dr̥ṣtam*), he proximately sees (*anupaśya*), whatever has been heard, he proximately hears (*anuśrunoti*). Whatever has been and has not been seen, whatever has been heard and has not been heard, intuitively known or unknown (*anubhūtam, ananubhūtam*), good or evil (*sat, asat*),¹⁰ whatever has been directly experienced (*pratyānubhūtam*) in any land or airt, again and again he directly experiences; he sees it all, he sees it all" (Praśna Up. iv.5); or, as the Commentator understands the conclusion, "being himself the all, he sees it all," in accordance with the principle of the identity of knowing and being enunciated in verse 11, where the Comprehensor of the Self "knowing all, becomes all." In the foregoing context, Śaṅkara interprets, rightly I think, "seen and not seen" as referring to "what has been seen in this birth and what has been seen in another birth":¹¹ the meaning of this

powers of perception and action. Resuming the cognitive power (*viññānam ādāya*), he rests in the heart. . . . When he 'sleeps,' these worlds are his. . . . Controlling the powers of perception and action, he drives around in his own person (lit. 'body') as he will." As in BU v.3.7, where this Person "as it were contemplates (*dhyāyati*), as it were disports, for when he is 'asleep' (*svapno bhūtvā*) he transcends this world and the forms of death."

In this technical sense, "sleep" and "dreaming" are not the sleep of fatigue but the act of imagination. And this is quite universal. For example, "I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh . . . your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions" (Joel 2:28); "my thoughts had soared high aloft, while my bodily senses had been put under restraint by sleep—yet not such sleep as that of men weighed down by fullness of food or by bodily weariness—[and] methought there came to me a Being . . . the Mind of the Sovereignty . . . [who said] 'Keep in mind all that you desire to learn, and I will teach you,'" (Hermes, *Lib.* 1.1; in 1.28 he refers to the sleep of fatigue as "irrational sleep"); "Me bi-fel a ferly . . . I slumberde in a slepyng . . . þenne gon I meeten a meruelous sweune . . . I beo-heold. . . ." (*Piers the Plowman*, Prologue). *Mathnawī* iv.3067 contrasts the sleep of the vulgar with that of the elect; the latter "has nothing in common with the sleep of ignorance (*khwab-i-ghaflat*) in which most people pass their conscious lives" (Nicholson's note on *Mathnawī* 11.31, cf. 1.388–393; also BG 11.69 [and M 1.260]). Life is an "awakening" from nonexistence; "sleep" is an awakening from life.

*What availeth me to sleep and wake?
If to sleep unsleeping the way is seen,
Ah, then I see it availeth me.*

Tayumānavar (P. Arunachalam, "Luminous Sleep," reprinted from the *Westminster Review*, Colombo, 1903).

¹⁰ Lit. "aught and naught," and here "good and evil" rather than "real and unreal"; cf. *punyam ca pāpam ca* in BU iv.3.5 and *sadasat* in MU 111.1.

¹¹ "God enjoys eternalwise the contingency of things. . . . The knower being that which is known" (Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 391, 394). "The mind of the Sage at rest becomes the mirror of the universe" (*Chuang-tzū*, p. 158).

will become clearer when we deal with *jātavedas* and *jātissaro* and if we bear in mind that though he speaks of former births, the Lord is for him “the only transmigrant.”¹²

The subject of Memory is discussed in Mil 78–80. It is first shown that it is not by thinking (*citta*) but by Memory (*sati* = *smṛti*) that we remember; for we are not without intelligence even when what was done long ago has been forgotten (*pamuttāham* = *pramṛṣtam*). It is then asked, “Does Memory arise (*appajjati*) always as an over-knowledge state (*sabbā . . . abhijānantā*)¹³ or is Memory factitious (*kaṭumikā* = *kr̥timā*), and answered that “Memory occurs as an over-knowledge state, and is also factitious,” i.e., it may be either spontaneous or artificially stimulated.¹⁴ The king rejoins, “That amounts to saying that all Memory is over-knowing, never factitious.” Nāgasena replies, “In that case, craftsmen would have no need of workshops or schools of art or science, and masters would be useless; which is not true.” So the king asks, “In how many ways does Memory arise?” Nāgasena answers, “Sixteen.”¹⁵ These are really only two ways, either by over-knowing without means (*abhijānato*), or by

¹² See Coomaraswamy, “On the One and Only Transmigrant” [in this volume—ED.].

¹³ *Abhi* in *abhijñā* intensifies *jñā*, to know (γινώσκω, νοέω, kennen, cunning): to remember is something more than simply to perceive; cf. Meister Eckhart’s “I can see a rose in winter when no rose is there.” Hence, while *abhijñā* can mean just “remember” or “understand” (Pāṇini III.2.112, *abhijānāsi* = *smarasi*, *budhyase*; Mil 77, *abhijānāsi*, “Did you ever remember?”), in Pāli Buddhism generally the sense of the marvellous predominates, and *abhiññā* = *abhijānanā* is usually the supernatural knowledge or omniscience of a Buddha, an *iddhi* acquired by contemplative discipline and which he or other Arhats can “intuit” (*anubhū*) at will. In this sense *abhiññā* includes the six powers of levitation (motion at will through the air), clairaudience, thought-reading, knowledge of one’s own and of other people’s former births, and assurance that liberation has been attained (D III.281, based on many other contexts, PTS Dictionary, s.v.). It is noteworthy that “over-knowing” and “liberation” coincide, reminding one of Meister Eckhart’s “Not till the soul knows all that there is to be known can she pass over to the unknown good.”

