

# AL-BĪRŪNĪ'S ARABIC VERSION OF PATAÑJALI'S *YOGASŪTRA* :

## A TRANSLATION OF HIS FIRST CHAPTER AND A COMPARISON WITH RELATED SANSKRIT TEXTS

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The first text of al-Bīrūnī (A.D. 973–c. 1050) published in Europe which contains a reference to his translation of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* is his *Risāla fī fihrist kutub Muḥammad ibn Zakarīya' al-Rāzī*, the relevant part of which was published by E. Sachau, Leipzig, 1876–8.<sup>1</sup> In his list of his own works, which is included in this *Risāla*, al-Bīrūnī states that this list comprises the works he has written up to the end of 427/1037.<sup>2</sup> Several years later Sachau published al-Bīrūnī's *India* (London, 1887), in which al-Bīrūnī not only refers to his having translated this work of Patañjali,<sup>3</sup> but also quotes from it copiously.<sup>4</sup>

The relationship of the latter work to the well-known classical sources of the Yoga philosophy has since been debatable. Sachau himself was led astray by the partial evidence constituted by the excerpts in the *India* to the extent of stating : ' Al-Bīrūnī's Patañjali is totally different from " The Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali " . . . and as far as I may judge, the philosophic system of the former differs in many points essentially from that of the Sūtras '.<sup>5</sup> This view was regarded as certainly true and further elaborated by S. N. Dasgupta, who as late as 1930 postulated a distinct Patañjali as author of the text translated by al-Bīrūnī.<sup>6</sup> Presumably Dasgupta did not have access to the MS of al-Bīrūnī's translation, which had been discovered by Massignon in 1922.<sup>7</sup> Sachau's

<sup>1</sup> In his introduction to his edition of al-Bīrūnī's *القرون الخالية* (Chronologie orientalischer Völker von Albērūnī, reprinted, Leipzig, 1923). The text in question is referred to on p. xxxv as *ترجمة كتاب باتنجل في الخلاص من الارتباك* ' the translation of Patañjali's book on the liberation from the entanglement ' (see below, p. 308, n. 51). The whole text of this *Risāla* was published by P. Kraus, *Épître de Bērūnī contenant le répertoire des ouvrages de Muḥammad b. Zakarīyā ar-Rāzī*, Paris, 1936. The relevant portion of the *Risāla* was translated by E. Wiedermann, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften*, LX (Sitzungsberichte der Physikalisch-Medicinischen Sozietät in Erlangen, LII–LIII), 1920–1, 66 seq. Al-Bīrūnī's translation of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* is mentioned once again in an appendix to this *Risāla*, the author of which is Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ghaḍanfar al-Tibrizī. According to Sachau (op. cit., p. xv) al-Ghaḍanfar states *inter alia* that he attempted to read a portion of Patañjali's book translated by al-Bīrūnī but could not understand it.

<sup>2</sup> P. Kraus, op. cit., 29 ; cf. Sachau, op. cit., p. xiii.

<sup>3</sup> cf. *Kitāb fī taḥqīq mā li' l-Hind or al-Bīrūnī's India* (Arabic text), Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as *India*, Hyd.), 6.

<sup>4</sup> cf. E. C. Sachau (tr.), *Alberuni's India*, London, 1910, reprinted, Delhi, 1964 (henceforth abbreviated as Sachau), index I s.v. Patañjali.

<sup>5</sup> Sachau, I, 264 (annotations).

<sup>6</sup> S. N. Dasgupta, *Yoga philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought*, Calcutta, 1930, 64.

<sup>7</sup> Köprülü 1589, fols. 412a–419a. See L. Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*, Paris, 1922, 79 ; second ed., Paris, 1954, 97.

opinion was, however, contested by R. Garbe, who traced the excerpts in question to the known Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*.<sup>8</sup> He further claimed that the commentary on the *Yogasūtra* contained in the excerpts could also be determined. This he identified at one time as the *Yogabhāṣya* of Veda-vyāsa (fl. between A.D. 650 and 850),<sup>9</sup> and later—as the *Rājamārtāṇḍa* of Bhoja Rāja (c. A.D. 1018–60).<sup>10</sup>

In 1956 H. Ritter prepared and published from the above-mentioned unique MS, which is very poor, a critical edition of the text of al-Bīrūnī's translation.<sup>11</sup> The present undertaking is an attempted translation of al-Bīrūnī's Arabic version, based on a critical re-examination of Ritter's edition and a comparison with Sanskrit sources.

From the translation given below it will become abundantly clear that most of the *Yogasūtras* themselves are traceable in the Arabic text, occurring generally in their original sequence. They have, however, been woven together with a commentary on the *Yogasūtra*, assuming the form of a dialogue of questions and answers. *A priori* this form may possibly represent the structure of the original Sanskrit commentary or alternatively be an adaptation based on an Arabic usage. The evidence from al-Bīrūnī's own testimony is self-contradictory. On the one hand, in his introduction to his translation he appears to indicate that the incorporation of the commentary with the sūtras as well as the form of a dialogue are of his own making.<sup>12</sup> But, on the other hand, in his conclusion he speaks of the book originally 'consisting of one thousand and a hundred questions in the form of verse'.<sup>13</sup> It may be suggested that having found in the original commentary occasional questions and hypothetical objections introducing the sūtras, al-Bīrūnī further systematized this form into a series of questions and answers, lending a dramatic effect and a higher degree of readability to his translation.

The commentary used by al-Bīrūnī cannot be identified with any of the printed commentaries, despite a large number of similarities in the interpretation of the text. Thus al-Bīrūnī's translation of certain passages has an unmistakable resemblance to Veda-vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* or to Vācaspati-miśra's subcommentary (of about A.D. 850), called *Tattvavaiśārādī*, on these passages. But these similarities can be explained as normal repetition due to borrowing from a common tradition.

Garbe was certainly wrong when he identified the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī as that of Veda-vyāsa, and even more so when in his later view he concluded that it was identical with Bhoja Rāja's. He argued that the latter and the relevant quotations in al-Bīrūnī's *India* used identical parables and

<sup>8</sup> R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, Strassburg, 1896, 41.

<sup>9</sup> R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894, 63.

<sup>10</sup> R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, 41.

<sup>11</sup> H. Ritter, 'Al-Bīrūnī's Übersetzung des Yoga-Sūtra des Patañjali', *Oriens*, ix, 2, 1956, 165–200 (henceforth abbreviated as R).

<sup>12</sup> R., 168 (l. 2).

<sup>13</sup> R., 199 (ll. 1–2).

examples.<sup>14</sup> In fact the pertinent cases cited by him are also found in Veda-vyāsa's and other commentaries and appear to have been drawn from a common tradition. Equally erroneous is the statement made by J. Filliozat as late as 1953. Speaking of Bhoja Rāja's commentary he says: 'C'est peut-être en partie dans ce texte, alors tout récent, qu'al-Bīrūnī s'est initié au Yoga de Patañjali sur lequel il a d'ailleurs écrit un ouvrage en arabe'.<sup>15</sup> In fact al-Bīrūnī's text has more in common with Veda-vyāsa's commentary than with that of Bhoja Rāja. It is quite possible that the source of the commentary in question is traceable to one of the numerous manuscripts of unknown commentaries housed in Indian libraries. A comparison of peculiar figures of speech (rather than topics discussed) and perhaps especially of the opening benediction (*maṅgala*), would be a useful clue for the detection of the source. But the possibility also exists that the source in question has been lost.

In two places in his translation al-Bīrūnī distinctly and explicitly quotes from what he refers to as 'the commentator' (المفسر).<sup>16</sup> In one of them Ritter suggests for the indistinct text لا رناص the reading لوياص, namely 'by Vyāsa', the author of the *Yogabhāṣya*.<sup>17</sup> This suggestion, however, may be objected to on the following grounds.

(1) In his *India* al-Bīrūnī invariably transcribes the name Vyāsa—although not occurring there as the name of the commentator in question—by using the Arabic letter ص and not س.<sup>18</sup>

(2) A comparison of the two explicit quotations by al-Bīrūnī with Veda-vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* yields the following observations.

(a) In the case of the one quotation, where medical doctrines are referred to,<sup>19</sup> only a small portion is paralleled in Veda-vyāsa.

(b) In the case of the other quotation, though similar Purāṇic geographical and cosmological material is handled both in the Arabic version<sup>20</sup> and in Veda-vyāsa,<sup>21</sup> still the description in the former substantially differs from that in the latter. Furthermore, these differences may serve as an argument for inferring that the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī had probably been written at a time when the *bhāṣya* of Veda-vyāsa had not yet attained any great sanctity or authority.<sup>22</sup> The Arabic version is not much younger than the oldest known commentaries, and may represent a hitherto unknown line of interpretation.

Similarly, the fact that a number of sūtras—usually not essential ones—do not appear in the Arabic version suggests the possibility that the commentary

<sup>14</sup> See p. 303, n. 8, above.

<sup>15</sup> J. Filliozat in L. Renou and J. Filliozat, *L'Inde classique*, II, Paris, 1953, 46.

<sup>16</sup> R, 185 (l. 16), 188 (l. 3); cf. *India*, Hyd., 191, 192, 194, 196, 205 (Sachau, I, 232, 234, 236, 238, 248).

<sup>17</sup> R, 185 (l. 16).

<sup>18</sup> Thus at least 18 times (e.g. *India*, Hyd., 102, 104).

<sup>19</sup> R, 188 (l. 2 et seq.).

<sup>20</sup> R, 185 (l. 16 et seq.).

<sup>21</sup> Veda-vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* (henceforth abbreviated as V) on sūtra 3.26.

<sup>22</sup> cf. S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit., 63–4.

used by al-Bīrūnī had dealt with a very early version of the *Yogasūtra*, before interpolations were added. This possibility is further supported by considering al-Bīrūnī's misunderstanding of the word *nidrā* 'sleep', in sūtra 1.10,<sup>23</sup> as referring to dream (رُؤْيَا). He would hardly have done this had his source included sūtra 1.38, which clearly speaks of *nidrā* 'sleep' and *svapna* 'dream' as distinct states.

It may be argued that the commentary in question could be related to the theistic developments evident in late commentators prior or posterior to al-Bīrūnī, such as Vācaspati-miśra (ninth century A.D.), Vijñānabhikṣu (sixteenth century A.D.), and Nilakaṇṭha, who lived—as M. Eliade points out—when all India was full of mystical and devotional currents, and whose versions of the Yoga were shaped under the impact of Vedāntic ideas and *bhakti* (mystical devotion).<sup>24</sup> For indeed, whereas the sūtras speak of the goal as *kaivalya* and define it as 'the energy of thought being grounded in itself',<sup>25</sup> the Arabic version speaks of liberation and also of union with God (الخلاص والاتحاد).<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the concept of God in the latter is a far cry from that of the sūtras themselves, which conceive of Him as a passive archetype of the Yogin, the object of a purely 'intellectual' devotion.<sup>27</sup> But against such argumentation one should not ignore the fact that al-Bīrūnī was a Muslim, so that in this major characteristic of his translation as well as in its minor characteristics, which likewise exhibit a good deal of 'islamization', his own interpretation, conditioned by his own cultural orientation, might have been at work.

It is quite certain that the commentary in question was not an oral one, for in his introduction to his translation of the text, al-Bīrūnī himself refers to it as belonging to a group of texts which were read to him 'letter by letter'.<sup>28</sup> That al-Bīrūnī was assisted by teachers is also evident from his own testimony in his *India*.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless there is much in our text to suggest that al-Bīrūnī relied to a considerable extent on his own intelligence and autodidactic capacity in studying the sūtras and their commentary. The evidence for this, which is cumulative, may be exemplified by the following points.

(1) Al-Bīrūnī's incorrect rendering of the term *nidrā* in sūtra 1.10, mentioned above, can be accounted for only as due to his independent effort to understand the same sūtra. The latter consists of a definition of the term *nidrā*: *abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā* 'Sleep is that mode of functioning of the mind which has as its object the conception of nothing'. However, a literal and uninitiated reading of the Sanskrit here could easily yield what al-Bīrūnī understood, namely: that mode of functioning of the mind which has as its

<sup>23</sup> Sūtras refer to the edition of Dhundirāj, Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 85, 1931.

<sup>24</sup> cf. M. Eliade, *Yoga: immortality and freedom*, London, 1958, 75.

<sup>25</sup> Sūtra 4.34: . . . *kaivalyaṃ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti*.

<sup>26</sup> R, 199 (l. 1); cf. R, 197 (l. 20). Cf. *India*, Hyd., 61 (ll. 7–8), 66 (l. 17), 102 (ll. 3–4).

<sup>27</sup> cf. M. Eliade, op. cit., 75.

<sup>28</sup> R, 167 (l. 10).

<sup>29</sup> *India*, Hyd., 18 (= Sachau, I, 24).



object *a content which is absent* (from the corresponding reality). That he naturally took to refer to the state of dream.<sup>30</sup>

(2) Another brain-wave of al-Bīrūnī himself may account for what he made of sūtras 2.33–4. Here the expression *vitarka-bādhane* is translated by Ballantyne: ‘in excluding things questionable’, and by Woods: ‘if there be inhibition by perverse considerations’. Al-Bīrūnī apparently renders it by *وإذا كانت الأشياء معلومة باضدادها وخلافاتها* ‘if things are known in their opposites and differences’.<sup>31</sup> The expression *pratipakṣa-bhāvanam* traditionally means ‘cultivation of the opposite’, the force of the context being that whenever perverse tendencies, such as anger and violence, should arise in the mind of the Yogin, he ought to cultivate their opposites, such as universal compassion, as an antidote. Presumably unaided by an oral tradition al-Bīrūnī here legitimately takes the expression to mean simply ‘vice versa’, i.e. ‘there is an effecting of the opposite’; and in view of the context he understands: ‘He who gives up violence will be recompensed by their opposites, namely the opposites of the earlier mentioned ignorance and causing of pain’ (الجهل والإيلام، وإذا كان الأمر كذلك فتارك القتل يُجَازَى بضدهما).<sup>32</sup>

(3) The succinct sūtra 2.22 reads: *kr̥tārtham prati naṣṭam apy anāṣṭam tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt* ‘Though it (the object of sight) has ceased (to be seen) in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others (besides him)’. Al-Bīrūnī appears to have taken the word *sādhāraṇa* in the sense of a generic property, a universal, and hence an *intellectum*. And he takes *kr̥tārtha* to be its opposite—a sense-perceived object. He is consequently led to translate the sūtra: *وليس للمعلومات الحسية حقيقة ثابتة* ‘The sense-percepts do not possess permanent reality in the way the *intellecta* do’.<sup>33</sup> A Platonic-Aristotelian background is evident in this translation.

(4) In sūtra 2.6 al-Bīrūnī, presumably unaided by a teacher, takes a definition to be a mere illustration and consequently fails to understand the sūtra. Here the concept of *asmitā* ‘the feeling of individuality or personality’ is defined as *dr̥g-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatā* ‘the state in which the seeing agent and the sight function are identified as one self’. Al-Bīrūnī takes this to be just a case illustrating the *vr̥tti* (mode of functioning of the mind) called *vikalpa* ‘false conception (based on language symbols)’,<sup>34</sup> which he uniformly translates by *الظن* ‘unproven opinion’.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>30</sup> R, 171 (l. 11).

<sup>31</sup> R, 182 (l. 14). Perhaps al-Bīrūnī read here *bodhane* for *bādhane*.

<sup>32</sup> R, 182 (ll. 15–16).

<sup>33</sup> R, 181 (l. 20).

<sup>34</sup> ‘Vikalpa is the existence of abstract imagination on the basis of language symbols, as when we say “the intelligence of the puruṣa” though we know that the puruṣa has no other essence than pure intelligence. Without such characteristic mode of chitta transformation abstract thinking would be impossible’ (S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit., 276).

<sup>35</sup> R, 178 (l. 13).

(5) In illustrating how the latent deposits of *karma* effect a change in condition, the commentaries on sūtra 2.12 include a reference to the celebrated story from the *Mahābhārata* of Nahuṣa, who, having replaced Indra as the chief of the gods, was later transformed into a snake by the Ṛṣi Agastya.<sup>36</sup> Al-Bīrūnī also has the story, but he has reversed the role of the characters: ومثل إندر رئيس الملائكة فانه لمّا زنى بامرأة نهش البرهمن لُعِنَ ومُسِخَ حية بعد ان كان ملاكا . . . and like Indra, chief of the gods (lit. : 'angels'),<sup>37</sup> for having committed adultery with the wife of the brahmin Nahuṣa, he was cursed and turned into a snake after he had been a god'.<sup>38</sup> This mistake may be accounted for by al-Bīrūnī's misunderstanding a Sanskrit text (especially if it used the word *indra* both as a private name and as a name of an institution or title, such as in the expression *devānām indra*);<sup>39</sup> but it could hardly be accounted for by postulating an Indian teacher who did not know this famous story.

The Arabic translation betrays a constant effort to bring the work as near as possible to the mentality of the Muslim readers. This is evident both in the selection of the terminology and the transposition of Indian philosophical notions and problems into similar ones grounded in Aristotelian and other streams of Muslim thought. Random examples are as follows.

(1) The term *karma-vipāka*, which had to be coped with in sūtra 1.24, is rendered by . . . فعل المكافأة عليه براحة تؤمل وترنجى او شدة تخاف وتتنى . . . ' . . . action for which either a blissful repose, which is hoped and longed for, or a troubled existence, which is feared and dreaded, might be given as recompense . . .'.<sup>40</sup>

(2) In dealing with sūtra 1.41 the Indian epistemological triad of *ghraṭr*, *grahana*, and *grāhya* is transposed respectively into the عقْل, عاقل, and معقول of the Aristotelians.<sup>41</sup>

(3) The Indian philosophical problem, implicit in sūtra 2.15, of what constitutes the real self (*ātman*) is analogous to a question discussed in Arabic philosophy as to whether it is the body (بدن) or the soul (نفس) that constitutes the essence of man (إنسان). The form which this problem assumes in Arabic philosophy is reflected in the selection of terms in al-Bīrūnī's translation here.<sup>42</sup>

Evidently, from the point of view of al-Bīrūnī and his readers, the Arabic work provides an operative or functional, though not literal, translation of the *Yogasūtra* with its commentary. This is often done by means of paraphrasing.

<sup>36</sup> *Mahābhārata*, v.17 ff., XII.342 ff., and with some variations XIII.99 ff. (Referred to, summarized, and discussed by Jacoby in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics*, s.v. 'Agastya').

<sup>37</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 72: طبقة ديو التي عيّنا عنها بالملائكة: . . . the class of *deva* whom we have explained as angels' (Sachau, I, 95); cf. R, 168 (l. 7). In translating the term for gods by ملائكة 'angels', al-Bīrūnī follows a long-established usage of translators of Greek texts into Arabic.

<sup>38</sup> R, 179 (ll. 15-16).

<sup>39</sup> cf. V on sūtra 21.2.

<sup>40</sup> R, 173 (ll. 13-14).

<sup>41</sup> R, 176 (ll. 11-12).

<sup>42</sup> R, 178 (ll. 11-12).

An example is the rendering of the term *maitrī* 'compassion' in sūtra 1.34 by :  
 أن يريد الخير لكافة الخلق من غير استثناء ويتمناه لهم ويستبشر بحصوله عندهم  
 '... that he should wish and desire well-being for all creatures without excep-  
 tion and rejoice in their attaining it'.<sup>43</sup>

But al-Bīrūnī is also well equipped with a terminological apparatus, some of which is drawn from the tradition of Arabic translations from the Greek masters. That Aristotelian connotations, however, may constitute a pitfall can be seen from the following. In his treatment of sūtra 2.6, *dr̥g-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatavāsmitā*, al-Bīrūnī renders *dr̥g* by عاقل and *darśana* by عَقْل, but he is then caught in a dilemma: while the union of these two is denounced by the sense of the sūtra here, it is commendable according to Aristotelian philosophy. He therefore slightly changes the two terms by qualifying them as follows: العاقل المتجسم والعقل البسيط 'the corporeal knower and the simple (i.e. immaterial) act of knowledge'.<sup>44</sup>

Al-Bīrūnī himself also coined new Arabic technical terms, this being another important aspect of his contribution in his work of translation. The following are examples: for *kleśa* 'affliction'—ثقل 'weight'<sup>45</sup>; for *buddhi* 'intelligence or the thinking organ'—قلب 'heart'.<sup>46</sup> His terminological apparatus, however, is not completely uniform. Thus, for instance, the same term عَمَل is used to render at least three distinct concepts: (i) *kriyā* in the sense of *rajas*<sup>47</sup>; (ii) *karma*<sup>48</sup>; and (iii) *sādhana*, the name of the second chapter of the *Yogasūtra*.<sup>49</sup>

A better understanding and appreciation of al-Bīrūnī's method of translation, as well as light on other aspects of his work, may still be expected from further clarification of the remaining textual ambiguities. Furthermore, the possibility exists that the commentary will be identified.

(R, 167) The book of the Indian Patañjali<sup>50</sup> on liberation from afflictions,<sup>51</sup> translated into Arabic by Abū al-Raiḥān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī.

<sup>43</sup> R, 176 (ll. 3–4); cf. R, 185 (l. 11).

<sup>44</sup> R, 178 (l. 14); cf. R, 197 (l. 5 et seq.).

<sup>45</sup> R, 177 (l. 20); cf. R, 167 (l. 2).

<sup>46</sup> R, 192 (l. 20).

<sup>47</sup> R, 181 (l. 7).

<sup>48</sup> R, 185 (l. 7).

<sup>49</sup> R, 183 (l. 18).

<sup>50</sup> The Arabic transliteration is باتنجل, which may also stand for the adjectival form *patañjala*; cf. *India*, Hyd., 6, 102 (= Sachau, I, 8, 132). However, in all probability al-Bīrūnī lengthened the first vowel in order to ensure an approximately correct pronunciation of the foreign name. Both in his present translation and in his *India*, he sometimes uses this method of transliterating a short Sanskrit *a* by an Arabic *alif* indicative of a long *ā*, e.g. براهم—*brahman* (R, 175 (l. 3)) (but برهماند—*brahmāṇḍa*, R, 187 (l. 2); لوك براهم—*brahma-loka*, *India*, Hyd., 191 (l. 1)). Cf. Sachau, I, 257 (annotations).

<sup>51</sup> The printed text has امثال. The emendation اثقال (lit. 'weights, burdens') is based on R, 177 (l. 20), where this word corresponds to *kleśa* in sūtra 2.2. For other descriptions by al-Bīrūnī of Patañjali's treatise cf. p. 302, n. 1 (cf. R, 179 (l. 17), 180 (l. 9), 181 (l. 14), 189 (l. 4); *India*, Hyd., 61 (l. 12) for the expression (إرتباك النفس من, *India*, Hyd., 6, كتاب) في تخليص النفس من,

The aspirations of men in this world vary, and the civilization of the universe is established in an orderly way through this variety. My resolution, nay my soul as a whole, is solely directed to teaching, since I have done with the pleasure of learning. This (i.e. teaching) I regard as the greatest happiness. Whoever has a correct knowledge of the situation will not blame me for my persistent efforts and for the burden of endeavour which I bear in translating, for the benefit of (my) equals and adversaries, from the language of India. Whoever does not know the situation <sup>52</sup> will set me down as ignorant and attribute my toil to my wretched state. For every man has things upon which his intention and thought are fixed and he is opposed to that of which he lacks knowledge—until he reaches a rank in which his excusing himself may be permitted and no obligation that does not please him is imposed on him.

I went on translating from the Indian (language) books of arithmeticians and astronomers <sup>53</sup> till I turned to <sup>54</sup> books on wisdom <sup>55</sup> preserved by their élite, and with respect to which the ascetics compete with a view to progressing upon the way <sup>56</sup> to worship. When they were read to me letter by letter, and when I grasped their content, my mind could not forgo letting those who wish to study them share (in my knowledge). For niggardliness with regard to sciences is one of the worst crimes and sins. What is (written) black on white cannot but (constitute) a new learning whose knowledge should lead to the attainment of some good and to the avoidance of harm.

An introduction giving particulars <sup>57</sup> about the state of these people and the state of the book.

These are people whose talk within their community is never free from (reference to) topics concerning transmigration and (to) the misfortunes of reincarnation <sup>58</sup> and (to) unification <sup>59</sup> and (to) generation not according to the mode <sup>60</sup> of (ordinary) birth. For this reason their talk, when it is heard, has a flavour composed of the beliefs of the ancient Greeks, of the Christian sects, <sup>61</sup>

رباط البدن ' (a book) on the liberation of the soul from the fetters of the body ' (cf. Sachau, I, 8); *India*, Hyd., 102, باتنجل في طلب الخلاص واتحاد النفس بمعقوها ' (the book of) Patañjali on seeking liberation and union of the soul with its *intellectum* (i.e. object of meditation) '. There is a possibility that the original title was في الخلاص من الارتباك 'liberation from entanglement', in which the last word was corrupted into امثال.

<sup>52</sup> More literally 'Whoever is in a different position'.

<sup>53</sup> Or 'astrologers'. The text has منجمون.

<sup>54</sup> Or 'came upon'.

<sup>55</sup> Or 'philosophy'.

<sup>56</sup> may also have the meaning 'to seek'.

<sup>57</sup> Lit. 'from which one is informed'.

<sup>58</sup> For حلول cf. below R, 193 (l. 16); R, 175 (l. 18) (Ans. to Q 20). In the language of the theologians and the Šūfis this word may refer to the indwelling of God or of a spirit in a body.

<sup>59</sup> cf. R, 199 (l. 1); cf. also *India*, Hyd., 102 (quoted in p. 308, n. 51), الخلاص واتحاد النفس 'seeking liberation and addressing himself single-mindedly to (the achievement of) absolute unity' (cf. Sachau, I, 73).

<sup>60</sup> Lit. 'law'.

<sup>61</sup> The printed text has فوق. The translation follows an alternative reading فرق mentioned by Ritter in his critical apparatus.

and of the Ṣūfī leaders. Not one of them (i.e. of the Hindu community) is free from the belief that souls are bound in the world and entangled in its ties, and that only those which achieve the supreme goal in their endeavour are liberated from these (ties and obtain a state of) enduring permanence. Those (souls) which do not attain this (goal) remain in the world, tossed about between good and evil in the existent (things) until they are cleansed, purified, and liberated.

Their books are composed according to metres, and the texts are provided with commentaries in such a way that a complete and accurate <sup>62</sup> translation is difficult, because the commentators are concerned with grammar and etymology and other (matters) which are of use only to a (person) who is versed in their literary languages (R, 168) as distinct from the vernacular. For this reason I was obliged to amalgamate in (my) translation the text with that overlengthy commentary,<sup>63</sup> to arrange the work <sup>64</sup> in a way which resembles (a dialogue consisting of) questions and answers,<sup>65</sup> and to omit (the parts which) are concerned with grammar and language. This is an apology which I offer because of the difference in size of the book in the two languages, if such a comparison is made. (I do this) in order that no one should think that this (difference) is due to remissness in (the rendering of) the meaning. Indeed he should be assured that it is due to a condensation of what (otherwise) would be troublesome (in its) prolixness. May God bestow His favour <sup>66</sup> upon the good.

This is the beginning of the book of Patañjali, text interwoven with commentary.

I prostrate (myself) before Him above whom there is nothing, and I glorify Him who is the beginning of things and to whom they shall return, Him who knows all beings. In the second place <sup>67</sup> I exalt, with a humble soul and a pure intention, the angels <sup>68</sup> and (other) spiritual beings <sup>69</sup> who are below Him, and I call upon them to help me in my exposition—which I wish to keep short—according to the method of Hiranyagarbha.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Lit. 'according to what it is'.

<sup>63</sup> The name of the commentator is not mentioned. For reference by al-Bīrūnī to 'the commentator' (المفسر) cf. R, 185 (l. 16), 188 (l. 2); *India*, Hyd., 191 (l. 1), 192 (l. 6), 194 (l. 6), 196 (l. 15), 205 (l. 14) (= Sachau, I, 232, 234, 236, 238, 248).

<sup>64</sup> Lit. 'the speech'.

<sup>65</sup> The Arabic has 'question and answer' in the singular.

<sup>66</sup> Probably owing to a printing error the diacritical dot over the *nūn* in *نعم* is missing in the printed text.

<sup>67</sup> Lit. 'then'.

<sup>68</sup> i.e. gods (*deva*). See above, p. 307, n. 37; cf. R, 172 (l. 17), 173 (l. 3), 192 (l. 2). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 68 (l. 17), الملائكة *ديو وهم* 'the deva or angels' (Sachau, I, 91).

<sup>69</sup> cf. R, 172 (l. 14). For a description of 'angels' (*deva*) as a subclass of 'spiritual beings' (الروحانيين) see *India*, Hyd., 68 (cf. Sachau, I, 91). Sachau's identification of the latter term with *deva* (loc. cit.) appears to be erroneous.

<sup>70</sup> In Vācaspati-miśra's subcommentary *Tattvavaiśārādī* (henceforth abbreviated as Vāc.), under sūtra 1.1, the following statement is quoted from the *Yogiyājñavalkya-smṛti*: 'Hiranyagarbha and no other of ancient days is he who gave utterance (*vaktā*) to Yoga' (J. H. Woods,

The ancients have been deeply engaged in the study <sup>71</sup> of the things through which the four objectives <sup>72</sup> may be achieved. These (objectives) are : religion and conduct of life,<sup>73</sup> property and ease,<sup>74</sup> enjoyable living and pleasure, liberation and permanence.<sup>75</sup> (In studying these the ancients) scarcely left for those who came later scope for discourse. However, my exposition excels in clearing up <sup>76</sup> the ambiguities which they put down. It is restricted to (a study of) the means <sup>77</sup> of bringing about the perfection of the soul through liberation from these bonds <sup>78</sup> and the attainment of eternal bliss. Accordingly I shall say :

As regards things which perception does not apprehend, the attribute (of not being apprehended) can only be ascribed to them because of various

*The Yoga system of Patañjali, with Veda-vyāsa's Yogabhāṣya and Vācaspati-miśra's Tattvavaiśārādī*, Cambridge, Mass., 1927 (henceforth abbreviated as Woods), 5). According to the interpretation of Vāc. this implies that Hiraṇyagarbha preceded Patañjali. For a similar argument Mādhava invokes in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, ch. Patañjali-darśana, the above-mentioned quotation (misleadingly abbreviating the name of its source as 'Yājñavalkyasmṛti'). Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.25 and Vācaspati-miśra's *Bhāmātī* under *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.37. Also cf. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī's *Maṇiprabhā* (c. A.D. 1592) on sūtra 1.1: 'Although an authoritative book was made by Hiraṇyagarbha, still since that was deemed too extended, an authoritative work conforming to that (book) is begun' (J. H. Woods's translation in *JAOS*, xxxiv, 1915, 1 et seq.). According to the *Mahābhārata* (*Mbh.*, xii.349.65, quoted by P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. I, Abt. 3, Leipzig, 1908, p. 17, n), Yoga was introduced by Hiraṇyagarbha, whereas Kapila is designated as the founder of Sāṅkhya. Elsewhere too there is reference to a connexion between Yoga and Hiraṇyagarbha (*Mbh.*, xii.342.95, referred to by Deussen, op. cit., 17). See op. cit. for further references to Hiraṇyagarbha. Also see R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, 27 et. seq.

<sup>71</sup> Lit. 'mention'.

<sup>72</sup> The four objectives (مطالب) referred to in the text are the well-known 'aims of life' (*puruṣārtha*), namely: *dharma* 'law', *artha* 'economic and political power', *kāma* 'pleasure', and *mokṣa* 'liberation'.

<sup>73</sup> Ritter's text has سيرة. In the Arabic script there is not much difference between سيرة and سنة, which means religious tradition. Possibly al-Bīrūnī had in mind the word سنة. In *India* the meaning of *dharma* is uniformly expressed by الدين 'religion'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 102, تفسير دهرم وتفسير الدين 'the word *dharma* means "reward" but in general it is used for "religion"' (Sachau, I, 132).

<sup>74</sup> For the inclusion of ease (النعمة) within the concept of *artha* cf. Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra*, 6.2.1-3: 'Peace and activity (*śama-vyāyāmau*) constitute the source of acquisition and security (*yoga-kṣemayor yoni*). Activity is that which brings about the accomplishment of works undertaken. Peace is that which brings about security of enjoyment of the fruits of works (*karma-phalopabhogānām kṣemārāadhanah śamah*)' (R. P. Kangle, *The Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra*, I, Bombay, 1960, 165; II, Bombay, 1963, 368). Elsewhere the word النعمة is used synonymously with الراحة to refer to the concept of *sukha* 'ease', as opposed to *duḥkha* 'sorrow' (R, 189 (l. 7); cf. 180 (l. 10)).

<sup>75</sup> In his *India* al-Bīrūnī also uses the Sanskrit term *mokṣa*, e.g. *India*, Hyd., 53, ويسمون 'they call its (the soul's) liberation in the Indian language *mokṣa*' (cf. Sachau, I, 70).

<sup>76</sup> Ritter's text has يحيل. Emendation proposed: يحل. The translation conforms to this emendation.

<sup>77</sup> The usual meaning of اسباب is 'causes'.

<sup>78</sup> All those who have not attained liberation are thought to be in a state of bondage.

modalities <sup>79</sup>: (1) (their) essential smallness, as (in the case of) atoms, <sup>80</sup> whose minuteness is the cause preventing them from (being apprehended by) the senses <sup>81</sup>; (2) (their being) far away, for distance prevents perception when it extends beyond the latter's limit; (3) a barrier which conceals, e.g. a fence <sup>82</sup> which prevents the perception of that which is placed behind it, bones which are covered up by the flesh and the skin, and mixtures, <sup>83</sup> which being inside the body cannot be perceived because of the veils (intervening) between them and ourselves; (4) their being remote from the present time either (because of their being) in the past, e.g. the former generations and the tribes which have perished, or (because of their being) in the future, e.g. things expected (to happen) in the time to come; (5) the deviating from the methods of cognition by means of which apprehension becomes perfected, as in the case of necromancy <sup>84</sup> whereby the state of hidden things is discovered. It is (in effect) known that the perfection of certitude can of necessity only be (obtained) through sense-perception, which is lacking in the case of hidden things. (R, 169) For what is absent can only be inferred from what is present, and that which can be attained only through arguments is not in the same (category) as that which is known through sense-perception. Similarly logical demonstration removes doubts as (effectively as) sense-perception. As long as ambiguities beset the soul, the latter is given over to perplexity and cannot give heed to that which (procures) its liberation from this entanglement and its deliverance from toil and bondage, and (gives) it an eternal sojourn, in which there is neither death nor birth.

Most of the intentions of the expounders <sup>85</sup> of books are (directed) either to the production of a comment <sup>86</sup> peculiar to them or to guidance towards an

<sup>79</sup> For the present discussion of causes of non-perception cf. Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, kārikā 7: *atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriya-ghātān mano-'navasthānāt/saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhībhavāt samānābhīhārāc ca (anupalabdhiḥ)* ' (non-perception may be) due to excessive distance, (excessive) proximity, damage to the sense-organs, unsteadiness of mind, minuteness (of the object), the intervening (of another object), being outshone (by another object), and the mingling (of the object) with like objects'. Also cf. V on sūtra 1.49.

<sup>80</sup> Read هبات instead of Ritter's هيات. This Arabic word has the primary meaning 'grains of dust'. Cf. Vācaspati-mīśra's *Tattva-kaumudī* on *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, kārikā 7 (quoted in the preceding note): *saukṣmyāt—yathendriya-sannikṛṣṭaṁ paramānvādi pravihita-manā api na paśyati* "due to minuteness"—as for instance (the case of an object) such as an atom, which (although) connected with one's sense (of sight), even one whose mind is fixed (on it) cannot see'.

<sup>81</sup> The Arabic has the singular.

<sup>82</sup> For the example of the fence cf. e.g. Jānakinātha's *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, Banaras, 1916, 40.

<sup>83</sup> Probably the humours of the body are meant. Cf. *Fākihāt al-bustān*, 1358: امشاج البدن — طبائع.

<sup>84</sup> The MS may be read الموجه على الاموات or الموجه على الاصوات. In the translation Ritter's emendation المزدرج instead of الموجه has been adopted. If the reading الاصوات (instead of الاموات translated in the text) is adopted, the meaning would be 'prognostication from voices (of birds ?)'.  
<sup>85</sup> المتكلمين.

<sup>86</sup> كلام, lit. 'speech, discourse'.

objective which they endeavour to obtain.<sup>87</sup> The aims are determined<sup>88</sup> according to (the capacity of) the knower. As for knowledge, it is divided into two parts : the superior which leads to liberation, for it procures the absolute good,<sup>89</sup> and that which is inferior relatively (to the first part) and which (refers to) the remaining objectives,<sup>90</sup> which rank lower than (liberation). I shall try to see to it that, comparatively to the arguments set forth by (my) predecessors with regard to this hidden subject, my comment will have for the reader<sup>91</sup> a status similar to that of sense-perception productive of conviction.

Question 1. The ascetic who roamed in the deserts and jungles<sup>92</sup> addressed Patañjali, asking : I have studied the books of the ancients and their discourses about things hidden from the senses, and I have found them concerned with weak arguments which are beset with doubts and do not aim at demonstrations which have the same status as perception providing the calm of certitude and guiding towards the achievement of liberation from bondage. Is it possible for you to show me by arguments and demonstrations what is sought for in order that by grasping it I should be assisted against doubts and misgivings ?

Answer. Patañjali said : This is possible. I shall give about this a brief exposition whose brief (compass) will convey many notions, using at the same time sound reasoning.<sup>93</sup> For not every man likes or has the time for a lengthy exposition. Indeed boredom overcomes him speedily so that he grows tired (of the exposition) and abandons it. Listen then, since you have asked. That which you seek is *praxis*,<sup>94</sup> which has (in the first place) causes and thereupon results and consequences and an agent (bringing) this (about). Accordingly you ought to have a true knowledge of each (factor) and criticize the various opinions concerning it, rejecting the erroneous<sup>95</sup> views. (R, 170) A part of *praxis*<sup>96</sup> is as it were activity,<sup>97</sup> and another part is as it were desisting from activity. If you grasp this matter you will find that it includes knowledge. For (it consists in)

<sup>87</sup> يَجْرُونَ إليه, lit. 'go, proceed to'.

<sup>88</sup> This corresponds to تَعَيَّن in the printed text. As Ritter points out, the word can also be read تَفَنَّن 'is differentiated'. A further possibility is تَنَبَّر 'are modified'.

<sup>89</sup> الْخَيْرُ الْمَخْصُصُ is an expression frequently used in Arabic philosophical texts which are translated or adapted from the Greek.

<sup>90</sup> الْمَطَالِبُ—the 'aims of life' (*puruṣārtha*) referred to above ; cf. p. 311, n. 72.

<sup>91</sup> Lit. 'for him who reads it'.

<sup>92</sup> 'Jungles' corresponds to الْبُيَاضُ occurring in Ritter's text. If the reading الْفَيَافِي, suggested by Ritter in his critical apparatus, is adopted, the meaning would be 'deserts' or 'waste lands'.

<sup>93</sup> A primary meaning of قِيَاس is 'comparison, analogy'. It may be used in the sense of syllogism or reasoning.

<sup>94</sup> عَمَل.

<sup>95</sup> The translation conforms to Ritter's reading الْمَخْطِئَةُ. Ritter's critical apparatus has الْمَخِطَةُ.

<sup>96</sup> cf. *India* (quoted by R, p. 169, n. 10) ; نقسم طريق الخلاص الى اقسام ثلاثة احدهما العملي بالتعويد ومدارة على قبض الخواص من خارج الى داخل حتى لا تشتغل الا بـ

<sup>97</sup> فَعْل.



compression<sup>98</sup> of that which spreads out from you towards external (things), so that you are not concerned with anything but yourself. (It also consists in) the quelling of the faculties of the soul,<sup>99</sup> so that they should not cling<sup>100</sup> to that which is not you.<sup>101</sup> (It consists finally in) every (faculty) engaging in the work which is assigned to it by you. This activity<sup>102</sup> comprises both knowledge and *praxis*.

Q 2. What is the state of a man who has compressed within<sup>103</sup> himself the faculties of his soul and hindered them from spreading out ?<sup>104</sup>

Ans. He is not completely bound, for he has severed the bodily<sup>105</sup> ties between himself and that which is other than himself, and has ceased to cling to things external to him. But on the other hand he is not prepared for liberation, since his soul<sup>106</sup> is with his body.<sup>107</sup>

Q 3. How is he (to be described) when he is in neither of the two states which have been mentioned ?

Ans. He then is as he really is in his essence.<sup>108</sup>

Q 4. This answer is not satisfactory as an explanation.<sup>109</sup> Let me know whether he increases or decreases<sup>110</sup> to any degree thereby, on the analogy of the expansion of leather in the rain and its contraction in the sun, so that he would decay and perish on account of the succeeding states which change him ; or alternatively whether he does neither increase nor decrease, as is the case with air,<sup>111</sup> in which case he would be inanimate<sup>112</sup> without awareness of anything.

<sup>98</sup> قبض الحواس عن الانتشار اليه (R, 183 (l. 167)) corresponding to *pratyāhāra* (sūtra 2.54).

<sup>99</sup> This expression corresponds to the term *vrtti* of the sūtras (e.g. 1.2).

<sup>100</sup> The translation conforms to the reading التثبث ; cf. R, 170 (l. 8). Ritter's text has التثبث.

<sup>101</sup> cf. sūtra 1.2: *yogaś citta-vrtti-nirodhaḥ* 'Yoga is the suppression of the modes of functioning of the mind'.

<sup>102</sup> فعل.

<sup>103</sup> Lit. 'towards'.

<sup>104</sup> cf. V introducing sūtra 1.3: *tad-avasthe cetasi viṣayābhāvād, buddhi-bodhātām puruṣaḥ kiṃśvabhāvaḥ* 'Since there is no object when the mind is in this state, what will be the character of the self which consists of intellected and intellection ?'.

<sup>105</sup> Ritter's text has here العصمة. The translation conforms to the reading الجسمية suggested by Ritter in his critical apparatus. Cf. R, 176 (l. 8). A possible but not very plausible emendation of the former reading would be العصبية, namely: social ties.

<sup>106</sup> نفس.

<sup>107</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 62 (quoted by R, p. 170, n. 4): '... انه ليس بموثوق لانه حل الرباط ولا متخلص لان بدنه معه' (cf. Sachau, I, 82).

<sup>108</sup> cf. sūtra 1.3: *tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe 'vasthānam* 'Then the seer (that is, the self) retains its own form'.

<sup>109</sup> في التفهيم.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.3: 'Never does the energy of the mind, (in that it is) absolutely eternal, deviate from itself. Accordingly, as (it is) in restriction, just so (is it) in emergence also. Assuredly, the actual form (*svārūpa*) of the mother-of-pearl does not suffer increase or decrease of being, no matter whether the perception (*jñāna*) which refers to it (*gocara*) be the source of correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or (the source) of misconception' (Woods, 14).

<sup>111</sup> Ritter's printed text has كالهواء. The translation conforms to the alternative reading suggested by Ritter's critical apparatus: كالهواء. This probably corresponds to *ākāśa* 'ether'. Cf. R, 190 (l. 8 and l. 10) (corresponding to sūtras 1.41 and 42 respectively).

<sup>112</sup> جماد.

Both opinions contradict the basic (universally) accepted tenets, namely that the soul is alive and will not die, and is not subject to decay and annihilation.

Ans. The meaning of my statement, that he is as he (really) is, is that when these sense-faculties and psychic faculties return into him, they are united with him in a certain manner which consists in his adhering<sup>113</sup> to them and belonging to their aggregate.<sup>114</sup> This man used to be aware through his senses of what he perceived<sup>115</sup> and used to know through the faculties of his soul, which were spread outside of it, that which is external to it, so that the return into him (of the sense-faculties and the faculties of his soul) did not add to him anything : he is exactly as he was before that.<sup>116</sup> (R, 171)

Q 5. How many are the faculties of the soul which spread out of it ?

Ans. They are five.<sup>117</sup> The first of them is apprehension,<sup>118</sup> which has three modes<sup>119</sup> : (a) (apprehension) by means of the five senses<sup>120</sup> ; (b) (apprehension) by means of inferring<sup>121</sup> from a percept,<sup>122</sup> for instance smoke indicating a fire which is behind a fence preventing it from being seen ; (c) (apprehension) by means of hearsay accompanied by a consensus of opinion,<sup>123</sup> for instance our knowledge that the city of Kanauj is on the bank of the Gaṅgā river. For this (knowledge) is attained by means of information received<sup>124</sup> and serves as a substitute for one's apprehension of this (fact) by eyesight.

The second (faculty of the soul) is imagination,<sup>125</sup> by means of which one knows a thing not as it really is. For instance when the rays of the sun fall on a (desert) plain in a certain manner and the thirsty man takes it to be water.

The third (faculty of the soul) is (conventional) opinion,<sup>126</sup> which has no

<sup>113</sup> Ritter puts a question mark after الباد. In all probability the word should be read الباد deriving from the root لبد.

<sup>114</sup> cf. sūtra 1.4 : *vṛtti-sārūpyam itaratra* 'At other times it (the self) takes the same form as the modes of functioning (of the mind)'.

<sup>115</sup> Or 'that which encompassed him'.

<sup>116</sup> cf. V on sūtra 1.3 : *svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā tadānim citi-śaktir yathā kaivalye ; vyutthāna-citte tu sati tathāpi bhavanti na tathā* 'At that time the energy of the mind is established in its own form, as in the state of *kaivalya*. But when the mind is in its emergent state, (the energy of the mind), although really the same, (does) not (seem) so' and cf. Vāc. ad loc.

<sup>117</sup> cf. sūtra 1.5 : *vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ* . . . 'The modes of functioning (of the mind) are of five kinds . . .'.

<sup>118</sup> إدراك. Cf. *pramāṇa* in sūtra 1.6 : *pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ* 'Modes of correct knowledge, incorrect knowledge, comprehension of words, sleep, and memory'.

<sup>119</sup> أوجه.

<sup>120</sup> cf. *pratyakṣa* in sūtra 1.7 : *pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni* 'The modes of correct knowledge are perceptual, inferential, and linguistic'.

<sup>121</sup> Ritter's text has here المقتبس with a question mark. In all probability the word should be read المقاييس. Cf. *anumāna* of the corresponding sūtra 1.7.

<sup>122</sup> المحسوس.

<sup>123</sup> سماع مع الإجماع. Cf. *āgama* in sūtra 1.7.

<sup>124</sup> خبر.

<sup>125</sup> تخيل. Cf. *viparyaya* in sūtra 1.8 : *viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭham* 'Incorrect knowledge is false cognition which takes a form other than that of the object'.

<sup>126</sup> الظن. Cf. *vikalpa* in sūtra 1.9 : *śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ* 'Conception based on communication lacks a (corresponding) object and results from perception of words'.

reality behind it, but in which one follows current habits of language. For instance the expression used by the general public 'the spirit's knowledge'.<sup>127</sup> (They use it) although the expression has no signification,<sup>128</sup> and yet (the man) who employs it is not blamed, on account of (linguistic) habit.

The fourth (faculty of the soul) is dream(ing),<sup>129</sup> which is man's knowledge of things which are (in reality) other (than what he knows), which have no subsisting reality corresponding to the knowledge in question.

The fifth (faculty of the soul) is memory,<sup>130</sup> which is the retention of what has been known by the knower without its being obstructed by forgetting.

Q 6. How can the quelling of the soul and the compression of its faculties away from external things be accomplished ?

Ans. This may be accomplished in two ways. One of them is of a practical nature,<sup>131</sup> namely habituation.<sup>132</sup> For when a person has turned to a faculty of the soul in itself,<sup>133</sup> has painstakingly prevented it from rebellion, and has given it in trust to that which is the best for it perseveringly and applying himself to it continually—then, unless he repeats (this practice), a time of negligence may intervene between two periods, in which time the soul may lapse back to what is unsuitable. But by means of continuous application, as a

<sup>127</sup> Ritter's text has here حياة, with the remark that the MS appears to have صاء. The word should probably be read علم. Cf. V on sūtra 1.9: *taḍ yathā caitanyaṃ puruṣasya svarūpam iti yadā citir eva puruṣaḥ tadā kim atra kena vyapadiśyate, bhavati ca vyapadeṣe vṛttir yathā caitrasya gauḥ* 'Thus when, since "the self is in the form of intelligence", (we say that) the self is nothing but intellect, then how can it have attribute or designation? Furthermore, it is to the designation that (attributive, etc.) relationships are imputed, as for instance (in the case of) "Caitra's cow"'.  
<sup>128</sup> محمول.

<sup>129</sup> الرؤية. Cf. *nidrā* 'sleep' in sūtra 1.10: *a-bhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā*. This sūtra is translated by Woods: 'Sleep is a fluctuation (of mind-stuff) supported by the cause (*pratyaya*, that is *tamas*) of the (transient) negation (of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations)'. Deussen, however, translates it: 'Die nicht auf einer realen Vorstellung fussende Funktion ist der Schlaf' (Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. I, Abt. 3, 512). Like al-Bīrūnī and unlike Woods, Deussen takes the negating particle *a* in the beginning of the sūtra as applying to the compound as a whole and not as applying to *bhāva*. Accordingly he construes the definition in the sūtra like al-Bīrūnī. The latter, however, misunderstood this definition as applying to dream.

<sup>130</sup> الذكر. Cf. *smṛti* 'memory' in sūtra 1.11: *anubhūta-viśayāsaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*. Woods, following the interpretation of Vāc. ad loc. translates this sūtra: 'Memory (*smṛti*) is not-adding-surreptitiously (*asaṃpramoṣa*) to a once experienced object'. Deussen, however, translates it: 'Das Nicht-abhandenkommen eines Objectes, dessen man inne ward, ist die Erinnerung' (op. cit., 512). Cf. J. R. Ballantyne's translation (*Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali*, reprinted, Calcutta, 1960, 14). The latter two, like al-Bīrūnī and unlike Woods, take *asaṃpramoṣa* to mean 'lack of loss, not letting drop (as from memory)'. For this meaning of the term cf. the Sanskrit dictionaries of Monier-Williams and Böhtlingk, and U. Wogihara, *The Sanskrit-Chinese dictionary of Buddhist technical terms, based on the Mahāvīyūtpatti*, reprinted, Tokyo, 1959, 109.13.

<sup>131</sup> عمل. Cf. R, 169 (ll. 18 and 19), 170 (l. 4).

<sup>132</sup> تعويد. Cf. *abhyāsa* 'repeated practice, training' in sūtra 1.12: *abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṃ tan-nirodhaḥ* 'The suppression of those (*vṛttis* is attained) by repeated practice and detachment'.