Abhiññā does not appear in the Upaniṣads; in BG it is always only used of “knowing” Krishna—certainly an “over-knowing” and not an empirical experience. [Alternatively, one “remembers” Krishna, BG VIII.5.]

¹⁴ The *Milindapañha* categories are not quite the same as those of the previously cited texts, in which *abhijñā* does not appear. But it is made very clear that all learning is really *re-cognition*, i.e., *re-collection*.

¹⁵ I.e., one *abhijānato* and the rest *kaṭumikā*. This must have something to do with the well-known doctrine of the “sixteen parts” of which the “Self” is the sixteenth (BU I.5.15) and that part “with which you now understand (*anubhavasi*) the Vedas” (CU VI.7.6). [Cf. *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, tr. Swami Nikhilananda, New York, 1942, p. 367.] On the number “16,” cf. E.J.H. MacKay, *Chanhu-Daro Excavations* (1935–1936), pp. 240–241 (*American Oriental Series*, Vol. 20, 1943).

external stimulation (*kaṭumikā*), the total of sixteen being made up by a subdivision of the second category according to the nature of the means. Thus Memory occurs by over-knowledge simply when such as Ānanda or others who are "birth-rememberers" (*jātissarā*)¹⁶ remember a birth (*jātim saranti*): it occurs factitiously when those who are naturally forgetful (*muṭṭha-ssatiḷo = mrṣṭa-*)¹⁷ are constrained or stimulated to remember by another person (or thing), e.g., when one recognizes a relative by likeness, or cattle by their brands,¹⁸ or reads letters or numbers, or consults a book, or intuitively (*anubhūta*), as when one remembers what has already been seen or heard (without being "reminded" of it). Memory, in any case, is a latent power.

Thus what we think we "learn," but really "remember," implies that in intuition directly, and in learning indirectly, we are really drawing upon or, as the older texts would express it, "milking" an innate prescience (*prajñāna = πρόνοια, προμήθεια*). In D 1.19-22 we are told that the gods fall from heaven only when their "memory fails, and they are of confused memory" (*sati mussati, satiyā sammosā*); those whose mind remains

¹⁶ This refers to the supernormal faculty of remembering past "habitations," as possessed by a Buddha or other Arhat, and is to be distinguished from the memory of a former habitation by an ordinary brother, whose memory of the past is included in the list of factitious rememberings because means are employed to evoke it. The supernormal power is exercised at will by a Buddha and extends to the recollection of any birth whatever, however remote; the brother who is not yet an Arhat can only, by a step-by-step procedure, recover the memory of one or more births, but no more (Vis 411): in the first case the all-seeing view is, as it were, from the center of a circle, whence all "moments" within or upon the circumference can be seen at a glance; the second case is that of a being whose range is naturally confined to motion along the circumference itself (i.e., in time, so far as memories are concerned), who cannot *see* forward or backward immediately but can only predict by inference or recover the past by successive steps—he can look inward by analogy, but has neither foresight nor hindsight nor insight, unless suprarationally and by inspiration. The Buddha has "prior knowledge of the ultimate beginning (*agaññam . . . pajānāmi*), and more than that" (D III.28); his range is infinite (*anantagocaram*, Dh 179); but it is as the Buddha, the Wake, not as this man Gotama, now waking and now sleeping, that he is thus omniscient (*sabbaññu = sarvajñā*), and similarly in the case of others. This amounts to saying that Buddha = Paramātman.

¹⁷ TS VII.6.10.4, *madya*, is glossed by *vismrtyonmatta*, "oblivious," "in a state of amnesia." Sn 815, *mussati*, is explained by *nassati*, "perishes" (SnA 536); and *parimussati* is *paribāhiro hoti*, i.e., "wholly forgets" is to be "alienated" (Vis 44). I infer that amnesia was a known malady, and further that *all* forgetfulness was thought of as a madness of the same kind, only the Buddha and other Arhats being perfectly sane.

¹⁸ Cf. CU VII.13.1, "recognize cattle," cited above. On cattle brands see Pohath-Kehelpannala in *Ceylon National Review*, I (1907), 334, and John Abbott, *The Keys of Power* (New York, 1932), p. 140, and figs. 19-21 and 52.

uncorrupted, and do not forget, are “steadfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and will remain so for ever and ever”; and such, likewise, is the liberated (*vimutto*) Buddha’s prescience (*pañānanā*), or foreknowing, “on which, however, he lays no stress” (*tam ca pañānanam na parāmasati*).¹⁹ It is significant, in the first place, that what is thus said of the Buddha is, as so often happens, only a paraphrase of what has already been said of Agni, who “does not forget the prior nor the latter word, but is not vainglorious by reason of his counsel” (*na mṛṣyate prathamam nāparam vaco’sya kṛtvā sacate apradṛpidaḥ*, RV 1.145.2).²⁰ And secondly, that for Plato also it is precisely a *failure to remember* that drags down from the heights the soul that has walked with God (*θεῶ ξυνοπαδός* = *brahmacārī*) and had some vision of the truths,²¹ but cannot retain it (*Phaedrus* 248c, cf. Plotinus, iv.4.7 ff.).²²

¹⁹ I.e., *na parāmṛśati*, and rendered by Rhys Davids, “he is not puffed up”; in a similar context, D III.28, *na paramāsāmi* (cf. M 1.433 for this word) is rendered by “I do not pervert it”—“I am not attached to it” might be better. That these are the right connotations seems to follow from the Vedic parallel cited above. It will be because his prescience is “of far more than that” (*tato ca uttarataritaram pañānāmi*, M 1.433 and D III.28), rather than because such knowledge is not essential to liberation (M 1.277), that it is not overvalued; there are other than cosmic possibilities.