<sup>133</sup> بعينها.

result of which affects disappear, and by means of habituation,<sup>134</sup> the faculty in question will indubitably acquire this habit in a permanent fashion, and will be diverted from the tendencies it had when it lacked this habit.<sup>135</sup> (R, 172)

The second way is intellectual,<sup>136</sup> namely mental asceticism,<sup>137</sup> which consists of contemplating the consequences with the eye of the heart,<sup>138</sup> and considering the evil of the existents, which come into being and pass away. For nothing is worse<sup>139</sup> than decay and passing away, these two being inherent in (the existents). The result of this way is that when the person knows the ill and the malignity in all things; his heart eschews all pursuits of this world and the next, his mind becomes free to seek liberation from them; he is relieved of questions and needs. For they are the causes of attachment to things existing in the world, and add to the evils of bondage, and prevent him from addressing himself single-mindedly to his liberation.<sup>140</sup> When his ambitions are turned away from whatever there is in all the worlds, he has attained a stage transcending the three primary forces.<sup>141</sup> The latter are such that no world can exist unless there is production by them. They generate nature by means of one of them<sup>142</sup> and destroy it by means of another of them,<sup>143</sup> (these two forces being) pure<sup>144</sup> in their two respective genera. (The third force) which is intermediate between the two partakes of the two others, and is on account of this capable

<sup>134</sup> Ritter gives the Arabic word as التعديد and states that the MS is not clearly legible here. The correct reading appears to be التعويد.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. sūtra 1.13: *tatra sthitau yatno 'bhyāsah* 'Of these, repeated practice is the effort to remain in the state (of suppressed *vṛttis*)'; and sūtra 1.14: *sa tu dīrgha-kāla-nairantarya-satkāra-sevito dr̥ḍha-bhūmiḥ* 'This (effort), however, is consolidated (lit. 'possesses solid ground'), when it is well attended to for a long time and without interruption'.

<sup>136</sup> عقل. Cf. V on sūtra 1.12. In the corresponding quotation in *India*, (R, p. 172, n. 1 = Hyd., 60 = Sachau, I, 79) this word is corrupted into الغفلي (Sachau: 'renunciation', 'via omissionis').

<sup>137</sup> الزهد—a term referring to a way of life characterized by abstinence as practised by the Ṣūfis. Cf. *vairāgya* 'detachment, passionlessness, renunciation' in sūtra 1.15: *dr̥ṣṭānuśravika-viśaya-vitr̥ṣṇasya vaśīkāra-samjñā vairāgyam* 'Detachment is the consciousness of (self-) control on the part of one who is no longer thirsting for objects that are perceivable or promised by scriptures (lit. 'heard')'.

<sup>138</sup> بعين القلب—a regular Ṣūfī term denoting non-discursive intuitive knowledge of the mystic.

<sup>139</sup> The translation follows Ritter's reading here, أسوء. He, however, states that he is not sure of this reading. An alternative reading may be suggested: أئبرء 'free from'. Cf. Vāc. on sūtra 1.16: 'For nothing alive is ever free from connexion with bondage to birth and death' (Woods, 39).

<sup>140</sup> الخلوص الى الخلاص.

<sup>141</sup> i.e. the three *gunas*. Cf. sūtra 1.16: *tat-param puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vaitr̥ṣṇyam* 'The no-longer-thirsting for the *gunas* that results from the knowledge of the self is superior to that detachment'.

<sup>142</sup> Lit. 'on one side'.

<sup>143</sup> Lit. 'on the other side'.

<sup>144</sup> Replace original صرفين for Ritter's emendation طرفين. Cf. R, 181 (ll. 7–8).

of governance and maintenance.<sup>145</sup> That person transcends (these forces) by slipping away from (all) three of them.

Q 7. How many kinds of conception <sup>146</sup> are there ? One or more than that ?

Ans. There are two kinds. One of them is a conception of material (things) perceived by the senses.<sup>147</sup> The second is the conception of the *intelligibilia*,<sup>148</sup> which are devoid of matter.<sup>149</sup>

Q 8. Which of the two kinds belongs to those who are spiritual and god-like ? <sup>150</sup>

... Ans. Because they are of simple <sup>151</sup> species, not having gross (or corporeal) bodies.<sup>152</sup> The other <sup>153</sup> kind <sup>154</sup> is of greater value and price than is to be found among men.<sup>155</sup>

Q 9. And what is the position of angels <sup>156</sup> with regard to the two kinds ?

Ans. It is like the position of the spiritual ones in confining themselves to the other <sup>157</sup> kind, being free of anxiety as to being bereft of this (state), (R, 173) whereas the other spiritual ones do not enter upon it with the same integrity and freedom <sup>158</sup> from thoughts about consequences.

Q 10. Is there or is there not a difference of rank <sup>159</sup> in this state among the angels ?

<sup>145</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 30-1 : فالاولى منها راحة وطيبة . . . اسباؤها ست' ورج' وتم' . . . three powers . . . which are called *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* . . . The first power is rest and goodness, and hence come existing and growing. The second is exertion and fatigue, and hence come firmness and duration. The third is languor and irresolution, and hence come ruin and perishing' (Sachau, I, 40-1). For the equation of the three *guṇas* (qualities, constituents of Nature) with the three aspects or forms conceived in the doctrine of the *trimūrti*, the Hindu trinity, cf. e.g. Kālidāsa's *Kumārasaṃbhava*, 2.4: *namas trimūrtaye tubhyaṃ prāk sṛṣṭeḥ kevalātmanē/ḡṇa-traya-vibhāḡāya paścād bhedam upeyuse* 'Salutations to you, O Trinity, one before creation, afterwards divided for the sake of the division of the three qualities'. Also cf. W. Kirfel, *Symbolik des Hinduismus und des Jinismus*, Stuttgart, 1959, 44; J. Gonda, *Die Religionen Indiens*, II, Stuttgart, 1963, 65.

<sup>146</sup> تصور.

<sup>147</sup> محسوس.

<sup>148</sup> معقول.

<sup>149</sup> cf. sūtra 1.17-18: *vitarka-vicārānandāsmitā-rūpānugamāt samprajñātāḥ* 'The self becomes fully aware of objects by assuming the form of deliberation, reflection, joy, and egoism'; *virāma-pratyayābhyāsa-pūrvakāḥ saṃskāra-śeṣo 'nyah* 'By constantly dwelling on cessation until only the residual impressions remain in awareness, the self attains a different state'.

<sup>150</sup> The answer to this question and a further question answered by the following appear to be lacking.

<sup>151</sup> البسيط probably meaning here 'incorporeal'.

<sup>152</sup> cf. sūtra 1.19: *bhava-pratyayo videha-prakṛti-layānām* 'Those who experience the absorption-into-*prakṛti* characteristic of "videhas" (lit. 'the bodiless') attain the self which is aware of existence'.

<sup>153</sup> الآخر may alternatively be read as الآخر, i.e. 'the last'.

<sup>154</sup> الضرب may refer to one kind of concentration, or alternatively to a kind of men or spiritual beings.

<sup>155</sup> cf. sūtra 1.20: *śraddhā-vīrya-smṛti-samādhi-prajñā-pūrvaka itareṣām* 'Others attain this only after (developing) faith, energy (i.e. firmness of will), mindfulness, concentration, and insight'.

<sup>156</sup> See p. 307, n. 37 above.

<sup>157</sup> الآخر may alternatively be read as الآخر, i.e. 'the latter'.

<sup>158</sup> Lit. 'purity'.

<sup>159</sup> تفاضل cf. *viśeṣa* in sūtra 1.22 (next footnote).

Ans. There is certainly a difference of rank ; <sup>160</sup> (for) this is a characteristic of all groups, both spiritual and corporeal. Were this (difference in rank ever) lacking in them (one could not explain) why the emancipation of some of them is (relatively) speedier,<sup>161</sup> while that of others is slower. There is no reason for the speediness except the persistence in a devoted <sup>162</sup> activity, just as there is no reason for the slowness except remissness in this activity. Consequently there are degrees among them, and so a difference in rank results.

Q 11. Is there a way to liberation other than the two ways, namely habituation and asceticism ?

Ans. (Liberation) may be attained by devotion.<sup>163</sup> This is constituted by withdrawal<sup>164</sup> from the body and (directing oneself) towards knowledge, certainty, and sincerity in the heart, and towards praise, exaltation, and laudation with the tongue, and action with the limbs.<sup>165</sup> God alone and nothing else is aimed at in all these, so that succour should come from Him with a view to achieving eternal bliss.

Q 12. Who is this object of devotion who gives succour ? <sup>166</sup>

Ans. He is God, who because of His pre-eternity and unity dispenses with action, which is requited either by peace, for which one hopes and longs for, or by distress, of which one is afraid and which one endeavours to avoid,<sup>167</sup> and who is (withdrawn) from thoughts, for He transcends the repugnant contraries and that which being alike is beloved.<sup>168</sup> He knows eternally with His own essence.<sup>169</sup> For knowledge which supervenes (at a certain moment) has as its object that which (previously) was not known. Ignorance, however, cannot befall Him at any time or in any state.

<sup>160</sup> cf. sūtra 1.22 : *mṛdu-madhyādhimātravāt tato 'pi viśeṣaḥ*. (This sūtra appears to be an interpolation reading *tatrāpi*, subsequently assimilated to sūtra 1.23 by reading *tato 'pi*.) 'There are grades of propinquity, according as the fervour is weak, moderate, or excessive.'

<sup>161</sup> cf. sūtra 1.21 : *tīvra-saṃvegānām āsannaḥ* 'Those whose fervour is intense attain the self which is near the goal'.

<sup>162</sup> المخلص 'devoted', or alternatively المخلص 'conducive to emancipation'.

<sup>163</sup> عبادة. Cf. *pranidhāna* in sūtra 1.23 : *īśvara-pranidhānād vā* 'Or (the self near the goal) is attained by devotion to the *Īśvara*'.

<sup>164</sup> Amend تنزع for العمل.

<sup>165</sup> العمل بالجوارح—a Sūfī term. Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.23 : 'By devotion (that is) by a special kind of adoration either mental or verbal or bodily' (Woods, 49).

<sup>166</sup> For this question and the answer to it cf. *India*, Hyd., 30 (= Sachau, I, 27-8), referred to by R, p. 173, n. 4.

<sup>167</sup> ... المكافأة عليه. فعل. Cf. *karma-vipāka* in sūtra 1.24 : *kleśa-karma-vipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvaraḥ* '*Īśvara* is the supreme state of the self, having no contact with the substrata of the fruition of works (*karma*) based on the afflictions (*kleśa*)'.

<sup>168</sup> For the idea of this expression cf. the term *dvandva* 'pair of opposites', e.g. sūtra 2.48 ; *Bhagavadgītā* 2.45, 7.27. Cf. Sachau, I, 263 (annotations). Also cf. V on sūtra 1.24 : *tasyāīśvaryaṃ sāmyātiśaya-vinīrmuktam* 'His pre-eminence is altogether without anything equal to it or excelling it' (Woods, 50).

<sup>169</sup> cf. sūtra 1.25 : *tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajña-bījaṃ* 'In that state there is the unexcelled germ of the omniscient.'

Q 13. Since the liberated one is described by these attributes, what is the difference between him and God, the Exalted One ? <sup>170</sup> (R, 174)

Ans. The difference between them consists in the fact that the liberated one is as described above in the present and the future time, but not in the past which precedes his liberation. He is therefore like a deficient . . . ,<sup>171</sup> as he does not possess in the state which he has achieved the past time which has elapsed. For his liberation does not (belong) to pre-eternity.<sup>172</sup> God the Sublime, on the other hand, possesses the attributes described above in the three parts of time which are conceived by us, namely the past, the present and the future.<sup>173</sup> For He in His essence transcends time and its periods from pre-eternity to eternity in the future.<sup>174</sup>

Q 14. Does He have other attributes than those you mentioned ? <sup>175</sup>

Ans. He has perfect sublimity in worth, not in place, because He transcends location. He is the absolute perfect good desired by every existent,<sup>176</sup> and He is knowledge which is free from the pollution of heedlessness and ignorance.<sup>177</sup>

Q 15. Do you or do you not attribute to Him speech ?

Ans. Since He knows He must indubitably speak.<sup>178</sup>

Q 16. If he speaks because of His knowledge, what then is the difference between Him and Kapila <sup>179</sup> the knower and the other persons of knowledge who spoke because of what they knew ? <sup>180</sup>

<sup>170</sup> This question and the answer to it bear a resemblance to V on sūtra 1.24. Cf. also V on sūtra 1.26.

<sup>171</sup> The word is blurred in the MS.

<sup>172</sup> cf. *India* (quoted by R, p. 174, n. 1).

<sup>173</sup> 'Future' is designated by two words : آت and مستأنف.

<sup>174</sup> cf. *kālenānavacchedāt* in sūtra 1.26 : *sa pūrveṣām api gūruḥ kālenānavacchedāt* 'He is also the teacher of the ancients, for He is not limited by time'.

<sup>175</sup> For questions 14-18 and the answers to them cf. *India*, Hyd., 20 et seq. (= Sachau, I, 28 et seq.), referred to by R, p. 174, n. 4 et seq.).

<sup>176</sup> Al-Bīrūnī uses here expressions deriving from Greek philosophical texts translated into Arabic.

<sup>177</sup> cf. sūtra 1.25.

<sup>178</sup> cf. sūtra 1.27 : *tasya vācakah praṇavaḥ* 'The word expressing Him is the sacred syllable "Om"'. Al-Bīrūnī may have understood *vācaka* here as referring to speech as an attribute of God (*tasya*) and not to the sacred syllable 'Om' (*praṇava* in the sūtra) as expressive of God. In his translation al-Bīrūnī omits any reference to this sacred syllable.

<sup>179</sup> The word كپل occurring in the MS, which Ritter has replaced by الحكيم, was pretty certainly an Arabic transcription of the Sanskrit name *Kapila*. Al-Bīrūnī probably transcribed it كپل or alternatively he might have used the Persian character for 'p', in which case the transcription was كپل. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 102. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 54, كپل الحكيم فانه ولد مع العلم والحكمة 'the sage Kapila, for he was born knowing and wise' (Sachau, I, 72). According to Vāc. under sūtra 1.25 the earlier commentator Pañcaśikha described Kapila as 'the first knower'. Kapila is the well-known name of a celebrated ancient sage. Cf. R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, 24 et seq.

<sup>180</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 71 : ورشبن هم الحكماء الذين على انسيبتهم افضل من الملائكة بسبب العلم ولذلك : 'Rṣis are the sages who, though they are only human beings, excel the angels on account of their knowledge. Therefore the angels learn from them, and above them there is none but Brahman' (Sachau, I, 93).

Ans. It is time which differentiates them. For the above-mentioned (persons) learned to know and spoke after (a time) in which they did not know nor speak ; and through speech they transmitted to others what they knew. Consequently their speech and teaching are within a (certain) time. As, however, divine things have no connexion with time, God, may He be praised, knows and speaks in pre-eternity. It is He who addressed in various ways Brahmā<sup>181</sup> and other<sup>182</sup> primal (sages). To some of them God sent down a book, to others He opened a gate for intermediation (with respect to Him). Again to others He made a prophetic revelation so that they grasped in thought that which He bestowed upon them. (R, 175)

Q 17. Whence does He have this knowledge ?

Ans. His knowledge remains in the same state throughout eternity. Inasmuch as He is never ignorant, His essence is full of knowledge and does not (need to) acquire knowledge which He did not have. According to what He says in the Veda which He revealed to Brahmā : ' Praise and eulogize Him who spoke the Veda and was before the Veda '.<sup>183</sup>

Q 18. How can one worship Him who cannot be perceived by the senses ?

Ans. His appellation establishes His existence. For only an (existent) thing is given a predicate ; and a name is given only to a nameable (object).<sup>184</sup> Though He is inaccessible<sup>185</sup> to the senses, so that they do not grasp Him, the soul cognizes Him and thought conceives His attributes. This is the pure manner of worshipping Him. And as a result of constancy and diligence in this manner of worship some realization is achieved<sup>186</sup> through the above-mentioned habituation,<sup>187</sup> and hindrances are quelled (which prevent) the soul from being compressed and from compressing (its) faculties so as to prevent their spreading out and their attachment to what is not real.<sup>188</sup>

<sup>181</sup> cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.26. أوائل is a translation of *pūrveṣām* occurring in sūtra 1.26. The difference between Īśvara and Brahma is mentioned in Vāc. under sūtra 1.26. The way the Arabic version defines the difference between God and the ancient sages derives from sūtra 1.26, the commentaries on it, and probably also from the commentaries on sūtra 1.25.

<sup>182</sup> وغيرهم is probably a misreading of غيره which occurs in a parallel passage in *India* (R, p. 174, n. 9). The misreading may be due to the influence of the last part of the preceding name براهم.

<sup>183</sup> cf. V on sūtra 1.24 and Vāc. under sūtras 1.24–5 with regard to Īśvara as the author of the Veda. With regard to Īśvara as the knower cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.24 and sūtra 1.25 itself. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 21 (= Sachau, I, 29).

<sup>184</sup> cf. sūtra 1.27. Also cf. V and Vāc. on the same sūtra with regard to a name as proof for the existence of the object named.

<sup>185</sup> Lit. ' absent '.

<sup>186</sup> According to a parallel quotation in *India* (R, p. 175, n. 3) : ' felicity is achieved '.

<sup>187</sup> cf. R, 171 (ll. 15 and 19). With regard to verbal and mental habituation cf. sūtra 1.28 : *taj-japas tad-artha-bhāvanam* ' Utterance of it serves to reveal its meaning '.

<sup>188</sup> بغير الحق. In Ṣūfī terminology الحق means God. With regard to ' contraction ' and ' obstacles ' here cf. sūtra 1.29 : *tataḥ pratyak-cetanādhigamo 'py antarāyābhāvaś ca* ' From that comes knowledge of the intellect within and removal of obstacles '. Contraction seems to be the antithesis of *vikṣepa* ' projection ' mentioned in sūtra 1.30.



Q 19. What are the hindrances which prevent the soul from attaining its own self ? <sup>189</sup>

Ans. The hindrances which (keep) the soul (away) from its proper pure activity are blameworthy moral qualities, which it acquires because of negligence <sup>190</sup> with regard to that which is obligatory, of sloth <sup>191</sup> in action, of procrastination, <sup>192</sup> of doubt <sup>193</sup> with regard to truth, of impotence <sup>194</sup> due to ignorance and of the opinion which (sees) the obligatory as not obligatory. <sup>195</sup>

Q 20. The soul acquires blame because of these hindrances. Are there other hindrances which are not blameworthy ?

Ans. (The soul) <sup>196</sup> is distracted <sup>197</sup> by preoccupation in the following six manners : its preoccupation with impulses which come to it without any intention on its part ; its preoccupation with created beings <sup>198</sup> whose reincarnation <sup>199</sup> it expects ; its preoccupation with disappointment in and despair with regard to its quest ; <sup>200</sup> its preoccupation with change in the body <sup>201</sup> which is its chariot <sup>202</sup> . . . to it, or its occurrence is in it or in its actions. <sup>203</sup>

Q 21. What is the way towards quelling and warding off <sup>204</sup> of (the above) ? (R, 176)

Ans. The setting apart of one's thought towards God, the Exalted and Sublime One, (alone) to the point of not being aware of anything else that might distract him. <sup>205</sup>

<sup>189</sup> The expression *الاقبال على ذاتها* 'attaining its own self' is close in meaning to the expression *svarūpa-darśanam apy asya bhavati* 'he gains insight into his own nature' in V on sūtra 1.29.

<sup>190</sup> cf. *pramāda* in sūtra 1.30 : *vyādhi-styāna-saṁśaya-pramāḍālasyaṁvirati-bhrānti-darśanālabdha-bhūmikavānavasthitatvāni citta-vikṣepās te 'ntarāyāḥ* 'The obstacles are the distractions of the mind, i.e. error due to sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, and sensuality, also lack of an objective basis for perception, and instability of perception'.

<sup>191</sup> cf. *ālasya* in sūtra 1.30.

<sup>192</sup> Lit. 'putting off till to-morrow'. Perhaps this is meant to render *anavasthitatva* 'instability' of sūtra 1.30.

<sup>193</sup> cf. *saṁśaya* in sūtra 1.30.

<sup>194</sup> cf. *alabdha-bhūmikatva* in sūtra 1.30.

<sup>195</sup> cf. *bhrānti-darśana* in sūtra 1.30.

<sup>196</sup> For the text up to the word 'body' cf. sūtra 1.31 : *duḥkha-daurmanasyāṅgamejayatva-śvāsa-praśvāsā vikṣepa-sahabhavaḥ* 'The companions of the distractions are pain, melancholy, trembling of the body, inhaling and exhaling'. Also cf. V on this sūtra.

<sup>197</sup> *يشغلها* corresponds to *vikṣepa* in sūtra 1.31.

<sup>198</sup> cf. *adhibhautikam* in V on sūtra 1.31.

<sup>199</sup> *حلول*. See above, p. 309, n. 58.

<sup>200</sup> cf. *daurmanasya* in sūtra 1.31.

<sup>201</sup> cf. *aṅgamejayatva* in sūtra 1.31.

<sup>202</sup> The three words that follow appear to be corrupt. Ritter notes that they are difficult to read in the MS. For the simile of the chariot cf. *India* (Sachau, I, 49) : 'The soul is in matter like the rider (راكب) on a carriage (عجلة) . . . '.

<sup>203</sup> The meaning is not clear.

<sup>204</sup> cf. *pratīṣedha* in sūtra 1.32 (see next footnote).

<sup>205</sup> This is certainly meant to render sūtra 1.32, though the Sanskrit text here does not refer in any way to God : *tat-pratīṣedhārtham eka-tattvābhyāsaḥ* 'Their removal is effected by repeated practice aimed at a single entity'. *إفراد* corresponds to *eka-tattva* here. For this answer cf. *India* (quoted in R, p. 176, n. 1.).

Q 22. Is there a thing that ought to be wished for together with the thought which has been described ?

Ans.<sup>206</sup> He ought to wish and desire the welfare of all creatures without exception, rejoice in its being achieved by them,<sup>207</sup> have compassion on the unfortunate and the afflicted,<sup>208</sup> be glad because of the works of the righteous and the good,<sup>209</sup> shrink from the works of the wicked and the evil.<sup>210</sup> And he should (obtain) awakening<sup>211</sup> for his soul,<sup>212</sup> so that his breath<sup>213</sup> will not go away and be lost<sup>214</sup> in the two states of (namely) its retention and expulsion.<sup>215</sup>

Q 23. What is his state when he achieves this stage before liberation ?

Ans.<sup>216</sup> (At this stage) his psychic power overcomes his body, the bodily obstacles have been abolished and he is in control of his (own) self. If he wishes he makes it as small and subtle as a grain of dust, and if he wishes he makes it as big and extensive as the air.<sup>217</sup> It<sup>218</sup> is like to a crystal,<sup>219</sup> in which its surroundings are seen, so that the things are in it, whereas it is external to them. In the same way he contains that which encompasses him,<sup>220</sup> so that when

<sup>206</sup> For this answer cf. *India* (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3).

<sup>207</sup> Here *يريد الخير* corresponds to *maitrī* in sūtra 1.33: *maitrī-karuṇā-muditopekṣānām sukha-duḥkha-puṇyāpuṇya-viṣayānām bhāvanātas citta-prasādanam* 'By cultivation of affection for the pleasant, compassion for the unpleasant, delight at good, indifference to evil, calm of the mind is attained'. *كافة الخلق* corresponds to V ad loc.: *sarva-prāṇiṣu*; *حصوله* to V ad loc.: *sukha-saṃbhogāpanneṣu*.

<sup>208</sup> Here *يحنو* corresponds to *karuṇa* in sūtra 1.33; *المساكين وذوي البلوى والشدايد* to *duḥkhiṣu* in V ad loc.

<sup>209</sup> *يفرح* corresponds to *muditā* in sūtra 1.33; *لأعمال الصالحين* to *puṇyātmakeṣu* in V ad loc.

<sup>210</sup> Here *ينفر* corresponds to *upekṣā* in sūtra 1.33; *عن أفعال الإردياء والاشرار* to *apūṇyāt-makeṣu* in V ad loc.

<sup>211</sup> This possibly corresponds to *citta-prasādam* in sūtra 1.33.

<sup>212</sup> *نفس*.

<sup>213</sup> *نفس*.

<sup>214</sup> If Ritter's suggestion is correct, a *و* should probably be added : *ويضيع*.

<sup>215</sup> Al-Bīrūnī seems to have run the two sūtras 1.33 and 1.34 together. The word *نفس* corresponds to *prāṇa* in sūtra 1.34: *pracchardana-vidhāraṇābhyām vā prāṇasya* 'Or (this is attained) by breathing out and holding of breath'. Here *جذب* corresponds to *vidhāraṇa*; and *إرسال* to *pracchardana*.

<sup>216</sup> For this answer cf. *India* (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3).

<sup>217</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 1.40: *paramāṇu-parama-mahattvānto 'sya vaśīkārah* 'His control extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude'. For *مقدر* cf. *vaśīkāra*. For *كاهلها* cf. *paramāṇu* here and V ad loc. For *كاهلها* cf. *Maṇiprabhā* ad loc. There seems to be no reference to sūtras 1.35-9.

<sup>218</sup> For the present sentence and the following one cf. sūtra 1.41: *kṣīṇa-vṛtte abhijātasyeva maṇer grahitṛ-grahāṇa-grāhyeṣu tatstha-tad-añjanatā samāpattiḥ* 'Samāpatti is the presence in all (small and large) and the encompassing of all (large and small) on the part of the mind which has abandoned the functions of knower, knowing, and known, as a good gem shines on all and bears the image of all'.

<sup>219</sup> The word *بلورة* corresponds to *abhijāto maṇiḥ* in the sūtra and to *sphaṭika* in V ad loc. (where the whole illustration is used in a somewhat different way).

<sup>220</sup> The Arabic *أحاط ب* may also mean: 'that which he comprehends'. Cf. R, 170 (l. 19), 177 (l. 2).

union <sup>221</sup> between (the act of) knowing and the known <sup>222</sup> (is achieved) in him—he being the knower—intellection, he who intellects, and that which is intellected become in him one thing.<sup>223</sup> (R, 177) And withal he (subsists) within four <sup>224</sup> degrees whose glory and splendour <sup>225</sup> differ. The first is the lowest; it (consists in) the apprehension of the three above-mentioned (i.e. the act of knowing, the known, and the knower) *qua* names,<sup>226</sup> attributes,<sup>227</sup> and details which do not constitute <sup>228</sup> definitions.<sup>229</sup> When he transcends it, (reaching) definitions which turn the particulars of things into universals,<sup>230</sup> he achieves a second degree.<sup>231</sup> He does not, however, cease in this (state) from (engaging in) details of (his) knowledge of things. Then, when (engaging in) details is abandoned in his

<sup>221</sup> The word اتحد may correspond to *samāpatti* 'fusion' in sūtra 1.41.

<sup>222</sup> 'Known' is here in the plural in Arabic.

<sup>223</sup> The terms عِلْم, المعلومات, and العالم as well as the terms عَقْل, المعقول, and العاقل, may correspond to *grahana*, *grāhyāni*, and *grahītr* (sūtra 1.41). The formula affirming the identity in one subject of the second triad of Arabic terms is often used by the Aristotelian philosophers, being applied to God.

<sup>224</sup> cf. V on sūtra 1.46: *sa caturdhopasaṅkhyātāḥ samādhir iti* 'Thus concentration has been described according to its four subdivisions'. This refers to the kinds of concentration discussed in sūtras 1.42–4. For what follows cf. *India*, Hyd., 53 (quoted by R, 176, n. 3) = Sachau, I, 69–70: 'The Hindus say: "If a man has the faculty to perform these things, he can dispense with them, and will reach the goal by degrees, passing through several stages. (1) The knowledge of things as to their names and qualities and distinctions, which, however, does not yet afford the knowledge of definitions. (2) Such a knowledge of things as proceeds as far as the definitions by which particulars are classed under the category of universals, but regarding which a man must still practise distinction. (3) This distinction (*viveka*) disappears, and man comprehends things at once as a whole, but within *time*. (4) This kind of knowledge is raised above *time*, and he who has it can dispense with names and epithets, which are only instruments of human imperfection. In this stage the *intellectus* and the *intelligens* unite with the *intellectum*, so as to be one and the same thing". This is what Patañjali says about the knowledge which liberates the soul'. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 51–2 (= Sachau, I, 68).

<sup>225</sup> The reading of هاء seems to be doubtful.

<sup>226</sup> In the Arabic: اسم 'name' in the singular.

<sup>227</sup> صفة 'attribute' in the singular.

<sup>228</sup> Lit. 'give'.

<sup>229</sup> This has a slight correspondence to sūtra 1.42: *tatra śabdārtha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ saṅkīrṇā savitarkā samāpattiḥ* 'Of these (i.e. within the category of *samāpatti*) *savitarka* (the determinate)-*samāpatti* is associated with concepts arising from the cognition of the meanings of words' (*tatra* is absent in some versions). For اسم cf. *śabda* in the sūtra. However, al-Bīrūnī seems to introduce here conceptions deriving from the epistemology of the Aristotelians. This also seems to be the case in what follows.

<sup>230</sup> cf. sūtra 1.49: *śrutānumāna-prajñābhyām sāmānya-viśayā viśeṣārthatvāt*. Woods's translation here is apparently based on the probably incorrect reading *anya* (cf. Deussen, op. cit., 518) instead of *sāmānya* 'universal': 'has an object other than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular' (Woods, 94). Both تفصيل 'details' and جزئيات 'particulars' correspond semantically to *viśeṣārtha* here, whereas کلیات 'universals' corresponds to *sāmānya*. Al-Bīrūnī may have misconstrued the sūtra or the commentary on it.

<sup>231</sup> This differs from the second kind in Patañjali's sūtra 1.43: *smṛti-pariśuddhau svarūpa-śūnyevārthamātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā* 'The *nirvitarka* (non-determinate *samāpatti*) appears to consist of the object alone, as if it had relinquished its own nature, when memory is purified (i.e. done away with; or: 'when mindfulness is perfected')'.

knowledge, and when he apprehends things as unified<sup>232</sup> and actualized according to time, he reaches the third degree. In this (stage), when existence is separated in his (mind) from time and . . .<sup>233</sup> his knowledge of particulars and universals; then not (even) that which is as subtle<sup>234</sup> as an atom<sup>235</sup> is hidden from him.<sup>236</sup> He is superior to one who receives information<sup>237</sup> about a thing with regard to which something is hidden from him, so that the defect of a person who hears about (the thing) is not removed<sup>238</sup> by the (act of) hearing.<sup>239</sup> He can do without designating by names and attributes,<sup>240</sup> these being instruments of necessity and need. Thus he has reached the ultimate (stage) in the noble fourth degree, and deserves to be called truthful.<sup>241</sup>

Here ends the first section, (dealing with) making the heart steadfastly fixed,<sup>242</sup> of Patañjali's book.

<sup>232</sup> For وحاط بالاشياء متحدة 'when he apprehends things unified' cf. V on sūtra 1.43: *eka-buddhy-upakramah* 'the formation of a single mental-act' (Woods, 82).

<sup>233</sup> Ritter indicates a lacuna here.

<sup>234</sup> cf. sūtra 1.44: *etayaiva savicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-viśayā vyākhyātā* 'By this has been explained the *savicārā* and the *nirvicārā samāpatti* which has subtle objects'. (This translation is corroborated by V on sūtra 1.46. An alternative translation might be: 'By this has been explained the *savicārā samāpatti*; whereas the *nirvicārā samāpatti* may be explained as having subtle objects'.) Cf. also sūtra 1.45: *sūkṣma-viśayatvaṃ cālīṅga-paryavasānam* 'These subtle objects include the uncharacterized'.

<sup>235</sup> هباء sometimes serves as a term designating 'atom'; cf. p. 312, n. 80. This, however, is not the case in Kalām terminology.

<sup>236</sup> cf. Bhoja on sūtra 1.49: *asyāṃ hi prajñāyāṃ sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭānām api viśeṣaḥ sphuṭenaiva rūpeṇa bhāsate* 'When this (yogic) knowledge (has been attained), then (any) particular, even if it be subtle, hidden, or distant, becomes distinctly manifest'.

<sup>237</sup> المخبر may alternatively be rendered by 'one who gives information'.

<sup>238</sup> Lit. 'cured'.

<sup>239</sup> For سماع cf. *śruta*, sūtra 1.49. The translation proposed in the Arabic text may require here the emendation of the second منه in R, 177 (l. 7) into به. This statement appears to refer to a discussion similar to that of V on sūtra 1.49. Here المخبر 'one who receives information' may refer to *āgama* of V on sūtra 1.49, and خفي 'is hidden' may refer to *vyavahita* 'placed apart, hidden'.

<sup>240</sup> For الاسماء والصفات cf. *śabda* in V on sūtra 1.49.

<sup>241</sup> The Arabic word صديق is often used as a designation of persons venerated on religious grounds. Thus it is applied to Muhammad's friend and father-in-law, Abū Bakr, who was the first Caliph. The description of the last state by the word 'truthful' corresponds to that of sūtra 1.48: *rtambharā tatra prajñā* 'In this (calm) the insight is truth-bearing' (Woods, 94). Cf. *India*, Hyd., 57 (l. 12): وإن قصرت رتبته عن رتب الصديقين 'though his degree be lower than that of the saints' (Sachau, I, 76). Sūtras 1.46, 47, 50, 51 are not reflected in the Arabic text.

<sup>242</sup> Lit. 'fixed in one place'. For إقرار القلب here cf. R, 183 (l. 21), corresponding to sūtra 3.2.

# AL-BĪRŪNĪ'S ARABIC VERSION OF PATAÑJALI'S YOGASŪTRA: A TRANSLATION OF THE SECOND CHAPTER AND A COMPARISON WITH RELATED TEXTS

By SHLOMO PINES and TUVIA GELBLUM

The following study contains a translation of al-Bīrūnī's rendering into Arabic of the second chapter of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* cum commentary. (On this point see our translation of al-Bīrūnī's rendering of the first chapter of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*.)<sup>1</sup> This translation is based on Ritter's edition of the Arabic text.<sup>2</sup> Comparison has been made with the unique MS of Ritter's text: Köprülü, 1589, folios 412a–419a (written on the margins).<sup>3</sup> We have also compared the text with parallel passages and expressions in al-Bīrūnī's *India*.<sup>4</sup> In some cases the passages in *India* are identical, while in others they show differences. Sometimes these differences are merely stylistic.<sup>5</sup> In other cases there is a doctrinal divergence.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, an attempt has been made here to indicate the parallels between the Arabic version on the one hand, and the Sanskrit text of the *Yogasūtra*,<sup>7</sup> as well as its extant commentaries,<sup>8</sup> on the other.

The following is a list of those sūtras of the second chapter correspondence to which may be found al-Bīrūnī's text: 1–18, 19 (?), 20–31, 33–40, 42–49, 52–55.

The following sūtras of the chapter under consideration do not seem to have been translated or to be reflected in al-Bīrūnī's text: 32, 41, 50, 51. On the face of it, it is likely that these sūtras did not occur in the text available to al-Bīrūnī.

Some observations on al-Bīrūnī's rendering of various terms and passages of the second chapter may be found in the introduction to our translation of the first chapter.

## Chapter 2

(R, 177, l. 12) Question 24. What is the way to the degree which is sought for one who, lagging behind,<sup>9</sup> has not yet reached it? <sup>10</sup> And how does one return to it who has fallen from it through a fault which he (committed) with respect to it? <sup>11</sup>

Answer. If the heart of him who committed a fault were not gone in wretchedness,<sup>12</sup> he would not have declined from (the degree of) happiness <sup>13</sup> which he had achieved. As for the way of attaining it, in the case of the striving (aspirant), and the way of return to it, in the case of the one who forfeited it, it consists in the steadfast performance of acts of worship and in tiring the body, i.e. fasting, prayer, chants of praise and recitations <sup>14</sup> whereby reward and recompense are attained, and all that is directed towards the essence of God, may He be exalted, and by means of which one may come near Him.<sup>15</sup>

Q 25. What <sup>16</sup> results for man from (his) exertions, asceticism, and self-mortification?

Ans. The result (consists in) his soul turning away from rebellion and (in) the quietude and tranquillity of his heart on account of the lightening of his afflictions.<sup>17</sup>

Q 26. What are these afflictions which burden <sup>18</sup> the heart?

Ans. They are ignorance, (wrong) opinion, desire, hatred,<sup>19</sup> and the attachments.<sup>20</sup> The greatest of these is ignorance, which serves for them as a root and basis.<sup>21</sup> Through them, or through most of them, man's destruction (comes about). Creatures have erred a long time because of them and have perished through them. In a self-mortifying ascetic, however, they subsist potentially and do not actively manifest themselves, just as seeds placed in a granary do not germinate, although (the capacity for) germination is latent in them; <sup>22</sup> and as a frog stunned by a blow, when not in water, does not revive upon the (dry) land, though it be alive.<sup>23</sup> For asceticism and self-mortification have weakened these (afflictions), so that they have been enfeebled, have withered and have come to the verge of being reduced to nothing. On the other hand, in the case of one who does not yet practise asceticism they are vigorous, strong,<sup>24</sup> and manifest. If he quells and attenuates one of these <sup>25</sup> (afflictions), its place is occupied in force by another one whose evil has increased. Accordingly he does not gain anything by the removal of (one particular affliction).<sup>26</sup>

Q 27. What is the meaning <sup>27</sup> of these forces which afflict <sup>28</sup> the heart and corrupt man ? (R, 178)

Ans. Ignorance consists in representing a thing in a way contrary to its true reality. Thus (an ignorant person) regards the impure as pure, pleasure as good, distress as well-being, the earthy turbid body as eternal <sup>29</sup> and as being man himself; he is ignorant of the fact that (man) is the soul rather than <sup>30</sup> (the body).<sup>31</sup>

(Wrong) opinion is the confusion of things so that one does not differentiate between them and, because of the resemblance,<sup>32</sup> imagines them to be one and the same thing. Thus one may have the (wrong) opinion that the corporeal subject which intellects and an abstract intellect are, with respect to existence, one and the same thing; <sup>33</sup> (or) one may not distinguish between the light of sight <sup>34</sup> and the light of the sun or that of a lamp, and may regard the two lights as identical.

Desire (consists in) coveting the goods of this world and the turning of one's attention towards the pleasures of the senses like roses, sandalwood <sup>35</sup> of Āndhra (?),<sup>36</sup> and the chewing of the betel <sup>37</sup> leaves after meals for the sake of savour and (the arousing of) lust.<sup>38</sup>

Hatred <sup>39</sup> (occurs) whenever distress and pain are inflicted <sup>40</sup> upon the body, or grief and anxiety upon the soul. This leads to aversion and to the manifestation of a hostile attitude towards them (bringing about) their <sup>41</sup> subjugation <sup>42</sup> with a view to cutting off the ties <sup>43</sup> with them.<sup>44</sup>

The attachments <sup>45</sup> are accessories <sup>46</sup> and additions to volitions and other (things).<sup>47</sup> For instance in the case of lusting <sup>48</sup> after women (R, 179): one cannot gain access to them except through accessories which help (in obtaining) success. Such (accessories) are presents (offered) when meeting them, constantly cleansing and perfuming oneself on account of their nearness, (trying to) make them bolder by playful (ways) and other (things) by means of which prestige is acquired in their (eyes) and love is won. (Another) example which (belongs) to the accessories of repugnant things is the (thought) of future <sup>49</sup> death when reflection is applied to the various kinds of the causes (of death).<sup>50</sup> When vigorous and dominant, all this <sup>51</sup> hinders the heart from making an effort (to do) what is obligatory and find rest from the affliction.<sup>52</sup> If, however, (the afflictions) have been enfeebled by means of the asceticism, the self-mortification and the abstinence referred to above, they become like unto roasted seeds <sup>53</sup> which (cannot) be made to germinate through being sown in



the ground, and like unto stewed frogs which cannot be revived through being plunged into a water tank.<sup>54</sup> Their corrupt and corrupting activity is (thus) annulled, so that it does not emerge into being. Thereupon they disintegrate like the simple (components) of the body when these return to their<sup>55</sup> wholes.<sup>56</sup>

Q. 28. What is the reason<sup>57</sup> for effecting in these five burdensome<sup>58</sup> forces the enfeeblement, the separation, and the removal referred to above?

Ans. The desire for liberation. For when (the forces) encompass and inundate the soul, it<sup>59</sup> cannot but acquire . . .<sup>60</sup> Among them requital through recompense and<sup>61</sup> compensation. Although in the other (world) these are imagined, in this world they are perceived by the senses and known.<sup>62</sup> For instance Nandikeśvara.<sup>63</sup> When he offered many sacrifices to Mahādeva, the greatest of the angels,<sup>64</sup> he merited paradise and was transported to it in his corporeal form and became an angel. (Another) instance (is) Indra, chief of the angels. When he fornicated with the wife of the brāhmaṇa Nahuṣa,<sup>65</sup> he fell under a curse and was transformed into a snake after having been an angel. While the soul is exposed to acquiring compensation, it will be necessarily entangled and will not<sup>66</sup> find liberation from its bonds despite its being pre-occupied with it.

Q. 29. Has entanglement a cause other than this, and in what way will you find compensation with regard to it?

Ans. Ignorance is in true reality the hindrance (preventing) liberation. The other (afflictions) that come after it,<sup>67</sup> although they are factors (bringing about) bondage, go back to ignorance. The latter is their source and place of origin. Entanglement has no cause (R, 180) other than it. The soul *vis-à-vis* these factors<sup>68</sup> may be compared to a grain of rice within its husk.<sup>69</sup> As long as (the grain) has the husk with it, it has the disposition (required) for sprouting and for ripening, and it alternates between its being generated and generating.<sup>70</sup> When, however, the husk is removed from it, these occurrences cease. It is purified (and thus becomes fit) for permanent existence in a (changeless) state.<sup>71</sup> As for requital, it exists in the (different) kinds of beings in view of the fact that the soul<sup>72</sup> repeatedly passes (through various changes) with respect to the length or shortness of the span of life and to abundance of or deficiency in well-being.<sup>73</sup>

Q. 30. What is the state of the soul<sup>74</sup> when it comes (to subsist) between rewards and the (consequences of) sins and thereupon is entangled in the trap<sup>75</sup> of births for the purpose of (receiving) benefit or punishment?

Ans. It alternates according to what it has opted for and obtained, between comfort and discomfort, and oscillates between pain and pleasure.<sup>76</sup>

Q. 31. Are, then, all entangled<sup>77</sup> souls equal in this matter or do their states differ?

Ans. Discomfort and pain only are the lot of the cognizant<sup>78</sup> soul, since the comfort of this world is the discomfort of the hereafter.<sup>79</sup> For in truth (comfort) can scarcely be obtained except through sinning in some respect.<sup>80</sup> And also for the reason that the man endowed with knowledge grasps the essence<sup>81</sup> of good and evil, and therefore comfort (obtained) by way of requital is transformed, as far as he is concerned, into discomfort.<sup>82</sup>

Q. 32. What ought he to do at this point?

Ans. (He ought) to turn away from that which generates entanglement and engenders (a specific) station<sup>83</sup> (in existence).<sup>84</sup>

Q. 33. And what are they?<sup>85</sup>

Ans. If the knower is not separated from the known (objects) he is with them, and consequently, because of this conjunction between him and them,

he is not liberated.<sup>86</sup> For in truth this conjunction only exists because of a certain ignorance.<sup>87</sup> But for the latter he would have been separated from the known (objects).<sup>88</sup>

Q 34. How is this ? (R, 181)

Ans. The intention with regard to each known (object) seen (by the knower) is the cognition of its elements<sup>89</sup> (namely, the knowledge) to which of the five (elements) it (belongs). (By 'the five elements') I mean earth, water, fire, wind, and sky.<sup>90</sup> (A further purpose is) the cognition (of the known object) with regard to its *quale*<sup>91</sup>; (i.e.) does it (belong to) the class of pure good or to the class of pure evil or to a class which is a mixture of the two ?<sup>92</sup> This cognition comes about through the intermediary of the senses.<sup>93</sup> Now, the senses<sup>94</sup> are untruthful on account of errors<sup>95</sup> occurring in them. That, however, which has no truth in it is not known with certitude. And that which has become voided of certitude must have been overtaken by ignorance.

Q 35. How (can) the class of a known (object) be discerned ?

Ans. If it is knowledge it (belongs to) the class of pure good ; if it is activity it (belongs to) the intermediary mixed class ; if it is persistence it (belongs to) pure evil.<sup>96</sup>

Q 36. What is the cause which necessitates the conjunction between the knower and the known ?

Ans. The knower, without the known, is in his essence<sup>97</sup> a knower *in potentia* ; he is actualized only through the known.<sup>98</sup> And it is for the sake of (the knower) that the known is known.<sup>99</sup> For this (reason) the conjunction between the two is necessary.<sup>100</sup>

Q 37. If it is through the known that the knower is a knower, how<sup>101</sup> then will he (subsist) in the abode of liberation, since there is no known (object) there ?<sup>102</sup>

Ans. The knower becomes a knower through the known only in the stage of entanglement, which is far from true cognition. In it knowledge is like unto a fantasy which is acquired by means of stratagems and of effort. For in it the known is within the sphere of hiddenness and concealment. In the abode of liberation, on the other hand, the veils are removed, the coverings are lifted, and the impediments eliminated. In it the (knower's) essence is cognizant<sup>103</sup> only and nothing but that.<sup>104</sup>

Q 38. How is separation which replaces the conjunction (in question) achieved ?

Ans. As long as a thing which (belongs to) the known (objects) is unknown the desire to know it keeps increasing until it (becomes) known, whereupon this desire subsides.<sup>105</sup> The *sensibilia* which are objects of knowledge are not, however, true reality which is as fixed as the *intelligibilia*.<sup>106</sup> When this is established with certitude which is not subject to any doubt, the conjunction (in question) comes to an end ;<sup>107</sup> the knower is separated from the known (objects) and in consequence is isolated and disengaged.<sup>108</sup> This is the meaning of liberation.<sup>109</sup>

Q 39. What happens to the knower when he is isolated and disengaged ? (R, 182).

Ans. Seven things happen to him, three of them in the soul, namely immunity from committing sins and the disclosure . . . this . . . the . . .<sup>110</sup> and four in the body, namely (a) regarding pleasures as pains, and (b) (considering) that the stuff<sup>111</sup> (of the feeling) of pleasure is ignorance, and (c) that the comprehension of that necessitates the knowledge of the contraries of their causes,<sup>112</sup> and (d) that the result of this is the effective<sup>113</sup> removal of these causes.<sup>114</sup>



Q 40. Whereby are these seven things achieved ?

Ans. By means of the qualities which render the knower pure and holy.<sup>115</sup>

Q 41. What are they and how many are they ?

Ans. These are eight qualities.<sup>116</sup> The first of them, speaking in general terms, is refraining from evil.<sup>117</sup> Speaking in detail, it is abstaining from harming any living being,<sup>118</sup> and avoidance of lying,<sup>119</sup> of robbery<sup>120</sup> and of fornication,<sup>121</sup> as well as keeping aloof from mingling with this world<sup>122</sup> without making abandonment of (all) this conditional upon (a specific) time rather than another or (a specific) place rather than another.<sup>123</sup> In these matters one should not restrict oneself to the avoidance of the deed (but should also) avoid giving orders concerning (the execution of the deed) as well as being pleased with the doer (thereof).<sup>124</sup> Though the species of evil are many in respect of their magnitude, their forms and the quality of the motives (to which they owe their impulsion), all of them pertain either to greed or to anger or to ignorance.<sup>125</sup> Furthermore, their forms<sup>126</sup> differ (for they present both) the extremes of excess and deficiency as well as the intermediate degrees.<sup>127</sup> If things are known by means of their opposites and of what is different from them,<sup>128</sup> and if, furthermore, it is known that whenever one kills, and thereby, through ignorance occasions pain and distress to the (person) killed, (the consequence which) is not hidden is that his retribution for this (act) is likewise composed, as was his act of ignorance and the infliction of pain ;<sup>129</sup> then, this being so, he who avoids killing is recompensed by the opposites of those two (i.e. ignorance and infliction of pain).<sup>130</sup> Then nothing attacks him in order to harm him.<sup>131</sup> For why should anything attack him, since (any) two antagonists are equal in his view so that he sees them as one form and as (having) one and the same degree. He does not pronounce judgement in favour of the snake and against the mongoose or vice versa.<sup>132</sup> As for falsehood, how base it is in its essence ! Whoever holds that veracity is good and prefers it is rewarded in paradise with the highest of the latter's degrees.<sup>133</sup> Whoever preserves his soul from the devil of robbery and the villainy of theft is given the capacity to perceive with his eyes the treasures<sup>134</sup> which are on the surface of the earth and those which are in its womb.<sup>135</sup> Whoever does not defile it (his soul) with fornication is granted the capacity to be able (to perform) whatever marvellous actions he desires.<sup>136</sup> In this places and times shrink for him.<sup>137</sup> Whoever sets himself apart from this world (R, 183) and does not mingle with it sees his state in the past before he entered (his) present form, so that he knows how (the state) was and where he was.<sup>138</sup>

The second quality is holiness, outward and inward. Whoever intends to purify and cleanse the body<sup>139</sup> magnifies (?)<sup>140</sup> hereby its impurity and consequently he regards it with disgust, loathes it, and turns away from it to the love of what is not impure ; hence he prefers the soul to the body.<sup>141</sup> Whoever fasts (abstaining) from food refines his body,<sup>142</sup> cleanses his limbs, and sharpens<sup>143</sup> his senses.<sup>144</sup> Whoever is content and is not greedy relaxes from fatigue and is set free from servitude.<sup>145</sup> Whoever recites<sup>146</sup> many (formulae of) praise to the angels and the spiritual beings<sup>147</sup> makes his heart familiar with (the particular angel or spiritual being) among them whom he aims at by means of these (formulae), and the communion between the two<sup>148</sup> becomes manifest.<sup>149</sup> Whoever applies himself assiduously to glorifying and extolling God<sup>150</sup> (achieves this :) his heart turns away from whomever is not (God), and he<sup>151</sup> returns to Him and abides with Him in peace.<sup>152</sup>

The third<sup>153</sup> quality is quietude.<sup>154</sup> For whoever aspires to (obtain) a thing seeks it, and seeking is motion, and with motion (stirred) by desire comes the

cessation of ease. Hence when he renounces all things singly and generally, and does not attach his attention to any one of them, he is truly at rest.<sup>155</sup> He is rewarded by not being harmed by heat or cold, by not suffering pain from hunger and thirst, and by not feeling any need; accordingly he is at peace.<sup>156</sup>

The fourth<sup>157</sup> quality is the quieting of breath through inhaling and exhaling of air and suspension of the two (i.e. of inhaling and exhaling) so that one becomes like one sojourning in the depth of water (and) doing without air.<sup>158</sup> Whoever realizes this (has the following:) his heart is divested of whatever turbidity it contained.<sup>159</sup> It is therefore able to do whatever it wishes.<sup>160</sup>

The fifth<sup>161</sup> (quality) is the compression of the senses (which are held) to oneself<sup>162</sup> (and prevented) from spreading out, so that one does not apprehend anything but (that which is) inside (oneself) and does not know that beyond the subject that apprehends there is anything else.<sup>163</sup> Thereby one is able to subjugate and dominate (one's) senses.<sup>164</sup>

Here ends the second section (dealing with) guidance<sup>165</sup> towards the *praxis* which<sup>166</sup> has been treated previously in the first section.

#### APPENDIX

##### I. Some rectifications of Ritter's printed text.

- (1) R, p. 167, l. 9: the MS has كتاب الحساب والتنجيم rather than الحساب والمنجمين as Ritter's text has it. Accordingly the translation ought to be: '... books of arithmetics and astronomy' rather than 'books of arithmeticians and astronomers' (cf. our translation, *BSOAS*, art. cit., 309, ll. 13–14).
- (2) R, p. 168, l. 1: the MS has ولذلك and not لذلك.
- (3) R, p. 168, l. 11: the MS has يحل and not يحيل. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 311, n. 76, where يحل has been proposed as an emendation.
- (4) R, p. 168, l. 20: the MS has الوجود and not الموجر. The reading الزجر is proposed.
- (5) R, p. 169, l. 6: the MS has المعالم and not العالم. Accordingly the translation ought to be: '... (according to) the sciences'. Cf. R, p. 167, l. 11: فالبخل بالمعالم من اقبح المظالم والمآثم.
- (6) R, p. 169, l. 16: the MS has كثير من المعاني rather than كثير في المعاني as R has it.
- (7) R, p. 170, l. 4: the MS appears to have الدهمة rather than العصمة or الجسمية suggested by Ritter. Possibly the word should be read الرغبة. Accordingly the translation would be: '... has severed the ties of desire'. Cf. R, p. 178, l. 16: وأما الرغبة فهي الحرص على النعم الدنياوية.
- (8) R, p. 171, l. 4 from bottom: Ritter reads مرتبة which he amends to زمنين (cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 316, l. 2 from bottom: 'two periods'). The reading زمنين seems preferable in view of R, 183, last line, where the correct reading appears to be المرات (rendered by us as 'occasions') rather than Ritter's (المراتب?). In the context زمنين and مرتين have practically the same meaning.
- (9) R, p. 173, l. 13: the MS has باوليته rather than بازليته. Accordingly the translation would be: 'because of his primordial (character)'. Cf. a parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 20 (Sachau (tr.), I, 27) where one MS has باوليته and the other بازليته.

##### II. Some rectifications of our translation of the first section (*BSOAS*, art. cit., 302–25) with some additional references.

- (1) art. cit., p. 312, l. 6: '... mixtures ...'—Arabic: أمشاج. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 35, ll. 2–3: الأبدان المشجية—translated by Sachau in a rather vague way: '... the ... bodies, being from their nature compounds of different things ...' (Sachau (tr.), I, p. 46, ll. 11–12).

- (2) art. cit., p. 313, n. 92: For the reading الغياض 'jungles' here, rather than Ritter's suggested الغياي 'desert', 'waste lands', cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 93, ll. 11–13: يسبحون في الغياض: زُهَّاد... Evidently يسبحون in the latter text should be emended to يسبحون and accordingly the translation would be: '... anchorites ... roaming in the jungles' (rather than Sachau's translation: '... anchorites ... swim in the pools'; Sachau (tr.), I, 121). Cf. the Sanskrit terms *vānaprastha* (derived from *vana-prasthā* = 'setting out for the forest' in e.g. Nāgōji's *Vṛtti* on YS 2.1), *araṇyāyana* 'betaking oneself to (hermit life in) the forest' (*Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 8.5.3), *parivraj-* 'to wander (as a mendicant)' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.22). Also cf. Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra* 4.2.41 (ed. W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928, 126): *aranya-guhā-pulīnādīṣu yogābhyāsopadeśaḥ* 'The instruction is that *yoga* should be repeatedly practised in places such as forests, caves, and on river-banks'.
- (3) R, p. 171, l. 2 from bottom: the MS has الانفعال والتعويد. Ritter's reading is الانفعال والتعويد. The reading as proposed in our article, p. 317, n. 134, is الانفعال والتعويد. But comparison with R, 183, last two lines from bottom, لا يقع عليه عدد فينفسل ويتبدد فيها بين المرات (Ritter's reading is المراتب) whereas the MS has المرات, suggests the reading الانفصال والتعديد. The sentence should accordingly be rendered as follows: 'But by means of continuous application, as a result of which division and multiplicity (lit. numbering) disappear, the faculty in question ...'. The latter reading الانفصال والتعديد يجب أن تتصل الفكرة اتصالاً (Ritter's reading is اتصالاً) p. 56, ll. 7–9: يزول عنها العدد لأن العدد يقع على المرات والمرات لا تكون إلا بسبب يتخللها فينفسل ما بينها (Sachau (tr.), I, 74, ll. 10–17: '... it is necessary that cogitation should be continuous, not in any way to be defined by number; for a number always denotes *repeated times*, and repeated times presuppose a break in the cogitation occurring between two consecutive times. This would interrupt the continuity, and would prevent cogitation becoming united with the object of cogitation'). If the reading الانفعال والتعديد is retained, the translation would be: '... as a result of which affects and numbering disappear, the faculty in question ...'.
- (4) art. cit., p. 319, l. 2: after 'rank' close parentheses.
- (5) art. cit., p. 321, l. 23: '... some realization is achieved through the above-mentioned habituation'. Replace by 'the same realization is achieved as the one achieved by habituation'.
- (6) art. cit., p. 342, l. 1: insert after 'compression': 'within yourself'.<sup>167</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In *BSOAS*, xxix, 2, 1966, 302–25. Incidentally, through misunderstanding the first introductory remarks in that study, a recent bibliographical work (Hajime Nakamura, *Religions and philosophies of India: a survey with bibliographical notes*, [II.] *Hinduism*, Tokyo, 1974, VII–21) confuses the text of al-Bīrūnī which is under consideration with a different work of his, the *Risāla fī fihrist kutub Muḥammad ibn Zakariyā' al-Rāzī*. It may also be noted in passing that what has been listed as a Chinese version of a commentary on the *Yogasūtra* in another recent bibliographical work (K. Potter, *Bibliography of Indian philosophies*, Delhi, 1970, 528, No. 6326) turns out to be a text belonging to the Buddhist Yogācāra school (cf. review by T. Gelblum in *Asia Major*, xix, 2, 1975, 276 f.).

<sup>2</sup> H. Ritter, 'Al-Bīrūnī's Übersetzung des Yoga-sūtra des Patañjali', *Oriens*, ix, 2, 1956, 165–200 (henceforth abbreviated as R). The edition has been compared with the unique MS of the text.

<sup>3</sup> We refer to the pagination known to Ritter. Since then the pagination of the MS has been changed: fols. 417a–424a instead of fols. 412a–419a.

<sup>4</sup> *Kitāb fī taḥqīq mā li 'l-Hind or al-Bīrūnī's India (Arabic text)*, Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as *India*, Hyd.).

<sup>5</sup> e.g. *India*, Hyd., 70, ll. 13–14: وفي كتابه باتنجل إن ننديشفر أكثر القرابين لمهاديو فانتقل إلى الجنة بقاله الجسداني ... ننديشفر فانه لما أكثر which corresponds to R, 179, ll. 14–15:

القرايين لمهادبو عظيم الملائكة استحق الجنة وانتقل اليها بقاله الجسداني. That it is not always *India* that has the shorter version can be seen from the following example. *India*, Hyd., 20, l. 9, reads *قال السائل في كتاب باتنجل من هذا المعبود الذي ينال التوفيق بعبادته* which corresponds to R, 173, *قال السائل من هذا المعبود الموفق* . 12.

<sup>6</sup> For instance see the nine rules of virtuous conduct as given in *India*, Hyd., 56. These correspond in part to the description of the 'qualities' (خصال), which refer to the *aṣṭāṅgāni* 'eight limbs, or stages' in *Yogasūtra*, ch. 2, sūtra 29 et seq. (see R. 182-3).

<sup>7</sup> Alias *Pātañjalasūtrāṇi*. Henceforth abbreviated as *YS*. References are made to the edition printed in P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, 3, Leipzig, 1908, 511-43 (abbreviated as Deussen).

<sup>8</sup> The following commentaries have been used.

I Vyāsa, (*Pātañjalayogasūtra*)-*Bhāṣya* (written between A.D. 350 and 650, probably in the sixth century A.D., according to Winternitz). Edition: Rājārām Śāstri Bodas (ed.), BSS, Bombay, 1892. (Abbreviated as Vy.).

Subcommentaries on I

(a) Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, (*Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣya*)-*Vivaraṇa* (eighth century A.D., according to P. Hacker, who defends the identification of this author with Śaṅkara, the celebrated Advaitin. See P. Hacker, 'Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin', in G. Oberhammer (ed.), *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner*, Wien, 1968, 119-48). Edition: Rama Sastri and Krishnamurthi Sastri (ed.), Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1952.

(b) Vācaspati Miśra, *Tattvavaiśārādī* (c. A.D. 850). Edition: as in I(c). (Abbreviated as Vāc.)

Subcommentaries on I(b)

(i) Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī, *Pātañjalarahasya* (sixteenth century A.D.?). Edition: *Sāṅga yogadarśana*, Gosvāmī Dāmodara Śāstri (ed.), CSS, Benares, 1935.

(ii) Hariharānanda Araṇya (A.D. 1869-1947), *Bhāsvatī*. Edition: in I(b)i.

(c) Vijñānabhikṣu, *Yogavṛttika* (mid-sixteenth century A.D.), comments on the *YS* and parts of Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya*. Edition: Nārāyaṇ Miśra (ed.), *Pātañjalayogadarśanam*, Vārāṇasi, 1971.

(d) Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (= Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa), *Bhāṣyacchāyākhyavṛtti* (end of seventeenth century and first half of eighteenth century A.D. according to P. V. Kane and P. K. Gode). Edition: Jivanātha Miśra (ed.), *Pātañjaladarśanam*, Benares, 1907 (henceforth abbreviated as *Bhāṣyacchāyā*).

(e) Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa (= Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa), *Pātañjalayogasūtra*-*vṛtti*. This is a separate commentary, patently different from the prec. though not unrelated to it. Edition: Dhundhirāj Śāstri (ed.), *Yogasūtra with six commentaries*, KSS, 83, Benares, 1930 (henceforth referred to as *Vṛtti*).

II Bhojarāja (= Bhojadeva), *Rājāmārtanda* (= *Bhojavṛtti*) (tenth century A.D. according to S. Dasgupta; early eleventh century A.D. according to R. Garbe). Edition: Rāma-śaṅkar Bhaṭṭācārya (ed.), *Pātañjalayogasūtra*, Vārāṇasi, 1963.

Subcommentary on II

(a) Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya, *Kiraṇa* (nineteenth-twentieth century A.D.). Edition: *Yogadarśanam*, Benares, 1939.

III Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, *Maṇiprabhā* (c. A.D. 1592 according to J. H. Woods). Edition: in I(e).

IV Bhāvāgaṇeśa, *Pradīpikā* (seventeenth or eighteenth century A.D. according to Dhundhirāj Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

V Ananta, *Yogacandrikā* (= *Padacandrikā*) (nineteenth century A.D. according to Dhundhirāj Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

VI Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī, *Yogasudhākara* (twentieth century A.D. according to Dhundhirāj Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

VII Nārāyaṇa Tirtha, *Yogasiddhāntacandrikā* (seventeenth century A.D. according to Rāmaśaṅkar Bhaṭṭācārya). Edition: Ratna Gopāla Bhaṭṭa (ed.), CSS, Benares, 1911.

VIII Baladeva Miśra, *Yogapradīpikā*. Edition: Dhundhirāj Śāstri (ed.), KSS, 85, Benares, 1931.

IX Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya, *Bhāṣya* (see II(a)). Edition: in II(a).

<sup>9</sup> For the Arabic word *مُتَخَلِّف* here cf. the term *manda* 'slow-moving, tardy, sluggish' in Nāgeśa's commentary on sūtra 2.1: *yogādhiḥkāriṇas trividhā manda-madhyamottamāḥ krameṇāru-rukṣu-yuñjāna-yogārūḍha-rūpāḥ* 'Those appropriately engaged in yoga are of three kinds: the tardy, the middling, and the most excellent, namely the novice (or aspirant, lit: "the one who wishes to climb"), the practiser (lit: "the one applying himself"), and the adept (lit: "the one who has mounted on", i.e. is in control of yoga) in successive stages'. Also cf. Baladeva ad loc.

<sup>10</sup> There is some similarity between this question and the one formulated by Vyāsa in his

introduction to sūtra 2.1: *katham vyutthita-citto 'pi yoga-yuktah syād iti* 'How can even one whose mind is aroused be disciplined in yoga?'. Also cf. Bhoja's commentary ad loc.

<sup>11</sup> There is some similarity between this part of the question and Hariharānanda Āraṇya's gloss (in his subcommentary on Vāc. under sūtra 2.1) on the expression *vyutthita-cittasya* 'of the mind which has been aroused': *nirantara-dhyānābhīyāsa-vairāgya-bhāvanāsamarthasya cetasaḥ* 'Of a mind which is incapable of mentally cultivating meditation, repeated practice, and detachment without interruption'. The latter, however, does not necessarily imply the idea of relapse or backsliding, which is clearly expressed in the Arabic text.

<sup>12</sup> Ritter's emendation شقاء has been adopted. The MS has شاعا and not شفاع as Ritter's text has it.

<sup>13</sup> السعادة. The term occurs in a similar context in *India*, Hyd., 21; tr. E. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, London, 1910, reprinted Delhi, 1964, I, 29 (henceforth referred to as Sachau (tr.)) in a passage parallel to one in the first chapter of al-Bīrūnī's translation of the *Yogasūtra* (cf. R, p. 175, n. 3).

<sup>14</sup> Lit: 'readings'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 61: القراءة والتسييح (Sachau (tr.), I, 80).

<sup>15</sup> cf. sūtra 2.1: *tapah-svādhyāyēśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyā-yogaḥ* 'Yoga of ritual acts consists in asceticism, recitation (of formulae), and the directing of one's mind to the īśvara'. مواصلة steadfast performance of acts of worship': cf. *kriyā-yoga* in the sūtra. Al-Bīrūnī appears to consider *kriyā-yoga* as co-ordinate with the rest of the sūtra. Unlike all other translators, al-Bīrūnī correctly understood here *kriyā* to mean 'ritual act' and not 'activity' in general. Cf. the use of the same term in sūtra 2.36 below: ... *kriyā-phala* ... 'the fruits of ritual acts ...' (cf. *Manusmṛti* 6.82; *Bhagavadgītā* 2.43; 11.48; Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.1; and elsewhere). Also cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 6.1: ... *kāryam karma karoti yah ... na niragrñ na cākriyah* '... he who does action that is required (by religion) ... not he who builds no sacred fires and does no ritual acts'; and cf. ibid. 6.3: *āruruṣor muner yogam karma kāraṇam ucyate / yogārūdrhasya tasyaiva śamaḥ kāraṇam ucyate* 'For the sage when he is a novice in Yoga the ritual act (*karma*) is called the means; for the same man when he is an adept quiescence is called the means'. Also cf. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.2.42, where a similar series of distinctly acts of worship is referred to as bringing about the dwindling away of one's *kleśas* (cf. *YS* 2.2). As for the single occurrence of *kriyā* in the *YS* in a different meaning, i.e. as 'activity' in the widest sense, in sūtra 2.18 (*prakāśa-kriyā-sthiti-śūlam ... drśyam*), it is explicable as a reference to an old or common fossilized cliché. التعب البدن 'tiring the body': cf. *tapah* in the sūtra, and its gloss as *śarīra-śoṣaṇam kāya-śoṣaḥ* 'emaciating (or drying up) of the body' (e.g. Baladeva, *Rāmānanda* ad loc., cf. Yājñavalkya's pronouncement quoted in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha*, ch. on the Pātañjala-darśana: ... *śarīra-śoṣaṇam prāhuḥ tapasām tapa uttamam* 'the drying up of the body is traditionally considered as the highest of all ascetic practices' (Poona, 1951, p. 367). Elsewhere al-Bīrūnī seems to have rendered *tapas* by التقيش and الصوم والتقش (India, Hyd., 56-7). On *tapas* as belonging to ritual methods for achieving contact with a deity and on the concept of 'the generating of creative glow' expressed by the term, cf. J. Gonda, *Change and continuity in Indian religions*, The Hague, 1965, 294; *idem*, *Die Religionen Indiens*, I, Stuttgart, 1960, 185. Also cf. H. Jacobi, *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, Bonn, Leipzig, 1923, 29. Also cf. Bhārucci's com. on *Manusmṛti* 12.87: *tapas ... karmāṅgam 'tapas ... is an auxiliary to the ritual'* (cf. J. D. M. Derrett (ed. and tr.), Wiesbaden, 1975, I, p. 283 = II, p. 428).

والصلوة والتسابيح والقراءات 'prayer, chants of praise and recitations': cf. *svādhyāya* in the sūtra and Vy. ad loc.: *svādhyāyah praṇavādi-pavitrāṇām japo mokṣa-śāstrādhyayanam vā* 'The term *svādhyāya* stands either for repeated utterance of such purifying formulae as the syllable *om*, or for the study of doctrinal texts on liberation'. (Cf. Śaṅkara on *Chāndogyaopanīṣad* 1.12.1). Gangānātha Jhā's translation of the term *svādhyāya* by 'self-teaching' (G. Jhā, *Yoga-darśana*, Madras, 1934, 75) and J. W. Hauer's by 'eigenes Forschen in den heiligen Schriften' (J. W. Hauer, *Der Yoga*, Stuttgart, 1958, 244) are over-restrictive and misleading. A. Daniélou's rendering of the term by 'self development' (A. Daniélou, *Yoga—the method of re-integration*, London, 1949, 22) is even less justifiable. 'Study', i.e. 'recite for the purpose of study' is rather a specialized meaning of the Vedic term *svādhyāya*. Its derivation from the centre-meaning 'individual recitation, rehearsing to oneself' is plainly explicable given the cultural context of oral transmission (cf. the English 'to read' with its specialized meaning 'to study'). In the *YS*, however, the relevant meaning is 'recitation', especially if the statement in sūtra 2.1 is considered as applying the ancient Indo-Iranian triad of 'deed, word, and thought' (cf. *Bhāsvatī* ad loc.). Thus *tapas* would represent bodily action, *svādhyāya*—voice activity, and *īśvara-praṇidhāna*—mental activity, the triplet presenting a series of progressive interiorization. Cf. the parallel use of *japa* 'repeated utterance' in sūtra 1.28, and the relation of *svādhyāya* to *īṣṭa-devatāsamprayoga*, 'communion with the chosen deity' in sūtra 2.44. For, as E. Conze puts it, 'The mantra is a means of getting into touch with the unseen forces around us through addressing their personifications. ... To pronounce a mantra is a way of wooing a deity ...' (E. Conze, *Buddhism—its essence and development*, London, 1953, 183). Also cf. the explicit classification of *svādhyāya* as a speech (*vāc*) activity in contradistinction from bodily (*śarīra*) and mental (*mānasa*) activities in *Bhagavadgītā* 17.15 and in Vātsyāyana's commentary on Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2. The employment of *svādhyāya* for yoga training can be traced



back to the *Brāhmaṇas* (see *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 11.5.7.1, referred to by H. von Glasenapp, *Die Philosophie der Inder*, Stuttgart, 1948, 218). In the *Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (4.4.22) *vedānūvacana* (recitation, or study by recitation, of the Veda) is presented, besides sacrifice, charity, asceticism (*tapas*), and fasting, as means of 'knowing Him'. In his *Yogasārasaṅgraha* Vijnānabhikṣu treats *svādhyāya* as itself embodying the principle of withdrawal or interiorization: he presents a graduated classification of *svādhyāya* into (a) vocally expressive (*vācika*), (b) secretive, i.e. restricted to lip-movements (*upamśu*), and (c) purely mental (*mānasa*) (G. Jhā (ed.), Bombay, 1923, 37; quoted by S. Lindquist, *Die Methoden des Yoga*, Lund, 1932, 112). Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha* (Pātañjala-darśana) includes *tāntrika* as well as *vaidika* formulae (*mantras*) as illustrations of *svādhyāya*. Also cf. R, p. 173, l. 10 (tr. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 319, Ans. to Q 11); *India*, Hyd., p. 61, l. 2 (Sachau (tr.), I, 80), R, p. 183, l. 6.

وكل ما يقصد به ذات الله تعالى يتقرب اليه cf. *īśvara-praṇidhāna* in the sūtra. Also cf. the expression *īśvarābhimukhikaraṇa* 'directing oneself to the *īśvara*' in a definition of the Sanskrit term referred to by Baladeva's com. on the sūtra. (See, however, al-Birūnī's rendering of the term in sūtra 2.45 below: n. 152.) The term *īśvara-praṇidhāna* has frequently been restrictively rendered by translators of the *Yogasūtra*. Thus 'resignation to the Lord' (J. R. Ballantyne, *The aphorisms of the Yoga philosophy*, Book II, Allahabad, 1853, 2; reprinted, Calcutta, 1960, 40); 'resignation to God' (Rājendralāla Mitra, *Yoga aphorisms of Patañjali*, Calcutta, 1883, 41); 'making God the motive of action' (Rāma Prasāda, *Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras*, Allahabad, 1924, 88); 'complete surrender to God' (Svāmi Hariharānanda Āraṇya, *Yoga philosophy of Patañjali*, Calcutta, 1963, 126). These translators, like most of the extant commentaries, were evidently misled by Vyāsa, who exhibits in his restrictive interpretation here a bias in favour of the Bhāgavata *bhakti* movement. Vy. ad. loc.: *īśvara-praṇidhānam* = *sarva-kriyāṇām parama-gurāv arpanam tat-phala-samnyāso vā*, i.e. the dedication (or alternatively: attribution; for this interpretation of *arpana* cf. both of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's commentaries on sūtra 2.1) of all actions to the Supreme Teacher, or the renunciation of their fruit (cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 3.30; 5.10 with Śaṅkara's versus Rāmānuja's com. ad loc.; 9.27; 12.6; 18.56-8). Divergence from Vyāsa's interpretation of the term, however, is already indicated in Vāc. under sūtra 1.23, where he discusses the term. The Sanskrit term in itself is applicable to three different levels or types of action: (a) (bodily) prostration of the body: cf. e.g. *Bhagavadgītā* 11.44a: *tasmāt praṇamya praṇidhāya kāyam* ..., (b) (verbal) prayer: cf. Nārāyaṇa Tirtha on sūtra 2.1: *praṇidhānam* = *stuty-ādi-janitā bhaktiḥ*, i.e. a devotion generated by chants of praise, etc., (c) (mental) contemplation, meditation: cf. Hariharānanda Āraṇya's com. on sūtra 2.1: *īśvara-praṇidhānam tu mānasah samyama iti*, i.e. the term refers to mental 'Discipline' (the three-staged meditation); and cf. the same commentary on sūtra 1.23: *sarva-karmārpana-pūrvam bhāvanā-rūpam praṇidhānam na tu karmārpanam* 'praṇidhāna consists in such meditation that is preceded by dedication (or: attribution) of all actions, and it does not consist merely in the dedication of action'; and cf. Bhoja on sūtra 3.20. By conflating the irrelevant usages (a) and (b) with the relevant one (c), this ambiguity or multivalence of the term *praṇidhāna* seems to have been systematized and rendered constructive or functional by Vāc. under sūtra 1.23. Here Vyāsa had commented: *īśvara-praṇidhānād* = *bhakti-viśeṣād* ... = by supreme (rather than 'special kind of', pace Woods, H. Jacobi, and others) devotion'. On this Vāc. comments: ... *mānasād vācikat kāyītvād* '... mental, verbal and bodily', correspondingly with (c), (b), and (a) above. This wide and integrated interpretation of the term here was later adopted by Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī's commentary on sūtra 2.1: *īśvare līlayā svikṛtātimanoharāṅge parama-gurau kāya-vān-manobhir nirvartito bhakti-viśeṣah praṇidhānam* 'praṇidhāna means supreme devotion performed by body, speech, and mind with regard to the *īśvara* as the ultimate preceptor (or: teacher) who has sportively assumed an extremely captivating body'. (Cf. the Jaina division of *duṣpraṇidhāna* 'misdirection' into *mano*- 'mental', *vāg*- 'speech', and *kāya*- 'bodily'. See R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga*, London, 1963, 135.) Other commentaries, followed by some modern scholars (e.g. S. Dasgupta, *Yoga as philosophy and religion*, London, 1924, 142) viewed the meaning of *īśvara-praṇidhāna* in sūtra 2.1 as being different from that of the same term in sūtra 1.23 (see e.g. Baladeva on sūtra 2.1), and various solutions were advanced to the problem ensuing from the assumed divergence of meaning (see e.g. Bhāvāganeśa on sūtra 2.1). In translating *īśvara-praṇidhāna* in sūtra 1.23 al-Birūnī seems to have followed an interpretation similar to that of Vāc. ad loc. (see R, 173, Ans. to Q 11, *BSOAS*, art. cit., 319; also cf. R, p. 175, l. 8; *India*, Hyd., 60-1). He then consistently translates the Sanskrit term in sūtra 2.1 in a similar manner. In translating the Sanskrit term in sūtra 1.23 he uses the words العبادات and وجهه دون غيره (R, 173); and in translating the term in sūtra 2.1 he quite similarly uses the words العبادات and الله تعالى يتقرب به اليه (R, 177). Al-Birūnī's translation of sūtra 2.1 implies (a) an understanding of this sūtra as referring back to sūtra 1.23; and (b) an understanding of *tapas*, *svādhyāya*, and *īśvara-praṇidhāna* as being closely interconnected in one well-integrated process. These two points are similar to the explanation propounded by H. Jacobi. The latter points out (a) that the pair of expressions *svādhyāya* and *īśvara-praṇidhāna* of sūtra 2.1 corresponds to the pair of expressions *taj-japa* ('repeated utterance of the symbolic syllable om') and *tad-artha-bhāvana* (contemplation on the meaning of that syllable, i.e. on the *īśvara*) of sūtra 1.28 respectively. Jacobi shows (b) a further correspondence in that *īśvara-praṇidhāna* follows *svādhyāya* (cf. also sūtra 2.32) in the same manner as *tad-artha-bhāvana* follows *taj-japa* (H. Jacobi, 'Über das ursprüngliche Yoga-system', *SPAW*, Phil.-hist. Kl., 1929, 605, reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden, 1970,

706). On the wider underlying problem of the textual structure of the *Yogasūtra* and the inter-relationships between its chapters 1 and 2 see F. Staal, *Exploring mysticism*, London, 1975, 90–5; cf. R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya und Yoga*, Strassburg, 1896, 40). For the meaning of the term *prañidhāna* relevant to the YS, cf. its use in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.41 as referring to one of the causes of recollection. It is defined by Vātsyāyana's com. ad loc.: *susmūrṣayā manaso dhāraṇaṃ prañidhānam susmūrṣita-līṅgānucintanam vā* ... 'prañidhāna is the fixing of the mind (i.e. narrowing the field of attention) with a desire to remember (an object in question), or alternatively: the pondering on the characteristics peculiar to the object desired to be recalled'. And cf. Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, kārikā 7: *prañihita-manāḥ* 'one whose mind is fixed (on an object which cannot be seen due to its minuteness)'; Bhāravi's *Kīrātārjunīya* 6.39: *prañidhāya cittaṃ* and Mallinātha's com. ad loc.: *viṣayāntara-parihāre-nāmany avasthāpya* ... 'fixing (his mind) on the self to the exclusion of (all) other objects ...'. Also cf. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.2.42: ... *yad api tasya bhagavato 'bhigamanādi-lakṣaṇam ārādhanaṃ ajasram ananya-cittatayābhīpreyate tad api na pratiṣṭidhyate śruti-smṛtyor īśvara-prañidhānasya prasiddhatvāt* 'Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhāgavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach etc.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Smṛti and Scripture' (tr. G. Thibaut, SBE). For Patañjali's definition of *īśvara* see YS 1.24. For a general account of the term *īśvara* cf. J. Gonda, 'The *īśvara* idea' in his *Change and continuity in Indian religion*, The Hague, 1965, 131 seq.

<sup>16</sup> The reading *وما* which is in the MS has been adopted instead of *وما* which occurs in Ritter's printed text.

<sup>17</sup> cf. sūtra 2.2: *samādhi-bhāvanārthaḥ kleśa-tanūkarāṇārthaś ca* ' (The *yoga* of ritual acts) has as its aim the cultivation of concentration and the attenuation of the afflictions'. خفة الإثقال in the Arabic text corresponds to *kleśa-tanūkarāṇa*; أثقال—*kleśāḥ* (cf. BSOAS, art. cit., p. 309, n. 51). R. C. Zaehner's rendering of *kleśa* in sūtra 1.24 by 'care' (in his *The Bhagavadgītā*, London, 1973, p. 141) is rather far-fetched. For an early attestation of the term *kleśa* as used in the YS cf. *Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad* 1.11: ... *kṣīṇaiḥ kleśair janma-mṛtyu-prahāṇiḥ*, '... when the afflictions have dwindled away there is cessation of birth and death' (and see n. 20 below). Also see H. Jacobi, art. cit., 590, 593; cf. E. Lamotte, 'Passions and impregnations of the passions in Buddhism', in L. Cousins and others (ed.), *Buddhist studies in honour of I. B. Horner*, Dordrecht, 1974, 91 seq. The expression *samādhi-bhāvanā* (or possibly a commentator's interpretation of this expression) appears to be rendered by *ارعواء* ... وطمانينة. However, al-Bīrūnī seems to have rendered the term below in sūtra 2.45, R, p. 183, l. 8, by *استقر*. *samādhi* can mean 'adjustment, settling, fixing', as well as 'reconciling' (cf. *samādhi* 'union, reconciliation'). And see n. 152 below.

<sup>18</sup> cf. the original meaning of أثقال—'weights, burdens'.

<sup>19</sup> In the plural in the Arabic text.

<sup>20</sup> In the plural in the Arabic text. This passage corresponds to sūtra 2.3: *avidyāsmītā-rāga-dveṣābhīniveśāḥ pañca kleśāḥ* 'The five afflictions are ignorance, egoism, desire, hatred, and clinging (to life)'. Some editions and MSS omit the word *pañca* 'five' in this sūtra. (For the fivefold division of the *kleśas* here cf. the expression *pañca-kleśa-bhedām* ... 'whose parts are the five afflictions' in the *Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad* 1.5, according to the reading adopted by the critical edition in R. Hauschild's *Die Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad*, Leipzig, 1927, reprinted Nendeln, 1966, p. 4.) For a different list, of six *kleśas*, cf. the Buddhist *Dharmasaṅgraha* ascribed to Nāgārjuna (ed. Kenjiu Kasawara, Max Müller, and H. Wenzel, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Aryan Series, I, Pt. v, Oxford, 1885, 14): 1. *rāga* 'desire', 2. *pratigha* 'hatred', 3. *māna* 'pride', 4. *avidyā* 'ignorance', 5. *kudṛṣṭi* 'false belief', 6. *vicikitsā* 'scepticism'. For further Buddhist groupings of *kleśas*—of eight, and of ten, beside the widely adopted group of three (i.e. *rāga* 'desire', *dveṣa* 'hatred', and *moha* 'delusion') see the PTS *Pali-English dictionary* s.v. *kilesa* (where, however, the Pali words *rāga*, *dosa*, and *moha* are incorrectly translated as 'sensuality, bewilderment, and lust'). There is an obvious agreement of the Arabic text with regard to four out of the five *kleśas*. ظن 'opinion' does not prima facie accord with *asmītā* 'egoism, ego-awareness' (cf. below Ans. to Q 27). Vy. and Vāc. ad loc. describe all the five *kleśas* as *viparyayaś* 'modes of erroneous knowledge' (cf. YS 1.6, 8 with Vy. ad loc.; *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 47 f. [henceforth abbreviated: SK] [reference is made to kārikās] with Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī* ad loc.; for an explanation: Jacobi, art. cit., 598–9). The latter or a similar term may account for the fact that al-Bīrūnī regards الظن as one of the *kleśas*. (In rendering *viparyaya* in sūtras 1.6, 8 above, R, 171, however, he used the Arabic word *نخيل*, and for *vikalpa*—الظن, whereas the reverse, i.e. the use of the latter Arabic term for the former Sanskrit term and of the former Arabic term for the latter Sanskrit term, would have seemed more appropriate.)

<sup>21</sup> cf. sūtra 2.4: *avidyā kṣetram uttareṣāṃ prasupta-tanu-vicchinnoḍārāṇām* 'Ignorance is the ground for the rest, whether they be dormant, attenuated, interrupted, or vigorous'. Cf. Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2, where a similar causal relation between *mithyā-jñāna* 'false or defective cognition', and the triad of *doṣas* 'defects', i.e. *rāga* 'attachment', *dveṣa* 'hatred, aversion', and *moha* 'delusion', is implied. For a similar position of the concept of *avidyā* (Pali: *avijjā*) in Buddhism cf. K. N. Jayatilleke's article *avijjā* in G. P. Malalasekera (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, III, fasc. 3, 455.

<sup>22</sup> Vy. on sūtra 2.4 (cf. Vy. on sūtras 2.2; 2.10; 3.50; 4.27) also uses the simile of the seeds but refers to 'burnt (*dagdha*) seeds' rather than seeds in a granary. Cf. R, p. 179, l. 6. And see next note.

<sup>23</sup> For this simile, and its juxtaposition with the preceding one, in the Arabic text here cf. Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabḥūṣaṇa* (tenth century), ed. Svāmī Yogindrānanda, Vārāṇasī, 1968, 576: *tatra ye jīvā avidyāvanta eva pare brahmaṇi layaṃ gacchanti teṣāṃ maṇḍūka-cūrṇavad anirdagdhā-bīja-bhāvavāt punar-utpattis tato rāgādi-yogāt punah-saṃsāra iti* 'As for those individual selves which attain assimilation into the supreme *brahmaṇ* while still possessing ignorance, they are reborn on account of the fact that their seeds (of rebirth, i.e. of mundane existence) are unburnt, like the powder (i.e. minute seeds?) of the *maṇḍūka* (plant), and in consequence of desire etc. (i.e. hatred and delusion—the three *doṣas* 'faults', cf. *kleśas*) they become enmeshed in further rebirths'. Evidently the word *maṇḍūka* here is a plant name, although its botanical identification cannot be conclusively ascertained. The word is attested in lexicons as a name of various plants, notably: (a) as *kuṭannaṭa* (i.e. *Cyperus rotundus* L. according to Monier-Williams) in Śivadatta's *Śivakoṣa* (an early seventeenth-century lexicon of medicinal plants, ed. R. G. Harshe, 'Sources of Indo-Aryan Lexicography', 7, Poona, 1952, stanza 41); (b) as *śonaka* (i.e. either (i) *Oroxylum indicum* Vent., or (ii) *Cyperus rotundus* L.—according to Monier-Williams) in the *Viśva(-prakāśa)* (early twelfth century), quoted by Śivadatta in his self-commentary, *ibid.*). Further, in the *Amarakoṣa* (which does not have *maṇḍūka* as a plant name) we find in 2.4.131 (ed. A. A. Ramanathan, Madras, 1971, r, 294) *kuṭannaṭam* with several synonyms, all of which appear in Monier-Williams as *Cyperus rotundus* L. If 'seeds' are meant by *cūrṇa* above, then *Cyperus rotundus* L. is a more likely candidate than *Oroxylum indicum* L. (of the Bignonia family), since the seeds of the former are approx. 1 mm. in diameter. (Cf. also Vy. under YS 4.25: *yathā prārṣi tṛṇāṅkurasyodbhedena tad-bīja-sattānumiṣyate* ... 'As the existence of seeds is inferred from the fact that a blade of grass sprouts during the rains ...') The *Cyperus rotundus* L. seems to have been known under the names *musta* and *mustā* (cf. Monier-Williams) to the Bower manuscript (fourth century); cf. its medicinal use in a mixture with pulverized iron (*ayo-rajas*) (A. F. R. Hoernle (ed. and tr.), *The Bower manuscript* (Archaeological Survey of India. New Imperial Series, xxii), Calcutta, Part II, 1894–5, ch. iv, p. 55, ll. 17, 19 (text), p. 135, ll. 5–9 (translation)). The *Oroxylum indicum* Vent., under the name *syonāka* (cf. Monier-Williams) also seems to have been known to this manuscript (Hoernle (ed. and tr.), Part II, p. 36, l. 8 (text), p. 98, l. 12 (translation)). Al-Bīrūnī may have found in the text of the commentary used by him the expression *maṇḍūka-cūrṇa*. This would account for the Arabic text here having بالضرب بالطحن

'as a frog stunned (or crushed) by a blow (or by beating)': the Sanskrit word *maṇḍūka* commonly means 'frog'; the word *cūrṇa* can mean 'pulverized, pounded'. However, the mistaking of *maṇḍūka* as referring to a frog rather than to the plant bearing this name seems to have occurred already in Vāc. under YS 1.19 in an amplified version of the simile in question. The latter reads: *yathā varṣātīpāte mṛd-bhāvam upagato maṇḍūka-dehah punar ambhoda-vāridhārāvasekām maṇḍūka-deha-bhāvam anubhavatīti* 'Just as in the absence of rains a frog's body, after having been reduced to a state of earth, when sprinkled with water from a cloud experiences again the state of being a frog's body'. This misunderstanding in Vāc. of *maṇḍūka* as 'frog' may have been encouraged by the observable connexion of the revivification of frogs with the advent of the rainy season, as expressed in the well-known 'frog-hymn', *Rgveda* 7.103.1–2: *saṃvatsarām śaśayānāṃ brāhmaṇā vrata-cārīnāḥ / vṛcam parjānyajinvitām prā maṇḍūkā avādiṣuḥ || divyā āpo abhi yād enam dyaṇ dītiṃ nā śuśkaṃ sarasī śāyānam / gāvām āha nā māyūr vatsīnīnām maṇḍūkānām vagnūr ātrā sām eti* 'The frogs having lain (dormant) for a year, as *brāhmaṇas* practising a vow (of silence), uttered forth their voices roused by the Rain deity. When heavenly waters have descended upon each of them lying like a dry leather bucket in a (dried-up) lake, the sounds of the frogs build up in concert like the lowing of cows accompanied by (their) calves'. The simile under consideration recurs in Vāc. under sūtras 1.27 and 2.17 where the corresponding passages significantly have *udbhijja* 'a plant' and *udbhijja-bheda* 'a kind of plant' respectively for *maṇḍūka-deha* 'a frog's body'. Accordingly Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī's com. *Pātañjalārāhasya* on Vāc. under sūtras 1.27 and 2.17 offers the gloss: *udbhijja* = *maṇḍūkādi*. (Also cf. Nāgoji's *Vṛtti* under YS 1.19, where the same simile has *mṛd-rūpaḥ* 'having the form of earth' for *mṛd-bhāvam upagataḥ*, and under YS 2.17.) The possibility cannot be ruled out that al-Bīrūnī had the expression *mṛd-bhāvam upagataḥ* in a similar passage in the commentary used by him, and mistook the noun *mṛd* 'lump of earth, clay' for the verbal root meaning 'to crush, pound, trample on, bruise', and hence rendered it by اثن بالضرب 'to stun by a blow' in the Arabic text here. It is also conceivable, however, that the latter Arabic expression is due to al-Bīrūnī's having misunderstood the expression *atīpāte* to mean 'attacking, knocking out'. Such a meaning for this word seems to be attested through the expression *prāṇātīpāta* (*Rāmāyaṇa* 1.58.22, crit. ed. G. H. Bhatt, Baroda, 1960). A similar misunderstanding—either by al-Bīrūnī or by the commentary used by him—of the word *maṇḍūka* as referring to a frog rather than to the plant bearing that name may underlie the similar simile occurring in the Arabic text below in Ans. to Q 27 = R, p. 179, l. 6 تصير كالحبوب المقلوة لا ينبت البذر في الارض 'they (the enfeebled afflictions) become like unto roasted seeds which (cannot) be made to germinate through being sown in the ground, and like unto stewed frogs which cannot be revived through being plunged into a water tank'. Also cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.204.16 (Poona ed.), for the simile of the 'burnt seeds'.



<sup>24</sup> Amend قوية instead of قوة of Ritter's text.

<sup>25</sup> The Arabic text has here أحديهما 'one of those two', i.e. one of a pair of afflictions. See following note.

<sup>26</sup> There is a correspondence between (a) *prasupta* ('dormant', i.e. latent) in sūtra 2.4 and the state of potentiality of the afflictions described in the Arabic text; (b) *tanu* ('attenuated', i.e. sublimated or weakened; cf. *tanūkarana* 'attenuation' in sūtra 2.2) in the same sūtra and the state of weakness of the afflictions mentioned in the Arabic text, (c) *udāra* ('vigorous', i.e. operative) in the same sūtra and the state of strength of the afflictions mentioned in the Arabic text, (d) *vicchinna* ('interrupted', i.e. intercepted, deferred) and the process of substitution of one affliction by another described in the last sentence of the same paragraph in the Arabic text. The rendering of *vicchinna* by 'interrupted' is supported by Vy. on sūtra 2.4, which defines *vicchinna* as the replacement of one *kleśa* by another.

<sup>27</sup> معاني—the plural form.

<sup>28</sup> Lit: 'burden'.

<sup>29</sup> Lit: 'pre-eternal'.

<sup>30</sup> An alternative rendering would be: 'he (himself) is the soul rather than (the body)'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 30 (Sachau (tr.), I, 40): ويسمون النفس بورش 'They call the soul *puruṣa*'; *BSOAS*, art. cit., 307.

<sup>31</sup> cf. sūtra 2.5: *anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā* 'Ignorance is the apprehension of the impermanent as permanent, of the impure as pure, of pain as pleasure and of not-self as self'. There is a correspondence between الجهل and *avidyā*, النجس and الطاهر—*asuci* and *śuci*, الشدة and الراحة—*duḥkha* and *sukha*. The error referred to in the Arabic text, that the body is pre-eternal—or eternal—is to some extent paralleled by Vāc. on sūtra 2.5, where reference is made to the practice of drinking *soma* in order to become deathless. The misapprehension of the body as man himself, referred to in the Arabic text, derives presumably from a passage similar to Vy. on sūtra 2.5: *tathānātmany ātma-khyātir bāhyopakaraneṣu cetanā-cetaneṣu bhogādhiṣṭhāne vā śarīre puruṣopakarane vā manasy anātmany ātmakhyātir iti* 'Similarly, apprehension of self in what is not self: "apprehension of self in what is not the self is apprehension of self in what is an animate or inanimate extraneous auxiliary, viz. the body, which is rather the location of sense-experience, or the mind, which is rather a tool of the *puruṣa* "'. And cf. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī on sūtra 2.5. Apparently al-Bīrūnī rendered *puruṣa* according to its original meaning 'man'. It may be added that the distinction between the body and 'man' was a commonplace of dominant trends of Greek and Arabic philosophy (cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 307). The words واللذة خيراً reflect a Greek philosophical conception. See, however, the sixteenth-century A.D. commentary *Maṇiprabhā* of Rāmānanda on sūtra 2.5: *tathā pariṇāma-duḥkhe bhoge sukhata-bhāntih* 'Similarly, the erroneous cognition of the property of happiness in pleasure which is (ultimately tantamount to) distress on account of (its subsequent) transformation (into the latter)'. Al-Bīrūnī may have encountered an early version of this explanatory remark. But it should be noted that while the Istanbul text has here واللذة خيراً والشدة راحة, a parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52 has واللذة هو شرّ وشدة راحة (Sachau (tr.), I, 68: '... and perceives that that which it held to be good and delightful is in reality bad and painful'). This version seems to approximate more closely than that of the Istanbul MS, which may be corrupt, to the meaning of sūtra 2.5.

<sup>32</sup> المشابهة derives from the same root as اشتباه which is rendered here by 'confusion'.

<sup>33</sup> Here the idea of confusion between العاقل البسيط and العاقل المتجسم, in spite of the difference of terminology, corresponds to sūtra 2.6: *ārg-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatevāsmitā* 'Egoism is the state in which the faculty constituted by the seeing(-agent, i.e. *puruṣa*) and the faculty constituted by the sight(-instrument, i.e. *citta*) appear as being essentially one (i.e. identical)'. (Deussen's version reads here *eva* instead of *iva*. The latter variant is, however, more plausible. It is supported by the semantically and syntactically similar use of *iva* in sūtra 2.54. For *śakti* here, cf. sūtra 2.23). But al-Bīrūnī has الظن, which he uses to render *vikalpa* (R, p. 171, l. 8) and perhaps *viparyaya* (R, p. 178, l. 1), whereas the sūtra here has *asmitā* 'egoism, ego-awareness, feeling of personality', the concept of which implies but is not identical with 'wrong opinion'. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 306.

<sup>34</sup> For the expression نور البصر 'the light of the eye' cf. *cakṣuḥprakāśa* in *YS* 3.21. For the underlying concept see Nārāyaṇa's *Mānameyodaya* 2.2 (ed. C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Adyar, Madras, 1933, 9): *cakṣur nāma kanīnikāntara-gaṭaṃ tejo* ... 'What is known as the sense of sight consists of the light situated inside the pupil of the eye'. And cf. for the varieties referred to in the Arabic text here op. cit., p. 155: *tejas* ... *arka-candrāgni-nakṣatra-svarṇādi-rūpaṃ nayanendriya-rūpaṃ ca* 'Light (or: fire; German: Glut) is of two kinds: (a) that which has the form of the sun, the moon, (ordinary) fire, the stars, gold, etc., and (b) that of the form of the sense of sight'. Also cf. Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.12 and 3.1.30 (ed. W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928); Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṅgraha* ed. Y. V. Athalye, Bombay, 1930, 8, and notes ad loc. Also cf. S. Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics*, second ed., Poona, 1975, 153-4: '... each sense is constituted of the physical substance whose specific quality it apprehends ... the visual sense is composed of light (*tejas*), since it is the instrument of the

sensation of colour which is the specific quality of light; and similarly for the rest of the senses'.

<sup>35</sup> cf. Sadāśivendra's commentary on sūtra 2.5: ... *śrak-candana-vanītādau* ... '... such as garlands, sandalwood, and women ...' as an illustration of pleasure. Cf. Mādhava's *Sarva-darśanasamgraha*, ch. 'Pātañjaladarśana' (Poona, 1951 ed., 361). Al-Bīrūnī may have encountered a similar expression in the earlier commentary which he used.

<sup>36</sup> The word الأدهري may be an attempted transcription of *āndhra*, the name of a South Indian country, whose western border could have been conceived (in North India) as extending as far as the Western Ghāts (*malayādrī*). For the likelihood of the association of Andhra with sandalwood cf. Daṇḍin's *Daśakumāracarita*, seventh ucchvāsa, ed. Kāle, fourth ed., Delhi, 1966, 177. In *India*, however, the name *āndhra* seems to be transcribed as اندر (*India*, Hyd., 201, Sachau (tr.), I, 299), انتر (Hyd., 135, Sachau (tr.), I, 173), and the derivative form انترى (loc. cit.). Alternatively الصندل الأدهري may be an attempt at transcribing *candanādrī* 'the Sandal mountain', or 'deriving from the Sandal mountain', referring to the Western Ghāts in South India, known as the source of the best sandalwood, and frequently referred to in Sanskrit literature. A further possibility is to read here الدردري, i.e. deriving from the *dardura* mountain (well-known for its sandalwood, cf. e.g. Kālidāsa's *Raghuvamśa* 4.51).

<sup>37</sup> The MS may be read التبول which is the form occurring in al-Bīrūnī's *India*, Hyd., 468: والقوة الهاضمة ضعيفة يقوّنها باكل اوراق التبول عقب الطعام ومضغ الفوفل فيلهب التبول بحدّته الحرارة '... the power of digestion is so weak that they must strengthen it by eating the leaves of betel after dinner, and by chewing the betel-nut. The hot betel inflames the heat of the body ...' (Sachau (tr.), II, 152). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 144 (Sachau (tr.), I, 180). The usual Sanskrit word is *tāmbūla*. For a detailed account of the custom of chewing betel leaves see M. N. Penzer 'The romance of betel-chewing' in his *Poison-damsels and other essays in folklore and anthropology*, London, 1952, 187 et seq. Penzer traced the earliest description of this custom to Sanskrit medical works of the first century A.D. Thus, op. cit., p. 201, n. 1: 'We find it mentioned by Susruta in a section on digestion after a meal (ch. xlv) where it says that the intelligent eater should partake of some fruit of an astringent, pungent or bitter taste, or chew a betel leaf prepared with broken areca-nut, camphor, nutmeg, clove, etc.' Cf. L. Lewin, *Über Areca catechu, Chavica belle und das Betelkauen*, Stuttgart, 1889; W. Krenger, 'Betel', *Ciba-Zeitschrift* (Basel), No. 84, 1942.

<sup>38</sup> cf. sūtra 2.7: *sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ* 'Desire is consequent upon pleasure'. The printed edition of Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda has in the sūtra here the variant *anuśanmā* 'born from, produced from' instead of *anuśayī*, evidently due to replacement of the latter word by an easier synonym. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī glosses: *sukham anuśete viśayīkaroti* 'It leans towards pleasure, i.e. it makes it its object'. This accounts for Woods's translation: 'Passion dwells on pleasure' and J. W. Hauer's: 'Die Sinnlichkeit erscheint im Bewusstsein als Lust' (op. cit., 244). (Cf. Vijñānabhikṣu, ad loc.; and the translations by Ballantyne, G. Jhā, and Rājendralāla Mitra.) But Vyāsa seems to explain the term *anuśayī* by *sukhānuśmṛti-pūrvah* 'preceded by the memory of pleasure'. A similar idea to that expressed by the sūtra here seems to be presented by Kaṇḍa's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, sūtra 6.2.10: *sukhād rāgaḥ* 'From pleasure (arises) desire'. (Cf. Śaṅkara on *Bhagavadgītā* 2.27.) Evidently, the point of sūtra 2.7 of the YS, and of the whole section, is to claim that passions are caused, and to show what the cause is—i.e. sense-objects contact. Thus the sūtra introduces and justifies the subsequent technique of the removal of this cause, namely the graduated withdrawal from the contact of the senses with their objects.

<sup>39</sup> In the plural in the Arabic text.

<sup>40</sup> يَكْسَب should apparently be vocalized: يَكْسَبُ.

<sup>41</sup> R has here a footnote reference numbered 4 which is apparently due to a printing error. Further apparently erroneous references to a footnote 4 on R, 178 occur in ll. 5 and 17 (after the fourth word).

<sup>42</sup> The MS has بالانماع followed by بها. We propose to read بالانماع لها.

<sup>43</sup> Or: 'their causes'. أسباب may be interpreted in both ways.

<sup>44</sup> cf. sūtra 2.8: *duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ* 'Hatred is consequent upon pain'. The expressions *pratigha* 'repulsion', *manyu* 'wrath', *jighāmsā* 'antipathy', *krodha* 'anger' in Vy. on this sūtra correspond more or less to كراهتها واطهار معاداتها of the Arabic text here.

<sup>45</sup> علائق. Cf. R, p. 178, l. 1.

<sup>46</sup> توابع, lit. 'consequent upon'.