On the distinctions of gnosis amongst the gods in the Brahma worlds, cf. A IV.74 ff.: some are content with its beatitudes, others are prescient (*pañānanti*) of an absolute liberation.

²⁰ Suggestive of Agni’s epithet *satya-vāc*, “whose word is truth,” RV III.26.9, VII.2.3; cf. Pāli *sacca-vācā*, *sacca-vādin*. “The flower and fruit of speech is truth” (AĀ II.2.6 [or “meaning,” *Nirukta* 1.10]). *Prathamam nāparam* may well mean “eternal” rather than “earlier and latter”; cf. BU II.5.19, *apūrvam anaparam* = *Paradiso*, XXIX.20, *nè prima nè poscia*.

Agni, *kṛtvā . . . apradṛpitaḥ*, contrasts with the Indra of BD 7.54, *svena vīryena darpitaḥ*, until he is reawakened by Saptagu-Bṛhaspati = Agni and comes to himself again. The Sacerdotium is not intoxicated by knowledge, but the Regnum may be intoxicated by power.

²¹ Few retain an adequate memory of them (*Phaedrus* 250a).

²² The gods do not sometimes forget and sometimes remember—“such memory is for those who have lost it.” The omniscience of Zeus does not depend on observation, but on the innate gnosis of his own unlimited life. Cf. Ibn ‘Atā, “Openly the heart’s eye then beholds him, and doth scorn remembrance, as a burden hardly to be borne,” quoted by Abū Bakr, *Kitāb al Tā’arruf*, ch. 47 [cf. *Paradiso* XXIX.79 ff.]. For Aristotle, too, the Divine Mind “does not remember,” as does the perishable mind, which is reminded by its sense perceptions (*De anima* 3.5). “In the heart one knows the truth, in the heart alone, forsooth, is truth established” (BU III.9.23); the soul’s recognition of the visions stored up in her is the process of “remembering” (*Enneads* IV.7.10, 12). When everything has been remembered, once and for all, then there is no more remembering as a process, but only an immemorial knowledge. The disparagement of memory will not, then, be misunderstood; one might say

No less striking is the fact that *mosā, musā (mṛṣā)*, "false," is regularly opposed to *saccam (satyam)*, "true"; and since this *musā, mṛṣā* derives from *mussati, mṛṣ*, to "ignore," "forget," "overlook," it is clear that "not-true" coincides with "forgotten." In the same way, although conversely, *λήθη* is "oblivion," "forgetting," and *ἀληθεια* "truth," or literally "not-forgetting." Accordingly, *ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανός (Phaedo 109E)* is not merely "true, or real, heaven" but also "heaven where there is no forgetting," and where, by the same token, the gods "never learn" because there is nothing ever absent from their ken (Plotinus, iv.4.7); in the same way Plato's *τὸ ἀληθείας πεδίων* is not merely "plain of truth" but also "land of no forgetting," and the opposite of Aristophanes' *τὸ λήθης πεδίων*, "land of oblivion" (*The Frogs*, 186). *Lethe*, too, is one of Discord's deadly brood (Hesiod, *Theogony* 227), and still for Shakespeare means "death"; so that the "land of not-forgetting" is also the "land of immortality." In the sense that we are what we know, and that to be and to know are the same (*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι*),²³ recollection is life itself, and forgetfulness a lethal draught.

So far, it is clearly implied that Memory is a kind of latent knowledge,²⁴

that, like "consciousness" in the Buddhist parable of the Raft, remembering is "good for crossing over, but not an activity to be clung to." To remember is a virtue in those who have forgotten, but the perfected never lose their vision of the truth and have no need to recall it (*Phaedrus* 249cd, cf. Proclus as discussed in n. 25).

Sister M. P. Garvey, *St. Augustine, Christian or Neo-Platonist* (Milwaukee, Wis., 1939), (p. 107, confuses memory with remembering, as one might being with becoming. Memory, taken absolutely, coincides with omniscience and is not a procedure; but remembering is learning and would be a contradiction in one whose memory never fails. This is, in fact, Philo's distinction of memory (*μνήμη*) from recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*), the latter being a *means* of escape (*ἐκ λήθης*), but evidently needless as such on the part of one whose memory has never lapsed (*Legum allegoriae* III.91-93). This distinction, if I am not mistaken, is that of *smara* from *smarana*, the former denoting love as well as memory, and the latter the act of remembering, which implies a desiring or seeking rather than a loving.

²³ Hermann Diels, ed., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1903), fr. 18b 5. Cf. MU VI.34.3, *yac cittas tanmayo bhavati*, "What is one's thought, that he becomes," and St. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII.II, "esse, nosse, velle . . . in his tribus . . . et una vita mens et una essentia."