<sup>47</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.9. There are two versions of this sūtra: (a) *sva-rasa-vāhī viduso 'pi tathā(-rūḍho 'bhiniveśaḥ* 'Clinging (to life) persists (lit.: flows on) by force of one's (or its) own (i.e. intrinsic—not due to extraneous causes such as pain and pleasure) nature (or impulse; schol.: = *rasa* = *saṃskāra*, *vāsanā*, motivating latent impressions) and is similarly ingrained (cf. Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda's gloss: *rūḍho 'bhinivīṣṭaḥ shirah*, i.e. "deep-seated, firmly fixed"; or alternatively: notorious, cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's gloss: *rūḍhaḥ = prasiddhaḥ*, i.e. "widely known") even in (the case of the) learned'. (This version is commonly printed together with Vy. For the reading *ārūḍha* the meanings 'incurred' and 'intensive' may also be considered here.) (b) *sva-rasa-vāhī viduṣo 'pi tanv-anubandho 'bhiniveśaḥ* 'Clinging (to life),

which is attachment to the body, persists by force of one's own nature (or impulse) even in the learned'. (This version, which was reprinted in Deussen, is attested in the editions printed by Ballantyne in 1853, and later by Rājendralāla Mitra with Bhoja's commentary in 1883, and noted as variant in the Chowkhamba edition of 1930, *pace* J. W. Hauer, op. cit., p. 466, n. 3). Version (a) appears to be a corruption of (b), although the possibility cannot be ruled out that even *tanu-anubandha* of (b) in turn is due to a commentatorial interpolation. The latter possibility would lend support to J. Filliozat's rendering of the term *abhiniveśa* in the *YS* by 'obsessions' (J. Filliozat, 'The psychological discoveries of Buddhism', in his *Laghu-prabandhāḥ*, Leiden, 1974, 147). Accordingly the term *abhiniveśa* in the sūtras themselves would not be restricted to the meaning of 'clinging to life' i.e. fear of death, as interpreted by Vy., Bhoja, and other commentaries. It would rather be a blanket-term for *prima facie* uncontrollable, congenital instinctive attachments, which differ from *rāga* and *dveṣa* in that they are (a) not temporary but continuous (cf. *vāhi*) and (b) not caused by any extraneous motivation, but are natural, or—as amplified by commentaries—are due to subconscious pre-natal conditions, i.e. experiences in a previous life which left their latent traces (*saṃskāras*). Thus the case of fear of death would be a mere exemplification of the wider concept of *abhiniveśa*. This would be in consonance with the general use of the term in Buddhism and the rest of the literature other than the commentaries of the *YS* (see, however, S. Dasgupta, *Yoga philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought*, Calcutta, 1930, 68). Moreover, Vyāsa himself seems to use this term in a wider sense: 'adherence to a view' (Vy. on sūtra 2.18; cf. S. Dasgupta, *Yoga as philosophy and religion*, London, 1924, 101). Also cf. the late *Tattvasamāsa* which uses the term synonymously with *prasakti* 'attachment' and defines absence of *vairāgya* ('detachment') as *śabdādi-viṣayeṣv abhiniveśaḥ* 'clinging to objects such as sound' (ed. J. R. Ballantyne, Mirzapore, 1850, 6–7). For the use of *svarasa* in the sūtra here cf. e.g. Āpadevi's *Mīmāṃsānyāyapraśāsa*, ed. and tr. F. Edgerton, London, 1929 s.v. in glossarial index. For the opposition between *svarasavāhi* and *anuśayī* in the preceding two sūtras cf. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinction between *sāmsiddhika* 'natural' and *naimittika* 'dependent on an extraneous cause, induced' (e.g. in *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*, ed. Nārāyaṇ Miśra, Vārāṇasi, 1966, 218; Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṅgraha*, ed. A. Foucher, Paris, 1949, 73). For *viduso 'pi* in the sūtra above cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 2.60. Al-Bīrūnī's Arabic text may perhaps reflect an early commentary which understood *abhiniveśa* to stand for attachment in the wide sense, and which exemplified the concept by two types of 'obsessions' or inborn instinctive drives, i.e. the sexual desire and the fear of death, both of which were accounted for by experiences in a previous life which left their latent impressions. Al-Bīrūnī apparently used version (b) and took *anubandha* to mean 'accessory'. This signification of the word is attested.

<sup>48</sup> Arabic: الولوع.

<sup>49</sup> Lit: 'is expected death'.

<sup>50</sup> In speaking of *abhiniveśa* Vy. and other commentaries on sūtra 2.9 mention the fear of death, but al-Bīrūnī's text does not correspond to them.

<sup>51</sup> Referring to the afflictions (*kleśas*) enumerated in R, p. 178, l. 1.

<sup>52</sup> ثقل is viewed by al-Bīrūnī as a rendering of *kleśa*. Cf. above R, 177.

<sup>53</sup> cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.10: *te pañca kleśa dagdha-bīja-kalpāḥ* 'the five afflictions (when they have become) like burned seeds'. The simile of the burned seeds recurs in Vy. under sūtras 2.2, 11, 13, 26; 3.50; 4.28 (cf. Saṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3.3.30). Nāgōjī's *Vṛtti* amplifies: *kleśa dagdha-bījavat vamaḥyā bhavanti* 'The afflictions are sterile like burned seeds' (under sūtra 2.2; cf. Vāc. *ibid.*).

<sup>54</sup> See n. 23.

<sup>55</sup> i.e. the wholes of the elements, earth to earth, water to water, and so forth.

<sup>56</sup> cf. sūtra 2.10: *te pratiprasava-heyāḥ sūkṣmāḥ* 'When subtle they (i.e. the afflictions) should be relinquished by resorption'. For the meaning of *pratiprasava* cf. sūtra 4.33: *puruṣārtha-śūnyānām guṇānām pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā vā citi-śaktir iti* 'The state of *kaivalya* consists in the resorption (into *prakṛti*, 'primordial Nature') of the *guṇas* (constituent qualities) no longer (motivated by) the self as a purpose, or alternatively (it may be defined as) the state in which the faculty of consciousness is established in its own nature'. There does not seem to be sufficient justification for Deussen's attempt to differentiate between the meanings of *pratiprasava* in the two sūtras: 2.10: 'Diese (Kleśa's), soweit sie fein (latent, unbewusst) sind, müssen überwunden werden durch eine (asketische) Gegenanstrengung (*pratiprasava*)'; 4.33: 'Die Rückströmung der von den Zwecken des Puruṣa freien Guṇa's ist die Absolutheit, oder auch sie ist die in ihrer eigenen Natur verharrende Kraft des Geistes'. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.2. Also cf. the use of the related term *prasava* 'production, evolution' in *SK* 65.

<sup>57</sup> سبب may also be rendered by 'cause' or 'means'. This last rendering may be suggested by the reference to sūtra 2.11: *dhyāna-heyās tad-vṛttayah* 'Their functions (i.e. their manifestations, or the afflictions in their gross and active phase) should be relinquished by meditation'.

<sup>58</sup> ثقیلة. Cf. القوى المثقلة للقلب R, p. 178. ثقیلة may correspond to *sthūla* 'gross' in Vy. on sūtra 2.11.

<sup>59</sup> Or: 'they'?

<sup>60</sup> According to R, several words here are wholly or partly illegible. Possibly two of the words are جزاء 'reward', which occurs in the next sentence, and اجر 'remuneration'.

<sup>61</sup> The MS has المكافاة and not المكافاة or which occurs in Ritter's printed text.

<sup>62</sup> cf. sūtra 2.12: *kleśa-mūlaḥ karmāśayo dṛṣṭādrṣṭa-janma-vedanīyaḥ* 'The latent residuum (or substratum) of *karma* (i.e. the traces of actions) has the afflictions as its root, and is experienced in the visible and the invisible birth'. In the *YS*, as elsewhere, it is often difficult to determine whether *karma* means the action as such or its subliminal supersensory effects (cf. J. D. M. Derrett (ed. and tr.), *Bhārucci's commentary on the Manusmṛti*, Wiesbaden, 1975, II, p. 406, n. 1). In the present context 'invisible birth' means 'future birth'. For this usage of the term *adrṣṭa* cf. *SK* 30 and Gauḍapāda's com. ad loc., Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.8, Kalhaṇa's *Rājataranginī* 1.130; Bhārucci's com. on *Manusmṛti* 10.80. For *vedanīya* as applicable to both pleasure and pain cf. e.g. Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasaṅgraha*, ed. Athalye, Bombay, 1930, 58; cf. Pūjyapāda's com. *Sarvārthasiddhi* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* 9.32: *vedanā-śabdah sukhe dukkhe ca vartamāno* . . . 'The word *vedanā* is applicable both to happiness and to suffering . . .'. For the use of the term *āśaya* in the sūtra, cf. sūtras 1.24; 4.6. For the meaning of *āśaya* here, which is synonymous with *saṃskāra* 'latent impressions', and may also be rendered by 'vehicle' or 'substratum', cf. sūtra 1.24 and Vy. ad loc. Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, 'Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali', *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, v, 1937, 231: '... *bijas*, germes, *vāsanās*, parfums, *āśayas*, que Vyāsa explique par "gésir jusque", *saṃskāras*, impressions: termes synonymes qui désignent une même chose considérée comme cause ou comme effet'. (For a view that *saṃskāra* should be rendered by 'motivations' rather than 'impressions' see A. Wayman, 'Buddhist Sanskrit and the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, II, 3-4, 1974, 352-3. Cf. S. Lévi (ed. and tr.), *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, Paris, 1911, II, p. 47, n. 1. For a distinction made sometimes by commentaries on *YS* sūtra 2.13 between *saṃskāra* and *vāsanā* see S. Dasgupta, *History of Indian philosophy*, I, Cambridge, 1957, p. 263, n. 1.) And cf. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English dictionary*, s.v. *āśaya*; = 'stock'. The opposition between imaginary requital in the other world and requital perceived by the senses as presented in the Arabic text here may be due to a misunderstanding of the opposition between *dṛṣṭa* 'seen, perceived, visible', and *adrṣṭa* 'unseen, invisible' in sūtra 2.12 above. According to certain Islamic philosophers, e.g. Ibn Sīnā, punishment in the after-life is an effect of the imagination. Similarly according to some Buddhist schools the infernal guards inflicting torments in hell are not real. Cf. Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*, verse 3; Candrakīrti's com. on Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamikasūtras* (Bibl. Buddhica), St. Petersburg, 1913, 44-5. The mutual relationship between actions (*karma*) and the afflictions (*kleśa*) is amplified by Nāgeśa on sūtra 2.3: *karmabhiḥ kleśāḥ kleśaiḥ ca karmāṇāṃ anavasthā tu bijāṅkuravad anādītvaṇ na doṣāya* 'Afflictions are due to actions and vice versa, but the (circular) infinite regress involved is no logical fault, for it is beginningless as encountered in (the stock example of) the case of the seed and the sprout (or the hen and the egg)'. (For the logical concepts here see B. K. Matilal, *The Navya-nyāya doctrine of negation*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 83.)

<sup>63</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 70 (Sachau (tr.), I, 93) where the stories of Nandikeśvara and Nahuṣa (below) are quoted from here. Nandikeśvara corresponds to Nandīśvara mentioned in Vy., Bhoja, and Rāmānanda on sūtra 1.12, where also Nahuṣa is mentioned. The story of Nandīśvara occurs in the *Brhannandikeśvara Purāṇa* (referred to by Rājendralāla Mitra, op. cit., 70). A story of Nahuṣa being turned into a snake by a curse is related in the *Mahābhārata* (Poona ed.) 12.329.30 f. (Cf. Manu 7.41; Āsvaghosa's *Buddhacarita* 11.14, 16; for further references see V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, *The Purāṇa index*, Madras, 1952, II, 216.) In this story, as known from the Hindu sources, it was Nahuṣa rather than Indra that was transformed into a snake. Al-Bīrūnī's mistake may be accounted for by his misunderstanding a Sanskrit text, especially if it used the word *indra* both as a private name and as a name of an institution or title, such as in the expression *devānām indra* which occurs in Vyāsa's version of the story here. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 307. For further references and a detailed account of the Nahuṣa legend which also occurs in the Purāṇas see J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit texts*, London, 1877, I, 307 f.

<sup>64</sup> الملائكة 'angels' is the usual Arabic translation for 'gods' in polytheistic, for instance Greek, texts. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 72 (Sachau (tr.), I, 95); Hyd., p. 68, l. 17 (Sachau (tr.), I, 91). Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 307, n. 37.

<sup>65</sup> Ritter's text has نَهَشَ.

<sup>66</sup> The MS has وانی; Ritter's printed text has وائى. We propose to read ولا (or possibly ولم).

<sup>67</sup> i.e. the *kleśas* listed in sūtra 2.4 after *avidyā* 'ignorance'.

<sup>68</sup> cf. here Ritter's quotation from *India*, Hyd., 42 (Sachau (tr.), I, 55): مثال النفس فيها بين: علائق الجهل التي هي دواعي الرباط.

<sup>69</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., loc. cit.: قشرة.

<sup>70</sup> For the simile, cf. *Kāthopaniṣad*, 1.6b: *sasyam iva martyaḥ pacyate sasyam ivājāyate punaḥ* 'A mortal ripens like corn, and like corn is born again'.

<sup>71</sup> cf. Ritter's quotation from *India*, Hyd., 42 (Sachau (tr.), I, 55): وصار له البقاء على حاله.

<sup>72</sup> The addition of the word 'soul' is justified by R's quotation from *India*, Hyd., 42 here: التي تتردد النفس فيها.

<sup>73</sup> cf. sūtra 2.13: *sati mūle tad-vipāko jāty-āyur-bhogāḥ* 'As long as the root (i.e. the afflictions) persists there will be fruition of the *karma*-residuum in the form of birth into a specific class (or species), length of life, and kind of experience'. Ballantyne, G. Jhā, Woods, and Hauer take the demonstrative *tad* here to refer to *mūla* rather than to the subject of the preceding sūtra, i.e. *karmāśaya*. This is implausible, both for syntactical reasons and in view of sūtra 4.8 where



*vipāka* recurs with reference to *karma*. The text of the *YS* seems to differentiate in its usage between *jāti* and *janma*, using the latter to refer to birth or rebirth as such (sūtras 2.12, 39; 4.1). For the use of the term *vipāka* here (also shared by Buddhism) cf. sūtras 1.24; 4.8. For the Arabic text here cf. *India*, Hyd., 42: 'وَمَا الْمَكَافَاةُ فُوجُودَهَا فِي اجْتِنَاسِ الْمَوْجُودَاتِ الَّتِي تَتَرَدَّدُ النَّفْسُ فِيهَا بِمَقْدَارِ: (Sachau (tr.), I, 55: 'The retribution of the soul depends on the various kinds of creatures through which it wanders, upon the extent of life, whether it be long or short, and upon the particular kind of its happiness, be it scanty or ample'. The words *السَّعَةِ وَالسَّعَةِ فِي الضِّيقِ وَالسَّعَةِ* which occur both in *India* and the translation of the *YS* can also be translated: '... and to well-being in adversity and prosperity'. Here *نَعْمَةٌ* seems to render *bhoga* 'experience' (lit. 'enjoyment').

<sup>74</sup> النفس. The relevant passage in *India*, referred to by R, has روح 'spirit'.

<sup>75</sup> Lit. 'the imprisonment'. R's emendation here, بَحْسَن, is less plausible than بَحْسَن that occurs in the MS.

<sup>76</sup> cf. sūtra 2.14: *te hlāda-paritāpa-phalāḥ puṇyāpuṇya-hetutvāt* 'The latter (i.e. birth, length of life, and the kind of experience) bring joy or anguish as their fruit, according as their cause is merit or demerit'.

<sup>77</sup> The MS has المرتبة and not المتركة which occurs in R's text.

<sup>78</sup> R reads here العالية 'superior'. For the reading العالمة cf. *vivekin* 'discriminative, wise' in sūtra 2.15: *pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair gaṇa-vṛtti-virodhāc ca sarvaṃ duḥkham eva vivekinah* 'To the discriminating person all is nothing but suffering, on account of (the types of) suffering constituted by (a) transmutation (of pleasure into eventual suffering e.g. through hankering for it), (b) pain as such (or the anxiety to secure pleasure), and (c) latent impressions (i.e. past demerit which results in suffering), and because the functions of the *gaṇas* (which constitute the mind) are in conflict'. For the conflict between the three *gaṇas* cf. *SK* 12. Also cf. *Vāc.* on sūtra 1.2 (= Woods's tr., 10) where mental restlessness (*vikṣepa*) is explained as due to reciprocal antagonisms of the *gaṇas* which constitute the mind-stuff (*citta*). Ballantyne, however, unconvincingly takes *virodhā* to refer to an opposition between the *gaṇas* and the goal of liberation: 'since the modifications of the Qualities are adverse (to the *summum bonum*)'. Jacobi takes *pariṇāma* to mean impermanence ('Unbeständigkeit') (of enjoyment). But our rendering by 'transmutation' may be supported by comparison with *Bhagavadgītā* 18.38 (quoted by Baladeva ad loc.): *viśayendriya-samyogād yat tad agre 'mr̥topamam / pariṇāme viṣam iva tat sukhaṃ rājasam smṛtam* 'Springing from union of the senses with their objects (that pleasure) which at the beginning is nectar, but is in maturity like poison, that pleasure is traditionally known as the *rājas* type'. (For *pariṇāma* here cf. the parallel expression *anubandha* 'consequence', in the subsequent verse. Also cf. the idea in verse 5.22.) Moreover, *pariṇāma* (unlike *vipariṇāma*, see below) does not mean change, vicissitude, or impermanence as such, but maturing in time, transformation (cf. W. Liebethal, *Sattkārya in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegner*, Berlin, 1934, p. 36, n. 33). The idea expressed by the term *pariṇāma* in the sūtra is also implicit in *YS* 2.5, above. There *avidyā*—a term rendered by T. Stcherbatsky (in his *The conception of Buddhist nirvāṇa*, reprinted, The Hague, 1965, 236) as 'naïve realism' (as contrasted with 'philosophic insight')—is described as consisting *inter alia* in misapprehending as pleasure that which is (eventually or ultimately) suffering (cf. *Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī's* com. on *YS* 2.5). This is essentially also the force of *Bhagavadgītā* 5.22: *ye hi saṃsparśajā bhogā duḥkha-yonaya eva te / ādyantavantaḥ kaunteya na teṣu ramate budhah* 'For the enjoyments that are generated by (outside) contacts are nothing but sources of suffering / They have beginning and end, son of Kuntī; the wise man takes no delight in them'. And cf. *Aniruddha's* commentary on *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 2.1. A better understanding of the sūtra under consideration, especially with reference to the phrase *gaṇa-vṛtti-virodhāt*, might depend on the understanding of the full meaning of the concept of *duḥkha*. In *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* as in early Buddhist writings, *duḥkha* appears to have been conceived as a real character of a constantly changing objective world; moreover, *duḥkha* itself seems to refer to unrest and commotion. Cf. *loka-duḥkha* in *Kāthopaniṣad*, 5.11 and its antonym *sukha* 'restfulness', op. cit., 1.11 (cf. *sukha* in *YS* 2.46). (Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Central conception of Buddhism*, reprinted, Calcutta, 1956, 40 et seq.) In the sūtra under consideration in the *YS* there seems to be an underlying construction referring to the threefold division of time: *pariṇāma*—transformation, which of necessity involves pain, points to the future; *tāpa*—suffering centred in the present, and *saṃskāra*—active traces of past experience, which are a source of pain. Reflection on the divisions of time may also be found in *YS* 1.26; 3.13, 16. Also cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, discussed in Stcherbatsky, *Central conception*, 39. A somewhat similar threefold classification of *duḥkha* constitutes a well-known early Buddhist formula: (a) *vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā* 'suffering due to change or decay'; (b) *duḥkha-duḥkhatā* 'suffering as such'; (c) *saṃskāra-duḥkhatā* 'suffering due to the fact of being conditioned'. (For references see de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Paris, 1925, I, ch. vi, section 3. Also cf. Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature*, reprinted, Delhi, 1975, 157.) In their Buddhist application or adaptation the three terms of the formula have a conspicuous correspondence to the Buddhist fundamental triple doctrine of *anityatā* 'impermanence', *duḥkha* 'suffering', and *nairātmya* 'unsubstantiality' respectively. In the sūtra under consideration in the *YS* the lack of co-ordination between the instrumental suffix in *duḥkhaiḥ* and the ablative suffix in *virodhāt*, which seems to be unusual for the style of

the YS, may point to the possibility of *guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāt* being an accretion. Vijñānabhikṣu, and his pupil Bhāvāgaṇeśa, have here the implausible variant *avirodhāt* instead of *virodhāt*. The former commentator has the gloss: *duḥkha-sambhinnavāt* 'on account of suffering being involved'. He seems to refer to the Sāṅkhya theory that the *guṇas*, i.e. *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, are of the nature of *sukha* 'happiness', *duḥkha* 'suffering', and *moha* 'delusion', respectively (cf. SK 12, and cf. *Maitryupaniṣad* 6.10), which implies that *duḥkha* is involved in all combinations and functioning of the three *guṇas*. The fundamental concept of *duḥkha* has recently been subjected to some misguided and fanciful reinterpretations, with little regard to its ordinary meaning. An example is A. Danto's *Mysticism and morality*, Pelican Books, 1976, 57, where the concept is presented in terms of 'cosmic boredom' and the 'mere tedium' of having repeatedly to be reborn. Translations of the sūtra under consideration vary considerably; none of them is indubitable. A recent example is G. Feuerstein and Y. Miller in their essay 'The meaning of suffering in Yoga' in their *A reappraisal of Yoga: essays in Indian philosophy*, London, 1971, 88: 'Because of the [moment of] suffering in the "vibrations" (of the psychomental life), in the affliction (of life), in the subconscious impressions and because of the opposite movements of the primary energies—everything is nothing but suffering to the one who discriminates (*vivekin*)'.

<sup>79</sup> cf. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* 18.38 (the verse itself is alluded to by Baladeva on YS 2.15, see previous note above): ... *pariṇāme viṣam iva ... adharmatāj-janīta-narakādi-hetuvāc ca pariṇāme tad-upabhoga-pariṇāmānte viṣam iva* ... and (that pleasure) is consequently (in maturity, lit.: 'transformation') like poison, i.e. (because ... and) because of demerit and hell which is generated by it'.

<sup>80</sup> cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.15: *tathā cokaṁ nānupahatya bhūtāny upabhogaḥ sambhavatīti himsākṛto 'py asti śārīrah karmāśaya iti* 'And similarly it has been said: "No enjoyment is possible without hurting (or, killing) some living beings"; so that there is in addition (to the mental latent impressions) a corporal latent residuum due to the act of inflicting injury (or, killing)'.

<sup>81</sup> The MS has مائة which is given in Ritter's text as مائة. The reading of this word is doubtful. An alternative reading could be بنائبة, i.e. 'the alternating succession' of good and evil.

<sup>82</sup> Ritter's text has here شدة. The correct reading is شدة. Cf. *India*, Hyd. (see next note).

<sup>83</sup> The reading مقام seems preferable to مقام as vocalized in R. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 60: إن المحيط بأحوال الدنيا يعلم أن خبرها شراً وراحتها مستحيلة في المكافأة إلى شدة فيعرض عما يؤكد الارتباك ويولد المقام. This is translated by Sachau: 'For he who accurately understands the affairs of the world knows that the good ones among them are evil in reality, and that the bliss which they afford changes in the course of recompense into pains. Therefore he avoids everything which might result in making him stay in the world for a still longer period' (op. cit., I, 79; italics—ours, T.G. and S.P.). Also cf. next note. In *India* al-Bīrūnī also uses the term مقام as a Sūfī term. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 66: والظلمة والنور مقام من الله ألف مقام بين العبد وبين الله. 'Further they (i.e. the Sūfīs) say: "Between man and God there are a thousand stages of light and darkness"' (Sachau (tr.), I, 88).

<sup>84</sup> This passage in the Arabic text probably corresponds to sūtra 2.16: *heyam duḥkham anāgatam* 'That which is to be avoided (lit.: relinquished) is suffering yet to come'. For the technical use of *heyā* here cf. in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.1 the fourfold formula *heyā-hānopāyādhigantavya* ... 'that which is to be relinquished (i.e. *duḥkha*), the relinquishing (i.e. knowledge of reality), its means (i.e. the relevant philosophical science), and that which is to be attained (i.e. emancipation)'. Also cf. Gauḍapāda's *Āgamaśāstra*, verse 4.90: *heyā-jñeyāpya-pākyāni vijñeyāny agrayānataḥ / teṣām anyatra vijñeyād upalambhas triṣu smṛtaḥ* 'That which is to be relinquished, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be learned from the Agrayāna (i.e. Mahāyāna). It has been recorded that apart from that which is to be known, the remaining three are amenable to perception' (cf. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya (ed. and tr.), *The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*, Calcutta, 1943, 199). الإعراض 'turn away' in the Arabic text seems to correspond to *heyam* 'is to be relinquished' or 'should be relinquished'.

ما ينتج الارتباك ويولد المقام 'that which generates entanglement and engenders (a specific) station (in existence)' is probably a rendering of a gloss on *duḥkha* in terms of *samsāra*. The latter term has the meaning 'undergoing transmigration' (as well as 'mundane existence, the world'). Cf. Bhoja on sūtra 2.16: ... *samsāra-duḥkham hātavyam* '... mundane suffering is to be abandoned'; and on sūtra 2.17: *sa heyasya duḥkhasya guṇa-pariṇāma-rūpasya samsārasya hetuḥ* 'That is the cause of the suffering which is to be relinquished, i.e. of the mundane condition (*samsāra*) which consists in the transformation of the constituent qualities'.

<sup>85</sup> The word هي may refer to ارتباك 'entanglement' and مقام 'station', in which case the dual هما would be grammatically more correct. Alternatively, it may refer to ما in عما 'from that which'. In this case هو would be grammatically more correct.

<sup>86</sup> This seems to be a translation of sūtra 2.17: *draṣṭṛ-dṛśyayoh samyogo heyā-hetuḥ* 'The cause of that which is to be relinquished (i.e. the cause of suffering) is the conjunction between the seer (i.e. *puruṣa*) and (objects) seen (i.e. *prakṛti*)'. An alternative reading incorporates *iva* 'as it were' after *samyoga*. For the term *samyoga* here cf. SK 20, 21. And see n. 88, below.

<sup>87</sup> This seems to be a translation of sūtra 2.24: *tasya* (viz. *saṃyogasya*, see last word of the preceding sūtra) *hetur avidyā* 'The cause of that (conjunction) is ignorance'. An alternative reading of Bhoja's com. (recorded in Rajendralāla Mitra's critical apparatus) incorporates *heyam* 'to be relinquished' but this is not reflected in al-Bīrūnī's Arabic text.

<sup>88</sup> Here عالم corresponds to *draṣṭr* in sūtra 2.17; المعلومات to *dr̥ṣya* ibid.; الاتصال to *saṃyoga* ibid. Also انفصل roughly corresponds to *heyam* ibid. For the use of the term *saṃyoga* here cf. sūtras 2.23, 25. The YS significantly uses a different term, *saṃprayoga*, for 'contact' (as between the senses and their objects), in sūtra 2.54, and in sūtra 3.21 (according to a plausible variant reading), and for 'communion' with a chosen deity in sūtra 2.44. Cf. SK 20, 21, 66 and Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.4. To the term *saṃprayoga* as used in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā corresponds the term *saṃnikarṣa* as used in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (cf. e.g. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.1.18). For the term *draṣṭr* here cf. sūtras 1.3; 2.20; 4.22 and SK 19. For the term *dr̥ṣya* cf. sūtras 2.18, 21; 4.20, 22.

<sup>89</sup> العنصر in the singular. This Arabic term renders *bhūta* 'element', which occurs in Vy. on sūtra 2.18: ... *bhūta-bhāvena prthivy-ādīnā* ... '... as elements (it evolves into) earth ...'. Cf. R., 191, l. 4 (third chapter of the Arabic text): العناصر الخمسة من الارض والماء والنار والرياح والهاء 'This is what he attains as far as the elements are concerned, i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, and heaven'. (Elsewhere al-Bīrūnī seems to render *ākāśa* by الهواء 'air'. Cf. R., 170, 190; see BSOAS, art. cit., p. 314, n. 111.)

<sup>90</sup> These five elements are referred to by commentators on sūtra 2.18. See Vy. and Bhoja ad loc.

<sup>91</sup> Either كيفية or جنس may refer to *guṇa* (which is elsewhere sometimes rendered by القوى, e.g. R., p. 191, l. 7). Cf., however, Vy. on sūtra 2.18: *tatpreṣṭāṇiṣṭa-guṇa-svarūpādvadhāraṇam* ... 'the determination of the nature of *guṇas* (viz. specific objects of experience) as being desirable or undesirable ...'. See also following note.

<sup>92</sup> This may either reflect Vy. on sūtra 2.18 (see preceding note) or the text of sūtra 2.19: *viśeṣāviśeṣa-līṅgamātrālīṅgāni guṇa-parvāni* 'The subdivisions of the constituent qualities (*guṇas*) are the particularized (*viśeṣa*; according to Vy.: the gross elements, the senses and the *manas*), the non-particularized (*aviśeṣa*; viz. the subtle elements and the *ahaṅkāra*), the characterized (*līṅgamātra*; viz. the *buddhi*), and the non-characterized (*ālīṅga*; viz. *prakṛti*)'. The expression *guṇa-parvāni* may correspond to معرفته بالكيفية. The words آخر جنس اهو من جنس الخیر may be an attempt based on the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī to translate the rest of the sūtra. The possibility cannot be ruled out that al-Bīrūnī may have discovered the view that one of the three *guṇas*, namely *kriyā* (= *rajas*) is a compound of the other two in this commentary used by him. But if this too should not have been the case, the conjecture may be put forward that this passage may have been due to a misunderstanding on his part of a definition of *bhoga* 'experience' similar to that occurring in Vy. on sūtra 2.18: ... *iṣṭāṇiṣṭa-guṇa-svarūpādvadhāraṇam avibhāgāpannam bhogo* ... '... experience is the determination of the nature of the *guṇas* (viz. in the form of specific empirical objects), which have not been distinguished (from the real self, the *puruṣa*) as being desirable or undesirable' (cf. definition of experience in sūtra 3.35: *sattva-puruṣayor atyantāsaṃkīrṇayoh pratyaṣṭāviśeṣo bhogah* ... '... experience consists in the lack of discrimination in (a given) mental percept between the *sattva* (viz. the *buddhi*, the mind) and the real self which are absolutely distinct ...'). Al-Bīrūnī may have misinterpreted the difficult expression *avibhāgāpannam* (or a similar expression). He may have believed that in this context *avibhāga*, lit. 'lack of separation', refers to a mixture of *guṇas*. The correct interpretation of the Sanskrit words here is: 'characterized by lack of discrimination'. This clearly refers to the relationship between the *puruṣa* 'self', and the *buddhi* 'mind'. For the Arabic expression آخر الجنس as a rendering of *sattva* cf. the latter's meaning 'purity and goodness'. Cf. e.g. the term *sattva-sthah* in *Maitryupaniṣad* 6.30 (pace P. Deussen's rendering of *sattva* here by 'Realität' in his *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1905, 350). Also cf. the moral interpretation of the three *guṇas*, or the application of their scheme to the moral sphere, as in *Mahābhārata* 12.302.4 (Poona ed.). In the latter verse a correspondence seems to be brought out between the action of *sattva* and that of *puṇya* (merit), the action of *tamas* and that of *adharma* (i.e. *pāpa* 'demerit'), and the action of *rajas* and that of *puṇya-pāpa* (the admixture of merit and demerit). (Cf. E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṅkhya*, London, 1937, 23 seq. Johnston, however, seems to have overstated his point: 'In the earliest stage of Sāṅkhya ... the *guṇas* ... have nothing to do with explanations of the multifariousness of phenomena; their sole function is to register the moral state of the individual as determined by his acts', op. cit., p. 36.) This or a similar text in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī might account for his characterization of *rajas* as a mixture of *sattva* and *tamas*.

<sup>93</sup> In the Arabic الحس in the singular.

<sup>94</sup> The senses (*indriya*-) are mentioned in sūtra 2.18.

<sup>95</sup> In the Arabic الناطق in the singular.

<sup>96</sup> cf. sūtra 2.18: *prakāśa-kriyā-sthiti-śīlam bhūtendriyātmakam bhogāpavargārtham dr̥ṣyam* 'The range of objects that are seen (i.e. *prakṛti*) (consists of) that which (a) has as its function illumination, activity, and inertia (lit.: "constancy"), (b) is constituted by the elements and

the senses, and (c) has as its purpose experience and liberation'. Deussen's rendering of *bhoga* here by 'enjoyment' ('Genuss') is misleadingly too literal, and Hauer's rendering by 'devouring the world' ('Weltessen') is rather bizarre. See e.g. Annambhaṭṭa's definition of *bhoga* in his *Dīpikā* commentary on his *Tarkasaṅgraha*: ... *sukha-duḥkhānyātara-sāksātkārah* '... the direct apprehension either of pleasure or pain' (A. Foucher, *Le compendium des topiques*, Paris, 1949, 24). For the characterization of the three *guṇas* here cf. *SK*, 12: ... *prakāśa-pravṛttinīyamārthāḥ* ... *gunāḥ* 'The *guṇas* have as their purpose illumination, activity, and restraint ...'. علم 'knowledge' of the Arabic text corresponds to *prakāśa* 'illumination' in the sūtra, which is équivalent to *sattva*; عمل 'activity' corresponds to *kriyā* 'action' which is equivalent to *rajas*; and بقاء 'persistence' corresponds to *sthiti* 'inertia, constancy', which is the equivalent of *tamas*. Ritter reads here قنينة which presupposes a slight emendation. The MS has متينة which should probably be read بقينة. A different characterization of the three *guṇas* occurs in *India*, Hyd., 31: قوى ثلاث بالقوة دون الفعل أسسها ست' ورج' وتم'. ... فالأولى منها راحة وطيبة منها الكون والنساء والثانية تعب ومشقة منها الثبات والبقاء والثالثة فتور وعمه' منها الفساد والفناء ولهذا تنسب الأولى الى الملائكة والثانية الى البهائم. ... three powers potentially, not actually, which are called *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. ... The first power is comfort (i.e. happiness, opposite شدة, cf. R, p. 178, l. 11; and not 'rest' as Sachau translates here) and goodness, and hence come creation (or production; not 'existence' as Sachau translates here) and growing. The second is exertion and toil (Sachau: 'exertion and fatigue'), and hence come firmness and duration. The third is languor and irresolution, and hence come ruin and perishing. Therefore the first power is attributed to the angels, the second to men, the third to the animals' (cf. Sachau (tr.), I, 40-1). Cf. the celebrated Hindu formula of the cycle of three states: *utpatti* 'origination, coming into being', *sthiti* 'continued existence', and *laya* 'dissolution', as in *SK*, 69. Also cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.302.3 (Poona ed.). For al-Bīrūnī's rendering of *prakāśa* in the sūtra cf. Vāc. on sūtra 3.21: *prakāśa* = *jñāna* 'knowledge'.

<sup>97</sup> For the expression في ذاته here cf. ذاته. R, p. 170, l. 11 (*BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 314, l. 15).

<sup>98</sup> This appears to correspond to sūtra 2.20: *draṣṭā dr̥śīmātrah śuddho 'pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ* 'The seer is nothing but seeing (and), though pure (i.e. undefiled by the *guṇas*), is cognizant of (lit. looks upon) mental percepts (*pratyaya* = *pratīti*)'. The *YS* uses derivatives such as *dr̥śi*, *citi* in the sense of the nouns of action 'fact of seeing, thinking' (see L. Renou, 'On the identity of the two Patañjalis', *Indian Historical Quarterly*, xvi, 3, 1940, 590). Ballantyne understands by *anupaśya* 'looking directly on ideas', whereas Deussen, taking his lead from Vyāsa, understands by it: discerning ideas by means of the *buddhi*. In any case, in this sūtra a distinction seems to be made between two aspects of the seer: (a) the *puruṣa* as such, and (b) his perception of objects, or cognitions. Al-Bīrūnī may have tried to bring this out by using the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. (See, however, also our note 104 relating to Question and Answer 37 below.) This interpretation may have been suggested to him by Vy. on sūtra 2.20: *dr̥śīmātra itī dr̥k-śaktir eva* 'Nothing but seeing'—that is, the sheer faculty of seeing'. Here, قوة can be a literal translation of *śakti*. For the term الذات as used here cf. R, p. 170, l. 11 (transl. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 314, l. 15). For the use of the term *anupaśya* in the sūtra cf. *SK* 65b: *prakṛtiṃ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavad avasthitah svasthaḥ* 'Abiding in itself, self-composed (or retaining its own nature), like a spectator, the *puruṣa* beholds *prakṛti* ...'. For the epistemological concept consistently expressed by the term *pratyaya* here as well as in all its other occurrences in the *YS* (1.10, 18, 19; 3.2, 12, 17, 19, 35; 4.27; pace Woods's and G. Jhā's lack of uniformity in understanding the term) cf. *Maitryupaniṣad* 6.10; *SK* 46. For the idea expressed by *pratyayānupaśyaḥ* in sūtra 2.20 cf. *YS* 4.17: *sadā jñātāś citta-vṛttayaḥ tat-prabhoh puruṣasyāpariṇāmāt* 'The functions of the mind are permanently known, since their master, the self, is unmodifiable'.

<sup>99</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.21: *tad-artha eva dr̥śyasiyātmā* 'The specific character (*ātman*) of the seen (objects) (i.e. the evolution of *prakṛti*) is only for the sake of it (the seer, i.e. the self)'. Our translation follows Vy. who glosses *ātman* by *svarūpa* 'specific character'. Rājendralāla Mitra's translation, 'Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle' (and likewise Hauer's) is obscure. Similarly Ballantyne's rendering of *ātman* here by 'entity' and Gangānātha Jhā's rendering by 'the very essence' are implausible. On the other hand, Rāma Prasāda's and Woods's rendering of *ātman* here by 'being' may be considered. For the meaning 'being' is suggested by expressions such as *ātma-tābha* 'coming into being' (cf. Śaṅkara *Bhagavatpāda* on sūtra 2.21; Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākṣasa*, Act 1, verse 1), *labdhātmaka* and *pratilabdhātmaka* 'having come into being' (cf. Śaṅkara on *Bhagavadgītā* 7.27; Vy. on sūtra 2.21). For the idea expressed by the sūtra here cf. sūtra 2.18.

<sup>100</sup> This sentence seems to reflect sūtra 2.23: *sva-svāmi-śaktyoh svarūpopalabdhī-hetuḥ samyogah*. Woods's translation of this sūtra may be used with some modification: 'The cause for the apprehension of what the power of the property and of what the proprietor are is conjunction'. In this interpretation of the sūtra Woods follows Vy. ad loc. and subsequent commentaries. Deussen, however, understands the sūtra differently, translating it: 'Die Ursache des Wahrnehmens der Wesenheit des Besessenen (der *prakṛti*) vermöge der Potenzen des Besessenen und des Besitzers (der *prakṛti* und des *puruṣa*) ist ihre Verbindung'. Evidently Deussen takes *sva* in both of its occurrences in the sūtra as a reflexive referring to *prakṛti*. The



use of the term *saṃyoga* here refers back to sūtra 2.17. The Arabic sentence here is, however, also in keeping with the theory of the commentators on sūtra 2.21. (See Vy. and Nāgeśa's *Bhāṣyachāya* ad loc.) In rendering this sūtra al-Bīrūnī used terminology of the Arabic Aristotelians. For the term *svāmī* in sūtra 2.23 cf. the term *prabhu* 'master, lord' used in YS 4.17 to refer to the *puruṣa*.

<sup>101</sup> Or: 'in what way'.

<sup>102</sup> A somewhat similar objection may be found in Vy. on sūtra 2.24: *nanu buddhi-nivṛttir eva mokṣaḥ, adarśanakāraṇābhāvād buddhi-nivṛttiḥ. tac cādarśanam bandhakāraṇam darśanān nivatate* "'Is release anything but the cessation of the thinking-substance? When there is no cause of non-sight the thinking-substance ceases. And this non-sight which is the cause of bondage ceases when there is sight'" (Woods's tr., 166). Despite a certain resemblance, the question suggested by sūtra 2.22 and the commentators ad loc. is different from the one posed in the Arabic text. The Sanskrit sources here do not question the continuance of the existence of the knower *qua* knower after he achieved liberation but that of the known objects after liberation has been attained. Cf. sūtra 2.22: *kṛtārtham prati naṣṭam apy anāṣṭam tad anya-sādhāraṇatvāt* 'Though it (the object of sight, i.e. of experience) has ceased (to be seen) in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased (to be) since it is common to others besides him'.

<sup>103</sup> 'Cognizant' renders عالمة. The term عالم is rendered above by the word 'knower'.

<sup>104</sup> This statement contrasts with the answer to Q 36. The expression عالمة فقط may correspond to *dr̥ṣi-mātra* 'seeing only' in sūtra 2.20. For the answer to Q 37 here cf. *India*, Hyd., 61: كان قبله في محل الاتِّك عالمًا بالعلوم وعلمه كالخيال مكتسب بالاجتهاد ومعلومه في ضلالت السَّار وأما في محل الخلاص فالستور مرفوعة والاغلبية مكشوفة والموانع مقطوعة والذات عالمة غير حرة رصة على تعرف... before liberation he existed in the world of *entanglement*, knowing the objects of knowledge only by a phantasmagoric kind of knowing which he had acquired by absolute exertion, whilst the object of his knowing is still covered, as it were, by a veil. On the contrary, in the world of liberation all veils are lifted, all covers taken off, and obstacles removed. There the being is absolutely knowing, not desirous of learning anything unknown, separated from the soiled perceptions of the senses, united with the everlasting ideas' (Sachau (tr.), I, 81).

<sup>105</sup> A certain portion of the answer seems to correspond to sūtra 2.24 and Vy. ad loc. The sūtra reads: *tasya hetur avidyā* 'The cause thereof is ignorance'. Ballantyne's printed text has here a variant reading which incorporates *heyam* 'to be removed' after *hetur* in the sūtra. Vy. ad loc.: *viparyaya-jñāna-vāsanety arthah; viparyaya-jñāna-vāsanā-vāsitā ca na kārya-niṣṭhām puruṣa-khyātīm buddhiḥ prāpnoti sādḥikārā punar āvartate* 'In other words, (ignorance) is a subconscious impression from erroneous cognition; the intellect (*buddhi*) impregnated with subconscious impressions from erroneous cognition does not attain the knowledge of the self, which is the goal of its actions, but returns again with its task yet unfulfilled'.

<sup>106</sup> cf. sūtra 2.22: *kṛtārtham prati naṣṭam apy anāṣṭam tad-anya-sādhāraṇatvāt* (see translation above, n. 102). Al-Bīrūnī appears to have taken the word *sādhāraṇa* in the sūtra in the sense of a generic property, a universal, and hence an *intellectum*; and he takes *kṛtārtha* to be its opposite—a sense-perceived object. Furthermore, he may have misread *naṣṭa* 'destroyed' as *niṣṭha* in the sense of 'steadiness, well-founded perfect knowledge, certainty'. He is consequently led to translate the sūtra: وليس للمعلومات الحسية حقيقة ثابتة ثبات المعقولات i.e. the sense-percepts do not possess permanent reality in the way the *intellecta* do. A Platonic-Aristotelian background is evident in this erroneous translation. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 306. Alternatively, the statement in the Arabic text here is perhaps an attempt at interpreting sūtra 2.26, in which the word *aviplava* may correspond to... ثابتة ثبات. Sūtra 2.26 reads: *viveka-khyātīr aviṣṭā hānopāyah* 'The means of this relinquishment is the undisturbed knowledge of the distinction (between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*)'. For the use of the term *viveka-khyāti* here cf. *anyatā-khyāti* 'knowledge of the difference' in sūtra 3.49.

<sup>107</sup> Or: 'is abolished'.

<sup>108</sup> The terms انفرد and تجرد belong to the vocabulary of the Ṣūfis. These terms may have been used by al-Bīrūnī to render *kaivalya*, traditionally understood as 'isolation', in translating sūtra 2.25. See next note. On the meaning of the term *kaivalya* see T. Gelblum, 'Sāṅkhya and Sartre', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, I, 1, 1970, 77 ff.

<sup>109</sup> The last passage of the answer to Q 38 dealing with cessation of conjunction corresponds to sūtra 2.25 and commentators ad loc. Sūtra 2.25: *tad-abhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānam tad dr̥ṣeḥ kaivalyam* 'When there is no longer that (ignorance) there is no conjunction; (instead there is) relinquishment which consists in the *kaivalya* (i.e. autonomy, independence) of the seeing (i.e. of *puruṣa*)'. Vy. ad loc.: *tasyādarśanasyābhāvād buddhi-puruṣa-saṃyogābhāva ātīyāntiko bandhanoparama ity arthah; etat hānam; tad dr̥ṣeḥ kaivalyam puruṣasyāmiśrībhāvaḥ punar asaṃyogo gunair ity arthah* 'When there is no longer absence of the vision there is absence of conjunction of the intellect with the self, that is to say a complete ending of bondage. This is the cessation, the *kaivalya* of the seeing, the unmixed state of the self; in other words, the state in which there is never again conjunction (of the self) with the *gunas*'. Al-Bīrūnī's use of the word معنى in this context may have been suggested by the Sanskrit *artha* in the commentary used by him.

<sup>110</sup> Here the MS is perforated, and several words are wholly or partly missing.

<sup>111</sup> For al-Bīrūnī's use of the term مادة العذاب here cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 60, l. 15.

<sup>112</sup> Possibly: the causes of the feeling of pleasure. For al-Bīrūnī's use of similar expressions cf. below R, p. 182, l. 14; *India*, Hyd., p. 51, l. 17.

<sup>113</sup> بالفعل, lit.: *in actu*.

<sup>114</sup> cf. sūtra 2.27: *tasya saptaadhā prānta-bhūmau prajñā* 'At the highest stage the insight into this distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is sevenfold'. Two variant readings here are *prānta-bhūmih* and *prānta-bhūmi* instead of *prānta-bhūmau*. Woods seems to have adopted one of these two variants and followed Vy. ad loc. in interpreting *tasya*. Accordingly he translates: 'For him (there is) insight seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest'. The number 'seven' which occurs in this passage of the Arabic text is found in this sūtra. The subdivision into two groups of four and three respectively is found in commentaries such as Vy. and Bhoja ad loc. In the Sanskrit sources, however, the first of these two groups is related to *kārya-vimukti* 'liberation from acts that have to be performed (or: from effort)'; the second of these two groups is related to *citta-vimukti* 'liberation from the mind-stuff'. The name of the latter group may correspond to the نفس group in the Arabic text. The name *kārya-vimukti* of the first group in the Sanskrit commentaries may have been read by al-Bīrūnī: *kāya-vimukti*. The word *kāya* 'body' would correspond to بدن, the term by which that group is referred to by al-Bīrūnī. It is by no means impossible that the Sanskrit source used by al-Bīrūnī employed the term *kāya-vimukti*. Moreover, it might have contained a list comprising seven terms which, contrary to the lists of the extant Sanskrit commentaries, did not essentially differ from al-Bīrūnī's list. In other words, this is one of the passages in al-Bīrūnī's text which may provide a pointer to an otherwise lost Sanskrit tradition. The reading *kāya-vimukti* suggested by al-Bīrūnī's translation may indicate a way out of a difficulty posed by the following sentence in Vāc. ad loc.: *kvacit-pāṭhaḥ kārya-vimuktir ūi* 'A different reading is *kārya-vimukti*'. As *kārya-vimukti* occurs in the text of Vy. which is commented upon by Vāc., it seems plausible that the 'different reading' mentioned by Vāc. may have been *kāya-vimukti*. For the use of the term *prajñā* in the sūtra cf. sūtras 1.20, 48, 49; 3.5.

<sup>115</sup> The Arabic text corresponds to sūtra 2.28: *yogāṅgānuṣṭhānād aśuddhi-kṣaye jñāna-dīptir ā viveka-khyateḥ* 'When, following the practice of the *yoga* stages, impurity has dwindled away, enlightenment arises culminating in the knowledge of discrimination (between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*)'. In contrast to the Sanskrit original, the state of knowing appears, according to the Arabic text, to precede purity. For the use of the expression *jñāna-dīpti* in the sūtra cf. *prajñāloka* in sūtra 3.5.

<sup>116</sup> cf. sūtra 2.29: *yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇa-dhyāna-samādhayo 'ṣṭāv aṅgāni* 'The eight stages (lit.: auxiliaries, aids) are restraint (or: cardinal rules of conduct), observance (or: vows), posture, regulation (lit. either 'restraint, control', or 'protraction') of breath, withdrawal (of the senses), fixation (of thought), meditation, and (final) concentration'. Al-Bīrūnī refers further on in the translation to all these constitutive parts. The expression ثمان خصال 'eight qualities (or: characteristics)', which corresponds to *aṣṭāv aṅgāni* 'eight parts (or: auxiliaries)' in the sūtra, may have been suggested to al-Bīrūnī by the Sanskrit expression *aṣṭa-guṇa* which was perhaps contained in the original commentary used by him, as a description of the *aṣṭāṅga-yoga*. The expression *aṣṭa-guṇa* can mean 'eightfold' and also 'having eight qualities'. For the use of the compound *aṣṭagaṇa* to refer to the *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.317.5: *vedeṣu cāṣṭa-guṇinam yogam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ / sūksmam aṣṭa-guṇam prāhur netaraṃ* ... 'The wise declare in the Vedas that Yoga has eight characteristics (or: virtues); none other they declare than the subtle eightfold one ...'. Cf. E. W. Hopkins, 'Yoga-technique in the Great Epic', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, xxii, 2, 1901, 340–1. (For a variant reading *-guṇitaṃ* instead of *guṇinam* here see the Poona critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, 12.317.7.) For the use of *aṅga* in the *YS* to refer to ancillary, propaedeutic stages cf. the synonym *upakāra* 'aid' and the Mīmāṃsaka definition of the term quoted in Bhīmācārya Jhalakikar's *Nyāyakośa*, Poona, 1928, s.v.: *mukhya-phalājanakatve sati mukhya-phalajanaka-vyāpāra-janakam aṅgam* 'aṅga is the generator of that operation which generates the chief product, but it is not (itself directly) the generator of the chief product'. For an earlier and partly different list of *yogāṅgas* see *Maitryupaniṣad* 6.18: ... *prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānaṃ dhāraṇaṃ tarkaḥ samādhiḥ ṣaḍ-aṅgā ity ucyate yogah* 'Yoga is traditionally said to consist of the following six stages: regulation of breath, withdrawal of the senses, meditation, fixation of thought, contemplation, and (final) concentration'. A third version, differing from the above list as well as from the one in the *YS* occurs in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.46 (ed. G. Jhā, Poona, 1939, 309). For a sixfold *yoga*, cf. also Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcanāna's *Vivṛti* on Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5.2.16. For further lists of *yogāṅgas* other than Patañjali's list of eight, see references in P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, v, Part II, Poona, 1962, 1419; A. Janacek, 'The methodical principle in Yoga according to Patañjali's *Yogasūtras*', *Archiv Orientalni*, xix, 1–2, 1951, 516; A. Zigmund-Cerbu, 'The Ṣaḍaṅgayoga', *History of Religion*, III, 1, 1963, 128 seq.; and C. Pensa, 'Osservazioni e riferimenti per lo studio dello ṣaḍaṅga-yoga', *Annali, Istituto Orientale di Napoli*, NS, xix, 4, 1969, 521 seq.

<sup>117</sup> This corresponds to *yama* in sūtra 2.29. Cf. the characterization of *yama* by *nivṛtti*

'abstention from action'; and *niyama* by *pravṛtti* 'engagement in activity' in Nāgeśa's *Bhāṣyacchāyā* on sūtra 2.32.

<sup>118</sup> This corresponds to *ahiṃsā* in sūtra 2.30. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 60-1: 'التبرؤ من القتل أصلاً' (Sachau (tr.), I, 80: 'keeping aloof from killing under all circumstances'); Hyd., 56: 'عن الإيذاء والاضرار' 'abstaining from doing harm'. The term *ahiṃsā* is traditionally understood as a negative concept: 'abstention from injury to living beings, harmlessness, non-violence'. For an exposition of the meaning of this term as fundamentally a positive concept, i.e. 'gentleness, benevolence', though expressed by a privative term, see J. Gonda, *Four studies in the language of the Veda*, The Hague, 1959, 95 et seq., and R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga*, London, 1963, p. xix.

<sup>119</sup> This corresponds to *satya* in sūtra 2.30.

<sup>120</sup> This corresponds to *asteya* in sūtra 2.30. Adopting R's suggestion, غصب has been amended to غصب. The latter term can mean 'robbery' and also 'violence'.

<sup>121</sup> This corresponds to *brahmācarya* in sūtra 2.30.

<sup>122</sup> This corresponds to *aparigraha* in sūtra 2.30. For traditional interpretations of this term cf. e.g. Rāmānuja's commentary on *aparigraha* (adjective) in *Bhagavadgītā* 6.10: = *mamatā-rahitā* 'bereft of any sense of possession'. Evidently al-Bīrūnī understood the term *aparigraha* as 'absence of *parigraha*' taking the latter term to mean 'surrounding people'. Cf. *Amarakośa* 9.236 (Bombay, 1907, 342) which gives *parijana* lit. 'surrounding people' as a synonym for *parigraha*. The original meaning of *aparigraha* in the sūtra may have been 'generosity'; cf. *parigṛhita* 'ungenerous, close-fisted, stingy', in F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary*, New Haven, 1953, s.v. The whole sūtra 2.30 reads: *ahiṃsā-satyāsteya-brahmacaryā-parigrahā yamāḥ* 'Restraint consists of non-violence, veracity, abstinence from stealing, continence, and generosity (or absence of covetousness)'. Unlike Woods who in translating this sūtra went so far as to make it uniformly negative ('abstinence from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts...'), Gonda translates: 'the abstentions... are: abstinence from malice towards all living creatures, truthfulness, honesty, continence and non-acceptance of gifts', op. cit., 97. Jacobi, op. cit., 25-6, notes that while the first four items here are paralleled in the Brāhmaṇic (Baudhāyana), Buddhist, and Jaina literatures, *aparigraha* is found in the *YS* and the Jaina literature only. The latter term, however, does occur in *Bhagavadgītā* 6.10.

<sup>123</sup> cf. sūtra 2.31: *ete jāti-deśa-kāla-samayānavacchinnāḥ sarva-bhauma-mahāvratam* 'Unrestricted to class, place, time, or circumstances, these (enumerated in sūtra 2.30) constitute the great vow which is universal'. For the meaning of *sarva-bhauma* here cf. the Jaina distinction between *anuvratas* and *mahāvratas*, conditional and unconditional vows respectively (*Tattvārthadhigamaśūtra* 7.2, referred to by Jacobi, op. cit., 26). Deussen, however, takes *sarva-bhauma* here to mean: applicable to all *bhūmis*, or stages ('für alle Stufen gültige'). For this meaning of *sarva-bhauma* cf. Vy. on sūtra 1.1: *yogaḥ samādhiḥ sa ca sarva-bhaumaś cīttasya dharmah* 'Yoga is attention. And attention is a property of the mind-stuff which exists on all levels' (cf. Staal, op. cit., 120). Also cf. *bhūmi* in sūtras 2.27; 3.6. A variant reading of *sārvabhauma* here is *sārvabhaumā*; *ete* is omitted in one variant reading and is replaced by *te tu* in another.

<sup>124</sup> cf. *kṛta-kāritānumoditāḥ*... (Whether) performed or caused to be performed or approved of... in sūtra 2.34. For the expression 'giving orders...' cf. Bhoja ad loc.: *kuru kurv iti prayojaka-vyāpāreṇa samutpāditaḥ kāritaḥ* "Caused to be performed" means: brought about through an instigator's (verbal) activity (such as the expression) "Do (it), do (it)". Cf. Rāmānanda ad loc.

<sup>125</sup> cf. ... *lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā(h)* ... '... motivated by (either) greed, (or) anger (or) delusion...' in sūtra 2.34. For al-Bīrūnī's rendering of *moha* by الجهل 'ignorance' cf. e.g. the implicit identification of *moha* with *avidyā* by Bhoja ad loc. A parallel statement occurs in *Indiā*, Hyd., p. 55, ll. 3-4.

<sup>126</sup> The Arabic has صورة in the singular.

<sup>127</sup> cf. ... *mṛdu-madhyādhimātrā(h)* ... (Whether) slight, medium, or excessive... in sūtra 2.34.

<sup>128</sup> This may correspond to *vitarka-bādhane* in sūtra 2.33. Al-Bīrūnī may have read here *bodhane* 'in case of knowledge' instead of *bādhane* 'in case of obstruction...'. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 306. See also n. 130 below.

<sup>129</sup> cf. *duḥkhājñānānanta-phalā(h)* 'they have pain and ignorance as their unending fruits' in sūtra 2.34. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: *tathā ca hiṃsakas tāvat prathamam vadyasya viryam āksiṃpati tatas ca śaṣṭrādi-nīpātēna duḥkhaḥyati tato jīvitād api mocayati ... duḥkhotpādān narakā-tiryak-prēṭādiṣu duḥkham anubhavati ... duḥkha-vīpākasya niyata-vīpāka-vedanīyatvāt* 'Thus for instance a killer first eliminates the strength (i.e. resistance) of the victim (by overwhelming him); he then inflicts pain upon him by striking (him) with a weapon; and thereafter even deprives him of his life. ... On account of having inflicted pain he (the killer in his turn) experiences pain in hell, in (the life of) a beast or a ghost. ... For the fruition consisting of pain is to be felt as a fruition which has a fixed measure...'.  
<sup>130</sup> This may correspond to *pratipakṣa-bhāvanam* in sūtra 2.33. The latter expression may have been understood by al-Bīrūnī to mean simply 'vice versa', i.e. 'there is an effecting of the opposite'. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 306. Also see n. 128 above. The whole of sūtra 2.33 reads: *vitarka-bādhane pratipakṣa-bhāvanam* 'In case of obstruction (of the performance of the *yamas*

and *niyamas*) by perversion, the (mental) cultivation of the (respective) antidotes (is to be practised)'. Translators vary here, though the main drift of the sūtra is quite clear. Ballantyne: 'In excluding things questionable, the calling up something opposite (is serviceable)'. Similarly Deussen: 'Wird das Zweifelhafte unterdrückt, so entsteht Bewusstwerdung des Gegenteils'. Woods, however, translates: 'If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations (*vitarka*), there should be cultivation of the opposites'. The latter translation has the support of the context, since *vitarka* seems to be exemplified by 'violence' in sūtra 2.34 and contrasted with *yama* and *niyama* of sūtras 2.30, 32. It also follows the explanation offered by Vijñānabhikṣu ad loc.: *viparītās tarkā vicārā yeṣv iti vitarka-saṃjñā himsādiṣu tāntrikī* 'The term *vitarka* is technical, referring to the intention to harm, etc., namely: those (phenomena) in which there are *tarkas* i.e. thoughts which are adverse (*vi-*)'. (The usual meaning of the term *vitarka* is 'doubt'.) The whole of sūtra 2.34 reads: *vitarkā himsādayaḥ kṛta-kāritānumoditā lobha-krodha-moha-pūrvakā mṛdu-madhyādhimatrā duḥkhāññānānanta-phalā iti pratipakṣa-bhāvanam* 'The (mental) cultivation (i.e. contemplation) of the antidotes takes the form (*iti*): "The perversions (pertaining to) violence, etc.—(whether) performed or caused to be performed or approved of, (whether) motivated by greed (or by) anger (or by) delusion, (whether) slight, medium or excessive—have pain and ignorance as their unending results (lit.: fruits)'. The word *iti* here can function as quotation marks, or alternatively mean 'hence'. The latter alternative, which seems less plausible, has been adopted in the translations of Ballantyne, Woods, and Deussen. Accordingly we would have to understand: 'The (mental) cultivation of the antidotes (is necessary) because the perversions ... have pain and ignorance as their unending results'. For a comparable Buddhist use of the term *pratipakṣa* occurring in the sūtra cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'On a yoga treatise in Sanskrit from Qizil', *JAOS*, LXXXVII, 2, 1967, 158.

<sup>131</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.35: *ahimsā-pratiṣṭhāyām tat-sannidhau vaira-tyāgah* 'When non-violence has been consolidated, hostility is abandoned in his proximity'.

<sup>132</sup> In this context ابن عرس certainly corresponds to *nakula* 'mongoose' in Vāc. under sūtra 2.35: *śāśvatika-virodhā apy aśva-mahiṣa-mūṣaka-māṇṣārāhi-nakulādāyo 'pi bhagavataḥ pratiṣṭhitā-himsasya saṃnidhānāt tac-cittānukārīno vairam parityajanti* 'Despite their perennial antagonism, even horse and buffalo, mouse and cat, snake and mongoose, etc., on account of proximity to a sage whose non-violence has been consolidated, conform to his mind-stuff and renounce hostility'. Cf. Bhoja ad loc. For the hostile pairs cf. Pāṇini 2.4.9. with *Kāśikāvṛti* and *Siddhāntakāumudī*; Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*, Parab's ed., 93, Kālidāsa's *Śākuntala*, Nir. Sāg. ed., 23 (referred to by Woods, p. 186, n. 2). Also cf. the alleged quotation from the *Bhagavadgītā* in *India*, Hyd., 458: قال باسديو في طالب الخلاص إن العاقل قد سوى عنده البرهمن وچندلا والصاديق والعدو والأمين والحاتن بل عرس الحية وابن عرس (Sachau (tr.), II, 137: '... Vāsudeva says regarding him who seeks salvation: In the judgement of the intelligent man, the Brahman and the Caṇḍāla are equal, the friend and the foe, the faithful and the deceitful, nay, even the serpent and the weasel'.

<sup>133</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.36: *satya-pratiṣṭhāyām kriyā-phalāśrayatvam* 'When veracity has been consolidated (one attains) the property of being the recipient of the fruits of (meritorious) actions'. Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.: *kriyamāṇā hi kriyā yāgādīkāḥ phalam svargādīkam prayacchanti; tasya tu satyābhyāsavato yoginas tathā satyaṃ prakṛṣyate yathā kriyāyām akr̥tāyām api yogi phalam āpnoti* 'For acts such as sacrifice, when performed, yield fruit such as heaven. In the case of a *yogin* practising veracity, veracity reaches such a degree that even when an act has not been performed the *yogin* attains (its) fruit'. The Qur'anic term الخنة in all probability renders the Sanskrit *svarga* 'heaven'. The interpretation of this sūtra by Vy. and Vāc. is far less plausible than the above by Bhoja. The former interpretation is reflected in Rāma Prasāda's translation: 'Veracity being confirmed, action and fruition become dependents' (cf. Lindquist's translation: 'Wenn er in *satya* befestigt ist, beruht Handlung und Folge auf ihm', *idem*, op. cit., 170).

<sup>134</sup> The word 'treasure' renders two words: ذخائر and كنوز.

<sup>135</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.37: *asteya-pratiṣṭhāyām sarva-ratnopasthānam* 'When abstinence from stealing has been consolidated, all jewels become present (to him)'. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: *sarva-dik-sthāny asyopatiṣṭhante ratnāni* 'The jewels situated in all quarters present themselves to him'; and Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda's gloss: *ātmānam darśayanti* '... show themselves'. But the extant commentaries do not explicitly mention the capacity of the *yogin* to see all the jewels that are upon the earth.

<sup>136</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.38: *brahmacarya-pratiṣṭhāyām vīrya-lābhaḥ* 'When continence has been consolidated, manly strength is attained'. The expression 'granted the capacity to be able ...' renders the Arabic أهّل للاقدر. The hypothesis that in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī a similar expression may have occurred is supported by the phrase *niratiṣayam vīryam sāmāthyam* 'limitless manly strength (lit.: capacity)' in Bhoja ad loc.

<sup>137</sup> Lit.: 'are rolled up'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 52: انطواء المسافات بينه وبين المقاصد الشاسعة (Sachau (tr.), I, 69: 'That all distances between a man and any far away place vanish'). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 63: إن شاء طويت له (Sachau (tr.), I, 83: 'If he wishes, the earth rolls itself up for him'). The Arabic sentence under consideration may belong to a commentary on the next sūtra. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.39 quoted in the following footnote. Here *upavartate* may correspond to انطوت 'are rolled up'. For this cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.45: *iśvarārpiṭa-sarva-bhāvasya samādhi-siddhir yayū sarvam īpsitam avitatham jānāti deśāntare dehāntare kālāntare ca* 'One



whose whole nature is surrendered to the *īśvara* has perfection of concentration. By which (concentration) he knows as the whole thing really is all that he desires to know, in other places and in other bodies and in other times' (tr. Woods).

<sup>138</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.39: *aparigraha-sthairye janma-kathamtā-sambodhaḥ* 'When generosity (or, non-covetousness) has been firmly established one attains insight as to the "how" of (other) births'. Cf. Vy. ad loc.: *ko 'ham āsam katham aham āsam kimsvid idaṃ kathamsvīd idaṃ ke vā bhaviṣyāmaḥ katham vā bhaviṣyāma ity evaṃ asya pūrvānta-parānta-madhyeṣu ātma-bhāva-jijñāsā svarūpenopavartate* 'Who was I? How was I? Or what (can) this birth be? Or how (can) this birth be? Or what shall we become? Or how shall we become?' Such a desire to know his own condition in former and later and intermediate times becomes of itself fulfilled for him' (tr. Woods). For a Buddhist parallel to this 'perfection' see the detailed description in the *Ākaṅkheyya-sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, PTS, London, 1888, I, 35 (tr. I. B. Horner, *The Middle Length sayings*, I, PTS, London, 1954, 44).

<sup>139</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 60, تنظيف البدن (Sachau (tr.), I, 80: 'keeping clean the body'), allegedly quoting the *Bhagavadgītā*. The term القدس here seems to be paralleled by الطهارة 'holiness and purity' in *India*, Hyd., 56.

<sup>140</sup> The word in the MS is blurred. The portion which is more or less legible looks: ك. ر. This could be read كبر or كثر. In the context both words can be rendered: 'magnifies'.

<sup>141</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.40: *śaucāt svāṅga-jugupsā parair asaṃsargah* 'From (practising) purity arises disgust with one's own limbs (and) absence of (bodily) contact with others'. Cf. Rāmānanda ad loc.: *yo bāhya-śauca-siddhas tasya svāṅge kāye buddhim apaśyato jugupsā bhavati; aśuci-svabhāvo 'yaṃ kāyo nātrāhaṅkāraḥ kārya iti ... doṣa-darśināḥ ...* 'One who is perfected in outer cleanliness does not see (any) purity in his own body and is disgusted at it. This body is essentially impure; no pride should be taken in it. One who sees its defects ...' (tr. Woods, 54). The extant commentaries do not seem explicitly to refer to the superiority of the soul over the body. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 56-7: وفي لزوم الطهارة وقوف على قدر البدن وداعية الى 'The result of practising purity is that a man knows the filth of the body, and that he feels called upon to hate it, and to love cleanness of soul'. The 'second quality' refers to the first of the *niyama* group. See sūtras 2.29 and 2.32.

<sup>142</sup> التمكن من تطييف البدن حتى يخفى عن الاعين. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 52, l. 11: لطف بدنه (Sachau (tr.), I, 69: 'The faculty in man of making his body so thin that it becomes invisible to the eyes'). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 57, l. 1 (Sachau (tr.), I, 75).

<sup>143</sup> cf. *India*, Hyd., 57: وفي تعذيب النفس بالتشفي وتسكرته تذكية حواسه 'The result of tormenting oneself through self-mortification is that a man should reduce the body, allay its feverish desires, and sharpen its senses'.

<sup>144</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.43: *kāyendriya-siddhir aśuddhi-kṣayāt tapasah* 'From ascetic practices arises the dwindling away of the impurities which leads to the "perfections" of the body and the senses'. A reference to fasting may be found in Bhoja ad loc.: *cāndrāyaṇādīnā citta-kleśa-kṣayaḥ; tat-kṣayād indriyādīnām sūksma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-darśanādi-sāmarthyam āvirbhavati kāyasya yatheccham anuṭva-mahatvādīni* 'Through (the performance of fasts such as the *cāndrāyaṇa*) the dwindling away of the afflictions of the mind-stuff comes about; from this dwindling away manifest themselves capacities of the senses, such as seeing subtle, covered, or remote (objects) (and capacities) of the body, such as (assuming) at will either bulk or the size of an atom'.

<sup>145</sup> This seems to correspond to sūtra 2.42: *santoṣād anuttama-sukha-lābhah* 'From contentment arises the attainment of unsurpassed bliss'. Vijñānabhikṣu's reading adopted here seems to be preferable to *anuttamah sukha-lābhah* 'unsurpassed attainment of bliss' as Deussen has it. The word *سنتوسا* may be a rendering of *santoṣa*. For the expression لا يشتره cf. *trṣṇā-kṣaya* in the following verse quoted by Vy. ad loc.: *yac ca kāma-sukham loke yac ca divyaṃ mahat sukham/trṣṇā-kṣaya-sukhasyaite nārhatāḥ sōdāṣiṃ kalām* 'Whatever sensual pleasure there may be in this world and whatever great heavenly pleasure there may be, they cannot equal the sixteenth part of the bliss (that arises) from the cessation of craving'. Also cf. Vijñānabhikṣu on Vy. ad loc.: *trṣṇā-kṣayo hi saṃtoṣah; trṣṇā-pratibandhāpagame ca cītasya svābhāvika-sattvādhikya-nimittika sukha-svabhāvatā svata evāvirbhavati na ca tat sukhe viṣayāpekṣeṭi* 'For contentment is the cessation of craving; with the obstruction (consisting of) craving has vanished, the fact that bliss is an essential property of the mind-stuff, on account of the preponderance of the essential *sattva* (in the mind-stuff), becomes manifest on its own accord, it does not depend on objects'. The above oft-quoted verse has been traced to the *Mahābhārata* (Poona ed., 12.168.36) by Woods (p. 189, n. 1). The expression استراح من التعب may possibly be a rendering of *sukha* in the sūtra.

For the expression انفك عن الرق cf. *trṣṇā-pratibandhāpagame* ... 'When the obstruction (lit.: 'binding') of the craving has vanished ...' in the passage from Vijñānabhikṣu quoted above. For the common idea embodied in the sūtra cf. e.g. *Mahābhārata* (Poona ed.) 12.287.35a: *vistarāḥ kleśa-samyuktāḥ saṃkṣepās tu sukhāvahāḥ* 'Vast riches bring sorrow; *res angusta*, happiness' (Hopkins, art. cit., 356-7). Cf. *India*, Hyd., 56: وفي ترك الادخار نفص التعب والامان 'The benefits of giving up hoarding are that one is rid of toil and fatigue; that one is secure from seeking the superfluous; and that

one is relieved from the degradation of servitude by the nobility of liberty'. (طلب here is our proposed emendation of طالب which occurs in the printed editions of *India*.)

<sup>146</sup> أكثر التسايح. The term التسايح has been rendered above by 'chants' (R, p. 177, l. 16).

<sup>147</sup> By the term الملائكة al-Bīrūnī regularly renders the Sanskrit terms *deva*, *devatā*. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 307, n. 37. In the present passage the term *devatā* is rendered both by الملائكة and الروحانيون.

<sup>148</sup> The man who recites the formulae and the angel or spiritual being.

<sup>149</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.45: *svādhyāyād iṣṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ* 'From recitation (of formulae) arises communion with the chosen deity'. The Arabic text seems to be closely related to Bhoja ad loc.: *abhipreta-mantra-japādi-lakṣaṇe svādhyāye prakṣyamāṇe yogina iṣṭayā abhipretayā devatayā samprayogo bhavati sā devatā pratyakṣā bhavatyiti arthaḥ* 'When the recitation consisting in (methods) such as muttering of selected formulae, has been perfected, the *yogin* possesses communion with the chosen, i.e. selected, deity. That is to say, this deity becomes visible'. The word بدت may be compared with the Sanskrit expression *pratyakṣā* (variant: *pratyakṣi-*) *bhavati* in the passage quoted above. Both al-Bīrūnī and Bhoja interpret *svādhyāya* as referring to the recitation of formulae. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.1. For التسايح in the Arabic text here cf. والتسايح والقرأت 'chants of praise and recitations' in Answer to Q 24 above, R, p. 177, l. 16; and cf. القراءة والتسايح in *India*, Hyd., 61 (Sachau (tr.), I, 80: 'the reciting of the holy texts, praising God').

<sup>150</sup> The term ذكر may also refer to a religious practice of Muslim mystics.

<sup>151</sup> Or: 'his heart'.

<sup>152</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.45: *samādhi-siddhir īśvara-praṇidhānāt* 'The perfection of concentration arises from the directing of one's mind to the *īśvara*'. Cf. sūtras 1.24 and 2.1. The term إستقر may be a rendering of the Sanskrit term *samādhi*. Cf. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī ad loc.: *samādhiḥ cittasya samādhānam prasāda iti yāvat 'samādhi* is the focusing (lit. 'putting together') of the mind-stuff, i.e. settling down peacefully'. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 55: *وحيث يستقر القلب على شيء واحد وهو طلب الخلاص والخلوص إلى الوحدة المحضة* (Sachau (tr.), I, 73: 'and then the heart quietly rests on one thing, viz. the search for liberation and for arriving at the absolute unity'). The related term إقرار القلب is used by al-Bīrūnī to render the title of the first chapter *samādhi*, R, p. 177, l. 10 (tr. *BSOAS*, art. cit., 325: 'making the heart steadfastly fixed'), though the same term is also used by him to render *dhāraṇā* in sūtra 3.2 (R, p. 183, l. 20). For al-Bīrūnī's understanding of the term *samādhi* cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 2.53: *... yadā sthāsyati niścalā / samādhāv acalā buddhiḥ tadā yogam avāpsyasi* '... when thought stands motionless and immovable in concentration, then will you attain *yoga*'.

The expression تمجيد الله وذكره seems to be a rendering of *īśvara-praṇidhānāt* in the sūtra. For such an understanding of the latter term cf. e.g. Nārāyaṇa Tirtha on sūtra 2.1: *praṇidhānam = stuty-ādi-janitā bhaktiḥ* 'The term *praṇidhāna* means (a type of) devotion generated by chants of praise, etc.'.

<sup>153</sup> After (1) the *yama* group and (2) the *niyama* group comes (3) *āsana* (yogic posture). Cf. Bhoja (introducing sūtra 2.46): *yama-niyamān ukṭvāsanaṁ āha* 'Having discussed the Restraints and Observances he (Patañjali) addresses himself to (the topic of) Posture'.

<sup>154</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.46: *sthira-sukham āsanam* 'Posture is steady and easy'. The reading adopted by Deussen inserts the word *tatra* 'there', i.e. 'in that state') before *sthira-*. But an examination of Vy.'s introduction to this sūtra would suggest that *tatra* belongs to the commentary and not to the sūtra itself. For the term السكون here cf. the parallel expression in *India*, Hyd., p. 55, l. 15: تسكين الحركات 'the complete suppression of motion'. For the concept of *āsana* as presented in the sūtra cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 6.13: *samaṁ kāya-śiro-grīvaṁ dhārayann acalaṁ sthirah* '... holding the body, head, and neck erect and motionless (keeping himself) steady ...' (cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 2.8, and especially, op. cit., 2.9: *saṁyukta-ceṣṭah* 'one who has controlled his movements').

<sup>155</sup> This may be a reflection of a commentary on the following sūtra (2.47): *prayatna-saithilyānanta-samāpattibhyām* 'This is achieved by relaxation of effort and (by) unlimited meditation'. (The variant reading *ananta* 'unlimited' adopted here is preferable to the reading *ānantiya* 'unlimitedness' which Deussen has. Woods's translation '... with reference to Ananta (i.e. Vāsuki, the Lord of Serpents)' is scarcely plausible.) The commentary used by al-Bīrūnī (which is not available to us) may have contained a discussion of *prayatna* 'effort', of its effects and of the consequences that its renunciation would lead to in relation to Posture. Cf. Rāmānanda on sūtra 2.47: *svābhāvikaḥ prayatnaś calatvad āsana-vighātakah tasyoparamenāsanam sidhyati* 'It is natural effort that disrupts Posture, on account of movement; and (hence) it is by cessation of effort that Posture is accomplished'. Also cf. Baladeva ad loc.: *... bahu-vyāpārānantaram yadāsanam kriyate tadāṅga-kampanād āsana-sthairyaṁ na bhavatyiti bhāvah* '... that is to say, when after numerous attempts Posture has been performed, still there is no steadiness of Posture, on account of a stirring of the limbs' (also cf. Vijñānabhikṣu ad loc.). For the use of the term *saithilya* here cf. sūtra 3.38; for *samāpatti* cf. sūtra 1.41, 42; 3.42.

<sup>156</sup> The word استراح has been rendered above by 'relaxes'. The whole sentence in the Arabic text here corresponds to sūtra 2.48: *tato dvandvānabhighātāḥ* 'Consequently (the yogin) is unaffected by the pairs (of extremes)'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 56: برد او حر من مؤلم من حر او برد (Sachau (tr.), I, 73-4: 'and he will be occupied in such a degree as not to perceive anything that gives pain, like heat or cold . . .'). The examples of the pairs of opposites, or rather complements, found in al-Bīrūnī are also listed in Bhoja ad loc.: *tasmīn āsana-jaye sati dvandvāḥ śītoṣṇa-ksut-trṣṇādibhir yogi nābhīhanyata ity arthaḥ* 'When mastery over Posture has been achieved, the yogin is not affected by pairs such as cold and heat, hunger and thirst'. These examples, as well as others, are not infrequently mentioned elsewhere in commentatorial explanations of *dvandva* (cf. e.g. Medhātithi's, Kullūka's, and Govindarāja's com. on *Manusmṛti* 1.16; Vijnānabhikṣu on Vy. under sūtra 2.32). As is evident from the examples, the oft-quoted traditional definition of *dvandva* requiring that it be constituted by two mutually exclusive terms is too restrictive. Cf. Vijnānabhikṣu loc. cit.: *yadyapi śītoṣṇādivat paraspara-viruddhatvaṃ bubhukṣā-pipāsāyor nāsti tathāpi mithunavā eva pāribhāṣika-dvandvatā* 'Although (the defining condition of *dvandva* i.e.) mutual exclusiveness (of the terms) is not satisfied in (the example) "hunger and thirst", the latter is technically a *dvandva*, just like the case of "a couple (of male and female)"'. The concept of *dvandva* and its illustration here appear to convey completeness, totality of external factors impinging on one's senses. However, the full significance of the formation of pairs (*dvandva*) in yoga, where it implies extraordinary forcefulness and efficacy, is in all probability not disconnected from the Vedic maxim that a pair means strength and a productive copulation (*dvandvaṃ vai vīryam . . . dvandvaṃ vai mithunam prajananam*—quoted and discussed by J. Gonda, *Viṣṇuism and Śivaism: a comparison*, London, 1970, 56, 168, n. 304. For further discussion of the tendency to divide various categories of phenomena into two groups and distinguish between them two complementary classes, see J. Gonda, *The dual deities in the religion of the Veda*, Amsterdam, 1974, p. 22 et seq.). For the use of *anabhighāta* in the sūtra cf. sūtra 3.45. Also cf. *Manusmṛti* 12.77: . . . *śītātāpābhighātān . . .* 'harassment (lit. "attacks, striking") by cold and heat . . .' and *SK* 1: *duḥkha-trayābhighātāt* 'since one is harassed (lit. "struck") by the threefold misery . . .'. For the use of the term *dvandva* in the sūtra cf. *Māitryupaniṣad* 3.1: . . . *dvandvair abhibhūyamānaḥ . . .* 'overcome by the pairs of opposites'; 6.29: *santoṣaṃ dvandva-tiṭikṣaṃ śāntatvaṃ yogābhyasād avāpnoti* 'By the practice of yoga one attains contentment, endurance of the pairs (of opposites) and tranquillity'. Also cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 2.45; 4.22; 5.3; 7.27-8; 12.18. The significance of the 'perfection' under discussion is brought out by Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* 4.2.40 (ed. W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928, 125): *kṣud-ādibhiḥ pravartanāc ca* 'And (*samādhi* 'concentration' is not possible) because (cognitions, or ideas) are generated by hunger, etc. (schol.: and thirst, heat and cold and disease—even against one's wish; cf. Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* ad loc.)'. Cf. Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5.2.16.

<sup>157</sup> This represents the fourth *yogāṅga*. See sūtra 2.29.

<sup>158</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.49: *tasmīn sati śvāsa-prāśvāsāyor gati-vicchedaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ* 'When this (i.e. Posture) has been accomplished, regulation of breath (consisting in) cutting off the flow of inhaling and exhaling (is to be practised)'. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 4.29: *prāṇāpāna-gatī ruddhvā . . .* ' . . . checking the flow of exhaling and inhaling . . .'. The simile of the person sojourning in the depth of water occurred in all probability in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 55: وتسكين الحركات والتنفس فقد علم ان الحريص ساع والساعي تعب والتعب ضايح فالضح اذن نتيجة الحرص وبانقطاعه يصير التنفس على مثال تنفس المستغنى عن الهواء في قرار الماء (Sachau (tr.), I, 73: ' . . . to stop all motions, and even the breathing. It is evident that a greedy man strains to effect his object, the man who strains becomes tired and the tired man pants; so the panting is the result of greediness. If this greediness is removed, the breathing becomes like the breathing of a being living at the bottom of the sea, that does not want breath . . .'). For the regulation of breath as presented in the sūtra cf. *Śvetāśvataraṇiṣad* 2.9.

<sup>159</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.52: *tataḥ kṣīyate prakāśāvaraṇam* 'Consequently the covering which obstructs the light dwindles away'. Cf. the expression *prakāśāvaraṇa-kṣayaḥ* in sūtra 3.44. (Also cf. sūtra 4.30.) For the use of the term *prakāśa* 'illumination, light' as an attribute of *sattva*, and that of *āvaraṇa* 'enveloping, covering, obstructing' as an attribute of *tamas*, cf. *SK* 12-13. Also cf. Gauḍapāda's commentary on the latter. (See op. cit., 13, for the illustration of *tamas* by dark clouds covering the sky.) Also cf. Vidhushekhara, op. cit., 210, and Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* 9.13.

<sup>160</sup> This seems to reflect sūtra 2.53: *dhāraṇāsu ca yogyatā manasaḥ* ' (Also consequently there arises) the capability of the mind in (practising) the stages of contemplation'. Syntactically the following translation is also possible: 'He is therefore able to do whatever he wishes'.

<sup>161</sup> This represents the fifth *yogāṅga*. See sūtra 2.29.

<sup>162</sup> For the expression قبض المنبث عنك نحو cf. R, p. 170, l. 2: قبض الخواس عن الانتشار إليه الخارجات إليك. See *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 314, n. 98 (where the word 'cf.' at the beginning of the sentence is missing).

<sup>163</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.54: *sva-sva-viśaya-samprayogābhāve cittasya svarūpānukāra ivendriyānām pratyāhārah* 'Withdrawal is the imitation, as it were, by the senses of the mind-stuff itself, when they are no longer conjoined with their objects'. (Some editions have the alternative reading *sva-viśayāsamprayoge citta-* . . . at the beginning of the sūtra, cf. e.g. KSS, 1930, p. 112.) Cf. *Chāndogyaṇiṣad* 8.15.1: . . . *ātmani sarvendriyāṇi sampratīṣṭhāpya* ' . . . having made all his senses steadfastly fixed in the self'.

<sup>164</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 2.55: *tataḥ paramā vaśyatendriyāṇām* 'Consequently there is perfect subjugation of the senses'.

<sup>165</sup> R's suggestion الإرشاد is not obligatory.

<sup>166</sup> A less likely alternative translation is: 'towards a certain *praxis* which ...' (... عمل ما ...).

<sup>167</sup> Gratitude is hereby expressed to the director of the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, for permitting the examination of the unique MS of Ritter's text. The preparation of the present study has been facilitated by the assistance extended by the Central Research Fund, University of London, to T. Gelblum.



# AL-BĪRŪNĪ'S ARABIC VERSION OF PATAÑJALI'S YOGASŪTRA : A TRANSLATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER AND A COMPARISON WITH RELATED TEXTS

By SHLOMO PINES and TUVIA GELBLUM

The following study contains a translation of al-Bīrūnī's rendering into Arabic of the third chapter of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* cum commentary. (On this point see our translation of al-Bīrūnī's rendering of the first two chapters of Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*).<sup>1</sup> This translation is based on Ritter's edition of the Arabic text.<sup>2</sup> Comparison has been made with the unique MS of Ritter's text : Köprülü, 1589, fols. 412a–419a (written on the margins).<sup>3</sup> We have also compared the text with parallel passages and expressions in al-Bīrūnī's *India*.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, an attempt has been made here to indicate the parallels between the Arabic version on the one hand, and the Sanskrit text of the *Yogasūtra*,<sup>5</sup> as well as its extant commentaries,<sup>6</sup> on the other.

The following is a list of those sūtras of the third chapter correspondence to which may be found in al-Bīrūnī's text : 1–4, 5 (?), 6–7, 10–11, 14, 16–21, 21a, 22–32, 34–55. On the face of it, it is likely that the sūtras which are not reflected in al-Bīrūnī's text (viz. 5 (?), 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 33) did not occur in the text available to him ; the possibility may then exist that they were later accretions. Sometimes a part of a sūtra is missing in al-Bīrūnī's text. Thus, e.g. in sūtra 3.50 the phrase *doṣa-bīja-kṣaye* 'when the " (cardinal) faults " have dwindled away ' is not reflected in al-Bīrūnī's text.

On at least two points al-Bīrūnī appears to differ from all the commentaries available to us. He understands *prāpti* as 'perception with the senses' (R, p. 191, l. 17) and 'the capacity to know' (*India*, Hyd., p. 52, ll. 14–15) rather than 'the capacity to reach any place' (cf. commentaries on *animādi* in sūtra 3.45); and his cosmological description differs to a considerable extent from those occurring in the available commentaries on the *Yogasūtra* as well as in other Sanskrit sources quoted below. It may be supposed that on these points al-Bīrūnī followed the commentary utilized by him. Cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, Introduction.

Some observations on al-Bīrūnī's rendering of various terms and passages of the third chapter may be found in the introduction to our translation of the first chapter.

## Chapter 3

(R, 183, l. 20) The sixth quality <sup>7</sup> is quietude and tranquillity so that one is enabled to make one's heart steadfastly fixed upon one object.<sup>8</sup>

The seventh quality is the prolonging of reflection <sup>9</sup> upon (the object) on which the heart is, with great application,<sup>10</sup> steadfastly fixed, so that one is not subject to multiplicity <sup>11</sup> and (in consequence) is neither divided and split <sup>12</sup> between (the various) occasions <sup>13</sup> nor diverted <sup>14</sup> to another object.<sup>15</sup>

(R, 184) The eighth quality is perfect concentration <sup>16</sup> on this (very same) application so that reflection <sup>17</sup> becomes one with its object.<sup>18</sup>

He in whom these eight qualities are conjoined <sup>19</sup> and whose soul has been disciplined <sup>20</sup> in the stages <sup>21</sup> . . . <sup>22</sup> and the attainment of what is subtle and noble.<sup>23</sup> The latter three qualities which are referred to <sup>24</sup> in the third chapter are, as it were, separate from the five (qualities described in the) first (place) because they are more remote from the senses <sup>25</sup> and closer to the intellect <sup>26</sup>

and are on the brink of a mental representation of the *cognitum* stripped of matter<sup>27</sup> which is among the ties of the sense.<sup>28</sup>

Q 42. Does man reach through these (three qualities) the aim which is sought?<sup>29</sup>

Answer. He that progresses<sup>30</sup> in them is like one that progresses in years in (the space of time which ranges) between infancy and old age.<sup>31</sup> Knowledge regarding them is one, for it spreads out from the knower to the known (objects)<sup>32</sup> so that it is characterized<sup>33</sup> by multiplicity. When he quietsens<sup>34</sup> it and cuts off from it the factors<sup>35</sup> of spreading out, it becomes<sup>36</sup> one and through<sup>37</sup> the third (quality)—universal.<sup>38</sup> He has not, however, reached (at this point) the degree of mental representation stripped of matter.<sup>39</sup> The instrument for reaching this (degree) is repeated practice as has been (said) before.<sup>40</sup>

Q 43. What is the reward for him who perseveres in, and patiently applies himself to, repeated practice?

Ans. (His) reward (consists) in knowledge of the past, the present and the future.<sup>41</sup>

Q 44. Is knowledge concerning them one or three?

Ans. It is one, as clay is; for before being kneaded the latter was dust, and after that it (becomes) a jar. (Now) 'clayness' is one (and the same) in the three states even though the form differs, being manifest in some of them and being concealed in others. In the same way the form of this one knowledge differs according to the difference of the form of time in the three divisions of the latter.<sup>42</sup>

Q 45. Is he<sup>43</sup> recompensed in this world with things other than this also?

Ans. Names<sup>44</sup> do not change when they pass from speech to thought or vice versa. For a jar is a jar when (its name) is uttered<sup>45</sup> and it is (likewise) a jar when it is thought of. Whoever knows things by their names and thinks of them according to their definitions and is accustomed to distinguish this<sup>46</sup> and trace it<sup>47</sup> to its true reality knows the language of birds.<sup>48</sup> And whoever is accustomed to quieten and assemble knowledge knows his state in the past, before (his) descent<sup>49</sup> into the body,<sup>50</sup> and knows the hidden thoughts<sup>51</sup> with regard to love and enmity, with a general knowledge<sup>52</sup>—without knowing the beloved or the hated (object) with a particular<sup>53</sup> knowledge.<sup>54</sup>

(R, 185) Q 46. How does he perform his wondrous acts?<sup>55</sup>

Ans. By means of thought and steadfastness.<sup>56</sup> For he finds his recompense and reward in every case in which he applies his thought and to which (?)<sup>57</sup> he directs his steadfastness; albeit every reward that falls short of liberation is not perfect and is not a pure good.<sup>58</sup> Thus, whoever wishes to be hidden from the eyes applies his thought constantly to (his own) body and to the representation which he has concerning it, such as its beauty or ugliness, (its) being long or short, and (its) shape and configuration.<sup>59</sup> (He then) directs his efforts to turning away the eyes<sup>60</sup> (of other persons) and to constricting the sense of sight.<sup>61</sup> Accordingly he becomes invisible<sup>62</sup> to (other) persons.<sup>63</sup> Similarly, whenever he applies his thought constantly to speech and to its constriction, his voice becomes inaudible<sup>64</sup> so that it is no longer heard even if it be known (to be producing sound).<sup>65</sup>

Whoever wishes to grasp the circumstances<sup>66</sup> of his death, constantly applies (his) thought to (his) works,<sup>67</sup> and his soul becomes suddenly<sup>68</sup> prepared for<sup>69</sup> the knowledge of what is unknown.<sup>70</sup>

Whoever wishes to have a (mental) representation of Paradise<sup>71</sup> and Hell, of the angels<sup>72</sup> and the spirits that mete out punishment after death,<sup>73</sup> as well as<sup>74</sup>

of the dead among his ancestors,<sup>75</sup> should constantly apply (his) thought to them after having stopped his ears in such a way that no voice resounds in the hole of his ear, and after having closed his eyes in such a way that no visible object<sup>76</sup> falls within the scope of his vision.<sup>77</sup>

Whoever wants to strengthen his soul<sup>78</sup> should constantly remember to rejoice in good<sup>79</sup> and turn away from evil<sup>80</sup> and to have pity on (the evildoer).<sup>81</sup>

Whoever wants to strengthen his body directs (his) thought to the power (in question) and its localizations<sup>82</sup> in it<sup>83</sup> (i.e. the body). For by doing this constantly he will acquire a power which does not fall short of that of an elephant.<sup>84</sup> Therefore if he directs his thought to the light of the senses after having subdued and constricted them, he receives as his recompense knowledge of the subtle things, (both) present and absent.<sup>85</sup>

Whoever directs it (i.e. his thought) to the sun receives as his recompense comprehension of everything that is in the worlds so that he sees<sup>86</sup> them.<sup>87</sup>

The commentator has at this point an explanatory discourse describing the world and the Earths.<sup>88</sup> It seems useful to quote this discourse in an exact manner. For it is one of the sciences current among them.<sup>89</sup> In the description of the existent (things) he starts with the lowest section<sup>90</sup> (proceeding) towards the uppermost.<sup>91</sup> He regards darkness<sup>92</sup> as the lowest (section).<sup>93</sup> Its extent (in terms of) *yojanas*—a *yojana*<sup>94</sup> (equalling)<sup>95</sup> thirty two (R, 186) thousand cubits<sup>96</sup> according to their (system of) measurement of distances; in our (measures) this is eight miles<sup>97</sup>—is one *koṭi*<sup>98</sup> (i.e. 10,000,000) and eighty five *lakṣas*<sup>99</sup> (i.e. 8,500,000). According to our reckoning the total is eighteen thousand thousands and five hundred thousands (i.e. 18,500,000). For in their (system of numbers) *koṭi* is the term for ten thousand thousands (i.e. 10,000,000) and *lakṣa*—the term for one hundred thousands.<sup>100</sup>

(The commentator) says: Above the darkness there is *Naraka*, i.e. hell.<sup>101</sup> Its extent equals thirteen *koṭis* and twelve *lakṣas*, which is equivalent to one hundred and thirty one thousand thousands and two hundred thousand *yojanas*.<sup>102</sup> Above hell is again darkness, the extent of which is one *lakṣa* (i.e. 100,000) (*yojanas*).<sup>103</sup> Above this (darkness) is an earth which, because of its hardness, is called *Vajra*,<sup>104</sup> i.e. 'thunderbolt'. Its extent equals thirty four thousand *yojanas*.<sup>105</sup> Above it (*Vajra*) is *Garbha*<sup>106</sup>—i.e. 'the one that is the middle'—sixty thousand *yojanas*. Above it is *Suvarṇa*<sup>107</sup>—i.e. 'the golden earth'—thirty thousand *yojanas*. Then (come) above it *Sapta Pātāla*—, i.e. the seven Earth[s every one]<sup>108</sup> of which is ten thousand *yojanas* (in extent) . . . [The highest (of the *pātālas*) is]<sup>109</sup> (an Earth) that has *dvīpas*.<sup>110</sup> The midmost island is *Jambu-dvīpa* which we (inhabit). Then (comes) *Plakṣa-dvīpa*, then—*Śālmali* (or *Śālmala*)-*dvīpa*; then *Kuśa-dvīpa*; then *Krauñca-dvīpa*; then *Saka-dvīpa*; then *Puṣkara-dvīpa*.<sup>111</sup> The extent of *Jambu-dvīpa* (equals) one *lakṣa* (100,000) (*yojanas*), and (the extent of the island) which encompasses it equals two *lakṣas* (200,000) (*yojanas*). Then (come) four *lakṣas* (400,000) *yojanas*; and in this manner<sup>112</sup> (the extent is) progressively doubled<sup>113</sup> up to the most remote of them (i.e. of the islands).

In the interval between every pair of islands,<sup>114</sup> i.e. earths,<sup>115</sup> there is an ocean. The one surrounding the earth which we inhabit is *Kṣāra*, i.e. 'The Salty'; then *Ikṣu*, i.e. 'Sugar-cane Water';<sup>116</sup> then *Surā*,<sup>117</sup> i.e. 'Wine'; then *Sarpis*,<sup>118</sup> i.e. 'Melted Butter'; then *Dadhī*,<sup>119</sup> i.e. 'Curds'; then *Kṣīra*, i.e. 'Milk'; then *Svādūdaka*, i.e. 'Sweet Water'.<sup>120</sup> The first of these oceans, namely, (the one called) *Kṣāra*, is two *lakṣas* (200,000) (*yojanas* in extent), and (there is a progressive) doubling—(in the manner already) referred to—(of each of) the others.

Behind the Sweet (Ocean) is *Lokāloka*,<sup>121</sup> i.e. 'The Uninhabited'.<sup>122</sup> (Its extent) is ten thousand *yojanas*.<sup>123</sup> Beyond it (R, 187) is the Land of Gold.<sup>124</sup> (Its extent) is ten *koṭis* (100,000,000) (*yojanas*). Above it is *Pitr-loka*, i.e. the place where the ancestors dwell together. Its extent is sixty one *lakṣas* and thirty four thousand (6,134,000) (*yojanas*).<sup>125</sup> Above it is (one) half of the egg *Brahmāṇḍa*,<sup>126</sup> i.e. (the half) which contains the heavens and is at rest without any motion.<sup>127</sup> Above *Brahmāṇḍa* is a darkness designated as *tamas*,<sup>128</sup> the extent of which is one *koṭi* and eighty five *lakṣas* (18,500,000) (*yojanas*).

In the middle of the island which we inhabit is *Mount Meru*,<sup>129</sup> the habitation of the angels.<sup>130</sup> One of the sides of the quadrangle<sup>131</sup> (which it forms) is five *koṭis* (50,000,000) (*yojanas* in extent). On its four sides are mountains, kingdoms, rivers and seas, which it would serve no useful (purpose) either to enumerate, for they are unknown, or to name, for these names are (given) in the Indian<sup>132</sup> language.<sup>133</sup>

He, then, enumerates the worlds (*lokas*). He mentions the *Bhūr-loka*, whose inhabitants are men, beasts and birds, and in which there are mountains, rivers and trees. It (extends) up to the sun. Then (he mentions) *Bhuvār-loka*, in which there are *siddhas* (?), *gandharvas* (?) and *munis* (?).<sup>134</sup> It (extends) up to the pole-star. (He) then (mentions) *Mahar-loka*, in which are the protectors<sup>135</sup> of this world,<sup>136</sup> such as Indra and his like. Then (he mentions) *Jana-loka*, in which there are masters from among the species of the angels.<sup>137</sup> Then (he mentions) *Tapo-loka*, in which there are from among them<sup>138</sup> *naras* (?) and *kinṇaras* (?).<sup>139</sup> Then (he mentions) *Satya-loka*,<sup>140</sup> which is the place of the *brāhmaṇas* receiving (their) reward. For this<sup>141</sup> (reason) it is called *Brahma-deśa*,<sup>142</sup> in the same manner as the place of the *kṣatriyas* receiving (their) reward is called *Rāja-deśa*.<sup>143</sup> Then (he mentions) *Brahma-loka*,<sup>144</sup> in which is *Brahmā*.<sup>145</sup> The extent of all the seven *lokas* (equals) fifteen *koṭis* (150,000,000) (*yojanas*).<sup>146</sup> Their totality is designated as *Brahmāṇḍa* in the same manner as we designate the (heavenly) spheres as ether.<sup>147</sup> The explanation<sup>148</sup> of the commentator ends (here). Let us go back to the text.<sup>149</sup>

He<sup>150</sup> says: Whoever directs his thought to the moon achieves knowledge concerning the arrangement of the stars, their positions and their actions.<sup>151</sup>

Whoever directs it to the pole(-star)—it is in a complex of fourteen stars shaped as a *śakvara* (?),<sup>152</sup> i.e. the *saṇā*<sup>153</sup> out of whose skin hilts of swords are made<sup>154</sup>—knows the motions of the stars.<sup>155</sup> (R, 188) Thus all those who aspire (to know) something of (the matters) we have mentioned will discover it when they apply their thought to it.

Whoever wishes to know his own body should meditate continuously on the navel.<sup>156</sup>

This too belongs to the commentator's explanation.<sup>157</sup> When food is digested in the belly, matter is produced from it to which (pertain) a sediment<sup>158</sup> which is expurgated(?)<sup>159</sup> and three residues which remain in the body. They are wind, bile and phlegm.<sup>160</sup> (They) harm(?)<sup>161</sup> seven<sup>162</sup> things, namely the chyle, the blood, the flesh, the fat, the bones, the marrow and the semen.<sup>163</sup>

As for the above-mentioned matter, it is transformed into blood. Out of the subtle (part) of the latter flesh is generated,<sup>164</sup> and from its remaining gross (part)—all things that come forth from the body, such as sweat and hair and the nails. Then the fat of corpulence,<sup>165</sup> is generated from the flesh, the bones from fat, the marrow from bones, and the semen, which (among) these is the noblest, from the marrow.<sup>166</sup> Whatever is farther from matter is more excellent. The utility of comprehending the transformations of these things and of the manner of their generation and passing away,<sup>167</sup> of (the ways in which) they are useful

or harmful, of the periods (in which) this (happens) and of (the relevant) measures (consists in) establishing the truth that (all) this is not good,<sup>168</sup> nay that it is an evil. And this is a reason for being drawn towards the good. At this point we return to the text.

Whoever wishes to remove the harmful (effects) of hunger and thirst from himself should direct his thought to the hollow (part) of the chest and the larynx, (i.e.) the channel (through which) the wind (passes) by means of respiration.<sup>169</sup>

Whoever wishes to dispense with motion should reflect on the 'tortoise', namely, the twisted veins above the navel likened to this (animal).<sup>170</sup>

Whoever wishes to see the *siddhas*<sup>171</sup> among the ascetics,<sup>172</sup> who were able (to achieve) the objectives<sup>173</sup> and become, through knowledge and virtue, invisible<sup>174</sup> and inhabit *Bhuvan-loka*, should direct his thought to the light of the orifice which is (found) on the bone of the vertex. Thus he will see and behold(?)<sup>175</sup> them.<sup>176</sup>

Whoever wishes (to acquire) knowledge—let his thought be (centred) in the heart,<sup>177</sup> which is its source and dwelling place,<sup>178</sup> so that he should represent it united with the soul, without making a distinction between the two.<sup>179</sup> For the soul knows (lit. : is knowing) and the heart lives. This should not be difficult for him, since he has totally<sup>180</sup> emancipated<sup>181</sup> it from this world. When he does this he will truly know his own self,<sup>182</sup> and no object of the senses is concealed from him, even if it is hidden or remote.<sup>183</sup>

Q 47. Is there beyond this<sup>184</sup> requital by means of knowledge something that is nobler than it?

(R, 189) Ans. Why should not this be so? (For) this knowledge is not in truth knowledge; it is an impediment to true knowledge.<sup>185</sup> We have already mentioned the consequences of the division of knowledge (which is) theoretical. Accordingly we shall now speak of the consequences of the division (of knowledge which is) practical.<sup>186</sup> For the attainment of *praxis*, together with knowledge, has fallen (to the lot of) the ascetic described above. He is at the point of achieving that which he seeks. If he wishes that he, except for his spirit, be transported in this entanglement, from his (own) body to another body, not in a way in which (one is) transported after death, but rather in virtue of his (own) will, volition and (free) choice, he is able to bring this about.<sup>187</sup> This is because the bodies are nets for the spirits,<sup>188</sup> with a view to requiting them for former good and evil (deeds) with ease or discomfort<sup>189</sup> corresponding to the two (categories of deeds). Attracting (to oneself) the former and warding off the latter (involves) some wronging<sup>190</sup> of people of one's (own) species or (of those) of other species. (Hence) hostility<sup>191</sup> brings about the guaranteed (necessity) of future retribution. On the other hand, the above-mentioned ascetic has borne to the full in his present mould<sup>192</sup> that which he deserved for his past (deeds); and he refrains from acquiring (further *karma*) in the future. In his case there is no guaranteed (necessity); he knows his soul: whence it has come and whither it will go. Accordingly he is able to move and transport it, and does not stick to the body (in which the soul) is harassed. For this (reason) also he (is able) to die in virtue of his volition whenever he wishes.<sup>193</sup>

Q 48. Is he able to transport this garment<sup>194</sup> with him (by means of) practices<sup>195</sup> which others are unable to perform?