²⁴ "A fund of omniscience exists eternally in our heart" (*Mahāvairocana-bhisambodhi*, cited by R. Tajima from the *Taisho* (Tripitaka, XVIII, 38c.20). This "fund" corresponds to the *Ālayavijñāna* ("Hoard of Discernment"), which is to be distinguished from all specific (singular) discernments, and identified with the "Compendious Providence" (*vijñāna-ghana, prajñāna-ghana*) of the Upaniṣads, and with the form of God's knowledge in Christian theology, where his knowledge of himself is his knowledge of all things. [Cf. *Enneads*, IV.7.10,12, on the "eternal science" latent within you.]

which may be either self-revealing or revived by an appropriate external sign, for example, when we are "taught," or more truly "re-minded." There is a clear distinction of mere perception from recognition, whether or not evoked by the percept. Memory is a re-recovery or re-experiencing (*pratyānubhū*, *Praśna Up.* iv.5), and it may be observed that the other supernatural powers (*iddhi*) which can be experienced at will by the Arhat are similarly called "recoveries" (*pāṭihāra*, √*prati-hr*). It is evidently not, then, the outer, aesthetic self, but an inner and immanent power, higher than that of the senses, that remembers or foreknows (*prajñā*), by a "fore" knowledge that is rather "prior" with respect to all empirical means of knowing than merely "fore" with respect to future events—*unde non praevidentia sed providentia potius dicitur* (Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* v.6.69, 70). That which remembers, or rather which is always aware of all things, must be a principle always present to (*anubhū*) all things, and therefore itself unaffected by the duration in which these events succeed one another.²⁵ We are thus reduced to a Providence (*prajñā*, *πρόνοια*)²⁶ or Providential Self or Spirit (*prajñātman*) as the ultimate source on which all Memory draws, and with which

²⁵ "He knows, but it is not by means of anything other than himself that he knows," BU iv.5.15, etc. This is essentially also the Christian doctrine about the divine manner of knowing, cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* i.14. [note Euripides, *Helen*, 1015–1017.]

Cf. *Phaedrus* 247E ff., "Knowledge, but not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with (*ἐν . . . οὐσα* = *anubhavati*) the things we now call realities, but that has its being in the reality that *is*." The soul that can always hold this vision remains inviolable; but even of those who have seen it, "few are possessed of a consistent memory."

"Every God has an undivided knowledge of things divided and a timeless knowledge of things temporal; he knows the contingent without contingency, the mutable immutably, and in general all things in a higher mode than belongs to their station" (Proclus, *Elements of Theology* 124, cf. E. R. Dodds' ed., Oxford [reprinted 1963], p. 226). The gods of Proclus are, of course, the angels of Dionysius the Areopagite and of Christian theology in general.

²⁶ To employ the word "Providence" correctly, it must always be remembered that the foreknowing principle is that which gives being, and only indirectly a manner of being. It is much rather Fate (the operation of mediate causes, *ḥarma*) that "allots" or "provides for" the being of things *as they are*, than Providence, which is the timeless *witness* of this operation. The divine foreknowing is not, as such, a transitive act, but the act of being, prior to all becomings, of which it knows because it is the only real subject in them all.

Thus in Dodds' Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, p. 126, "for which it (Providence) provides" should read "of which it is provident." Fate inheres in time, Providence is *ex tempore*, and these are as much to be distinguished as are mediate causes from a first cause. [Cicero, *De natura Deorum* ii.xxix, confuses prudence and providence! St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.* 1.23.2: "Providence is not anything in the things provided for; but a type in the mind of the provider"—therefore, not fate.

whoever attains to the same uninterrupted omniscience must be identified, as in Praśna Up. iv.10.

We have already seen that there is such an omniscient Self, the fount of Memory (CU vii.26.1, MU vi.7; cf. 1 Cor. 2:11), and it is repeatedly affirmed that this immortal, spiritual, fore-knowing solar Self of all beings, whose presence is undivided in things divided (BG xiii.15, 16),²⁷ is our real Self, to be distinguished from the contingent Ego, an apparently unanimous (except in cases of schizophrenia) aggregate of powers of perception and action which are “only the names of *His* acts” (BU i.4.7, MU ii.6d, etc.). The providential principle, in other words, is the immanent Spirit, the Knower of the field, apart from whom on the one hand no birth could take place (BG xiii, etc.), and apart from whom, as only seer, hearer, thinker, etc. in us (BU iii.7.23, etc.), neither experience nor memory could be conceived.²⁸ We see also that the verification of the words, “That art thou,” must involve at the same time liberation and omniscience.

The connection of omniscience with birth implied above is significant. *Jātissaro*, cited above from Mil 78, in fact immediately suggests the older epithet Jātavedas, Agni's because “he knows all births” (*viśvā veda janimā*, RV vi.15.13; *jātānām veda*, AB ii.39), and the term *jātavidyā*, knowledge of births, or genealogy.²⁹ It is because *Tanū-napāt* (Agni-Prajāpati) becomes the immanent Breaths or Powers of the Soul (cf. ŚB i.8.3.2; TS ii.1.1.3, 4; JUB iv.2.6; MU ii.6a, b, etc.) and is thus “his offspring's witness” (*prajānām upadrastā*; cf. JB iii.261, *agnir jajñe . . . aupadrastryāya*) that the gods through him “know the mind of man” (ŚB iii.4.2.5-7).³⁰ How should He “who faces all ways” (*viśvatomukha*, RV i.97.6) and is “of many births” (*bhūri-janmā*, RV x.5.1), he who is the “universal life” (*viśvāyu*, RV i.27.3, and *passim*) or “mover of universal life” (RV vii.43.25), and who assumes all forms (*viśvarūpa*, RV iii.38.4), not be also the “All-knower” (*viśvavit*, RV iii.29.7; *viśvavedās*, RV iii.20.4, and *passim*)?

²⁷ As in Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* xii.11.

²⁸ Cf. Heb. 4:13. The recollected and regenerated man is “renewed in knowledge after the image of him who created him” (Col. 3:10).

²⁹ For the Knower of Births *in divinis* this will mean the “genealogy” of all things always; in the case of the human priest, his mortal analogue, who *vadati jātavidyām* (RV x.71.11), the genealogy will have to do with a particular line of descent (*santāna*).

³⁰ The all-seeing Sun and the myriads of the solar “rays” or “eyes” [feet or hands] that become the immanent Breath and the Breaths, our interior powers of which the sense organs are the instruments (JUB i.28; MU vi.8, etc.) are precisely “die göttlicher Späher, die der Menschen Thaten erschauen” (Grassmann), RV *passim*.

Agni, Jātavedās, is the Breath (AB II.39, ŚB II.2.2.15): “those of whose births he knows, they verily come to be (*bhavanti*), but of those whose births he knoweth not, how might they exist?” (AB II.39); “in that it is the Breath that mounts (quickens) the emitted semen and knows it, therefore He knows whatever is born” (ŚB IX.5.1.68). Being omniprogenitive, the Spirit is omnipresent; and being omnipresent, necessarily omniscient.

This immanent Breath (or “Life”) is, moreover, Vāmadeva (AĀ II.2.1), who says of himself, “Being now³¹ in the womb (*garbhe nu san*) I have known all the births of the gods” (RV IV.27.1; AĀ II.5); “thus spake Vāmadeva, lying in the womb” (*garbhe . . . sayānaḥ*, AĀ II.5).³² As Agni, etc., engendered in all things in motion or at rest (*garbhaś ca sthātām garbhaś carathām*), the Only Transmigrant³³ knows the operations of the gods and the births of men, and is besought to ward (*ni pāhi*) their births (RV I.70.1-3); as Gandharva³⁴ Soma-guardian “he wards (*pāti*) the generations of the gods” (RV IX.83.4), and as the All-seeing (*viśvam abhi caṣṭe*, RV VII.61.1), the Self of all that is in motion or at rest (RV I.115.1) and our true Father (JUB III.10.4), he is, as aforesaid, the “Knower of births” (RV I.50.1). As Krishna, “Self abiding in all beings” (*aham ātmā . . . sarva-bhūtāśaya-sthitah*, BG X.20; cf. Heb. 4:12, 13) he knows all their births (*janmāni . . . tāny aham veda sarvāṇi*, BG IV.5).

This is not a knowledge of successive events, but of all at once—“Dove s'appunta ogni ubi ed ogni quando . . . chè nè prima nè poscia procedette” (*Paradiso* XXIX.11, 20; Śvet. Up. 1.2). The Person of whom all things are born, the Lord of Immortality (*amṛtatvasyeśānaḥ*), “when he rises up on food”³⁵ (*yad annenāti rohati*) becomes “all this, both what hath been

³¹ Vedic *nu*, like *sakṛt*, “once for all,” “nowever.” Similarly the gnomic aorist, “I have known.”

³² As in BU II.5.18, *purīśaya*; *pura*, as in Plato πόλις, being “body,” and *śaya* or *śayāna* etymologically *civis*. Paul Deussen (*Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 606) has pointed out that the doctrine of a knowledge within the womb that is lost at birth, enunciated in Garbha Up. 3.4, corresponds to the Platonic doctrine that all “learning” is really recollection; cf. the Hebrew sources cited on pp. 63-64. [Similarly, Udayana’s view in the 10th-century *Kusumāñjali*; see A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 31, 269 (he calls the view “quaint”).]

³³ See Coomaraswamy, “On the One and Only Transmigrant” [in this volume—ED.].

³⁴ The progenitive solar deity, as in M 1.265,266, *gandhabbo*, apart from whom the union of human parents is sterile.

³⁵ When he “comes eating and drinking” (Luke 7:34). “That Golden Person in the Sun . . . is even He who dwells within the lotus of the heart and eats food” (MU VI.1). “Food” in this context is not, of course, merely “solid food,” but whatever fuel feeds the fires of life, whether physical or mental.

and what shall be" (RV x.90.2, cf. I.25.10-12; Śvet. Up. III.15).³⁶ "That God (Ātman and Brahma of the preceding verses), indeed, fills all quarters of the Sky, aforetime was he born, and he is within the womb. He alone hath been born, will be born. He standeth toward men, facing all ways" (Śvet. Up. II.16). "Other than past and future . . . Lord of what hath been and shall be, he alone is today and tomorrow" (KU I.14, IV.13). That Great Being is All-knowing, just because All things originate in him (Śaṅkarācārya on BrSBh I.1.3, BU II.4.10). *In divinis*, Brahma is the lightning flash, which reveals all things instantaneously; and within you, "that which comes to mind, and by which it instantly remembers" (*upasmaraty abhīkṣnam*, JUB IV.21.4, 5 = Kena Up. IV.4.5). [Cf. Plato, *Epistle VIII*, 341D, "sometimes this knowledge does blaze forth with a most instantaneous flash. . . ."]