Ans. If the state of his body had been (like) that of the bodies of the common people with regard to grossness<sup>196</sup> and sediment(s),<sup>197</sup> he would not have been able to have it as his companion. It is, however, in a state in which no sediments or dregs are left.<sup>198</sup>



In the body there are five categories of winds,<sup>199</sup> two of which (are related to) the passage of breath, one of them entering on account of attraction and the other going out on account of expulsion.<sup>200</sup> The third (wind) is present in all the places of the body, for it is one of its four basic constituents. As for the fourth (wind), it is through its (instrumentality) that there is motion: leaping and jumping. Taking its course, the fifth (wind) carries food and the (various) mixtures and transports them from one place to another in the body. Thus no place remains permanently in the same state.<sup>201</sup>

(R, 190) If the above-mentioned ascetic grasps the 'leaping wind', constantly fixes his thought upon it, and strengthens it by making additions to it, his (downward) inclination is lessened.<sup>202</sup> Consequently he (can) walk on flowing water and on shifting mud in the way someone else walks upon the face of the earth: he is not drowned and does not sink. He can (also) step bare-foot upon a piercing thorn without his foot being pricked, (the reason) for this being the absence of a (downward) inclination,<sup>203</sup> because of which he might have been affected by (this) harmful (object).<sup>204</sup> This 'wind' has different dimensions in (the various species of) the animals that walk and (those) that fly, such as the deer and the tortoise (on the one hand), or the hen and the dove (on the other). In each of these two pairs (of species the difference) in dimension may attain (such a degree) that each (of the species) may (appear to be) the contrary (of the other).<sup>205</sup>

Similarly, whenever (the ascetic) strengthens the 'wind' that transports the mixtures, his body (as it) appears to others is ablaze like unto a flaming fire.<sup>206</sup> Again, hearing (takes place) by means of air,<sup>207</sup> being part of air.<sup>208</sup> When (the ascetic) has a true knowledge of the two,<sup>209</sup> and has habituated<sup>210</sup> his thought (to apply itself) to the two, he hears sounds that are (produced) in the air, even if (these sounds) are distant from him in space.<sup>211</sup>

Again, the body is heavy and air is light. Accordingly whenever his thought combines the two so that they become one, his body becomes (as) light as the things that, having been separated from a plant, are tossed about in the atmosphere by winds; the air does not penetrate its (the body's) weight,<sup>212</sup> it can fly to whichever regions of the earth he wants, his flight being lighter than that of birds.<sup>213</sup>

Q 49. Do all these (attainments) come together in (one) person<sup>214</sup> or is every (ascetic) specialized with regard to his particularity and activity?

Ans. All these (attainments) come together in one (ascetic), for thought is one;<sup>215</sup> and this assembler is called *mahāvīdeha*.<sup>216</sup> Whenever the ascetic reflecting on his (own) body is united (in thought) with air, he (is able to) fly because of the latter's lightness. (Similarly, if he is united) with fire, he is ablaze because of its light. Whatever the natural body be upon which he reflects he (achieves) with regard to it whatever he imagines and wills.<sup>217</sup> For each of these bodies has three states. The first of them<sup>218</sup> is (its) identity,<sup>219</sup> as for example, in the case of Earth, for it is 'earth'. The second (state) is (that of the things) generated from a particular, which differ in form from it, as (for example) the minerals and plants which differ in form from the earth. The third (state) is the essence,<sup>220</sup> as (for example) earthiness which is (a characteristic) common both to (the earth) and these (generated things).<sup>221</sup>

When (the ascetic) truly realizes this with regard to both the generalities and the particulars of the elements, he is able to put an end to the harmful (effects) that they (may have) upon his body, such as (those due to) being burnt by fire, being penetrated by air,<sup>222</sup> being drowned by water, being (held back by) the impenetrability<sup>223</sup> of earth, and so forth. He has such power over his body that

he may render it subtle<sup>224</sup> so that it is hidden or manifest according to his wish.<sup>225</sup> (He can also) render it beautiful<sup>226</sup> or ugly, strengthen it,<sup>227</sup> soften it, coarsen it, or harden it<sup>228</sup> so that he can appear in whatever form he desires.<sup>229</sup> (He can also) make it light so as to fly and descend, skim (the ground) and soar.<sup>230</sup> (He can also) make it (R, 191) huge so that whoever sees it is terrified.<sup>231</sup> (He is also able) to perceive with his senses, even if (the object) perceived (by him) is far off from the place (where he is).<sup>232</sup> Nothing (can) hinder him from going (his way) and nothing can shake him when he stands still.<sup>233</sup> How (should it be possible for things) to make an impression upon him,<sup>234</sup> (seeing) that he is able to annihilate them and bring them into existence? <sup>235</sup> Indeed they obey his command.<sup>236</sup>

Q 50. This is what (he is able) to achieve with regard to the five elements,<sup>237</sup> namely, earth, water, fire, wind and the sky.<sup>238</sup> But what (is he able to) achieve with regard to incorporeal<sup>239</sup> (things)?

Ans. We have already said that his senses are purified<sup>240</sup> (so as to) overpower<sup>241</sup> the impediments<sup>242</sup> (which) therefore cannot gain mastery over them so as to render them incapable of perception.<sup>243</sup> In fact<sup>244</sup> (the ascetic) can see without an eye, and hear without an ear.<sup>245</sup> He transcends the three forces:<sup>246</sup> the first two which (respectively) are pure good and pure evil, and the intermediate one as between the two,<sup>247</sup> so that all of them are subordinate to his will, and consequently nothing that pertains to them exists in (something that is) other than he, unless he desires (something) to be there.<sup>248</sup> The root of this matter is the study of the true reality of the body, the heart, and the soul.<sup>249</sup> (For) then(?)<sup>250</sup> things obey (the ascetic) so that he (can) know them by their definitions<sup>251</sup> and (can) grasp them in a universal<sup>252</sup> (manner).<sup>253</sup>

Q 51. (Can the ascetic) attain in this science the highest degree (similar) to the one which he attains in (his) actions? <sup>254</sup>

Ans. No. For the possessor of this knowledge, even though it is designated by this name, fails to achieve liberation if he deems the latter to be knowledge, the reason being that this (knowledge) is obtained through the senses.<sup>255</sup> For knowledge is the cognition of the perishing and destruction of these *cognita*<sup>256</sup> followed<sup>257</sup> up by its rejection.<sup>258</sup> In a similar way as what is deemed to be knowledge prevents the (achievement of) liberation,<sup>259</sup> rejoicing and glorying in it,<sup>260</sup> being a sort of self-aggrandizement and pride, also prevent its<sup>261</sup> (achievement). (There is also the case of the ascetic) to whom angels<sup>262</sup> show themselves apprising him of their condition and state and calling him to Paradise.<sup>263</sup> They describe the latter to him (informing him) that it is a native place of everything (that is) good and the treasury that includes<sup>264</sup> with respect to trees and fruits whatever may occur to your mind, and women (of such a sort) that their sight gives all joy and delight; there is nothing harmful there (i.e. nothing that is excessively) hot or cold, and its inhabitants<sup>265</sup> are immune from old age, illnesses, other afflictions of the body and the basest needs. The soul (of such an ascetic may) be puffed up (R, 192) because of this call, and the signs of pride and vainglory (may) become manifest in him; he (may) suffer a setback (as far as) his degree (in the hierarchy is concerned) and his promise (may) be broken.<sup>266</sup>

Q 52. How should he answer the angels in order to be saved from such (an untoward) happening?

Ans. He should say that the master of the world<sup>267</sup> may be likened<sup>268</sup> to a worm which has fallen into a huge jar (full) of coals (burning with) a blazing flame.<sup>269</sup> These (coals) may (stand for) this world (whose) suffering<sup>270</sup> is nothing but the disturbance and upheavals (which occur) in it (i.e. the world); any hope



of escape and deliverance from it is cut off. This was my state of being while I clung to this world. When, however, I withdrew from it, I encountered the shadow of a cloud.<sup>271</sup> and (thus) obtained (some) little relief from fatigue and weariness. How should I, therefore, whenever my heart inclines towards Paradise, wish to be preoccupied with its delights. For<sup>272</sup> thereby I should return to (my) bonds, and thus my endeavour to come near the realm of liberation would be lost.<sup>273</sup>

Q 53. If what has been (referred to) above is not true knowledge,<sup>274</sup> what is it then?

Ans. It is within the compass of what is the *present* of time, i.e. the *now* of it.<sup>275</sup>

Q 54. What is achieved thereby?

Ans. Thereby<sup>276</sup> is achieved cognition of the substance of a thing and of its genus, and thereupon of its *quale*, i.e. of the characteristics which distinguish one thing from another, thereupon of its place, its situation and its direction.<sup>277</sup>

Q 55. What is the name of this knowledge, its object and its *quale*?

Ans. As for its name, it is 'crossing'<sup>278</sup> and 'causing to pass over'.<sup>279</sup> As for the object of this knowledge, it is everything that is either subtle or gross in its entirety. As for its *quale*, it is the universal grasp(?)<sup>280</sup> (which apprehends as) one whole and one species.<sup>281</sup> Furthermore, it is only useful in its application which (consists) in encompassing the *sensibilia* and the objects of knowledge and total dissociation from them.

Q 56. When does liberation come about?

Ans. Soul in man is a divine pure undefiled substance;<sup>282</sup> defilement of the heart comes about only because of its being tossed about between the three forces<sup>283</sup> which have been referred to several times. As long, therefore, as the heart has not yet achieved a purification similar to that of the soul so as to be united through a union of attribute their mixture is useless and liberation does not come about.<sup>284</sup>

Here ends the third section whose particular (subject) is recompense and the *quale* of requital.<sup>285</sup>

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> In *BSOAS*, xxix, 2, 1966, 302–25 (henceforth abbreviated as *BSOAS*, ch. I) and *BSOAS*, xli, 3, 1977, 522–49 (henceforth abbreviated as *BSOAS*, ch. II).

<sup>2</sup> H. Ritter, 'Al-Birūnī's Übersetzung des Yoga-sūtra des Patañjali', *Oriens*, ix, 2, 1956, 165–200 (henceforth abbreviated as R).

<sup>3</sup> We refer to the pagination known to Ritter. Since then the pagination of the MS has been changed: fols. 417a–424a instead of fols. 412a–419a.

<sup>4</sup> *Kitāb fi taḥqīq mā li 'l-Hind or al-Birūnī's India (Arabic text)*, Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as *India*, Hyd.).

<sup>5</sup> Alias *Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi*. Henceforth abbreviated as *YS*. References are made to the edition printed in P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, i, 3, Leipzig, 1908, 511–43 (abbreviated as 'Deussen'). References to Woods's translation, unless otherwise indicated, are to J. H. Woods, *The Yoga-system of Patañjali, with Veda-vyāsa's and Vācaspati-miśra's Tattva-vaiśārādī*, Cambridge, Mass., 1977.

<sup>6</sup> The following commentaries have been used.

I Vyāsa, (*Pātañjalayogasūtra*)-*Bhāṣya* (written between A.D. 350 and 650, probably in the sixth century A.D., according to Winternitz). Edition: Rājārām Śāstri Bodas (ed.), BSS, Bombay, 1892. (Abbreviated as Vy.)

## Subcommentaries on I

- (a) Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda, (*Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣya*)-*Vivaraṇa* (eighth century A.D., according to P. Hacker, who defends the identification of this author with Śaṅkara, the celebrated Advaitin. See P. Hacker, 'Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin', in G. Oberhammer (ed.), *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner*, Wien, 1968, 119–48). Edition: Rama Sastri and Krishnamurthi Sastri (ed.), Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1952.
- (b) Vācaspati Miśra, *Tattvavaiśārādī* (c. A.D. 850). Edition: as in I(c). (Abbreviated as Vāc.)

## Subcommentaries on I(b)

- (i) Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī, *Pātañjalarahasya* (sixteenth century A.D.?). Edition: *Sāṅga yogadarśana*, Gosvāmī Dāmodara Śāstri (ed.), CSS, Benares, 1935.
- (ii) Hariharānanda Āraṇya (A.D. 1869–1947), *Bhāsvatī*. Edition: in I(b)i.
- (c) Vijñānabhikṣu, *Yogavārttika* (mid-sixteenth century A.D.), comments on the *YS* and parts of Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya*. Edition: Nārāyaṇ Miśra (ed.), *Pātañjalayogadarśanam*, Vārāṇasī, 1971.
- (d) Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (= Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa), *Bhāṣyacchāyākyavṛtti* (end of seventeenth century and first half of eighteenth century A.D. according to P. V. Kane and P. K. Gode). Edition: Jivanātha Miśra (ed.), *Pātañjaladarśanam*, Benares, 1907 (henceforth abbreviated as *Bhāṣyacchāyā*).
- (e) Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa (= Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa), *Pātañjalayogasūtra-vṛtti*. This is a separate commentary, patently different from the prec. though not unrelated to it. Edition: Dhundhirāj Śāstri (ed.), *Yogasūtra with six commentaries*, KSS, 83, Benares, 1930 (henceforth referred to as *Vṛtti*).

II Bhojarāja (= Bhojadeva), *Rājamārtanḍa* (= *Bhojavṛtti*) (tenth century A.D. according to S. Dasgupta; early eleventh century A.D. according to R. Garbe). Edition: Rāmaśaṅkar Bhaṭṭācārya (ed.), *Pātañjalayogasūtra*, Vārāṇasī, 1963.

## Subcommentary on II

- (a) Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya, *Kiraṇa* (nineteenth–twentieth century A.D.). Edition: *Yogadarśanam*, Benares, 1939.

III Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, *Maṇiprabhā* (c. A.D. 1592 according to J. H. Woods). Edition: in I(e).

IV Bhāvāgaṇeśa, *Pradīpikā* (seventeenth or eighteenth century A.D. according to Dhundhirāj Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

V Ananta, *Yogacandrikā* (= *Padacandrikā*) (nineteenth century A.D. according to Dhundhirāj Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

VI Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī, *Yogasudhākara* (twentieth century A.D. according to Dhundhirāj Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

VII Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, *Yogasiddhāntacandrikā* (seventeenth century A.D. according to Rāmaśaṅkar Bhaṭṭācārya). Edition: Ratna Gopāla Bhaṭṭa (ed.), CSS, Benares, 1911.

VIII Baladeva Miśra, *Yogapradīpikā*. Edition: Dhundhirāj Śāstri (ed.), KSS, 85, Benares, 1931.

IX Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya, *Bhāṣya* (see II(a)). Edition: in II(a).

X Bhavadeva *Yogasūtravṛtti* MS, Sarasvatī Bhavan no. 29839 (in preparation for publication).

7 *الخصلة* in the Arabic. The term *الخصلة* (pl.) ('qualities, characteristics') is used in al-Bīrūnī's translation to render the *aṣṭāṅgaṇi*, 'the eight stages (lit.: auxiliaries, aids)'. For the first four of these as featuring in the Arabic translation of the second chapter of the *Yogasūtra* (R, pp. 182–3; cf. *YS* 2.28 et seq.) see *BSOAS*, ch. II, p. 526, 1.4 seq. For the term *الخصلة* as probably representing the Sanskrit term *guṇa*, which may have been contained in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī, see art. cit., n. 116.

\* Cf. sūtra 3.1: *deśa-bandhaś cittasya dhāraṇā* 'Fixed attention consists in restricting (or: binding) of the mind to (one) locus'. The term *bandha* here is variously glossed by the com-

mentaries: (a) = *sambandha* 'relation' (Vāc. ad loc.); (b) = *bandhana*, 'binding, tying' (Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda ad loc.); (c) = *sthīrikaraṇa*, 'steadying, making (something) firm' (Bhoja, Rāmānandayati ad loc.); (d) *sthāpana*, 'establishing' (Vijñānabhikṣu, Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī ad loc.); (e) *ekāgrya*, 'one-pointedness' (Nāgōjī Bhaṭṭa ad loc.). For إقرار القلب cf. especially (c) and (d). The same Arabic expression is used by al-Bīrūnī to render the Sanskrit term *samādhi*. See R, p. 177, l. 10: إقرار القلب في مقر واحد. For this and the related term استقر القلب below also cf. *BSOAS*, ch. II, n. 152.

<sup>9</sup> إدامة الفكرة. Cf. إدامة الفكرة below, R, p. 185, ll. 4, 6 and 7. Earlier the term and cognate terms have been rendered as 'thought'. R, p. 173, l. 1: والفناء عى الفكر في العواقب: 'and freedom from thoughts about consequences' (*BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 318, l. 16); والبرى عى الأفكار: 'and who is (withdrawn) from thoughts'; R, p. 174, last line: ومنهم من أوحى اليه فبال بالتفكر: 'to others he made a prophetic revelation so that they grasped in thought that which he bestowed upon them' (ibid., p. 321, l. 8); R, p. 175, l. 7: وإحاطت بصفته الفكرة: 'and thought conceived his attributes' (ibid., p. 321, l. 21); R, p. 176, l. 1: إفراة الفكرة في الله: 'the setting apart of one's thought towards God' (ibid., p. 322, l. 18) (corresponding to *eka-tattvābhyāsa* in sūtra 1.32). Also cf. R, p. 176, l. 2; R, p. 188, ll. 1–2 (below).

<sup>10</sup> The MS has واما and Ritter suggests the emendation وفيها. The reading دائبا seems preferable. Cf. R, p. 171, l. 17: مواظبا دائبا: 'perseveringly and applying himself to it continually'; R, p. 171, l. 18: دؤوب: 'continuous application' (also cf. R, p. 181, l. 1). Also cf. the term *yatra* in Rāmānandayati on sūtra 3.2: *yatra dhāraṇā vijātiya-vṛtti-parihāre yatnāpekṣā bhavati tatraiva yā pratyayānām vṛtīnām eka-tānatā yatnam anapekṣyaika-viṣayatā tad dhyānam* 'Fixed attention directed to a given locus requires effort in avoiding heterogeneous (mental) functions (i.e. other than the series of the one repeated percept). (On the other hand,) uninterrupted continuity of (such) functions, i.e. percepts, directed to that very same locus, consists in having one and the same object (for cognition) without requiring effort, and that is meditation'. (Woods's translation of this sentence, *JAOS*, xxxiv, 1914, 61, seems to be confused.) An idea similar to the one expressed here may have occurred in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī.

<sup>11</sup> Lit.: 'Number does not fall upon one'. For عدد ('number') here cf. R, p. 171, l. 15, where the MS has والعويد which Ritter reads بالتعدد.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. R, p. 171, l. 19, where the MS has الانفعال والعويد which Ritter reads as الانفعال (؟) والتعدد (؟), but the reading الانفعال والتعدد is suggested by a comparison with the present expressions . . . لا يقع عليه عدد فينفسل ويتبدد . . . and by the similarity of context in the two related passages. See Appendix in *BSOAS*, ch. II, 528.

<sup>13</sup> Ritter has here (؟) المراتب but the MS may be read as المرات, and the latter reading seems to be preferable. Cf. R, p. 171, l. 17, where Ritter reads مرتبه which he amends to زمين, but the reading مرتين seems preferable in view of المرات here. See Appendix in *BSOAS*, ch. II, 527.

<sup>14</sup> Lit.: 'goes'.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.2: *tatra pratyayaika-tānatā dhyānam* 'Meditation is the uninterrupted (lit.: one) continuity of thought concerning the same (locus)'. The word *tatra* in this sūtra may alternatively be taken to refer to *dhāraṇā* in the preceding sūtra rather than to *deśa* therein. Cf. the syntactic use of *tatra* in sūtra 1.25; and consider the relevant description *ekatra* 'taken together (i.e. seen as one gradually evolving succession or extension)' in sūtra 3.4. Bhavadeva's commentary (*Yogasūtravṛtti*, Sarasvatī Bhavan MS no. 29839) reads here: *tatra tat*. . . The sūtra would accordingly mean: '... uninterrupted continuity of the same thought (i.e. of the same percept to which *dhāraṇā* has been applied: *dhāraṇā-viṣaya-viṣayaka-jñānasya*, Bhavadeva ad loc.). . . For the expression المرات between cf. Vy. ad loc.: *pratyayāntareṇa-parāmrṣtaḥ* 'unaffected by (any) percept which is different (from the one percept repeated in a succession); Bhoja ad loc.: *jñānasya* . . . *nirantaram utpattiḥ* 'the uninterrupted (i.e. continual, or: identical) emergence of thought'; Nāgōjī Bhaṭṭa ad loc.: *vṛtty-antarāvyaṣahitaḥ* 'without being intercepted by a different (mental) function'. The expression فيما بين may have been suggested by *pratyayāntareṇa* (Vy. loc. cit.), or *vṛtty-antara* (Nāgōjī Bhaṭṭa loc. cit.) or some similar expression; *antara* may among other things mean 'amidst, between, gap, inter-

vening time or space, pause'. For the phrase آخر شيء cf. the quotation from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (6.7.85b) in Vāc. on sūtra 3.1: *nāpayāti yadā cittaṃ siddhāṃ manyeta tāṃ tadā* 'When the mind does not deviate (lit.: goes away) one deems it (i.e. *dhāraṇā*, "fixed attention") to have been accomplished'.

<sup>16</sup> إخلاص rendered as 'perfect concentration' may mean 'sincerity, sincere devotion' and so forth. Cf. R., p. 173, l. 6: —الدُّوب على الفعل المخلص— persistence (or application) in a devoted activity'. Also cf. R., p. 172, l. 6: —الخلوص إلى الخلاص— addressing himself single-mindedly to his liberation'.

<sup>17</sup> الفكرة. See n. 9 above. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 276: —ويتكون له زوج من فكرته— out of his thought there arises a spouse' (tr. E. C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, London, 1910, reprinted Delhi, 1964 (henceforth abbreviated as Sachau), I, 327).

<sup>18</sup> Lit.: 'with what is reflected upon'.—This sentence corresponds to sūtra 3.3: *tad evārtha-mātra-nirbhāsaṃ svarūpa-śūnyam iva samādhiḥ* 'Concentration is the same (meditation), (when) it appears as the object alone, and has seemingly relinquished its own nature'. Cf. sūtra 1.43. The renderings of *nirbhāsa* here as 'illuminating' (M. R. Yardi, *The Yoga of Patañjali*, Poona, 1979, 200), 'enlightens' (Rājendralāla Mitra), or 'shining with the light of (the object)' (Rāma Prasāda) are inaccurate. The term الإخلاص here may correspond to *samādhi* in sūtra 3.3 above, although the latter term has been rendered by al-Bīrūnī in a preceding passage by إقرار القلب على مقرر واحد (R., p. 177, l. 10)—'making the heart steadfastly fixed' (*BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 325, n. 242). Also cf. n. 16 above.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.4: *trayaṃ ekatra saṃyamah* 'The three (i.e. fixed attention, meditation and concentration) taken together (or: in one succession) constitute Discipline'. The commentary used by al-Bīrūnī may have had here the word *militānām*, 'joined together, jointly' (cf. *Vijñāna-bhikṣu* ad loc.: *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhiṇām militānām tatra tatra sūtre 'nayā saṃjñayā grahaṇam bhaviṣyati* 'A different technical term (i.e. *saṃyama*) will be used at various points in the (subsequent) sūtras (instead) of fixed attention, meditation and concentration conjointly') or some similar expression. The reference in this context in al-Bīrūnī's translation to eight (and not three) qualities does not seem to have a parallel in the relevant Sanskrit sources which are available. The term *ekatra* may have been understood by al-Bīrūnī as referring to the subject (cf. له here) rather than to the object. The latter understanding, taking *ekatra* as meaning 'in one place, in one and the same locus, with reference to one and the same point', seems to be reflected in Vy. ad loc.: *eka-viṣayāṇi trīṇi sādhanāni saṃyama ity ucyate* '(When) the three means (under consideration) have one (and the same) object they are called Discipline (*saṃyama*)'. Also cf. the use of *ekatra* in Vy. on sūtra 3.16, and Vy. on *tatra* in sūtra 3.2 (= *tasmīn deśe* 'in the same locus'). Also cf. Bhāvāgaṇeśa on sūtra 3.4: *tad dhāraṇādi-trayaṃ ekatraika-viṣaye kriyamāṇam saṃyama ity ucyate* 'When that triad consisting of fixed attention etc. is performed in one locus (*ekatra*), i.e. on one and the same object, it is called Discipline (*saṃyama*)'; and cf. Bhavadeva ad loc.

A curious combination of both of the above-mentioned meanings of *ekatra* has been resorted to in Ganganatha Jha's translation of sūtra 3.4: 'These three converging on any one substratum constitute Discipline'. An understanding of *ekatra* in sūtra 3.4 as meaning 'simultaneous application' seems to be suggested in M. R. Yardi, *The Yoga of Patañjali*, Poona, 1979, 56. This is implausible, since what the constituents or stages of *saṃyama* have in common is the same locus or object, but not the same moment of time.

<sup>20</sup> مَرَنْتَ نَفْسَهُ. An alternative reading is مَرَنْتَ نَفْسَهُ in which case the translation would be: 'disciplining his soul in the stages'.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.6: *tasya bhūmiṣu viniyogaḥ* 'It (i.e. *saṃyama*, "Discipline") is (to be) applied to the stages (or, alternatively: employed by stages)'. Here *tasya* clearly refers to *saṃyama* of sūtra 3.4 above. The word *bhūmiṣu* seems to refer to sūtras 1.42–44. See Vāc. on sūtra 3.3. Also cf. sūtra 2.27. The word مَرَنْتَ here may perhaps represent a misunderstanding by al-Bīrūnī of *viniyoga* as meaning *yoga*, 'discipline'. Cf. Bhāvāgaṇeśa's gloss ad loc.: ... *niyojanam yoginām kāryam* 'Yogīs ought to carry out their commitment ...'.

<sup>22</sup> At this point a number of words in the MS are illegible.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Bhoja on sūtra 3.6: *tasya saṃyamasya bhūmiṣu sthūla-sūkṣmāmbana-bhedena sthītāsu citta-vṛttiṣu viniyogaḥ kartavyaḥ* 'Application of it, i.e. of Discipline, with regard to fixed functions of the mind, ought to be done to the stages distinguished according as the object is gross or subtle'. Also cf. sūtra 3.44. The expression *دق* وشرف may correspond to *sūkṣma*. Cf. الدقائق R, p. 185, l. 14 below, which corresponds to *sūkṣma* in sūtra 3.26. The lacuna here may possibly have contained a reference to gross objects (*sthūlāmbana*).

<sup>24</sup> Lit.: 'fall'.

<sup>25</sup> الحس in the singular.

<sup>26</sup> Perhaps the reference to intellect (عقل) reflects *prajñāloka* in sūtra 3.5: *taj-jayāt prajñā-lokaḥ* 'From mastering it there arises the light of intelligence (or: insight)'. Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.: ... *prajñā jñeyam samyag avabhāsayatīty arthaḥ* '... this is to say, intelligence properly illuminates the object which is to be cognized'. The difference between the three qualities and the preceding five referred to by al-Bīrūnī is dealt with in sūtra 3.7: *trayam antar-aṅgam pūrvebhyah* 'The three (i.e. fixed attention, meditation and concentration) are more directly effective (lit.: "internal, proximate, intimate") than the preceding (five aids, namely, restraint, observance, posture, regulation of breath and withdrawal of the senses)'. Here *antar-aṅgam* may correspond to أقرب ('closer').

<sup>27</sup> المواد in the plural. (For al-Bīrūnī's use of the term المادة 'stuff' cf. R, p. 182, l. 3, and see *BSOAS*, ch. II, n. 111.) This phrase seems to correspond to sūtra 3.8: *tad api bahir-aṅgam nirbijasya* 'This (triad of aids, i.e. Discipline) is likewise (only) indirectly effective with regard to the Seedless (*samādhi*, i.e. the state of concentration bereft of consciousness of an object; cf. sūtra 1.51; Vy. on sūtras 1.2 and 1.56; Bhoja on sūtra 3.8)'. This would mean that in this phrase مادة renders *bīja*, lit. 'seed'. Cf. R, p. 172, l. 13 (ch. I, Ans. to Q 7): قال السائل كم التصور الواحد هو أو أكثر؟—قال المحيى هو ضربان احدها تصور المحسوس ذى المادة والثاني تصور المادّة (tr. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 318: 'Q 7. How many kinds of conception are there? One or more than that?—Ans. There are two kinds. One of them is a conception of material (things) perceived by the senses. The second is the conception of the *intelligibilia*, which are devoid of matter'). In *India* (e.g. Hyd., 22) the term المادة appears to be used regularly for rendering the Sanskrit term *prakṛti*.

<sup>28</sup> الحس in the plural. Cf. the reference to *indriya* in *Mañiprabhā* on sūtra 3.7. For the idea expressed here cf. under sūtra 3.6: *ata eva sthūla-viśaya-samāpatti-siddhau satyām purāṇe tat-tad-āyudha-bhūṣaṇāpanayena sūkṣma-viśayaḥ samādhir avatīritāḥ* — *tataḥ śaṅkha-gadā-cakra-śārṅgādi-rahitaṁ budhaḥ / cintayed bhagavad-rūpaṁ praśāntaṁ sūkṣa-sūtrakaṁ // yadā ca dhāraṇā tasminn avasthānavatī tataḥ / kirīṭa-keyūra-mukhair bhūṣaṇai rahitaṁ smaret // tadaikāvayavaṁ devaṁ so 'haṁ ceti punar budhaḥ / kuryāt tato hy aham iti prañidhāna-paro bhaved iti* — 'Hence in the *Purāṇa* (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 6.7.86–8) when the *samāpatti* (meditation, lit. "coalescence, identification", cf. *YS*, sūtras 1.41–2, 2.47, 3.42) the object of which is gross is perfected, then there is later introduced that concentration the object of which is subtle, in that this or the other of the weapons and ornaments (in the deity's image) are removed (gradually): "Then the wise man should contemplate on the serene form of the Exalted One, without its conch-shell and mace and discus and *śārṅga* (bow), but having its string of beads. When the fixed attention has become stable upon this (form), he should keep in mind the form without the ornaments, commencing (with the removal of) the diadem and the armlets. The wise man should then make (the image of) god consist of one limb only and (think) 'I am he'. Thereafter he should become intent upon applying his mind to the idea of 'I'." Cf. *Nāgajñāpavṛtti* ad loc. Sūtra 3.6 itself is referred to above: R, p. 184, l. 2.

<sup>29</sup> This may refer to 'mental representation of the *cognitum* stripped of matter' etc. mentioned in the preceding sentence.

<sup>30</sup> The translation 'progress' instead of 'he who progresses' is also possible.

<sup>31</sup> المتقل or المتقل may reflect *vāhitā*, 'flow', in sūtra 3.10. The sūtra reads: *tasya praśānta-vāhitā saṃskārāt* 'The tranquil flow thereof (i.e. of *nirodha-pariṇāma*, the transformation



into the suppression of the functions of the mind) is due to the subliminal impressions'. The reference to 'progress in years...' may reflect a commentator's attempt to illustrate the meaning of *praśānta*, 'tranquil', in the same sūtra. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 2.13: *dehino 'smin yathā dehe kaumāraṃ yauvanam jarā / tathā dehāntara-prāptiḥ*... 'The soul (merely) passes to another kind of body just as it (gradually) passes through childhood, youth and old age in (its) present body...'. (Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 39, ll. 13–14). An alternative but perhaps less likely hypothesis as to the origin of al-Birūnī's reference to 'progress in years...' is suggested by the following remark of Bhāvāgaṇeśa on sūtra 3.5: *ālokaḥ diptiḥ vṛddhiḥ krameṇa bhavatīty arthaḥ* 'Luminosity means light; the general sense is that (its) increase comes about gradually'. Al-Birūnī may have read *vṛddha* instead of *vṛddhi*. The word *vṛddha* may mean 'old, aged'.

<sup>32</sup> معلوم has been translated above as *cognitum*.

<sup>33</sup> The MS has here قسم. Ritter's reading is: فتقسم; we propose to read فيتقسم.

<sup>34</sup> This may reflect *praśānta* in sūtra 3.10.

<sup>35</sup> The literal meaning of مادة in the singular is matter. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 149, l. 16: مواد الشر — 'factors of evil'.

<sup>36</sup> The reading صارا proposed by Ritter (with a question mark) in a footnote is impossible from a syntactic point of view.

<sup>37</sup> The Arabic has here في 'in'.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.11: *sarvārthataikāgratayoḥ kṣayodayau cittasya samādhi-pariṇāmaḥ* 'The transformation of the mind (known as) "concentration" (*samādhi*) consists in the dwindling away of multiple-mindedness (lit. "many-object-ness") and the rise of single-mindedness (lit. "one-pointedness")'. The الثالثة in the Arabic version may correspond to *samādhi* which appears in the opening section of ch. 3, sūtras 1–4 as the third among the three states constituting the Discipline (*saṃyama*). The word واحد may correspond to *ekāgratā* in sūtra 3.11. Similarly الكلية may correspond to *sarvārthatā*. Both كل and *sarva* mean 'all', whereas the signification of *artha* is quite different from that of كلى. With regard to كلى cf. الكليات in R, p. 177, l. 6 (cf. our translation, *BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 324, n. 230), where it renders *sāmānya*, 'universal'.

<sup>39</sup> These words clearly refer to R, p. 184, l. 5: المعلوم مجردا عن المواد... '... mental representation of the *cognitum* stripped of matter', and for this reason have been translated in the same way. A literal translation would be: 'pure (or: stripped-off) representation without matter'.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.10: *nirodha-saṃskārād nirodha-saṃskārābhyāsa-pāṭavāpekṣā praśānta-vāhītā cittasya bhavati* 'From the subliminal impressions of the suppression (of the functions of the mind) arises the tranquil flow of the mind which depends on skill in the repeated practice of (the emergence of) the subliminal impressions of that suppression'. Cf. also Vāc. under sūtra 3.5: *saṃyama-vijayasyābhyāsa-sādhanaṣya phalam āha*... 'The purpose of the sūtra is to indicate) the result of that mastery over Discipline which has repeated practice as its means'. For the definition of *abhyāsa* see sūtra 1.13. Earlier the word تعويد has been translated by us as 'habituation' (cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 321, n. 137).

<sup>41</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.16: *pariṇāma-traya-saṃyamād atītānāgata-jñānam* 'Through the application of the Discipline to the three transformations (i.e. the three mental functions mentioned in sūtras 3.9, 11 and 12, or alternatively, following commentaries: *dharma*, "property", *lakṣaṇa*, "time-variation" and *avasthā*, "condition" mentioned in sūtra 3.13) knowledge of past and future (is attained)'. The sūtra does not refer to knowledge of present time, but Vāc. on sūtra 3.14 and Vy. on sūtra 3.15 do.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. the enumeration of different forms of clay in Vy. on sūtra 3.15. A discussion of the transformations of a lump of clay as well as a discussion in the same context of the three divisions of time—past, present and future—occurs in Vy. on sūtra 3.15 and in Vāc. on sūtra 3.14 and 15. The term بطنت here may correspond to *śānta*; and ظهرت to *udita* in sūtra 3.14. The sūtra reads: *tatra śāntoditāvya-padeṣya-dharmānupātī dharmī* 'A substance possessed of properties is correlated to properties which are quiescent (i.e. past) or emergent (i.e. present) or uncharacterizable (i.e. future)'. For the use of the term *anupātī*, cf. sūtra, 1.9.

<sup>43</sup> In all probability 'he' is a reference to Q 43.

<sup>44</sup> Apparently 'names' of objects as well as of persons.

<sup>45</sup> Lit.: 'when it is named'.

<sup>46</sup> Lit.: 'to separate this' or 'to distinguish this'. The Arabic text does not make it clear to what 'this' refers.

<sup>47</sup> Lit.: 'direct it'.

<sup>48</sup> *الطير* is a Qur'ānic expression. See Sūrat a-Namal, āya 16. The use of this expression may have been suggested by a passage in a commentary parallel to Vāc. under sūtra 3.17: *evam ca pravibhāga-saṃyamād yoginaḥ sarveṣāṃ bhūtānāṃ paśu-mrga-sarīṣpa-vayah-prabhṛtīnāṃ yāni rutāni tat-rāpy avyaktaṃ padaṃ tad-arthaḥ tat-pratyayaś ceti* 'Thus through (applying) Discipline the *yogī* (comprehends) the sounds produced by all living beings, tame and wild animals, crawling animals, *birds*, etc., as well as the corresponding unmanifested speech, objects and (mental) percepts'. Also cf. Bhoja ad loc. For the whole passage 'Names . . . birds' cf. sūtra 3.17: *śabdārtha-pratyayānāṃ itaretarādhyāsāt saṅkaraḥ; tat-pravibhāga-saṃyamāt sarva-bhūta-ruta-jñānam* 'From the mutual superimposition of word, object and (mental) percept a confusion (arises); by applying Discipline to the distinction between them understanding of sounds (produced by) all living beings (is attained)'.

<sup>49</sup> For al-Bīrūnī's use of the term *حلول* cf. R, p. 167, l. 15; p. 184, l. 21; p. 193, l. 16.

<sup>50</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.18: *saṃskāra-sākṣātkaranāt pūrva-jāti-jñānam* 'A knowledge of the class of beings into which one was born in the past arises from a direct apprehension of (one's) subliminal impressions (when Discipline has been applied to them—cf. Vijñānabhikṣu ad loc.)'. Cf. sūtra 2.39 and its rendering by al-Bīrūnī, R, p. 183, ll. 1–2 (tr. *BSOAS*, ch. II, 526). For a Buddhist parallel see *Digha-nikāya* (PTS), III, 281 (*pubbe-nivāsānussati*, 'remembering a previous life', referred to and discussed as a case of 'Hypermnésie' in Sigurd Lindquist, *Die Methoden des Yoga*, Lund, 1932, 183 and 177). Cf. P. Demiéville, 'Sur la mémoire des existences antérieures' in *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, xxvii, 1927, 283 et seq.

<sup>51</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.19: *pratyayasya para-citta-jñānam* 'From (the application of Discipline to) the mental percept (of another person, cf. Vāc. and Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda ad loc.; or: that one has of another person, cf. Bhoja ad loc.) there arises a knowledge of the mind of the other person'. On an alternative understanding of this sūtra the Discipline (*saṃyama*) is applied to the direct apprehension (cf. *sākṣātkāra* in the preceding sūtra) of the mental percept in question. For Bhoja's interpretation of this sūtra cf. Manu 8.25–6:

*bāhyair vibhāvayel līngair bhāvam antargataṃ nr̥ṇām /  
svara-varṇeṅgitākāraiś cakṣuṣā ceṣṭitena ca //  
ākārair iṅgitair gatyā ceṣṭayā bhāṣitena ca /  
netra-vaktra-vikāraiś ca grhyate 'ntargataṃ manah*

'By external signs let him (a king desirous of investigating law cases) ascertain the internal disposition of men, by their voice, colour, motions, aspect, eyes and gestures. The internal (condition of the) mind is apprehended through the aspect, the motions, the gait, the gestures, the speech, and the changes in the eyes and of the face.'

For Buddhist parallels see e.g. Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* 7.99 (referred to by Louis de La Vallée Poussin in 'Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali', *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques*, v, 239). Cf. Fr. Heiler, *Die buddhistische Versenkung—eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, München, 1922, 34–5, for further comparative discussion under 'Kardiognosie'. For a description of a practical application of this non-ordinary cognitive capability (*abhijñā* in Buddhist terminology) cf. *Daśabhūmika-Sūtram*, ed. J. Rahder, Paris, 1926, 35: *sa para-satvānāṃ para-pudgalānāṃ cetasīva cittaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti, sarāgaṃ cittaṃ sarāga-cittaṃ iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti, virāgaṃ . . . . prajānāti . . .* 'Merely with his mind, he (the Bodhisattva) correctly recognizes the mind of other beings, other men,—he recognizes a mind which is attached as a mind which is attached, and he recognizes a mind which is not attached as a mind which is not attached . . .'. Cf. *Ākaṅkheyya-Sutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, I, 34 (tr. in H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, 304); *Samyutta-nikāya*,



11, 212 (PTS, ed. M. L. Feer, London, 1884–1904); *Digha-nikāya*, I, 79 (PTS, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, London, 1890–1911). The notion of *para-citta-jñāna* may be adumbrated in *R̥gveda* 10.136.6c: *kétasya vidvān* ‘(The long-haired ascetic) knows the intentions (cf. *kēta-vedāh*, *R̥gveda* 1.104.3; tr. Geldner: “Gedankenleser”) (of the *apsarases*, *gandharvas* and wild animals)’.

<sup>52</sup> معرفة كَلِيَّة. For al-Bīrūnī’s use of the term كَلِيَّة cf. R, p. 184, l. 9 (see n. 38 above). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 31: —الموجودات الكليّة في العالم هي العناصر الخمسة: ‘The universal existents in the world are the five elements’. And see the following note.

<sup>53</sup> The MS has here صرويه. Ritter’s suggestion is ضرورية. We propose to read جزوية فاذا تجاوزها الى: 3–4, ll. 3–4: —الحلود الجاعلة جزئيات الاشياء كلية... ولم يخل فيها عن التفصيل في معرفة الاشياء. When he transcends it, (reaching) definitions which turn the particulars of things into universals... He does not, however, cease in this (state) from (engaging in) details of (his) knowledge of things’ (*BSOAS*, ch. I, 324, and see n. 231, loc. cit.). For the idea expressed in the Arabic sentence under consideration by means of the terms كلية and جزئية which render the Sanskrit terms *sāmānya*, ‘universal, general’ and *viśeṣa*, ‘particular’, respectively, cf. Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda on sūtra 3.20: ... *sāmānyam vijānāti na punaḥ ... viśeṣam* ... ‘He (the *yogī*) knows in a general manner ... but (he does not comprehend) the particular ...’. Cf. also Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī on the same sūtra: *jñānasya pratyayo dvidvidhaḥ sāmānyo deśa-kālādy-avacchinno viśeṣaś ca, tatradhyo yogi-dhī-viśaya ity āha raktam iti* ‘Percepts occurring in knowledge are of two kinds: (a) general, and (b) particular, i.e. determined (lit.: delimited) by location, time, etc. (i.e. *nimitam*, “instrumental cause”, and *anubhava*, “circumstantial condition”); of the two it is (a) that constitutes the content of a *yogī*’s cognition. Hence (Vyāsa) states: “... enamoured”, etc.’ (see the following note).

<sup>54</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.20: *na tat sālambanam tasyāviśayābhūtāt* ‘(But) that (knowledge) does not include knowledge of the supporting object, since the latter is beyond its range’. (Not all extant commentaries regard this as belonging to the sūtra text; some read *na ca tat*, and Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda’s text reads *na ca* instead of *na tat*). Al-Bīrūnī’s text here also reflects Vy. ad loc.: *rakta-pratyayam jñāti; amuṣminn ālambane rakta iti na jñāti* (this reading incorporates the version occurring in Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda’s text as well as the emendation of *raktam pratyayam* into *rakta-pratyayam*)—‘He (i.e. the *yogī*) has the (mental) percept “(the other person) is enamoured”, but he does not know of what particular object he is enamoured.’ The word *rakta* can signify ‘being affected with a strong feeling towards’, ‘being delighted with, having pleasure in’ (cf. Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda ad loc.), as well as ‘being attached or attracted to, being in love with’ (cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.13: *yathā puruṣa ekasyām striyām rakto na śeṣāsu virakto bhavati* ‘For instance, a man (may be) in love with one woman without (necessarily) being indifferent to all other women’). For عداوة (‘hostility, hate’) in the Arabic text cf. *dviṣṭa* in *Bhāsvatī* ad loc.: *pratyaye rakta-dviṣṭādi-citta-mātre saṃyamāt para-citta-mātrasya jñānam* “‘From the (application of) Discipline to the (mental) percept’”—i.e. to nothing but another’s mind as affected by love or hatred—there arises a knowledge of the mind of the other person and of nothing else’.

For a similar assertion to that made in sūtra 3.20 cf. Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśatikā Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhiḥ*, verse 21 (in ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1925, 10): *para-citta-vidāṃ jñānam anyathārtham katham? yathā sva-citta-jñānam* ... “‘How does a knowledge of those who know another (person’s) mind not involve a correspondence to an object?’—Just as is the case of the knowledge of one’s own mind ...’. Also cf. Śrīharṣa’s *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* (ed. Vārāṇasi, 1961, 64): *pratyate tūvad idaṃ sāmānyato yan nāma kiṃcid paraś cetasā cintayann astīti, kiṃcid vā vivakṣur ity ādi. tatra parasya buddhi-viśayo vivikṣā-viśayo vā viśeṣato vinigamanam vinā naiva pratyate* ‘One knows only generally that another person is thinking something or other or is desirous of speaking something or other. But the object of that individual’s thought or the object of his desire for expression is not specifically known in the absence of any determinant’ (cf. P. E. Granoff, *Philosophy and argument in late Vedānta: Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*,

Dordrecht, 1978, 168). In this connexion, cf. also Udayana's *Nyāyakusumanjālī* (ed. Benares, 1950, 46): *arthenaiva viśeṣo hi nirākāratayā dhiyām* 'Knowledge is specific only by virtue of its object, as it is itself without any particular form'.

<sup>55</sup> Lit.: 'the wonders of his acts'.

<sup>56</sup> In the plural in Arabic: بالافكار والعزائم. The term عزيمة ('steadfastness') can also signify species of magic. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 104, l. 5: العزائم والرقي—'spells and incantations', which apparently corresponds to the Sanskrit term *mantra*.

<sup>57</sup> The Arabic has إليه. It is not quite certain to what object the nominal suffix refers.

<sup>58</sup> This beginning of the answer does not reflect any passage contained in the commentaries which have been consulted.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *rūpa* in sūtra 3.21 (see the following note). This word can signify 'outward look or appearance' (cf. *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.12) in a wide sense encompassing visible aspects such as beauty as well as shape. Cf. al-Bīrūnī's expression تحسينه وتقبيحه 'rendering it beautiful or ugly' (below, R, p. 190, l. 22), which corresponds to *rūpa* 'beauty, shapeliness' in sūtra 3.46.

<sup>60</sup> Lit.: 'sight'.

<sup>61</sup> Lit.: 'eye'.

<sup>62</sup> Lit.: 'hidden'.

<sup>63</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.21: *kāya-rūpa-saṃyamāt tad-grāhya-śakti-stambhe cakṣuḥ-prakāśasamyoḡe 'ntardhānam* 'From the application of Discipline to the form of (one's own) body there arises (the latter's) invisibility (lit.: disappearance) when the contact (between the body and) the light (issuing from the spectator's) eye is severed, (which is tantamount to) the suspension of the (body's) capacity to be perceived'.

<sup>64</sup> Lit.: 'hidden'.

<sup>65</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.21a: *etena śabdādya-antardhānam uktam* (which is in some of the editions part of Vy.'s commentary) 'In the same way (i.e. by the corresponding application of Discipline) may be explained the disappearance of the sounds etc. that one makes'. ('Etc.' refers to the notion that other persons cannot in the circumstances alluded to perceive the *yogī* by means of their remaining senses.) For the syntactic structure of this sūtra, cf. sūtra 1.44.

<sup>66</sup> Lit.: 'the quality' or 'the how'.

<sup>67</sup> The Arabic term أعمال undoubtedly renders the Sanskrit term *karma*. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 272: *ووزعم آخرون ان المدبر هو كرم اى العمل* 'Others maintain that the disposer is *karma*, i.e. action'.

<sup>68</sup> The reading بئته here is not quite certain. In a different context Vy. has the word *akasmāt* which means 'suddenly', and Vāc. in yet another context has the word *sahasā* which possesses the same meaning.

<sup>69</sup> Ritter's text has لمعرفة. We propose to amend لمعرفة.

<sup>70</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.22: *sopakramaṃ nirupakramaṃ ca karma; tat-saṃyamād aparānta-jñānam ariṣṭebhyo vā—*'*Karma* (lit.: "action"; the reference is to the subliminal impressions of one's actions) is either immediately efficacious or otherwise; from the application of Discipline to either, there arises knowledge of one's final end (i.e. death); it also arises from portents'. Our translation of this sūtra follows commentaries such as Bhāvāgaṇeśa ad loc.: *sopakramam = tiva-vegana phala-hetuḥ*, i.e. yielding results speedily. Deussen, however, understands it somewhat differently: he translates the first part of the sūtra: 'Whether the work (of an earlier birth) has begun or not (to fructify) . . . ('Mag das Werk (einer frühern Geburt) angefangen haben oder nicht anfangen haben (seine Frucht zu bringen) . . .)'. The term *aparānta* ('death') is understood by Vāc. as contrasting with *parānta* which refers to the dissolution of the universe (*pralaya*) (see Vāc. ad loc.). Vijnānabhikṣu ad loc., more plausibly, contrasts the term *aparānta* with *pūrvānta* ('first, earlier end', i.e. 'the beginning'): cf. the use of the term *aparānta* in sūtra 4.32 ('am letzten Ende'—transl. Deussen), the expression *pūrvāparāvasthā* ('the preceding and succeeding conditions') in Vy. on sūtra 3.13, and the parallel use in Pali of the corresponding pair of terms *paranta* and *pubbanta* to refer to the future and the past respectively. The words ما لا يعرف ('what is unknown') in the Arabic text do not correspond to *ariṣṭebhyaḥ* in the sūtra. Instead of *aparānta* the text used by al-Bīrūnī

may have read here *parānta*. Cf. the expression *pūrvānta-parānta-madhyeṣu*, ‘concerning the past, future and present’, in Vy. on sūtra 2.39. The word *parānta* can signify ‘the utmost limit’ as well as ‘the posterior limit’, i.e. ‘death’. (Also cf. the meanings *para* = ‘being beyond, surpassing’; *anta* = ‘certainty’.) Accordingly the Arabic expression *يعرف ما لا يعرف* may reflect al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation of *parānta-jñāna* as meaning ‘(the knowledge of) that which is beyond the ultimate knowledge’. (The traditional and in all probability correct interpretation of *aparānta-jñāna* is ‘knowledge of death’. Cf. e.g. Vijnānabhikṣu ad loc.). This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the passage that follows apparently has no connexion with the knowledge (معرفة) mentioned in the Arabic text whereas the corresponding passage in Vy. constitutes a description of the *ariṣṭa*, ‘portent’. For the term *ariṣṭa* as used in the sūtra cf. *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed.) 12.305.8 et seq., where a descriptive list of the portents (*ariṣṭāni*) of approaching death is given in some detail.

<sup>71</sup> الجنة seems to render *svarga* in Vy.

<sup>72</sup> الملائكة seems to render *ādhidaivika*. In the Sanskrit text *ādhidaivika* is an adjective attached to *svarga* (‘Paradise’). Elsewhere al-Bīrūnī regularly renders *devāḥ* by الملائكة. Cf. R, p. 172, l. 17; p. 173, l. 3; p. 192, l. 2. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 68, l. 17: *ديو وهم الملائكة* ‘the deva or angels’ (tr. Sachau, I, 91).

<sup>73</sup> سَدْعُ الزَّبَانِيَةِ is a Qur’ānic term. See Qur’ān, sūra 96.18 (ed. G. Fluegel): سَدْعُ الزَّبَانِيَةِ. The term seems to render *yama-puruṣān* in Vy.

<sup>74</sup> We follow the MS reading here الموقى. Ritter erroneously reads الموقى.

<sup>75</sup> *الموقى من أسلافه* seems to render *pitṛn atitān* in Vy.—‘the fathers that have passed over’.

<sup>76</sup> We adopt the reading مبصر which Ritter suggests in a note, instead of فيبصر.

<sup>77</sup> The Arabic sentence here as a whole appears to correspond to the following passage in Vy. ad loc., detailing the portents (*ariṣṭa*): . . . *tatrādhyātmikam ghoṣam sva-dehe pihita-karṇo na śṛṇoti jyotir vā netre ’vaṣṭabdhe na paśyati; tathādhībhaṭikam yama-puruṣān paśyati pitṛn atitān akasmāt paśyati; tathādhidaivikam svargam akasmāt siddhān vā paśyati viparītam vā sarvam iti* ‘(Of the three kinds of portents) the kind pertaining to (i.e. issuing from) oneself is (exemplified) by the not hearing any sound within one’s body, on closing one’s ears, or not seeing any light (within one’s body) on closing one’s eyes; the kind pertaining to other creatures by the seeing of the messengers of Death (officers of Yama), or by suddenly seeing one’s departed ancestors; and the kind pertaining to the gods—by suddenly seeing Heaven or the *siddhas*, or alternatively—by apprehending the reversal (of everything)’.