There has thus been clearly established, in the Indian sources, a logical connection of Omniscience, an unbroken Memory of all things, with temporal and spatial omnipresence.³⁷ Only from this point of view can the notion of a "Providence" be made intelligible, the divine life being uneventful, not in the sense that it knows nothing of what we call events, but inasmuch as all of the events of what are for us past and future times are present to it *now*, and not in a succession. It is just at this point that we can most advantageously turn to consider the similar Platonic doctrine "that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is recollection" (ὅτι οὐ μαθησόμεν, ἀλλὰ ἣν καλοῦμεν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν), and that there is "no teaching, but only recollection" (ὅς οὐ φημι διδαχὴν

³⁶ There is a significant doctrine of past (*bhūtam*) and future (*bhavyam*). Past is to future as Sky, Day, Sun, Sacerdotium (*brahma*), Reality (*satyam*), and Certainty are to Earth, Night, Moon, Regnum (*kṣatra*), Unreality (*anṛtam*), and Uncertainty (AV II.15; ŚB II.3.1.25). These are progenitive pairs, respectively m. and f., differentiated here but coincident *in divinis*. Man is generated (*prajāyate*) and increases from the clash or conjugation (*maithunam*) of real and unreal (AĀ II.3.6); or as we might put it, man is the child of past and future. It is our uninterrupted genesis that separates these contraries; their reunion taking place only upon condition of our ceasing to become, so as to be what we are ("That art thou"), now, *sub specie aeternitatis*.

³⁷ It is, of course, "only as it were with a part of himself" (BG xv.7) that the Supreme Identity of Being and Nonbeing can be thought of as Omnipresent, Omniform, Omniscient. For Omniscience can be only of the possibilities and actuality of manifestation: of what remains (*ucchiṣtam*, AV XI.7, etc.) there can be neither science nor omniscience, and it is from this point of view that, as Erigena justly remarks, "God does not know *what* he is, because he is not any *what*" (cf. Buddhist *ākimcaññā*). It is only his possibilities of manifestation that become "whats" of which there can be science or omniscience.

εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀνάμνησιν, *Meno* 81E, 82A; cf. *Phaedrus* 278A).³⁸ Taking for granted Plato's repeated distinction of mortal and immortal "souls" that dwell together in us,³⁹ and assuming further that the immortal is not an individual but a universal principle "participated in" by the individual, not as a thing divided up but as one of which we can know—and be—according to the measure of our ability to "know our selves,"⁴⁰ we proceed to cite the main text, that of *Meno* 81CD.

"Seeing, then, that Soul [*θεός* of *Laws* 897B] is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things both in this world and in Hades, she has learnt all things, without exception; so that it is no wonder that she should be able to remember all that she knew before⁴¹ about virtue

³⁸ It is in accordance with this doctrine that Plato takes it for granted that the function of works of art is to *remind us* of the eternal realities (*Phaedo* 74 ff., *Phaedrus* 278A); cf. MU vi.34, *fin.*, where for those who do not sacrifice, or know, or contemplate, "the remembrance (*smaranā*, [*docta ignorantia*]) of the heavenly abode of Brahma (i.e., *brahmaloka*) is obstructed." "It is the unknown, methinks, that thou shouldst remember" (*atha nu mīmāṃsyam eva te manye 'viditam*, JUB iv.19.1). In the iconography of Śiva, the demon on whom he tramples is called "the person of amnesia" (*apasmāra puruṣa*).

³⁹ *Timaeus* 69D, 90AC, *Republic* 430, 604B; the Immortal Soul being the "real Self" of *Laws* 959B. That this Soul has never become anyone is clear from *Meno* 81B, where the hieratic doctrine is cited, that "the Soul of Man is immortal, and at one time reaches an end, which is called 'dying,' and is 'born again,' but is never slain." This is almost identical with BU iv.4.5,6, BG ii.13 and 17-26, Plato's ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε corresponding to *na hanyate hayamāne śarīre* and ὁ δὴ ἀποθνήσκειν καλοῦσι to *nityam vā mṛtam*. In the same way *Phaedo* 83BC, "the Self of (all) beings" (αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων) and "Soul of every man" (ψυχὴ παντός ἀνθρώπου, Fowler's version, preferable to Jowett's "every soul of man"), corresponds to the "Self of all beings" (*sarveṣam bhūtānām ātmā*, BU i.4.16) of the Upaniṣads. Cf. *Phaedrus* 246B, πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντός, and 249E; and Hermes, *Lib.* x.7, ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. Particular attention may also be called to *Phaedo* 77A, where we are told, not that "our souls existed before we were born," but that "the soul of us (ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ) existed before we were born." There is a parallel in the Buddhist *Vinaya*, i.23 (i.e., Mv i.14, cf. Vis 393), where the Buddha asks a group of young men who are searching for a missing woman, "Which were the better for you, to go seeking the woman, or to go seeking the Self"; he does not say "your selves." In both cases the reference is to the unique principle of many individuals. [Cf. Boehme, *Signatura rerum* ix.65.]

⁴⁰ "Philosophy . . . admonishing the soul to collect and assemble herself in her Self, and to throw in nothing but her Self, that she may know her Self itself, the Self of (all) beings" (*Phaedo* 83B). Cf. Coomaraswamy, "The 'E' at Delphi" [in this volume—ED.], and *Hinduism and Buddhism*, 1943, pp. 15-18, 58.

⁴¹ The doctrine of Recollection recurs in the Koran (vi.80), and permeates Rūmī's *Mathnawī* (see Anamnesis in Nicholson's subject index). *Mathnawī* iv.3632-3635 runs, "What wonder, then, if the spirit does not remember its ancient abodes, which have been its dwelling place and birthplace aforetime, since this world, like sleep,

and other things. And since all Nature is congeneric, there is no reason why we should not, by remembering but one single thing⁴²—which is what we call ‘learning’—discover all the others, if we are brave and faint not in the enquiry; for it seems that to enquire and to learn are wholly a matter of remembering.”⁴³ The same doctrine is discussed in *Phaedo*

is covering it over as clouds cover the stars? Especially as it has trodden so many cities, and the dust has not yet been swept from its perceptive faculty, nor has it made ardent efforts that its heart should become pure and behold the past; that its heart should put forth its head from the aperture of the mystery and should see the beginning and the end with open eye.” The wording is suggestive of Indian rather than Platonic derivation. The connected doctrine that God is the real agent and man only his instrument, as expressed, for example, in the *Manṭiqu’l-Tair*,

All you have been, and seen, and done, and thought,
Not *you*, but *I*, have seen and been and wrought

is equally Indian (JUB I.5.2, MU III.2, BG III.27, etc.) and Neo-Platonic (Philo, *De opificio mundi* 78, etc.).

⁴² Cf. *Timaeus* 50AB, and CU VI.1.4, “That teaching (*ādeśam*) whereby what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been known becomes known of. . . . Just as by one piece of clay everything made of clay may be known of, the modification being only a matter of naming, and the reality (*satyam*) just clay.” Cf. BU IV.5.6. [Socrates claims to know everything always by means of his soul, *Euthydemus* 295 ff.]

⁴³ “Virtue” (*ἀρετή*) is the subject under discussion. The Dialogue does not decide what “virtue” is; it is neither natural nor taught, nor is it prudence (*φρόνησις*), but a thing “that comes to us by a divine dispensation (*Meno* 98E, 99E ff.). It is a thing to be remembered, which remembrance is properly called “learning” (*μάθησις*, cf. *μαθητής*, disciple, *śrāvaka*): whence it follows that ignorance, or rather “want of learning” (*ἀμαθία*, cf. Pāli *assutavā putthujanā* = profane οἱ πολλοί), the ignorance that is so disgraceful (*Apology* 29B, *Phaedrus* 277E), is really “forgetfulness”; cf. Skr. *asruta*, “untaught,” and *asruti*, “oblivion.” For Hermes, “the soul’s vice is ignorance (*ἀγνοσία*) and her virtue (*ἀρετή*) gnosis” (*Lib.* x.8.9, cf. 13.7B); and that, I think, is just what Socrates means to imply, namely, that virtue is a function of self-knowledge (Skr. *ātmaññāna*), and can be theirs only who “know themselves.”

The traditional “ignorance” has nothing, of course, to do with what we call “illiteracy.” The exaggerated value that we attach to “literature” as such would have been, indeed, for Plato, in itself an evidence of “ignorance” (*Phaedrus* 275, 278); [cf. *Laws* 689, “only those should govern who are masters of themselves, not those who are merely literate or otherwise expert”]. Ignorance is “subjection to pleasure,” or what amounts to the same thing, “subjection to oneself” (*τὸ ἡττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ*, *Protagoras* 357E, 358C; cf. *Republic* 430E ff.); ignorance is of what is just and what unjust (*Phaedrus* 277E); nothing is worse than to think one knows what one does not know (*Apology* 29B). It is the Self that should be known (*Γνώθι σεαυτόν*): for when the Self is seen, is heard, thought of and known, this All is known (BU IV.5.6). Whereas to put our trust in the written characters, which are not a part of our Self, is a hindrance to that recollection that is in and of the Self (*Phaedrus* 275A).

72E ff., and 75E, where “we must necessarily have learned in some prior time what we now remember. But this is impossible if the Soul in us had not existed anywhere before being born in this human nature; and so by this consideration it appears again that the Soul is immortal”; as in *Meno* 86AB, “if in us the truth of all things be the Soul, then Soul must be ‘immortal’ for it knows things of which we could not have acquired knowledge in this life and ‘must have had this learning through all time’ (ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον)”⁴⁴ [cf. πρὸς τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον, *Timaeus* 36E]. Following *Meno* 81, Socrates goes on to give a practical demonstration by educating from rather than communicating to a pupil, knowledge which he did not appear to possess; and this seems to show that all true education is rather a destruction of ignorance⁴⁵ than the gift of a knowledge, a view that is in close agreement with what is called in India the “self-manifestation” nature (*sva-prakāśatva*) of the intellectual principle.

Plato’s Immortal Soul, “the most lordly and divine part of us” (*Timaeus* 90AB), can be only the immanent Daimon, “that vulgar fellow, who cares for nothing but the truth” (*Hippias major* 286b). It is Philo’s “Soul of the soul”; the Sanctus Spiritus as distinguished from the (mortal) “soul” (Heb. 4:12) and “source of all that is true, by whomsoever it has been said” (St. Ambrose on 1 Cor. 12:3, cited by St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I-II.109.1); the Scholastic Speculum Aeternum⁴⁶ and Synteresis,⁴⁷ Dante’s Amor (*Purgatorio* xxix.52–54), and our own “conscience” (E.E. “inwyt”) in the original and fullest sense of the word; and the Immortal Self, the source of Memory, of the Vedānta.

We meet the doctrine of recollection also in Hebrew contexts. In the Talmud (*Nidda* 30B) and Zohar (*Wayyiqra, Aharei Mot*), we are told that all human souls have a full knowledge of the Torah, etc. (see n. 32),

⁴⁴ Here again “soul” in the singular, “we” plural. But elsewhere we find (immortal) “souls” in the plural (*Phaedo* 76). Both uses are consistent with the view that all souls are facets of one Soul, which I think was Plato’s belief, as it was certainly that of Plotinus and Hermes.

⁴⁵ Not that ignorance is “real” (in which case it could not be “destroyed”), but as darkness (privation of light) it is removed by illumination. Pāli texts often employ this illustration: when the Buddha has cleared up some problem by his argument, “it is just as if a lamp were brought into a dark room.”