<sup>78</sup> The reading *نَفْسِ* seems preferable to *نَفْسِ* because of *بَدَن* ‘body’ that follows, and despite the occurrence of *نَفْسِ* in an analogous context; cf. R, p. 176, l. 6 (trans. *BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 323, l. 7).

<sup>79</sup> Or alternatively: ‘in the good’. The Arabic has بالخير.

<sup>80</sup> Or alternatively: ‘from the evil’. The Arabic has عن الشر.

<sup>81</sup> The Arabic has الإشفاق منه with the pronoun in the singular. According to the dictionaries *منه أشفق* means *être fâché, être au désespoir de* (R. Dozy, *Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes*, Leiden-Paris, 1967, I, 771). On the other hand, *أشفق على* means ‘to have pity on’. Our translation has been suggested by the corresponding Sanskrit term *karuṇā* ‘compassion’ in Vy. The Arabic sentence as a whole corresponds to sūtra 3.23: *maitṛy-ādiṣu balāni* ‘(From the application of Discipline) to (mental attitudes) such as friendliness (arise) powers’. The word *ādi* of the sūtra is explained by Vy. as referring to *karuṇā*, ‘compassion’, and *muditā*, ‘sympathetic joy’. السرور بالخير corresponds to *muditā*. There seems to be a connexion between the Arabic sentence and Vy.’s explanation of the sūtra. The following passage in Vy. seems to correspond to *الإعراض عن الشر*: *pāpa-śīleṣūpekṣā na tu bhāvanā tataś ca tasyām nāsti samādhīr ity ato na balam upekṣātas tatra saṃyamābhāvāt* ‘But equanimity (or non-partisanship) towards those that practise evil does not constitute one of the mental attitudes in question. Hence there cannot be concentration on it, and therefore no power arises from equanimity, because Discipline cannot be applied to it’. The Arabic text does not take into account the negation contained in this Sanskrit passage. The expression *الإعراض عن الشر* is on a par with the expressions

والاشفاق منه والسرور بالخير. The Arabic text does not seem to contain an explicit reference to *maitrī* of the sūtra; possibly السرور بالخير reflects both *muditā* and *maitrī*. Cf. R, p. 176, l. 3: '... to wish and desire the welfare of all creatures without exception, rejoice in its being achieved by them ...' (*BSOAS*, ch. I, 323). The sūtra under consideration appears to be based on sūtra 1.33.

<sup>82</sup> Lit.: 'places'. Cf. *dēsa*, 'locus', in sūtra 3.1 above, which Vy. explains by reference to examples such as *nābhi-cakra* 'the centre (lit.: 'circle, sphere') of the navel. Also cf. sūtra 3.29 et seq. below.

<sup>83</sup> Ritter's text has منه. We propose the emendation فيه.

<sup>84</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.24: *baḥṣu haṣṭi-balādīni* ' (From the application of Discipline) to powers there arise the elephant-power and so forth'. Vy. on this sūtra speaks of 'elephant-power', of 'Vainateya's (i.e. Garuḍa's) power' and 'wind-power'. These may possibly be a reference to powers centred in the human body. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that al-Birūnī makes a distinction between strengthening the soul and strengthening the body (in which the *cakras* are located). This distinction does not occur in the commentaries consulted by us but may have existed in the commentary used by him. For an early adumbration of the concept of *cakras* see *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.12: *sa yathā sarvāsām apāṇ samudra ekāyanam evaṇ sarveṣām sparśānāṇ tvag ekāyanam evaṇ sarveṣām gandhānāṇ nāsike ekāyanam evaṇ sarveṣām rūpānāṇ cakṣur ekāyanam* ... 'It is just as the ocean is the sole locus of all water, thus the skin is the sole locus of all touchings, thus the nostrils are the sole locus of all smells, thus the eye is the sole locus of all sights ...'.

<sup>85</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.25: *pravṛtṭy-āloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam* 'From the application of the light of (sense-) activity there arises knowledge of subtle, concealed or remote (things)'. (Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* (*SK*), kārikā 7, on causes of the non-perception of things.) According to Vy. this sūtra is based on sūtras 1.35–6 (which are missing in al-Birūnī's rendering). Sūtra 1.35 reads: *viśayavati vā pravṛtṭir utpannā manasaḥ sthiti-nibandhini* 'Alternatively any (sense-) activity, as it arises, which possesses an object leads to stability'. The Sanskrit word *nibandhini* may account for the Arabic بقضها وقبضها ('after having subdued and constricted them'). Possibly this sūtra was quoted in the commentary used by al-Birūnī under sūtra 3.25. Sūtra 1.36 reads: *viśokā vā jyotiṣmatī* 'Or alternatively (a sense-activity which is characterized by) absence of sorrow and illumination (leads to stability)'. While sūtra 3.25 mentions the well-known three categories of things, i.e. the subtle, the concealed and the remote, al-Birūnī mentions two only: the subtle that are present and the subtle that are absent. This deviation may be accounted for by the assumption that al-Birūnī read *avyavahita* ('unconcealed') instead of *vyavahita* ('concealed'). Deussen's implicit interpretation of *nyāsa* in sūtra 3.25 as synonymous with *saṃnyama* is questionable.

<sup>86</sup> Ritter reads فابصرها. Our translation presupposes the emendation وإبصارها. If this emendation were adopted the translation would be: '... he receives as his requital the comprehension of all that is in the worlds and the visual perception of the latter'.

<sup>87</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.26: *bhuvana-jñānam sūrye saṃyamāt* 'From the application of Discipline to the sun arises knowledge of the worlds'.

<sup>88</sup> The MS has العالم لاراضى. We propose the reading العالم والاراضى. Ritter has inserted into the printed text the emendation لوياضى, i.e. 'the learned Vyāsa'. This is supposed to refer to the well-known commentator on the *YS*. This emendation is highly implausible. Cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 304. By العالم 'world' al-Birūnī seems to render the Sanskrit term *loka*. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 44: (tr. Sachau, I, 59: 'The Hindus call the world *loka*. Its primary division consists of the upper, the lower and the middle. The upper one is called *sva-loka* ...'). Al-Birūnī also refers to the list of seven *lokas* as السموات 'the heavens', *India*, Hyd., p. 189, l. 1: ويتلو الارضين السموات السبع الطباق: 'After the earths follow the heavens, consisting of seven storeys, one above the other. They are called *lokas* ...' (tr. Sachau, I, 231). In the *India* al-Birūnī gives an account of Purāṇic versions of the constitution of the world, pointing out deviations by the 'commenta-

tor of the book of Patañjali' (see *India*, ch. xxi). The word الاراضى or الارضون here and elsewhere seem to render the Sanskrit term *bhūmi* (in the plural) as used by Vy. on sūtra 3.26 and other commentators. Cf. R, p. 181, l. 14; p. 186, l. 9; *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 9; p. 195, l. 2.

<sup>89</sup> i.e. among the Indians.

<sup>90</sup> Lit.: 'side' or 'direction'.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., 44: 'The world is divided in the first place into highest, lowest and middle' (والعالم ينقسم قسمة اولية الى علو وسفل واسطة).

<sup>92</sup> الظلمة. This represents the Sanskrit *tamas*, transcribed as تم in *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 18. Cf. below R, p. 187, l. 3.

<sup>93</sup> اسفل السافلين—lit.: 'the lowest of the lowest'.

<sup>94</sup> جوزن. In *India* al-Birūnī only mentions the plural form: اجوان. Cf. Sachau, Annotations, 311. Sachau's conjectured forms for the singular are spurious.

<sup>95</sup> Ritter reads هو whereas the MS has وهو.

<sup>96</sup> الذراع: 18–22 inches.

<sup>97</sup> فليعلم ان لهم في المسافات مقدارا يسمى جوزن ويشتمل على ٨٠٠٠٠٠٠ اميال. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 131, l. 2: 'ثمانية اميال فهو اذن اثنان وثلاثون الف ذراع' 'The reader must learn that they have a measure of distance called *yojana* which is equal to 8 miles or 32,000 yards' (Sachau, I, 167). Sachau translates ذراع as 'yard'. Cf. A. L. Basham, *The wonder that was India*, London, 1951, 503–4.

<sup>98</sup> The Arabic كورق represents the Sanskrit *koṭi*, 'ten millions'. A scheme of the Indian order of numbers is set out by al-Birūnī in *India*, Hyd., 137 (Sachau, I, 175).

<sup>99</sup> Sanskrit *lakṣa*, '100,000'.

<sup>100</sup> For the passage as a whole cf. *India*, Hyd., 194: . . . وهو ان مفسر كتاب باتنجل لما اراد تحديد العالم ابتداء من اسفله وقال ان مقدار الظلمة كورق واحد وخمسة وثمانون لكش جوزن وذلك ١٨,٥٠٠,٠٠٠ 'The commentator of the book of Patañjali, wishing to determine the dimension of the world, begins from below and says: "The dimension of darkness is one *koṭi* and 85 *lakṣa yojana*, i.e. 18,000,000 (emend: 18,500,000—T.G. and S.P.) *yojana* "' (Sachau, I, 237).

<sup>101</sup> Al-Birūnī uses here the Muslim term جهنم.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 8: وفوقها نرك وهو جهنمات ثلاثة عشر كورق واثنان عشر لكش 'Then follows Naraka, i.e. hells, of the dimension of 13 *koṭi* and 12 *lakṣas*, i.e. 131,200,000 *yojanas*' (Sachau, I, 236). In this parallel passage the Arabic word for 'hell' is in the plural.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., loc. cit.: ١٠٠,٠٠٠ 'Then follows darkness, of one *lakṣa*, i.e. 100,000 *yojana*' (Sachau, loc. cit.).

<sup>104</sup> بزرج in the Arabic transcription. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 11. But the term is transcribed by بجر in *India*, Hyd., 90 (last line); also cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 199, l. 9; p. 324, l. 15; p. 508, l. 12.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 11: ٣٤,٠٠٠ والصاعقة المنسكة او الاماس وهو الارض بزر لصلابتها which Sachau translates, loc. cit.: 'Above it lies the earth of *Vajra*, so called on account of its hardness, because the word means a *diamond*, and the *molten thunderbolt*, of 34,000 *yojana*'. The correct reading seems to be المنسكة (or: الممسكة) 'held fast, grasped' rather than المنسكة. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 90, last line: وفي يد صنم اندر سلاح يسمى بجر من الاماس 'The idol Indra holds in its hand a weapon called *vajra* of diamond. It has a similar handle to the *śakti* . . .' (Sachau, I, 119). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 508, l. 12, and Indra's common epithets *vajra-dhara* ('*vajra*-bearer') and *vajra-pāṇi* ('holding the *vajra* in his hand'). The term *vajra* has in fact the two meanings 'thunderbolt' and 'diamond' mentioned by al-Birūnī.

<sup>106</sup> The primary meaning of *garbha* is 'womb'. It can also be applied to some part of the interior of a building, etc. The term *garbha* is represented in the Arabic text by كرب. The transcription of the Sanskrit *ga* by the Arabic ك is in keeping with al-Birūnī's usage: cf. e.g. *hiranyagarbha*—هيريتركرب, R, p. 168, l. 8. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 12, which has almost the same transcription of *garbha*: ٦٠,٠٠٠ 'Above it lies the middle earth *Garbha* of 60,000 *yojana*' (Sachau, I, 236).

<sup>107</sup> Represented in the Arabic text by سورن. The Sanskrit word *suvarṇa* means 'gold'.



Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 12: ٣٠,٠٠٠ الذهبية الأرض وفوقها 'Above it is the golden earth 30,000' (Sachau, loc. cit.).

<sup>108</sup> The text is here reconstructed by Ritter in accordance with *India*. The Arabic MS is damaged at this point. Only الأرض can be read. Ritter's reconstruction, which is in all probability correct, reads الارضون السبع كل واحدة عشرة آلاف جوزن. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 13. The Sanskrit *sapta* 'seven' is represented in the Arabic here as سبب. The Sanskrit term *pātāla*, probably connected with *pāta* 'a fall', designates seven subterranean earths. These earths are represented as a building with seven storeys which are separated from one another by partitions called *bhūmi* ('earth, soil'), each of which has a thickness of 1,000 *yojanas*. Cf. W. Kirfel, *Die Kosmographie der Inder nach den Quellen dargestellt*, Bonn, Leipzig, 1920, 143. The term *sapta pātālāni* occurs in Vy. on sūtra 3.26 as referring to the following list: *mahātala*, *rasātala*, *atala*, *satula*, *vitāla*, *talātala*, and *pātāla*.

<sup>109</sup> At this point the MS is damaged. The words 'the highest' render عُلْيَاهَا which occurs in the corresponding passage in *India* (Hyd., p. 194, l. 14: (عليها ذات الدييات والبحار) but not in our MS. The word عليها has not been inserted into Ritter's text. This word possibly parallels the word *aṣṭamī* 'the eighth' in Vy. on sūtra 3.26. The 'eighth' is 'this earth' (*bhūmīr iyaṃ*), designated in Vy. as *vasumatī*. The words أرض ذات الدييات are likewise missing in the MS and have been inserted in Ritter's printed text; أرض ذات الدييات occur in the corresponding passage in *India* (Hyd., p. 194, l. 14); أرض does not.

<sup>110</sup> The term *dvīpa*, lit. 'island', also designates the seven concentric zones, separated by oceans, of Indian traditional geography. Cf. D. C. Sircar, *Cosmography and geography in early Indian literature*, Calcutta, 1967, Plate II. The term *dvīpa* is also rendered in *India* (e.g. Hyd., p. 194, l. 4) by جزيرة 'island'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 11: اسم الجزيرة 'Dvīpa is their word for island'. The word *dvīpa*, which is attested in *R̥gveda* 1.169.3 and 7.20.4 is derived by Pāṇini (6.3.97) from *dvi* ('two') and *āpah* ('water').

<sup>111</sup> In the *Yogasiddhāntacandrikā*, a seventeenth-century commentary on the *YS*, the list of the *dvīpas* tallies with the one occurring in al-Bīrūnī's translation. The Vy. commentary has a different list. On the various geographical and cosmographical lists (differing in names, order or number of items) found in Sanskrit commentaries on the *YS* as well as in the various *purāṇas* and in the *Mahābhārata* cf. W. Kirfel, op. cit., 56–7; *idem*, 'Ein medizinisches Kapitel des Garuḍapurāṇas' in *Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig, 1954, 335. Also cf. P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, 2nd ed., Poona, 1977, vol. v, part 2, 1523 et seq.

<sup>112</sup> The reading of the MS هذا could be retained. But Ritter's emendation هذه may be justified by referring to R, p. 186, l. 17: وسائرهما على التضاعيف المذكورة.

<sup>113</sup> For this progressive doubling cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.26: *tataś ca dviguṇā dviguṇāḥ śāka-kuśa-krauñca-śālmala-gomedha-puṣkara-dvīpāḥ* 'Then (come) the islands Śāka, Kuśa, Krauñca, Śālmala, Gomedha and Puṣkara, each double the preceding'. (The K.S.S. 1935 printed edition reads *magadha* instead of *gomedha*.)

<sup>114</sup> Lit.: 'every two islands'.

<sup>115</sup> i.e. continents.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* as quoted by W. Kirfel, *Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude (Bhuvanavinyāsa)—Die kosmographischen Traktate der Purāṇas—Versuch einer Textgeschichte*, Bonn, 1954, 24, l. 6: ... *ikṣu-rasoda* ... ماء may correspond to *udā* ('water').

<sup>117</sup> *surā*, represented in the Arabic MS by سُر (surā).

<sup>118</sup> *sarpis*, represented in the Arabic MS by سرب (sarbi).

<sup>119</sup> *dadhi*, represented in the Arabic MS by دذ (dadhi).

<sup>120</sup> The word *svādu* in the compound *svādūdaka* can also mean 'molasses' (lex.). For the list as a whole cf. the one given in *India*, Hyd., 193.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 15: وراء بحر الماء العذب لوكالوك وتفسيه لا يجمع أي التي لا عمارة فيها: 'Behind the Sea of Sweet Water is Lokāloka which may be interpreted as "lacking places where (people) dwell together", i.e. uninhabited, in which sociability is absent'. Sachau's rendering of يجمع by 'not gathering place' (I, 236) may be too literal. For the use of يجمع cf. below,



R, p. 187, l. 1: جمع الآباء 'the place where the ancestors dwell together'. For the above etymological derivation of *lokāloka* cf. the meanings of *loka*: (i) 'the space in which to live, Lebensraum' (cf. J. Gonda, *Loka—world and heaven in the Veda*, Amsterdam, 1966, 60, and *passim*); (ii) 'community, society' (as in the expression *loka-saṅgraha*, *Bhagavadgītā* 3.20; cf. Rāmānuja's gloss of *lokāḥ*, op. cit., 14.14, as *samūhāḥ* 'communities') respectively. For different etymological derivations of *lokāloka* see (i) Kālidāsa, *Raghuvamśa* 1.68 (cf. *Śabdakalpadruma* s.v.: *prakāśaś cāprakāśaś ca* 'visible and invisible'); and (ii) *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (quoted by H. H. Wilson, *The Vishnu Purāṇa*, 3rd ed., Calcutta, 1961, p. 167, n. 6): ... *loko 'lokaś ca ... vyavasthāpyate* 'the world is separated (thereby) from what is not the world'. Also cf. J. Gonda, op. cit., 154. Cf. also *Devi-Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 8.14.4 for the etymological explanation of the name *lokāloka* as 'bereft of any community (*saṅgha*); cf. جمع above) of living beings'.

<sup>122</sup> Lit.: 'that in which there is no habitation'.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 15 (see n. 121 above). Also cf. al-Bīrūnī's quotation from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* in *India*, Hyd., p. 195, l. 15: وراءها لوكالوك وهو جبل ارتفاعه عشرة آلاف جوزن في مثل ذلك من العرض 'Behind it is *Lokāloka*, a mountain of the height of 10,000 *yojana*, and of the same breadth' (Sachau, I, 237).

<sup>124</sup> أرض الذهب which is apparently not the same as الأرض الذهبية mentioned above (R, p. 186, l. 8). In the parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 15, أرض الذهب is also referred to but is supposed to have the extent of one *koti* of *yojanas* only.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 16: وفوقها بترلوك ١٣٤,٠٠٠ 'above it the *Pitrloka* of 6,134,000 *yojana*' (Sachau, I, 236). According to *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 1 et seq., 'the commentator of the book of Patañjali has heard that the dwelling place of the ancestors (the Sanskrit word is transliterated: *pitrin*) is in the sphere of the moon. This doctrine is based on the assertions of the astronomers. Thus he (the commentator) placed their dwelling place in the first heaven. He ought to have substituted it for *Bhūrloka* but he did not do so. (Instead) because of this addition, he left out the *Svarloka* which is the place of reward'. For the conception of the moon as a dwelling place of departed souls cf. e.g. *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* 1.2 (with schol.).

<sup>126</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 17: وجملة اللوكات السبع التي تسمى بجملة برهماند خمسة عشر كورتى وذلك ١٥٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ 'The totality of the seven *lokas*, which is called *Brahmāṇḍa*, has the dimension of 15 *koti*, i.e. 150,000,000 *yojana*' (Sachau, I, 237). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 179–80 (Sachau, I, 221), where al-Bīrūnī treats of the *brahmāṇḍa*. Sachau's translation of the passage contains an error (possibly due to a misprint). لا يرون للسماوات غير السكون is rendered: '... they believe that the earth is at rest'. The correct translation should be: 'they believe that the heavens are at rest'.

<sup>127</sup> In the plural in the Arabic.

<sup>128</sup> Represented in the Arabic by تم.

<sup>129</sup> Ritter's printed text has صل مرو, which Ritter identifies with the *sālmali* island referred to above. The MS may be read حل مرو. In our opinion there is no doubt that this should be read جبل مرو or جبل ميرو. Al-Bīrūnī refers to جبل ميرو in *India*, Hyd., p. 200, l. 14; p. 201, l. 2; p. 202, l. 16; p. 203, l. 13; p. 204, l. 8; p. 206, l. 7.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 201, l. 8, where Āryabhaṭṭa is quoted as saying that Mt. Meru is 'the realm of the angels' (مملكة الملائكة).

<sup>131</sup> Ritter's printed text has معه (؟) ترا. According to his n. 2 on p. 187 the MS has ترجمه. Our reading ترجمه can be proved as correct by reference to *India*, Hyd., p. 205, l. 14 et seq. This passage also proves that at this point several words are omitted in the Istanbul MS. The passage in question reads: كفسر كتاب باتنجل فانه جاوز التربع فيه الى الاستطالة وجعل احد تربيعة خمسة: عشر كورتى جوزن وذلك ١٥٠,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ والآخر خمسة كورتى على ثلث الاول. This may be translated: '... thus the commentator of the book of Patañjali, who goes beyond (attributing) the square (shape to Mount Meru, transforming it) into an oblong. He fixes (the length of) one of its sides at 15 *kotis yojana*, which is 15,000,000, and that of the other at five *kotis*, i.e. the third of the former'. In his translation Sachau (I, 248) refers to 'three sides' whose length is five *kotis*. This translation has no warrant in the text.

<sup>132</sup> الهندية. Probably Sanskrit is meant. Cf. R, p. 167, l. 9: —الهندي 'the Indian (language)', (*BSOAS*, ch. I, 309); *India*, Hyd., p. 53, l. 9: —بالحندية 'in Sanskrit' (*Sachau*, I, 70).

<sup>133</sup> The names referred to of mountains, kingdoms and seas which surround Mount Meru on its four sides occur in *India*, Hyd., 205.

<sup>134</sup> The printed text reads *بِسْ وَزَدْرُو الشَّمْسُ* which appears to correspond to the MS. Our emendations are based on *India*, Hyd., p. 196, l. 5: *يَتَرَدَّدُ فِيهِ سِدٌّ وَمَنْ وَكَتْدَهْرِبَ أَصْحَابُ الْجَنَّةِ* (the *gñāna* should be emended into *al-gñāna*; cf. *المغنيين*, *India*, Hyd., p. 118, l. 2) '... in which the Siddhas, the Munis and the Gandharvas, the musicians, wander to and fro, is the *Bhūvarloka*' (Sachau, I, 238). However, our reconstruction is uncertain, because in this passage of *India* al-Bīrūnī states that he uses the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and does not refer to the 'commentator of the book of Patañjali'. There is also the fact to be considered that in *India* *gandharva* is represented by two transliterations: *كندهرِب* (Hyd., p. 196, l. 5; p. 218, l. 2) and *كاندهرِب* (Hyd., p. 69, l. 4). Both are very different from *زَدْرُو* occurring in our MS. It seems, therefore, that the possibility that *زَدْرُو* represents *vidyādhara* should not be altogether excluded. In *India* *vidyādhara* is represented by *يَدْأَذَر* (Hyd., p. 69, l. 10; p. 218, l. 3; p. 421, l. 6). Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 421, l. 6: *فَارْتَفَعُ حَتَّى قَرَبَ مِنَ الْجَنَّةِ وَمَوَاطِنَ بَدْأَذَر* (Mount Vindhya) rose even to the neighbourhood of Paradise and the dwellings of the Vidyādhara, the spiritual beings' (Sachau, II, 92). For a definition of the term *vidyādhara*, lit. 'holder of the skill', cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 69, l. 10: *وَهُمْ جَنَّاتُ سِحْرَةٍ لَا يَدُومُ رَوَاجُ سِحْرِهِمْ* 'demon-sorcerers, who exercise a certain witchcraft, but not such a one as to produce permanent results' (Sachau, I, 91). Cf. Richard C. Temple, 'Hindu and non-Hindu elements in the *Kathāsaritsāgara*', *The Indian Antiquary*, LVIII, March 1929, section 2, a: 'Vidyādhara and white magic' (pp. 46-7). For a definition of *gandharva* cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 69, l. 4: *أَصْحَابُ الْإِلْحَانِ وَالْأَغَانِي بَيْنَ أَيْدِي الْمَلَائِكَةِ وَتَسْمَى قُجَاهِمُ أَبْسَرَسُ* 'musicians and singers who make music before the Deva. Their harlots are called Apsaras' (Sachau, I, 91). As for *siddha* and *muni*, they are characterized in *India* (Hyd., p. 70, l. 16 et seq.) as follows: *وَتَحْتَهُمْ مَرْتَبَةٌ بَتَرَبَّى الْإِبَاءِ الْمَوْقُ وَتَحْتُ هَؤُلَاءِ يَهْوَتْ أَنْاسٌ قَدْ أَتَصَلُّوا بِالرَّوْحَانِيَةِ وَتَوَسَّلُوا فَمَا مِنْ جَارِ الرَّبِّيَّةِ غَيْرَ مُجَرَّدٍ عَنِ الْبَدَنِ فَيَسْتَمُونَ رَشَّ وَسِدِّ وَمَنْ وَيَتَفَاضِلُونَ بِالصِّفَاتِ وَيَتِمَازُونَ وَسِدِّ هُوَ الَّذِي نَالَ بِعَمَلِهِ الْإِقْتِدَارَ عَلَى مَا شَاءَ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَاقْتَصَرَ عَلَى ذَلِكَ وَلَمْ يَجْتَهِدْ فِي طَرِيقِ الْخِلَاصِ وَلَهُ التَّرَقُّ إِلَى مَرْتَبَةِ رَشَّ* 'After the Deva comes the class of the *Pitaras*, the deceased ancestors, and after them the *Bhūta*, human beings who have attached themselves to the *spiritual beings* (Deva), and stand in the middle between them and mankind. He who holds this degree, but without being free from the body, is called either *Rṣi* or *Siddha* or *Muni*, and these differ among themselves according to their qualities. *Siddha* is he who has attained by his action the faculty to do in the world whatever he likes, but who does not exert himself on the path leading to liberation. He may ascend to the degree of *Rṣi*' (Sachau, I, 93). Also cf. Vy. and Bhoja on *YS*, sūtra 3.32; *Bhagavadgītā* 10.26; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.33 and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.14. For our proposed reading *siddha* here cf. also the description of *siddhas* as inhabiting *Bhūvar-loka* in R., p. 188, ll. 16-17 (transl. below).

<sup>135</sup> Ritter emends كُبار mentioning that the MS has حمار. There is a blur in the MS: the last letter can also be read ه. We propose to read حاة.

<sup>136</sup> The Arabic has *الدنيا* which is not usually used by al-Bīrūnī in this translation in a cosmological context. *حماة الدنيا* appears to render *loka-pāla*. The *loka-pālas* (لوكبال) are referred to in *India*, Hyd., p. 204, l. 8. The designation is rendered as *حفظة العالم وأهله*, 'the guardians of the world and its inhabitants' (Sachau, I, 247). Thus al-Bīrūnī appears to have used *الدنيا* as equivalent in meaning to *العالم وأهله*. For an early attestation of the term *loka-pālāḥ* see *Aitareya Upaniṣad* 1.1.3. The Sanskrit word *loka* can mean 'world' as well as 'people, inhabitants'. The *lokapālas* or *dikpālas*, guardians of the quarters of the sky, or rather, regions of the universe, were initially four in number: Yama, Indra, Varuṇa and Kubera (cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 204, l. 8: Sachau, I, 247). In later texts four further guardians were added for the intermediate quarters. The list of eight usually begins with Indra (in the East). According to Manu, 5.96, the eight are (in clockwise order) Indra, Agni, Yama, Sūrya, Varuṇa, Pavana or Vāyu, Kubera, and Soma or Candra; others substitute Nirṛti for Sūrya, and Iśāni or Prthivī for Soma. For the expression

كائنات (‘such as Indra and his like’) in our MS, cf. e.g. the expression *indrādi-loka-pālānām* ... in W. Kirfel, *Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude (Bhuvanavinyāsa)*, Bonn, 1954, p. 10, verse 27b.

<sup>137</sup> الملائكة ‘angels’ is regularly a translation of *devāḥ*. السادة ‘masters’ probably renders a specific designation of a category of *devas*.

<sup>138</sup> Possibly referring to the ‘angels’.

<sup>139</sup> The Arabic MS has برتنكار. Ritter’s suggestion that this represents *vairāja* (R, p. 187, n. 6) is most improbable. Our interpretation has been put forward tentatively. The collocation of *nara* and *kinnara* in a list of classes of demi-gods is attested, e.g. in *Mahābhārata* (see S. Sørensen, *An index to the names in the Mahābhārata*, reprint, Delhi, 1963, s.v. *kinnara*). Cf. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.14. The *kinnaras* (كينر) are mentioned in *India*, Hyd., p. 69, l. 6, where they are characterized as ‘having human shapes but horses’ heads, being the contrary of the centaurs of the Greek, of whom the lower half has the shape of a horse, the upper half that of a man’ (Sachau, I, 91). Possibly al-Bīrūnī had encountered in his source a Sanskrit compound in which *kumāra* was the second component. The term *kumāra* can signify a class of demi-gods (see S. Sørensen, op. cit., s.v.; cf. J. Gonda, *Viṣṇuism and Śivaism*, London, 1970, 139). A further conjectural reading would be the compound *nṛtya-kumārī*, which means ‘a dancing maiden’ and may designate an *apsaras* (a class of mythological beings comparable to the nymphs of Greece, who are supposed to be the mistresses of the *gandharvas*). Cf. W. Kirfel, *Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude*, Bonn, 1954, 71, verse 19b: *nṛtyantyo ’psaraso yānti sūryasyānu niśācarāḥ* (‘Dancing *apsaras* follow the sun, moving by night’).

<sup>140</sup> Transcribed in the Arabic by لوك. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 196, l. 14.

<sup>141</sup> The MS has ولذلك. Ritter’s reading is ولئك.

<sup>142</sup> In the Arabic this is represented by two separated words: برهم دش. Ritter’s reading is برهم رش. The Sanskrit *brahma-* is transcribed by al-Bīrūnī both as برهم (cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 6: برهم لوك for *brahma-loka*, p. 101, l. 11: برهماند for *brahmāṇḍa*) and as برهم (cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 101, l. 2: برهم بران for *brahma-purāṇa*). As observed by Sachau with regards to *India*, ‘the transliteration is not always uniform, as sometimes a short Indian *a* has been rendered by a long *ā* in Arabic’ (Sachau, Annotations, 257). The expression *brahma-deśa* means ‘the country or region of the *brāhmaṇas*’. The expression occurs in Manu, II, where it is, however, used to refer to a region of this earth. Cf. also Bhīmācārya Jhalakikar’s *Nyāyakośa* s.v. *sthānam* (quoting *Agni Purāṇa*): *prajāpatyaṁ brāhmaṇānām smṛtaṁ sthānam kriyāvatām; kṣatriyāṇām tathā caidrām saṁgrāmeṣu anivartinām; gāndharvām śūdra-jātinām paricaryānukārinām ity ādi* ‘The world of Prajāpati is recorded as the locality of the *brāhmaṇas* who engage in ritual, the world of Indra—as that of the *kṣatriyas* who do not shrink from battle, the world of the *gandharvas*—as that of the classes of *śūdras* who follow a routine of service.’

<sup>143</sup> Ritter’s reading is رازرش.

<sup>144</sup> In two words: برهم لوك. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 6.

<sup>145</sup> Transcribed برهم. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 198, l. 17. For the passage cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 5 et seq.: ثم عمل شيئاً آخر وهو أن ست لوك السابعة سُميت في البرانات برهم لوك فجعلها فوقها وجعل الواحد المسمى باسمين آنس وكان الواجب عليه أن يترك برهم لوك جانباً ويقيم بترك لوك الاول ولا يسقط (The commentator of the book of Patañjali) differs besides in another point. As the seventh heaven, Satyaloka, is in the *Purāṇas* also called *Brahmaloka*, he placed the *Brahmaloka* above the *Satyaloka*, whilst it would have been much more reasonable to think that in this case one and the same thing is called by two different names. He ought to have omitted the *Brahmaloka*, to have identified *Pitṛloka* with *Bhūloka*, and not to have left out the *Svarloka*’ (Sachau, I, 233). The triple set of *bhūr*, *bhuvaḥ* and *sva*, which were used as *vyāhṛtis* (sacred exclamations) as well as names of *lokas*, may be traced back to *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 2.23.2: *prajāpatir lokān abhyatapat; tebhyo ’bhītaptebhyas trayi vidyā saṁprāsavat, tām abhyatapat, tasyā abhitaptāyā etāny akṣarāni saṁprāsavanta bhūr bhuvaḥ svar iti* ‘Prajāpati brooded upon the worlds. From them, when they had been brooded upon, issued forth the three-fold knowledge (i.e. the three Vedas). He brooded upon this. From it, when it had been brooded upon, issued

forth these syllables: *bhūr, bhuvah, svar* (representing earth, atmosphere and sky, respectively)'. An example of a later Purāṇic seven-fold version of the list of *lokas* occurs in *Agni Purāṇa*: *bhūr bhuvah svar mahāś caiva janaś ca tapa eva ca / satya-lokaś ca saptaite lokāś tu parikīrtitāḥ* (quoted in *Śabdakalpadrūma*, s.v. *lokaḥ*). Cf. also *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.33 for an early attempted systematization of the *lokas* of men, the fathers (*pitr̥s*), the *gandharvas*, gods by virtue of merit (*karma-deva*), gods by virtue of birth (*ājāna-deva*) as well as of one who is versed in the Veda (*śrotriya*; cf. *brahma-deśa* represented in رشم, R, p. 187, l. 12 ?), etc.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 196, l. 14: وهذه الجملة أكثر من ثلاثة اصعاف التي حكيناها عن مفسر 'This sum, however, is more than thrice the sum which we have mentioned on the authority of the commentator of the book of Patañjali'. This statement presupposes that the total extent of the seven *lokas* has been given in the text. It is, however, missing in the Hyd. as well as Sachau's editions.

<sup>147</sup> In Arabic اثير. This term is derived from the Greek *aithēr*. It signifies in Arabic either (1) the area in which the heavenly spheres exist and the substance of which they are made—this appears to be the meaning of the term as used here by al-Bīrūnī—or (2) one of the four terrestrial elements, the elemental fire which forms a zone situated above the zone of the lowest heavenly sphere.

<sup>148</sup> Lit.: 'discourse'—كلام.

<sup>149</sup> For نص cf. R, p. 168, l. 5: 'The book of Patañjali—text interwoven with commentary' (transl. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 310, 122).

<sup>150</sup> Probably Patañjali is meant. Cf. R, 169, l. 15: قال باتنجل 'Patañjali said'.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. *sūtra* 3.27: *candre tāra-vyūha-jñānam*, '(From the application of Discipline) to the moon arises knowledge of the arrangement of the stars'.

<sup>152</sup> The MS has كوده which is also Ritter's reading. Our reading شكوره is proposed in view of the following passage in *India*, Hyd., p. 198, l. 13 seq.: والهند في تصويرها على هيئة حيوان مائي ذي اربع ارجل يسمى ششمارا أيضا اخبار خرافية واطن ششمار هذا هو الضب الكبير فإن اسمه بالفارسية سسمار وبينها مشابهة ومنه مائي مثل التمساح والإسقتور The Hindus tell rather ludicrous tales when speaking of the figure in which they represent this group of stars, viz. the figure of a four-footed aquatic animal, which they call *Śakvara* and also *Śiśumāra*. I suppose that the latter animal is the great lizard, for in Persia it is called *Susmār*, which sounds much like the Indian *Śiśumāra*. Of this kind of animal there is also an aquatic species, similar to the crocodile and the skink' (Sachau, I, 241). (The word خرافية above, which is misprinted as جزافية in Hyd. ed. means 'based on false beliefs, legendary' rather than 'ludicrous', pace Sachau.) This constellation has a connexion with the pole-star, as is evident from the subsequent passage: 'Fourteen of these stars he placed round the pole in the shape of a *śiśumāra*, which drive the other stars round the pole' (Sachau, I, 242). Although the Arabic transliteration of *śakvara* in *India* (in the passage quoted above) is شاكور and not شكوره as proposed by us with regard to the text under consideration, it should be borne in mind that al-Bīrūnī's transliteration of Sanskrit short *a* is not always uniform, as it has been sometimes rendered by him by a long *a* in Arabic (cf. Sachau, Annotations, 257). The association of *dhruva* (which is also used to refer to a Vedic ceremonial vessel connected with *soma* rituals) with *śiśumāra* and *śakvara* (the latter represented by the derivative *śākvara* (schol.: = *atyanta-śaktimān*, 'very mighty', i.e. as strong and potent as a *śakvara*) is traceable back to *Taittiriya Āraṇyaka* 2.19, where the three words occur together in a context which, although different, is not without connexion (in view of the underlying microcosmic-macrocosmic equivalence): *sa vā eṣo divyaḥ śākvaraḥ śiśumāras ... dhruvas tvam asi dhruvasya kṣitam asi tvam bhūtādhipatir asi ...* 'That is the celestial extremely potent (schol. on *śakvara*) *śiśumāra* ... (O, *śiśumāra*!) thou art *dhruva* (schol.: indestructible), thou art the dwelling place of *dhruva*, thou art the ruler of (all) beings ...'. Cf. especially Śāyana ad loc.: *anena mantrenodānmukho bhūtvā dhruva-maṇḍalam paśyan śiśumāra-rūpeṇa tam upatiṣṭhet* ' (Uttering) this (sacrificial) formula, looking up, gazing at the circle (*maṇḍala*, used also as a visual meditational aid), one should worship it in the form of a *śiśumāra*'. Detailed descriptions

of the constellation under consideration occur in various *purāṇas*. Cf. *Viṣṇudharmottara* I.106.4 et seq. (quoted from a MS by G. Bühler in his review of Sachau's translation of al-Birūnī's *India* in *The Indian Antiquary*, xix, November 1890, 395–6). According to G. Bühler, this passage referred to by al-Birūnī as 'Viṣṇudharma', was the source of the description in *India* of the constellation in question (Hyd., p. 198, l. 13 et seq. Cf. Sachau, I, 242).

The passage reads :

...  
*dhruva-sthāna-niviṣṭās ca tārakās ca caturdaśa //*  
 ...  
*uttānapādas tasyātha vijñeyāḥ [smo]ttaro hanuḥ //*  
*yajño dharas tu vijñeyo dharmo mūrdhānam āśritāḥ //*  
*[hr̥dī nārāyaṇas cāste āśvinau pūrva-pādayoḥ //*  
*varuṇas cāryamā caiva pascīme tasya sakthini //*  
*śiśumāra saṃvatsaras tasya mitro 'pānaṃ samāśritāḥ] //*  
*pucche 'gniś ca mahendraś ca māricāḥ kaśyapo dhruvaḥ //*  
*dhruva-sthāḥ [svaṛ gra]harkṣāṇām ekibhūtāḥ prakīrtitāḥ //*  
 ...  
*śiśumāra-nibaddhānāṃ tārakānāṃ prthak prthak //*  
*nāma-dheyāni vijñāya dṛṣtvā ca vimale 'mbare //*  
*āyur abhyadhikaṃ jīved varṣāṇi tu caturdaśa //*  
*āho-rātra-kṛtāt pāpāt tat-kṣaṇād vipramucyate //*

' (... And Brahmā created) fourteen stars placed near the pole-star ... Know that Uttānapāda is its upper jaw, know that Yajña is its lower (jaw), that Dharma resides in its head ; [Nārāyaṇa is seated in the heart, the two Āśvins in the fore-feet ; Varuṇa and Aryama are its hind-most haunches, Saṃvatsara its penis, and Mitra occupies its anus]. In the tail are Agni, Mahendra, Mārica Kaśyapa as well as Dhruva (the Pole-star). Those among the stars and planets which are situated near the Pole-star are collectively called Svar (?) ... He who knows severally the names of the stars contained in the *śiśumāra* and has seen them in the pure sky will live fourteen years beyond (his allotted period of life) and is forthwith liberated from sins committed during the day or night'. The text in square brackets was reconstructed by Bühler by comparison with *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 2.12.33 et seq. (cf. op. cit., 2.9.1 et seq.). Bühler's translation has been adopted with modifications. According to Bühler the *śiśumāra* denotes the alligator (loc. cit.). The pertinent penultimate verse above is significantly identical in corresponding passages in *Matsya Purāṇa* and *Vāyu Purāṇa* (cf. Bühler, op. cit., p. 397, n. 62). Cf. also *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 5.23.4 et seq.

<sup>153</sup> According to the dictionaries سفن is a term denoting the rough skin of various aquatic or amphibious animals, notably of the crocodile and of the أطوم whose skin is put upon the hilts of swords. Cf. فاكهة البستان and Lane's Arabic dictionary, s.v.

<sup>154</sup> تتخذ—lit. : 'taken'.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.28 : *dhruve tad-gati-jñānam* ' (From the application of Discipline) to the pole-star arises knowledge of the motions of the stars'.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.29 : *nābhi-cakre kāya-vyūha-jñānam* ' (From the application of Discipline) to the navel-circle (or : -wheel, cf. Bhoja ad loc.) arises knowledge of the arrangement (i.e. structure) of the body'. For the use of *vyūha*, 'formation, arrangement of parts, disposition, organization' cf. sūtra 3.27 above. Bhavadēva ad loc. glosses it with the synonym *saṃsthāna*, and Bhoja—with *sanniveśa*. Cf. J. H. Woods, op. cit., p. 224, n. 1. Taking *cakra* here to refer to 'a wheel of sixteen spokes which is named "navel"', (*nābhi-saṃjñakam yat ṣoḍaśāraṃ cakram*) Bhoja ad loc. explains : *nābhi-cakram śarīrasya madhya-vartī sarvataḥ prasṛtānām nādyādīnām mūla-bhūtam ; atas tatra kṛtāvadhānasya samagraḥ sanniveśo yathāvad ābhāti* 'The navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes ; therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body' (transl. Rajendralala Mitra). Also cf. the significance of *cakra* as referring to centres or localizations of psychic power in the body as



expounded in late Upaniṣads and Tāntric texts dealing with varieties of *kundalini-yoga*. See P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1921, 675; P. V. Kane, op. cit., v/2, 1136 et seq.; M. Eliade, *Le yoga, immortalité et liberté*, Paris, 1954, 237 et seq.; S. Lindquist, *Die Methoden des Yoga*, Lund, 1932, 190; H. v. Glasenapp, *Der Hinduismus*, München, 1922, 293 et seq.; Sanjukta Gupta et al., *Hindu Tantrism*, Leiden, 1979, 170 et seq. In accordance with the Tāntric theory of *cakras* the *nābhi-cakra* corresponds to the *maṇi-pūrakam*, the third *cakra* in the following scheme: (1) *ādhāra* (at the base of the trunk), (2) *svādhiṣṭhānam* (sexual centre), (3) *maṇipūrakam* (navel-centre), (4) *anāhatam* (heart-centre), (5) *viśuddhi* (throat-centre), (6) *ājñā* (the centre between the eye-brows) (cf. *Haṃsa Upaniṣad* 2). Cf. *Maṇiprabhā* ad loc. Accordingly Svāmi Nārāyaṇatīrtha comments in his *Svārthabodhinī* ad loc.: *kāyasya madhya-bhāge yan nābhi-cakram ādhāra-līṅga-cakrābhyām upari sthitaṃ daśa-patram; tasmīn samyamād dehasya sanniveśaṃ jñāti* 'The "navel-wheel" which is (situated) in the middle part of the body is the "(lotus) of ten petals" which is situated above the *cakras* of the *ādhāra* and *līṅga* (= *svādhiṣṭhāna*); through applying Discipline to it he knows the structure of (his) body'. (For the metaphor of the lotus as having the same reference as *cakra* here cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.34.) Also cf. *Yogasūdhākara* ad loc.: *kāyasya madhya-bhāge yan nābhi-cakram maṇi-pūrakākhyam daśa-dalam . . .* 'The *nābhi-cakra* (situated) in the middle part of the body is (the lotus) of the ten petals known as *maṇipūraka . . .*'. T. R. V. Murti has suggested (in a conversation—T.G.) that underlying the sūtra is the idea that the navel is the focal point of feeding an embryo, and hence it is the origin of the structure of the body that grows. For the symbolic significance of the navel as the life-centre in the Hindu ceremony of initiation cf. H. Zimmer, *Hindu medicine*, Baltimore, 1948, 120–1. One cannot rule out the possibility that the term *cakra* in the sūtra merely refers to the shape of the navel and is bereft of *tantric* signification (cf. Bhāvāganeśa ad loc.).

<sup>157</sup> Lit. : 'discourse'.

<sup>158</sup> Ritter reads ثقل. The reading which is proposed is ثفل 'sediment, sediments'. ثفل may correspond to *mala* 'excreta, bodily secretions or impurities'; فضول—to *prasāda* 'residue'. Cf. Bhoja ad loc.

<sup>159</sup> Ritter's text in keeping with the MS has براء. Ritter does not propose any emendation. Our reading ثبرا and interpretation are borne out by تبقى 'remain' which occurs in the next sentence.

<sup>160</sup> The three residues correspond to the three *doṣas* (humours)—*vāta* ('wind'), *pitta* ('bile') and *śleṣman* (= *kapha*) ('phlegm')—listed or referred to by all the commentaries on the *YS* known to us. Cf. Agniweśa's *Caraka Saṃhitā* (ed. and tr. Ram Karan Sharma et al., Vārāṇasī, 1977), *Vimāna* section, ch. i, para. 5 (I, 113): *doṣāḥ punas trayo vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇaḥ; te prakṛtibhūtāḥ śarīropakāraḥ bhavanti, vikṛtiṃ āpannas tu khalu nānāvidhair vikāraiḥ śarīram uttāpayanti* 'Doṣas are three, viz. *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha*. During their normal state, they sustain the body. When vitiated, they afflict the body with various types of diseases' (tr., op. cit.).

<sup>161</sup> This renders مضرّة which is Ritter's reading. If this is correct it may be connected with the fact that in Sanskrit texts the three humours in question are frequently referred to as *doṣas* 'defects' (from the root *duṣ*, 'to harm, damage'). Cf. Vy. ad loc.: *vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇas trayo doṣāḥ* 'The humours (*doṣa*) are three: wind, bile and phlegm'. An alternative reading would be مقبرة 'establish, sustain'. For this cf. Vāc. on sūtra 1.30 in which the three humours, here called *dhātus*, are said to sustain (*dhāraṇa*) the body: *dhātavo vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇaḥ śarīra-dhāraṇāt* 'The humours (*dhātu*)—wind, bile and phlegm—are so called because they sustain (*dhāraṇa*) the body'. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 274: *وان البدن المركب من الاخلاط المتضادة يحتاج اليه للراحة وعود* (The educated Hindus) know that the body, a compound of antipathetic *humores*, requires sleep for the purpose of resting, and for this purpose that all which nature requires, after being wasted, should be duly replaced. So, in consequence of the constant dissolution, the body requires food in order to replace that which had been lost by emaciation' (Sachau, I, 324). Apart from أخلاط, al-Birūnī appears also to use the term أمشاج for rendering the concept of humours. Cf. R, p. 168,



l. 17 (cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 312, n. 83). The theory of the three humours has its earliest attestation in *Atharvaveda-Parīṣiṣṭa* (68), according to G. M. Bolling, 'Diseases and medicine (Vedic)', in J. Hasting's *Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics*, Edinburgh, 1911, IV, 763a.

<sup>162</sup> The MS and Ritter's text have بسعة. Possibly this should be emended to لسعة.

<sup>163</sup> The list of the 'things' corresponds entirely to the list of *dhātus* (lit. 'layers, strata', i.e. constituents of the body or secretions generated by food) occurring in Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's *Bhāṣyacchāyā* ad loc.: *rasa-lohita-māṃsa-snāyav-asthi-majjā-śukrāṇi* 'chyle, blood, flesh, tendon, bone, marrow and semen'. This suggests that al-Birūnī's 'commentator' was dependent at least in this matter on the tradition upon which Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa drew. The list given in Vy. ad loc. differs in that *tvak* 'skin' takes the place of *rasa*. It is worth mentioning that one of the MSS of Vy. has *rasa* instead of *tvak*. The context shows that this variant is spurious. The list used by al-Birūnī's 'commentator' also corresponds to the one occurring in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, Vimāna section, ch. v, paras. 7–8 (op. cit., I, 174), where *snāyu* is replaced by its apparent synonym *medas* ('fat, adipose tissue'), and *lohita*—by its synonym *sonita*. For an early occurrence of the medical term *dhātu*, see *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.5.1 (see n. 166 below).

<sup>164</sup> The Arabic word is يتولد.

<sup>165</sup> سين in the Arabic.

<sup>166</sup> For this passage cf. *Caraka-Saṃhitā*, Sūtrasthāna section, ch. viii, para. 4 (op. cit., I, 568): *tatrāhāra[h] prasādākhya rasaḥ kiṭṭaṃ ca malākhyam abhinivartate. kiṭṭāt sveda-mūtra-purīṣa-vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇaḥ karṇākṣi-nāsikāśya-loma-kūpa-prajanana-malāḥ keśa-śmaśru-loma-nakhādayaś cāvayavāḥ puṣyanti. puṣyanti tv āhāra-rasād rasa-rudhira-māṃsa-medo'sthi-majjā-śukrauṇāṃsi . . .* 'Food (after digestion) turns into (1) (its) essence called "residue" (*prasāda*) and (2) refuse called "secreta" (or "excreta", *mala*). From (2) develop sweat, urine, excrement, "wind", "bile" and "phlegm"; secretions of the ear, eye, nose, hair-follicles, and the generative organ; as well as parts (of the body) such as hair of the head, beard, hair on the body and nails. From (1) develop "sediments", chyle, blood, flesh, fat (adipose tissue), bone, marrow, semen and energy . . .'. Cf. also *Śārṅgadharma-Saṃhitā*, Calcutta, 1975, 70, ch. i, v. 16: *rasād raktaṃ tato māṃsaṃ māṃsān medaḥ prajāyate / medaso'sthi tato majjā majjāyāḥ śukra-sambhavaḥ* 'Essence (of food)→ blood→ flesh→ fat→ bones→ marrow→ semen'. Cf. Manu 5.135 for a list of twelve impurities (*mala*) of human bodies. (For further related references from Sanskrit medical texts cf. C. Dwarkanath, *Introduction to Kāyachikitsā* (sic), Bombay, 1959, p. 324, nn. 722–4.) The physiological theory underlying our Arabic passage is adumbrated as early as *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.5.1: *annam aśitaṃ tredhā vidhiyate, tasya yaḥ shaviṣṭho dhātus tat purīṣaṃ bhavati, yo madhyamas tan māṃsam, yo 'niṣṭhas tan manah* 'Food, when eaten, becomes divided into three parts (*dhātu*). That which is its coarsest (part) becomes the excrement; that which is medium, flesh; that which is finest, the mind'.

<sup>167</sup> The Arabic word rendered as 'generation' is كتاب الكون والفساد. كون is the Arabic title of Aristotle's work which in the Latin version is entitled *De generatione et corruptione*.