⁴⁶ “Wherein those who gaze behold all things, and better than elsewhere” (St. Bonaventura, *I Sent.* d.35, a unic., q. 1, fund. 3, “sicut dicit Augustinus”); “as a clear mirror sees all things in one image” (Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 253).

⁴⁷ Cf. O. Renz, “Die Synteresis nach dem Hl. Thomas von Aquin,” in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, X (Münster, 1911).

and retain all their knowledge until they come down to earth and are born. Manasseh ben Israel (seventeenth century) saw here the equivalent of Plato's doctrine of Recollection, for it must follow that whatever is learnt after birth can only amount to a recovery of this knowledge; and so Elimelech of Lizensk (eighteenth century) says, "By relearning the Torah later on for its own sake he (the child) succeeds in grasping the truth as it was originally implanted in him."⁴⁸ The implied eternity of "the Torah that created all the worlds and is the means by which these are sustained" (*Zohar, Beha 'Alotheqa*) is like that of the Veda, of the origin of which nothing more can be said than that "the Lord" (Īśvara = Kyrios, Demiourgos), at the beginning of each world-aeon, "remembers" (*smṛtvā*) it and promulgates it, and there is no ground for supposing that it was composed by any other standard (Āpadeva).⁴⁹ Again, the doctrine of Recollection is explicit in Meister Eckhart, who says: "If I knew my Self as intimately as I ought, I should have perfect knowledge of all creatures," for "the soul is capable of knowing all things in her highest power," viz. "as a clear mirror sees all things in one image," and so "not until she

⁴⁸ For a fuller discussion of this material see J. Finkel, "A Psychoanalytic Prefiguration in Hasidic Literature," *Eidenu*, New York, 1942. Finkel justly observes that Elimelech's "Unconscious" is not psychological but transcendental. Cf. n. 33. [Eleazar of Worms (d. 1223-1232) held that a guardian angel causes forgetfulness at birth because if it is remembered, the contradiction of the course of the world with its knowledge would drive it to madness (G. G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, Jerusalem, 1941 [New York, 1954], p. 92).]

⁴⁹ *Mīmāṃsā Nyāya Prakāśa* 6; late, but a restatement of the oldest *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* doctrine; [cf. *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* 1.1.5 and BrSBh 1.3.28]. The similar doctrine that the Koran is "uncreated" is fundamental to Islam.

Not to have studied (*adhī*) or understood (*viññā*) the Veda ("wit," as in Wycliffe's version of Rom. 11:34) is utter ignorance (ŚA xiv). Since the dictionary meanings of *adhī* (lit. "go to") are to "study" or "remember," and of *smṛ*, to "remember" or "teach," all this amounts to saying that to learn is to remember. Closely related to this are the well-known Indian pedagogic principles of oral instruction and learning by heart, which are, again, in agreement with Plato (*Phaedrus* 275A, 278A). To have to "look up" a text implies that although we have been once reminded, we have again forgotten, and are no less ignorant than before. We only really *know* what we can always quote. Hence the preference for oral instruction, which *must* be remembered, if we are to possess it. Under these conditions, as also in many "primitive" civilizations, culture is independent of literacy, which last Plato called "a device for forgetting." Cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Bugbear of Literacy," 1944.

The further argument of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, that words participate in eternity because they have a meaning, is entirely comprehensible from the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic doctrine that knowledge can be only of the immutable, and not of any things in flux, singulars, or accidentals, which never retain their identity from one moment to another. In other words, perception and knowledge, facts and realities, are very different things.

knows all that there is to be known does she (the soul) cross over to the Unknown Good."⁵⁰ The doctrine survives in Blake's "Is the Holy Ghost any other than an intellectual fountain?"

We need not attempt to follow up the history of the doctrine in any greater detail. Our main object has been to call attention both to the importance and to the universality of the doctrine of Recollection, and to bring out that it is only one of the many consistent features of a philosophy that is essentially the same in Plato and in the Vedānta.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Evans ed., I, 324, 253, 359, 385.

⁵¹ The virtual identity of Indian and Socratic-Platonic philosophy is of far greater significance than the problem as more often discussed in connection with Plotinus. There we are dealing, not with "influences," but—just as in the case of the roots and idioms of the languages, Greek and Sanskrit themselves—with cognate doctrines and myths, many of which are as much Sumerian as they are Greek or Indian. The *Philosophia Perennis* antedates the whole historical period within which "influences" can be predicated.

For example, it is not by a borrowing but only by a long inheritance that we can explain the occurrence of the "cutting reed" and "clashing rock" forms of the "active door" (*Janua Coeli*) in Greece on the one hand and in Navajo and Eskimo, Mexican and South American, and Chinese and Indian mythology, on the other. Cf. R. Guénon, *Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines*, tr. Marco Pallis (London, 1945), p. 50. All mythology involves a corresponding philosophy; and if there is only one mythology, as there is only one "Perennial Philosophy," then that "the myth is not my own, I had it from my mother" (Euripides) points to a spiritual unity of the human race already predetermined long before the discovery of metals. It may be really true that, as Alfred Jeremias said, the various cultures of mankind are no more than the *dialects* of one and the same spiritual language. For this point of view, as now entertained by a large school of anthropologists, for whom the concept of one "High God" antedates even the development of animism, cf. Father Wilhelm Schmidt, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* (Münster, 1912-1939); *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, tr. H. J. Rose (New York, 1931); and *High Gods in North America* (Oxford, 1933). [Fundamentally, it is held in common that *philosophy* is both a way of life and a means of escape from the wheel, whereby the soul returns to its own.]