<sup>168</sup> Ritter's text has بشيء. We propose to read بخير. Cf. *BSOAS*, ch. II, p. 534, n. 31; *YS*, sūtra 2.5; R, p. 185, l. 11; R, p. 189, l. 6. Cf. also *India*, Hyd., 52 (Sachau, I, 68). For the idea expressed by this passage as a whole cf. *Maitri Upaniṣad* 1.3; *bhagavann asthi-carma-snāyu-majjā-māṃsa-śukra-sonita-śleṣmāśru-dūṣikā-viṇ-mūtra-vāta-pitta-kapha-saṃghāte durgandhe niḥ-sāre'smiṇ śarīre kiṃ kāmopabhogaḥ* 'Sir, in this foul-smelling unsubstantial (or devoid of all essence) body, a conglomerate of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, eye-secretion, faeces, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, how can one enjoy desires?' Comparable passages are common in the Buddhist literature.

<sup>169</sup> According to Ritter the MS has either النافضة or والفلعة. He emends to والخلقوم. In our view the MS should be read والنافضة. النافضة can mean 'larynx, epiglottis, back of the neck, root of the tongue, throat'. Cf. Sūtra 3.30: *kanṭha-kūpe kṣut-pipāsā-nivṛttiḥ* '(By applying Discipline) to the hollow (part) of the throat (one achieves) cessation of hunger and thirst'. The term فضاء may mean 'a hollow place, vacuum', which would correspond to *kūpa* (lit. 'well, pit'). فضاء may also mean 'space', which would correspond to *pradeśa* 'place, region', which

occurs in *Maṇiprabhā* ad loc.: *jihvā-tantor adhasat kañṭhasya kūpākāraḥ pradeśo 'sti* 'Below the cord of the tongue is a region of the throat in the shape of a cavity (or well)'. (Cf. also Bhoja ad loc.) For the mention of 'wind' and 'respiration' in the Arabic text cf. the reference to *prāṇa* in Bhoja ad loc.: *prāṇāder yat saṃparkāt kṣut-pipāsādayaḥ prādur bhavanti* 'By the contact of the vital airs with it (i.e. the hollow of the throat) (the sensation of) hunger and thirst emerge'; for 'chest' (صدر) cf. *uras* in Vy. on sūtra 3.31. Also cf. *Maitri Upaniṣad* 7.7 (quoting *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.5): *esa ātmāpahata-pāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur akṣut-pipāsāḥ satya-saṅkalpaḥ satya-kāmaḥ* 'He is the self (*ātman*), cleansed of evil, free from ageing, free from death, free from hunger and thirst (*akṣut-pipāsāḥ*), who (possesses the power of) having his intention realized, who (possesses the power of) having his wishes realized (*satya-kāmaḥ*, not "whose desire is the real" as usually translated)'.<sup>170</sup>

<sup>170</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.31: *kūrma-nāḍyām sthairyam* ' (By applying Discipline) to the tortoise- (shaped) artery (one achieves) steadiness'. For the meaning of *sthairyam* cf. sūtras 2.45, 46. Cf. also *alolupatvam* 'steadiness (lit.: "non-swerving")' in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 2.13: *laghutvam ārogyam alolupatvaṃ varṇa-prasādaṃ svara-sauṣṭhavaṃ ca / gandhaś śubho mūtra-purīṣam alpam yoga-pravṛttiṃ prathamām vadanti* 'Lightness, healthiness, steadiness (v.l.: *alolubhatvam* "non-covetousness" is evidently less plausible), clearness of complexion (lit.: "purified, clarified colour"), loveliness of voice, a pleasant odour, and scanty urine and faeces—these, they say (i.e. it is recorded by tradition), are the first (indications, results, of) the progress of *yoga*'. For *وهي عروق ملتوية*, namely, 'the twisted veins' in the Arabic text cf. Viṣṇūnabhikṣu ad loc.: *kuṇḍalita-sarpavad avasthitayā kūrma-kāraṃ hrdaya-puṇḍarikākhyam nāḍi-cakram* 'the *cakra* of the artery (*nāḍi*) which has the name "the lotus of the heart" and has the shape of a tortoise on account of its being positioned like a coiled serpent'. Cf. Sanjukta Gupta *et al.*, op. cit.: 'The mystical physiology envisages a series of lotus centres (*cakra*) and nodes (*granthi*) arranged up the (mystical) spine, and a system of veins (*nāḍi*) through which passes the vital air (*prāṇa* or *vāyu*). Crucial points in the body are occupied by deities and other symbols which historically arise from the macrocosm-microcosm equivalence' (p. 164); 'The mystical body contains a vast number of veins (*nāḍi*) which are considered to be the connecting links between the senses and the mind. Moreover, they are activated by the passage of the breaths. If the yogi stops the passage of the breaths through the *nāḍis*, he thereby stops the activities of the senses and severs the connection between the mind and external sensory objects, which are what distracts him from concentrating on the essence of his individual self' (p. 168).

<sup>171</sup> For a definition of *siddha* in India see n. 134 above.

<sup>172</sup> Al-Bīrūnī's use of the term زاهد seems to be equivocal. It appears to render both *yogī* and *siddha*; it may also mean ascetic in general. Cf. al-Bīrūnī's use of the term زهادة to render the state of being endowed with *siddhis* (cf. زهادة 'siddha-hood', R, p. 193, l. 1, in rendering *siddhayaḥ*, *YS*, sūtra 4.1). Also cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 494, l. 7: *ان رجلاً جوكيا وهو الزاهد الذى عقل* . . . الباري. 'A man who is a *yogī*, i.e. a *zāhid*, who intellects the creator . . .'. Also cf. R, p. 189, l. 3 et seq.: *وذلك ان الزاهد الذى تقدمت صفته وقد حصلت له مزية العمل مع العلم واشرف على* . . . نيل المطلوب اذا اراد ان ينتقل في هذا الارتباك من جسده الى جسد آخر . . . (see transl. below, Ans. to Q 47: 'For the attainment of *praxis* . . .'); *India*, Hyd., p. 63, l. 11 et seq.: *والزاهد في الدنيا من غير علم يفوز بالاعتلاء والثواب ولا يتخلص . . . والقانع المستغنى اذا اقتدر على الثمانية الحاصل* 'The *zāhid* in this world with no knowledge acquires transcendence (over the *gunas*) and reward . . . and (if) he is satisfied with acquiring the above-mentioned eight qualities (the printed text has *الحال*; the correct reading seems to be *الحاصل*; the eight *siddhis* seem to be referred to), and glories in, and is successful through, them and regards them liberation, is left with them (only)'. (For *تجسس* read *تجسس* 'rejoices in')? Cf. R, p. 191, l. 17.) Cf. *India*, Hyd., 70–1, quoted in n. 134 above.

<sup>173</sup> The term *المطالب* is also used by al-Bīrūnī to render *puruṣārtha*. Cf. R, p. 168, l. 9 (= *BSOAS*, ch. I, 311).

<sup>174</sup> *وغابوا عن الاعين*—lit.: 'hidden from the eyes'. Cf. *Maṇiprabhā* on sūtra 3.32: *siddhān adṛśyān api paśyati* 'He sees the *siddhas* although they are invisible'.

<sup>175</sup> Ritter's text has here يشاهدهم which seems to be a correct reading of the MS. However, the word seems to be redundant as it has approximately the same meaning as يراهم ('will see them'). Possibly يشاهدهم should be emended to يشاورهم 'will consult them'. Cf. Bhoja on sūtra 3.32: *tān paśyati taiś ca sa sambhāṣata ity arthaḥ* 'The meaning is that he (the *yogi* in question) sees them and holds conversation (or, if the variant reading *sambhāvata* is adopted: will meet intimately) with them'. The word *darśana* (lit.: 'seeing, sight') in the sūtra itself (see next note) can also mean 'meeting intimately face to face, audience, interview, holding visible converse'. For the theme underlying *siddha-darśana* here cf. Śāṅkara on *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.33: *bhavati hy asmākam apratyakṣam api ciraṁ-tanānām pratyakṣam. tathā ca vyāsādayo devādibhiḥ pratyakṣam vyavaharanīti smaryate. yas tu brūyād idānīm-tanānām iva pūrveṣām api nāsti devādibir vyavahartuṁ sāmāthyam iti sa jagad-vaicitryaṁ pratiśedhet . . . tasmād dharmot-karṣa-vaśac ciraṁ-tanā devādibhiḥ pratyakṣam vyavajahrur iti śliṣyate. api ca smaranti svādhyāyād iṣṭa-devatā-saṁprayoga ity-ādi* 'For also, what is for us imperceptible was perceptible for the ancients; thus it is recorded that Vyāsa (the author of the *Mahābhārata*) and others used to meet the gods and (*rṣis*) face to face. But if some would assert that, as for those now living so for the ancients also it was impossible to meet with gods and the like, they would deny the variety of the world . . . We must therefore believe that the ancients, in consequence of pre-eminent merits, held visible converse with gods and (*rṣis*). The *smṛti* also says (YS, sūtra 2.44): "through study (is gained) union with the beloved godhead" (P. Deussen, *The system of the Vedānta*, transl. Charles Johnston, Chicago, 1912, 38-9). (In this translation the supplied word *rṣis* may be replaced by *siddhas*.)

<sup>176</sup> For this passage cf. sūtra 3.32: *mūrdha-jyotiṣi siddha-darśanam* ' (By applying Discipline) to the radiance in the head (i.e. in the *brahmarandhra* opening, acc. Bhoja ad loc.) (one achieves) the sight of (or visible converse with) the *siddhas* '.

<sup>177</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.34: *hrdaye citta-saṁvit* ' (By applying Discipline) to the heart (one achieves) awareness of the mind '. For the idea that thought is located in the heart cf. e.g. *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.11: *sarvāsām vidyānām hrdayam ekāyanam* 'The centre of all knowledges is the heart'. Cf. also *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.6.6 (= *Kātha Upaniṣad* 2.3.16): *śataṁ caikā ca hrdayasya nādyah, / tāsām mūrdhānam abhiniḥṣṭaikā, / tayordhvam āyann amṛtatvam eti, / viṣvaṇ anyā utkramaṇe bhavanti* 'There are hundred and one arteries (*nādi*) of the heart; only one of them leads up to the head (*mūrdhā*). (By) going upwards through it, one goes to immortality, (whereas) the others are for going in various directions'. Also cf. the mystical significance of the series of *nābhīr, hrdayam, kaṇṭham, mūrdhā* in the late *Brahma Upaniṣad* 2. For the use of the term *saṁvit* here cf. Vy. on sūtra 1.35; Śāṅkaramiśra's *Upaskāra* on Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 7.2.26. Cf. also *pratisaṁvedin* 'witness' in Vy. on sūtra 2.17.

<sup>178</sup> Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 3.34: *tad . . . veśmā manasaḥ* 'It is the dwelling of the mind'.

<sup>179</sup> This reflects *sattva-puruṣayor atyantāsaṁkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ* in sūtra 3.35 (see n. 182 below). Here قلب ('heart'), which in the preceding sentence rendered *hrdaya*, apparently corresponds to *sattva* (i.e. *buddhi*) (cf. above R, p. 183, l. 20, where قلب corresponds to *citta* in sūtra 3.1; R, p. 191, l. 10, Ans. to Q 50); نفس—to *puruṣa* (cf. R, p. 191, l. 20, Ans. to Q 50).

<sup>180</sup> Ritter correctly states that the text may be read either إخلاء or أصلاً. This makes no substantial difference as far as the meaning of the sentence is concerned.

<sup>181</sup> Or: 'emptied'.

<sup>182</sup> عرف ذاته بالحقيقة 'knows his own self in its true reality' corresponds to *puruṣa-jñānam* 'knowledge of the self' in sūtra 3.35. In this sentence ذات (and not نفس) corresponds to *puruṣa*. (For ذاته بالحقيقة cf. R, p. 170, l. 11 (= *BSOAS*, ch. I, 314)). Al-Bīrūnī does not seem to have understood the doctrine concerning the utter distinctness of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, of which *sattva* (i.e. the *buddhi*) is a part, and the ultimate goal which is achieved by full awareness of this distinctness. Sūtra 3.35 as a whole reads: *sattva-puruṣayor atyantāsaṁkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ; parārthānya-svārtha-saṁyamāt puruṣa-jñānam* 'Experience (results from) the lack of differentiation in conceiving *sattva* and *puruṣa*, which are utterly distinct. By applying Discipline to (the idea of) being an end unto oneself, rather than having something else as an end, one

achieves knowledge of the *puruṣa*. A less plausible reading of the sūtra has . . . *parārthatvāt svārtha* . . . This reading underlies e.g. Woods's translation. For the significance of the expressions *parārtha* and *svārtha* here cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, kārikā 56.

<sup>183</sup> Ritter's emendation *بعد و غاب* instead of *بعد و غاب* is possibly correct.

<sup>184</sup> هذه, 'this', does not seem to refer to the knowledge mentioned in the previous sentence : عرف ذاته بالحققة 'he will truly know his own self' (R, p. 188, l. 19). It may allude to a passage corresponding to sūtra 3.36 (see below). The passage, which according to this hypothesis was translated by al-Birūnī, may have been omitted for some reason in the Istanbul MS. Sūtra 3.36 reads: *tataḥ prātibha-śrāvaṇa-vedanādarśasvāda-vātā* (v.l. *-vārtā*) *jāyante* 'From this there arise (supernal percepts which are) intuitive (*prātibha*, i.e. yielded by the faculty of *pratibhā*, "intuition"), auditory (*śrāvaṇa*), tactile (*vedanā*, cf. *vedanī*, "the true skin or cutis, L.", s.v., p. 1016c in Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English dictionary*; cf. English "feeling" as similarly applied to perception by touch), visual (*ādarśa*, lit. "seeing"), gustatory (*āsvāda*, lit. "tasting") and olfactory (*vāta*, lit. "perceived by the sense of smell", from the root *vā* "to smell", cf. Kālidāsa's *Vikramorvaśī* 4.41 (v. 1); the reading adopted here occurs only in a citation of the sūtra in Viṣṇanabhikṣu's *Yogasārasaṅgraha*, ed. G. Jhā, p. 56, as a variant reading; all available editions of YS have the enigmatic *-vārtā*)'.

Deussen, who seems to take *prātibha* as an adjective qualifying the rest of the compound (namely, taking the compound to be descriptive rather than aggregative), translates: 'Daraus entstehen intuitive Wahrnehmungen von (übernatürlichem) Hören, Fühlen, Sehen und Schmecken'. His interpretation is less plausible on two counts. First, it excludes the mind (*manas*) when all the other senses are represented in the syntactically co-ordinate types of percepts. Secondly, his interpretation is not in keeping with the occurrence of the term *prātibha* as a discrete phenomenon in sūtra 3.33 (*prātibhād vā sarvam* 'Or as a result of (the application of Discipline on) intuition everything can be known') as well as in the following difficult verse in the *Mahābhārata* (cf. crit. ed., 12.232.21–2; quoted by E. W. Hopkins, 'Yoga-technique in the Great Epic', *JAO*, xxii, 2, 1901, 344). The latter reads: *pramoho* (v.l. *pramodo*) *bhrama āvarto ghrāṇaṃ śravaṇa-darśane / adbhutāni rasa-sparśe śīloṣṇe mārūtākṛtiḥ // pratibhām upasargūṣ cāpy upasaṃgrhya* (v.l. *upasaṃhṛtya*) *yogataḥ / tāṃs tattvavid anādṛtya ātmany eva nivartayet* 'Bewilderment (or: exultation), dizziness, giddiness (*āvarta*, lit. "circling, spinning round"), wondrous smelling, hearing, seeing, tasting, and feeling, (i.e. the tactile sense), (the sensation of) feeling hot and cold, (the taking of) the form of wind (i.e. becoming invisible)—having checked (these) obstacles as well as (the power of) intuition (*pratibhā*), which are generated by yoga, the knower of ultimate reality ignores them and turns away towards the self'. Cf. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 2.11. The term *prātibha* is defined by Viṣṇanabhikṣu on sūtra 3.36: *upadeśādi-nairapekṣyeṇa sūkṣmādināṃ mānasam yathārtha-jñānam* 'a (purely) mental fact-corresponding cognition of what is subtle etc. (i.e. hidden, remote, past or future; cf. Vy. ad loc.) irrespectively of (prior) information'. It is further characterized as being a sudden (*akasmāt*) revelation (*sphuraṇa*, manifestation of the object as in a flash of illumination) in his *Yogasārasaṅgraha*, op. cit., 53. Like the other types of cognition mentioned in the sūtra it is characterized as occurring independently of one's will (*kāmanāṃ vināpi jāyante* 'they come about even without one's will', Viṣṇanabhikṣu on sūtra 3.36). A profane non-yogic example of *prātibha* occurs in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* (Benares, 1936 ed., 21): *katham tarhi pratibham anāgatārtha-grāhi śvo me bhrātāganteti pratyakṣam artha-jam iṣyate bhavadbhīḥ* (Opponent: ) "On your theory, namely, that a percept (*pratyakṣam*) is generated by an object, how would you account for the case of an intuitive perception (*prātibha*) in the form 'My brother will turn up to-morrow' which apprehends an object of the future (i.e. an object which does not yet exist)?"'. For further elucidation of the concept of *prātibha* and epistemological discussions aimed at establishing *pratibhā* as a distinct *pramāṇa* (a means of knowing) or subsuming it under other *pramāṇas* or classifying its types, see *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, kārikā 4; Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. N. J. Shah, Ahmedabad, 1972, 58; Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*, ed. Ruben (NS), IIIb.33 (and n. 144); Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana's *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, verses 65–6. Cf. also

Gopinath Kaviraj, 'The doctrine of *pratibhā* in Indian philosophy' in his *Aspects of Indian thought*, Burdwan, 1966, 1 et seq. For the interpretation of sūtra 3.36 cf. also Vy. with Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda on sūtra 1.35.

<sup>185</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.37: *te samādhāv upasargā vyūthhāne siddhayaḥ* 'They (i.e. the cognitive capabilities listed in the preceding sūtra) are obstacles in the context of concentration (although they are) perfections in the context of the state of empirical consciousness'. مانع, 'impediment', corresponds to *upasarga* in the sūtra. Early attestations of this term in comparable context are found in *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 7.8: *jñānopasargāḥ* (schol.: *jñānotpatti-vighātakā hetavaḥ* 'factors hindering knowledge from coming about'), and in the *Mahābhārata* (see quotation in the preceding note). Other meanings which may be pertinent: (a) 'affliction, trouble, disturbance, disruption' (cf. the verb *upasrj* in *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 1.3.6, and Halāyudha's *Abhidhāna-ratnamālā*, London, 1861, 15); (b) 'complication' (in medical sense, cf. *Sūruta* 2.429.13); (c) 'deflecting factor', as in grammatical usage; cf. the verse quoted by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā* commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakāśāstra* (ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960, 2): *upasargeṇa dhātva-artho balād anyatra nīyate* ... 'By the preposition (*upasarga*) is the meaning of the verb drastically deflected (as exemplified in the words *prahāra*, *āhāra*, *saṃhāra*, etc.) ...'; cf. schol. *vikṣepa*, 'distraction, deviation', with reference to *pratibhā* in the above-quoted *Mahābhārata* verse (see preceding note); (d) epiphenomenon, by-product (cf. *upasarjanābhūta* in Vy. on sūtra 1.1).

<sup>186</sup> القسّم النظري corresponds to the Greek *theōrētikós*; العمل corresponds to the Greek *praktikós*. Cf. R, p. 171, l. 15; p. 172, l. 1 (= *BSOAS*, ch. I, 316-17).

<sup>187</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.38: *bandha-kāraṇa-sāthilyāt pracāra-saṃvedanāc ca cittasya para-śarirāveśaḥ* 'From the loosening of the cause of bondage and from awareness of the movements (i.e. working, processes, or procedures of the passing, of the mind) there arises (the capacity) of the mind to enter another's body'. (For the meaning of *saṃvedana* here cf. *sva-buddhi-saṃvedana* in sūtra 4.21; *citta-saṃvit* in sūtra 3.34; *saṃvedana* in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* Va.31, ed. Ruben, 140.) For the meaning of *pracāra* as 'condition, conduct, working' with reference to mind cf. Gauḍapāda's *Āgamaśāstra* 3.34. Cf. also the use of this term in the *Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra* (ed. R. P. Kangle, Bombay, 1970, Part I, 'Glossary'): 'activity, function, work', or 'sphere of activity'.

According to E. W. Hopkins, *cittasya para-śarirāveśaḥ* of this sūtra is comparable with the narration with some detail in the *Mahābhārata* (crit. ed., 13.30.1 et seq.) of 'a very clear case of the exercise of hypnotic power ... exploited as yoga-power'. For an analytical description of the passage in question see his 'Yoga-technique in the Great Epic', *JAOS*, xxii, 358 et seq.

<sup>188</sup> Cf. the expression بالشبّك بالارواح (التي) تملكّت in al-Shahrastānī's account of the doctrines of Empedocles in *Kitāb al-mīlāl wa'l-nihāl*, ed. M. Tawfiq, Cairo, 1948, II, 266.

<sup>189</sup> For the use of the word النعمة synonymously with الراحة to refer to *sukha* 'ease, bliss' and of the word شدة to refer to *duḥkha* 'discomfort, suffering' cf. R, p. 180, l. 10 (cf. *BSOAS*, ch. II, p. 524, l. 41; p. 311, n. 74).

<sup>190</sup> This translation of the Arabic word تحامل is not quite certain. The idea is in keeping with doctrine of *karma*.

<sup>191</sup> The MS has either واما or واما. Ritter's text has واما. The reading proposed here is واما.

<sup>192</sup> Lit.: 'the mould in which he is'.

<sup>193</sup> Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 62, l. 13 seq.: قوله انّ الابدان شبّك الارواح لاستيفاء المكافاة والمنتهى الى درجة الخلاص قد استوفاه في قاله على ماضى الفعل ثم تعطل عن الاكتساب للمستأنف فأنحلّ عن الشبّكة واستغنى عن القالب وتقلقل فيه غير متشبك فهو قادر على الانتقال الى حيث احبّ ومتى اراد لا على وجه الموت فان الاجسام الكثيفة المتشاكسة غير ممانعة لقلبه فكيف جسده لروحه (The book of Patañjali) states: "The bodies are snares for the spirits with a view to bearing to the full (one's) recompense. He who reaches the stage of liberation has already borne to the full in his (present) mould the recompense for the acts of the past. He then ceases to acquire a title to a recompense in the future. He sets himself free from the snare; he can dispense with his mould and move freely (or: be harassed) in it without being ensnared. Moreover, he is able to transport (his soul) to



wherever he wishes whenever he wishes, not in a manner (in which one is transported after) death. For as the gross cohesive bodies do not pose an obstacle to his mould, how much less would his own body pose an obstacle to his spirit'. The rendering بالبدن لا يتشبث by al-Birūnī may reflect a Sanskrit expression similar to *asajjamāna*, lit. 'not clinging, remaining unattached, no longer stuck' in the *Sāmaññaphalasutta* of the *Digha-nikāya*, II, 88 (quoted in n. 236 below).

<sup>194</sup> Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 2.22: *vāsāmsi jīrṇāni yathā vihāya / navāni grhṇāti naro 'parāni / tathā śarīrāni vihāya jīrṇāni / anyāni saṃyāti navāni dehi* 'As leaving aside worn-out garments / A man takes other, new ones, / So leaving aside worn-out bodies / To other, new ones goes the embodied (soul)' (transl. Edgerton) = *India*, Hyd., p. 39, l. 18: تنقل عن بدنها إذا عتق نحو آخر: 'ليس كذلك كما يستبدل البدن اللباس إذا خلق' (The soul) is transported from its body, after it has become old, into another, a different one, as the body, when its garment has become worn-out, replaces it by another one'. (Cf. J. Gonda, 'The Javanese version of the *Bhagavadgītā*', *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 75, Batavia, 1935, 49 et seq.)

<sup>195</sup> This may refer to ascetic practices. An alternative translation would be 'actions' (*karma* in the singular or the plural). Cf. أعمال in *India*, Hyd., p. 63, l. 10; R, p. 193, l. 3.

<sup>196</sup> الكثافة—This may represent the Sanskrit term *sthūla* 'gross'; cf. also *India*, Hyd., p. 63, l. 17.

<sup>197</sup> Ritter's text has ثقل. We propose the reading ثفل. Cf. R, p. 188, l. 4. The term seems to refer to *mala*, i.e. the excreta, bodily secretions and impurities (notably excrement, urine, nose-mucus, ear-wax, eye-rheum, perspiration, nails and hair). Cf. *Caraka-Saṃhitā* quoted in n. 166 above. The theory underlying the passage seems to be adumbrated in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 2.13: *laghutvam ... varṇa-prasādam ... mūtra-puṣṭam alpam yoga-pravṛttiṃ prathamām* 'Lightness ... clearness of complexion (lit. 'purified, clarified colour', cf. *prasāda* as opposed to *mala* in *Caraka-Saṃhitā*, see n. 166 above) ... scanty urine and faeces, these they say, are the first (stage, results or signs of) progress of *yoga*' (cf. n. 170 above).

<sup>198</sup> Ritter has زال معه الثقل. We propose to read زال منه الثفل.

<sup>199</sup> إرسال, lit. 'letting go'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 286, l. 5 seq.: ... النفس مركب من آبان وهو جذب الهواء ومن بران وهو إرساله ويسمان ايضاً نشاس وأوشاس لكن احدهما اذا ذكر تضمن الآخر (each) breath (i.e. *prāṇa* in its wider meaning) is composed of (1) *apāna*, i.e. breathing in (lit. "attraction") of air, and (2) *prāṇa*, i.e. letting it out. The two (acts) are also termed *niḥśvāsa* and *ucchvāsa* (respectively). However, if one of the two is mentioned, the other is (implicitly) included, just as in mentioning (the word) "days" (one includes also the corresponding) nights'. For this definition of *prāṇa* and *apāna* cf. Śaṅkara on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 1.3.3: *yad vai prāṇīti mukha-nāsikābhyāṃ vāyur bahir niḥśarayati sa prāṇākhyo vāyor vṛtti-viśeṣaḥ; yad apāṇīti apaśvasiti tābhyāṃ evāntar ākarṣati vāyur so 'pāno 'pānākhyā vṛttiḥ* 'The special function termed *prāṇa* is the fact (expressed by the verb) *prāṇīti*, i.e. that one lets the air go out through the mouth or the nose; the function termed *apāna* is the fact (expressed by the verb) *apāṇīti* or *apaśvasiti*, i.e. that one attracts (i.e. draws) in air through the mouth or the nose' (cf. also Śaṅkara on *Brahmasūtra* 2.4.42). The Arabic إرسال 'letting go, sending out' corresponds to *niḥśarayati*; جذب 'attracting, drawing' to *ākarṣati* in this definition. Al-Birūnī uses إرسال and جذب also in rendering *pracchardana* 'breathing out' and *vidhāraṇa* 'holding of breath' in *YS*, sūtra 1.34 (R, p. 76, l. 6). Evidently al-Birūnī's sources reflect an Indian commentatorial tradition other than the one that conceived of *prāṇa* as breath in the upper part of the body and of *apāna* as breath in the lower part of the body accounting for evacuation. On the controversy as to the meaning of *prāṇa* and *apāna* cf. P. V. Kane, op. cit., v, ii, 1434 et seq.; M. Eliade, op. cit., Appendix III, 2; F. Edgerton, *The beginnings of Indian philosophy*, London, 1965, p. 104, n. 1; A. H. Ewing, 'The Hindu conception of the functions of Breath', *JAOS*, xxii, 1901, 249–308; G. W. Brown, 'Prāṇa and Apāna', *JAOS*, xxxix, 1919, 104–12; J. Filliozat, *La doctrine classique de la médecine indienne*, Paris, 1949 (English transl., Delhi, 1964), ch. v; *idem*, 'Les origines d'une technique mystique indienne', *Revue Philosophique*, cxxxvi, 1946, 208–20.

<sup>200</sup> More or less lit.: ' (As for) the third no place in the body is free of it'. This is in keeping



with the Sāṅkhya conception of *vyāna*. Cf. Gauḍapāda on *SK*, kārikā 29: *śarira-vyāpty ākāśavad vyānaḥ* 'The *vyāna* is so called since it pervades the body like ether'. It is not clear what اركان 'basic constituents' in the Arabic sentence here refers to.

<sup>201</sup> الرياح 'the winds' represent the Sanskrit term *vāyavaḥ* (lit. 'winds') which can be used to refer to the five *prāṇas* 'vital' breaths' discussed in this passage. Cf. *prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ pañca* 'the five vital airs (lit. "winds")': *prāṇa* etc.' (cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.5.22). In the Arabic passage under consideration the first wind corresponds to *apāna* (see n. 199 above), the second to *prāṇa*, the third to *vyāna*, the fourth to *udāna*, and the fifth to *samāna*. They are mentioned in Vy. on sūtra 3.39 in the following order: *prāṇa, samāna, apāna, udāna, vyāna*; and in Bhoja ad loc.: *prāṇa, apāna, samāna, udāna, vyāna*. The text of *YS* itself refers to *udāna* and *samāna* only (sūtras 3.39–40). The account of the five *prāṇas* in the Arabic text partly corresponds to the one occurring in *India*, Hyd., p. 35, l. 6 seq.: ودخلها الرياح الخمسة التي يائنتن: وبالرابعة طرفة البدن من موضع الى منها جذب النفس وارساله، وبالثالثة اختلاط الاغذية في المعدة، وبالخامسة انتقال الاحساس من طرف البدن الى آخر... the five winds enter the bodies. By the first and second of them the inhaling and exhaling are effected, by the third the mixture of the victuals in the stomach, by the fourth the leaping of the body from one place to the other, by the fifth the transferring of the apperception of the senses from one side of the body to the other'. (This is Sachau's translation, I, 46, altered in some particular: 'leaping' replaces 'locomotion'). This account is not based on the one occurring in Vy. on sūtra 3.38. The characterization of the fourth 'wind' here bears some resemblance to Gauḍapāda on *SK*, kārikā 29: *ūrdhvārohanād utkarṣād unnayanād vā udānaḥ* 'The *udāna* is so called since (it accounts for) ascending, lifting up, or bringing up'; also cf. *utkrānti*, lit. 'upward movement', in sūtra 3.39 (see below) glossed by Bhoja as *udgacchati* 'goes up'. For the characterization of the fifth 'wind' cf. Gauḍapāda, loc. cit.: *āhārādi-nayanāt samaṇṇ nayanāt samānaḥ* 'The *samāna* is so called since it carries i.e. equalizes (i.e. digests) food (and drink)'; cf. also *Praśna Upaniṣad* 4.4. The expression *samaṇṇ nayati* can also be understood to mean 'leads to every place equally, i.e. distributes equally'.

<sup>202</sup> خَفَّ، lit. 'lightened'.

<sup>203</sup> اعتياد is an Arabic term which when applied to heavy bodies (i.e. bodies other than air or fire) refers to the tendency to move downwards. The term عدم الاعتقاد is apparently used by al-Bīrūnī as an equivalent of *asaṅga* 'non-adhesion' (cf. sūtra 3.39).

<sup>204</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.39: *udāna-jayāj jala-paṅka-karṣhakādiṣv asaṅga utkrāntiś ca* 'From the mastery over the *udāna* there arises absence of adhesion to water or mud or thorns or similar (objects) as well as upward movement'. According to Vy. the 'upward movement' (*utkrānti*) specifically refers to the ascension at the time of death. Cf. *Praśna Upaniṣad* 3.7: *athaikayordhva udānaḥ punyena punya-lokaṁ nayati pāpena pāpam ubhayābhyām eva manuṣya-lokaṁ* 'Now, rising through one of these (arteries, *nāḍi*, namely the *suṣumṇā*, according to *Maitri Upaniṣad* 6.21), the *udāna* leads in consequence of merit to the world of merit; in consequence of demerit to the world of demerit; in consequence of (a balanced mixture of both) to the world of humans'. According to Bhoja, on the other hand, 'upward movement' during the yogi's life-time is meant.

<sup>205</sup> This remark, which is apparently intended to clarify the effects of 'absence of inclination', has, as far as is known, no parallel in the commentaries on *YS*.

<sup>206</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.40: *samāna-jayāt prajvalanam* 'From the mastery over the *samāna* there arises radiance'. Cf. *Praśna Upaniṣad* 3.5: *mādhye tu samānaḥ; eṣa hy etadd hutam annam samaṇṇ nayati, tasmād etāḥ saptaṛciṣo bhavanti* 'In the middle is the *samāna*. It is this that equalizes whatever is offered as food. From this arise the seven flames'. In later systematized versions of the concept *samāna* accounts for 'the digestive abdominal fire (*anala*)' (cf. A. Foucher, *Le compendium des topiques (Tarka-saṅgraha) d'Annambhaṭṭa*, Paris, 1949, 28 and 32).

<sup>207</sup> This term translates *ākāśa*. Elsewhere, however, the latter is also rendered by the word السماء 'heaven' (cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 140, l. 1: آকাশ وهو السماء 'ākāśa i.e. heaven'). For a

critical account of the element termed *ākāśa* 'ether, physical space' cf. Sadananda Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Poona, 1975, 2nd ed., 163 et seq.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Vāc. on sūtra 3.41: *sarva-śrōtrāṇām āhaṅkārikāṇām apy ākāśaṃ karṇa-śaṣkuli-vivaraṇaṃ pratiṣṭhā* 'Each sense of hearing, although derived from *ahaṅkāra* (the principle of individuation or ego-formation), has the (part of the) *ākāśa* which is (contained in) the hollow-space of the auditory canal as its basis'.

<sup>209</sup> i.e. hearing and air.

<sup>210</sup> For *عَدَد* cf. *التعويد*—R, p. 171, l. 15 (= *BSOAS*, ch. I, 316); R, p. 184, l. 11.

<sup>211</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.41: *śrōtrākāśayoh sambandha-samyamād divyaṃ śrotram* 'From the application of Discipline to the relation between the sense of hearing and ether arises a supernal sense of hearing'. Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.: *sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-śabda-grahaṇa-samartham bhavati* 'He becomes able to perceive sound which is subtle, hidden or remote'. For the meaning of *divyaṃ śrotram* cf. *śrāvana* in sūtra 3.36; also cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 11.8: *na tu mām śakyase draṣṭum / anenaiva svacakṣuṣā / divyaṃ dadāmi te cakṣuḥ / paśya me yogam aiśvaram* 'But thou canst not see Me / With this same eye of thine own; / I give thee a supernatural eye: / Behold My mystic power as God!' (transl. Edgerton).

<sup>212</sup> A possible, though not very probable, reading might be *بثقله* instead of *ثقله* as in Ritter. In that case the translation would be: 'If (the body) does not in its locomotion traverse the air'. This reading is not very satisfactory in view of the expression *والخرق من احواء*, 'being penetrated by air' occurring in R, p. 190, l. 20. For the latter expression cf. *Nyāyasūtra*, 4.2.18 (ed. G. Jhā, Poona, 1939): *ākāśa-vyatibhedāt* ... and Vātsyāyana ad loc.: *antar bahiḥ cānur ākāśena samāviṣṭo vyatibhinnah* 'Both inside and outside the atom is penetrated, i.e. permeated, by *ākāśa*'. Also cf. Rajendralala Mitra's remark on sūtra 3.42: 'The rationale of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last [sūtra 3.41]; the body is kept down by ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it' (op. cit., 155). Cf. R, p. 190, l. 2 (see n. 220 below).

<sup>213</sup> This corresponds to sūtra 3.42: *kāyākāśayoh sambandha-samyamād laghu-tūla-samāpattēś cākāśa-gamanam* 'From the application of Discipline to the relation between (one's) body and ether and from the identification (cf. *samāpatti* in sūtras 1.41, 2.47) with the lightness of (a piece of) cotton there arises the (capacity) to move through ether (i.e. air-space)'. The term *samāpatti* could also have in this context the meaning 'attainment'. In that case the translation would be: '... attainment of the lightness of cotton (lit. "light cotton")'. One of the meanings of *tūla* is 'cotton'. It has, however, also other botanical significations, one of which may account for al-Bīrūnī's translation: *... as the things that, having been separated from a plant, are tossed about in the atmosphere by winds*'. As a rule the Sanskrit *tūla* here is translated by 'cotton' (cf. Woods, Rajendralala Mitra, G. Jhā, Rama Prasada, Yardi, Divedi, Bangali Baba, Hariharānanda Āraṇya, Deussen, F. Feuerstein). However, the word may mean 'tuft (or plume, as of a reed)'. Cf. Vāc.'s description (under sūtra 3.45 below) of *laghimā*, 'levitation', which he compares with *iṣikā-tūla*, 'tuft of a reed' ('the floating about of a tuft of a reed'): *mahān api laghur bhūtveṣikā-tūla ivākāśe viharati* 'Despite being big, he becomes light and floats about in space ("ether") like a tuft of a reed' (cf. also Vijñānabhikṣu under sūtra 3.45 below). Monier-Williams's *Sanskrit-English dictionary* gives *picu*, *tūla* as well as the cpd. *picu-tūla* (L.) all as meaning 'cotton'. F. Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary* gives *tūla-picu* as well as *karpāsa-picu* as meaning 'cotton'. It notes that in Pali both these cpds. are used together as symbols of lightness and raises the question: 'There evidently was some difference between the two, but what?' (s.v. *karpāsa*). The evidence referred to above as well as al-Bīrūnī's rendering of the sūtra in question, would suggest that *tūla* can indeed be different from *karpāsa*, in that the latter means 'cotton' while the former refers to some other fluffy substance (such as air-borne seeds) readily detachable from plants and observably floating up and down in the air, possibly including visible pollen (?). Cf. also n. 230 below. Moreover, Gauḍapāda, who uses the term *tūla* in a botanical context (on *SK*, *kārikā* 23), uses elsewhere (on *SK*, *kārikā* 17) a different term, *tūli*, for 'cotton' in the context

of listing the various items that together constitute a bed. In the *Amarakośa* lexicon (2.4.42 and 2.9.106, ed. Bombay, 1890, 89 and 237) the term *tūla* is attested as signifying *inter alia* the top of the lotus (?) (*kamalottaram*) and as being synonymous with various plant names, notably *kusumbham*, *vahni-śikham* and *mahā-rajanam*. Significantly all the latter three names can refer, according to Monier-Williams, to safflower, i.e. the thistle-like *Carthamus tinctorius*. Cf. the English expression 'light as thistle-down'. For early attestations of *tūla* in a botanical sense see Atharvaveda 19.32.3 and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.24.3. Also cf. *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* 2.1.8.1 (cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.3) where *tūla* is opposed to *mūla* ('root').

According to both Vāc. and Vijñānabhikṣu the particle *ca* in the sūtra under consideration signifies the introduction of an alternative (= *vā*; cf. Woods's translation). This is implausible. For the sūtra as a whole cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.12.2: ... *yāvad ākāśasya gataṃ tatrāsyā yathā kāma-cāro bhavati ya ākāśaṃ brahmeti upāste* ... 'As far as *ākāśa* goes, so far he moves freely, he who reverences (or: contemplates on) *ākāśa* as *brahman*'. For *ākāśa-gamanam* cf. Ṛgveda 10.136.4; for parallels in the Buddhist literature see references in Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature*, repr. Delhi, 1975, p. 116, n. 131.

<sup>214</sup> شخص. An alternative translation could be: '(so as to belong) to (one) person'. شخص may also be translated: 'individual'.

<sup>215</sup> This may possibly, though not necessarily, reflect a Vedāntic conception regarding the oneness of consciousness.

<sup>216</sup> مهابة. Cf. *mahāvidehā* occurring in sūtra 3.43: *bahir akalpitā vṛttir mahāvidehā; tataḥ prakāśāvaraṇa-kṣayaḥ* 'The external (i.e. extra-corporeal) mode of functioning which is not (merely) imagined, is (known as) the Great Incorporeal One; therefrom (or, alternatively: as a result of the application of Discipline to it) the dwindling away of that which obstructs the light (cf. sūtras 2.52, 4.30) (comes about)'. For the use of *vṛtti* here cf. the use of *pravṛtti* in sūtra 1.35. Al-Birūnī does not seem explicitly to refer to the phenomenon mentioned by Vy. ad loc. of the *yogī* entering the bodies of other individuals. For *prakāśa* as a characteristic of *sattva* and knowledge cf. e.g. *YS*, sūtra 2.18; *SK*, kārikā 12; *Bhagavadgītā* 14.6. For the term *āvaraṇa* as used here cf. sūtra 2.52. Cf. also Gaudapāda's *Āgamaśāstra*, ch. iv, kārikā 97 (ed. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1943, 209).

<sup>217</sup> The MS has فيه مال واراد. (The base of ل is longer than is usual.) Ritter reads: فيه ما شاء واراد. The translation corresponds to the reading فيه ما خال واراد. This Arabic expression may render the Sanskrit *saṅkalpa*, found in commentaries (e.g. Vy. on sūtra 3.45; cf. e.g. *Manu* 2.2; *Brahmasūtra* 4.4.8; *Nyāyasūtra*, ed. Ruben, IIIa.25, IVa.64, b.2, 34), which denotes a mental act which is both cognitive and conative (cf. T. Gelblum, review of N. S. Junankar's *Gautama: the Nyāya philosophy in BSOAS*, XLV, 2, 1982).

<sup>218</sup> Ritter's printed text has أحدهما. Read: أحدها.

<sup>219</sup> هوية. An alternative translation is 'being'.

<sup>220</sup> ذات.

<sup>221</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.44: *sthūla-svarūpa-sūkṣmānvayārthavattva-saṃyamād bhūta-jayaḥ* 'From the application of Discipline to the proper character of the gross, to (its) inherence in the subtle and to the objectivity (of things) there arises mastery over the elements'. This translation is based on al-Birūnī's rendering which refers to three states only. It presupposes the reading *arthatva* instead of *arthavattva*. Two further arguments may be adduced in its favour. (a) It accounts for the fact, which is not explained in the usual interpretations of the sūtra (see below), that the terms *sthūla* ('gross') and *sūkṣma* ('subtle') are not adjacent. (b) It has a parallel in sūtra 3.47 below (see n. 243 below) where the terms *svārūpa*, *anvaya* and *arthavattva* are the second elements of compounds other than those found in the sūtra under consideration. According to Vy. and the other commentators the sūtra refers to five aspects, namely grossness, proper character, subtlety, inherence and purposiveness. The possibility should be borne in mind that al-Birūnī may have had a text in which *arthatva* (either 'essence, objectivity' or 'possessing a goal', cf. *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 2.11) rather than *arthavattva* (lit. either 'being like an object' or 'possessing a goal, purposiveness') occurred. For the meaning of *anvaya* in the sūtra

cf. Bhīmācārya Jhalakikar's *Nyāyakośa*, Poona, 1928, s.v., which gives two apparently interchangeable definitions: (a) *kārye kāraṇasyānusaraṇam* 'the continuance of the cause in its effect', (b) *kāraṇādhikaraṇe kāryasya sattvam* 'the (pre-)existence of the effect in the substratum of its (material) cause'. Cf. also Śaṅkara on *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.4: ... *yo 'pi kaścid ācakṣita śrutvā jagataś cetana-prakṛtikatām tad-baleṇaiva samastam jagac cetanam avagamīṣyāmi, prakṛti-rūpasya vikāre 'nvaya-darśanāt* '... Someone might say: "On the strength of the scriptural evidence to the effect that the universe has sentience as its constituent cause I am to conclude that the whole universe is itself sentient, since the characteristics of a constituent cause are commonly known from experience to inhere (i.e. continue, persist) in its effect (i.e. product)"'. Cf. also sūtra 3.47 and n. 242 below.

For the distinction made in the present and the preceding sentence of the Arabic text between the five elements (e.g. Earth), on the one hand, and perceptible objects generated from, or constituted by, them (e.g. minerals), on the other, cf. *Visuddhimagga*, ch. ix, para. 38 (ed. Dharmananda Kosambi, Bombay, 1940, 208): *evampi nibbāpetum asakkontena pana dhātu-vinibbhogo kātabbo; katham? ambho pabbajita, tvam etassa kujjhamāno kassa kujjhasi? kim kesānam kujjhasi, udāhu lomānam, nakhānam ... pe ... muttassa kujjhasi? atha vā pana kesādisu pathavidhātuyā kujjhasi, apodhātuyā, tejodhātuyā, vāyodhātuyā kujjhasi? ...* 'But if he is still unable to bring about the cessation of it (i.e. of his own anger), he should try (the analytical method of) resolution into the elements. How? My friend, you who have renounced the world, (tell me) when you are angry with this man, what is it you are angry with? Are you angry with the hair of the head, or with the hair of the body, or with the nails, etc.? ... Or is it the urine you are angry with? Or alternatively, are you angry with the Earth-element in the hair of the head and the rest? Or are you angry with the Water-element, or with the Fire-element, or the Wind-element (in them)? ...'.

<sup>222</sup> الحرق من الهواء. Cf. R, 190, l. 11 above: *وَلَمْ يَخْرُقِ الْهَوَاءُ ثِقْلَهُ* 'The air does not penetrate its (the body's) weight'. See n. 212 above. Also cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.44: *sarvato-gatir ākāśaḥ* 'Ether is omnipresent (lit.: goes in every direction, i.e. penetrates everywhere)'. Also cf. Vy.'s use of the word *anāvāraṇa* to characterize *ākāśa* (under sūtra 3.45). The word *anāvāraṇa* may mean 'that which admits of no obstruction'. This meaning corresponds to some extent to that of الحرق which according to our Arabic text characterizes 'air', i.e. 'ether'. Both Vāc. and Vijñānabhikṣu on sūtra 3.44 contain a quotation which is comparable to NS IVb.22 (ed. W. Ruben). The latter reads: *avyūhāviṣṭambha-vibhutvāni cākāśa-dharmāḥ* 'The properties of ether are uniformity throughout (*avyūha*, lit.: "having no structure", transl. Ruben: "indivisibility" — "Nicht-zerteilbarkeit"; Vidyābhūṣaṇa: "It is not repelled"; G. Jhā: "absence of transfiguration or displacement"), unobstructiveness and omnipresence'. Vijñānabhikṣu, loc. cit., defines *avyūha* as *praviralikaraṇam*, ' (the property of) rendering things separated from each other, set out in space'. The possibility cannot be ruled out that a similar characterization of *ākāśa* occurring in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī underlies the use of الحرق in the Arabic text. It should also be borne in mind that one of al-Bīrūnī's reasons for choosing the words غرق ... خرق ... حرق may have been their phonetic similarity.

<sup>223</sup> 'Impenetrability' renders المنع which may correspond to *varaṇam*, 'obstructiveness, resistance' in Vāc. under sūtra 3.44; but cf. also *mūrti*, 'corporeality' in Vy. on sūtra 3.45: *mūrtiḥ na niruṇaddhi ...* '... does not obstruct by its corporeality' (see below). The term *mūrti* is glossed by both Vāc. and Vijñānabhikṣu ad loc. as *sāṃsiddhikam kāṭhīnyam*, 'natural (as distinct from induced) hardness'. The sentence in the Arabic text here corresponds to *tad-dharmānabhighātaḥ*, ' (the state of) being unaffected (lit.: "no longer harassed"; cf. sūtra 2.48 and SK, kārīkā 1) by the properties of those (elements)' in sūtra 3.45 (see also next note). Cf. also Vy. ad loc.: *prthivī mūrtiḥ na niruṇaddhi yoginaḥ śarīrādi-kriyāṃ śīlām apy anupraviśatīti nāpāḥ snigdhaḥ kledayanti nāgnir uṣṇī dahati na vāyuh praṇāmi vahati; anāvāraṇātmake 'py ākāśe bhavaty āvṛta-kāyaḥ siddhānām apy adṛśyo bhavati* 'In spite of its corporeality earth does not obstruct the activity of a yogi's body etc. He penetrates even the rock. The water, moist as it is, wets him not. The fire, hot as it is, burns him not. The wind, motile as it is, moves

him not. Even in ether, which conceals not, his body is hidden (lit.: “ becomes covered ” or “ obstructed ” from sight) so as to become invisible even to the *siddhas*’.

<sup>224</sup> تَطْيِفُه. Cf. لَطَّفَ بَدَنَه ‘refines his body’, R, p. 183, l. 5 (= *BSOAS*, ch. II, p. 526, l. 32); cf. also *India*, Hyd., p. 57, l. 1. This corresponds to *añimā*, ‘the capacity to become minute’ in sūtra 3.45 (see below). Cf. also *sūkṣma* in Gauḍapāda on *SK*, kārikā 23: *aṇor bhāvo ’ñimā sūkṣmo bhūtvā jagati vicarati* (The term *añimā* (means the state of being of the size of) a minute particle; by becoming subtle (he is able to) move about (freely) in the universe’. Sūtra 3.45 reads: *tato ’ñimādi-prādurbhāvaḥ kāya-sampat tad-dharmānabhihātāś ca* ‘Therefrom follow (1) the manifestation of (the capacities) of becoming of the size of a minute particle etc. (i.e. according to Vy., *laghimā*, becoming light, i.e. levitation; *mahimā*, becoming huge; *prāpti*, the capacity to reach distant objects; *prākāmya*, complete fulfilment of one’s wishes; *vaśīva*, complete control over the elements, *iśīrtvam* (= *iśīva*), lordship, i.e. the capacity to create, destroy and arrange the elements, *kāmavasāyīva*, the capacity to determine things according to one’s wishes), (2) the perfection of the body, and (3) the impossibility for these properties (i.e. the properties of the *yogī*) to be affected’. (3) May also be rendered: ‘the impossibility for the properties (of the five elements—referring to *bhūta* in sūtra 3.44) to be affected (cf. sūtra 2.48)’. This presupposes that *tat* in this sūtra is an accretion. Al-Bīrūnī’s text appears to have adopted the latter interpretation: *... العناصر ... قدر على إزالة ضررها عن بدنه كالخرق ... من النار ... وإمثال ذلك* ‘... the elements ... he is able to put an end to the harmful (effects) that they (may have) upon his body, such as (those due to) being burnt by fire ... and so forth’. Possibly a less plausible interpretation is the one propounded by Bhoja ad loc. and others, according to whom *tat* in the sūtra refers to *kāya*, ‘the body’. (Following Bhoja, Deussen translates: ‘... Trefflichkeit des Leibes und Unverletzlichkeit seiner Eigenschaften.’) The expression *kāya-sampat* is explicated in sūtra 3.46: *rūpa-lāvaṇya-bala-vajra-saṃghanatvāni kāya-sampat* ‘Perfection of the body consists in shapeliness (*rūpa*, beauty of “form” or “colour”; cf. *varṇa-prasādam*, “clearness of complexion” in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 2.13 in a comparable context), gracefulness, strength and adamant firmness’. For a Buddhist parallel cf. Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa* (ch. VII), where ‘strength’ (*bala*) and ‘a body whose bones are like a diamond’ (*vajra-sārāsthī-śarīratā*) are referred to as two constituents of the fourfold ‘perfection of the material body’ (*rūpa-kāya-sampat*) (cf. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., 240). Cf. also *Rasārṇavakalpa* (ed. Mira Ray, New Delhi, 1976), verse 160: *ṣaṇ-māsasya prayogena vajra-deho bhaven naraḥ* ‘By the use (of mercury) for six months one will be endowed with a thunderbolt-like body’. The Sanskrit word *lāvaṇya* is derived from *lavaṇa* ‘salty’ (cf. Pāṇini 5.1.123). Cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, ‘Words for beauty in Classical Sanskrit poetry’ in *Fest. W. Norman Brown*, ed. E. Bender, New Haven, Connecticut, 1962, 99: ‘By way of explanation one may observe that *lavaṇa* is one of the six tastes or flavours (*rasa*) ... But *lavaṇa* is the flavour (*rasa*) par excellence, for one adds salt not sweetness to food to bring out its taste. Since the word *rasa* is used ... of everything that excites one’s interest, curiosity or aesthetic sense, it is appropriate that *lāvaṇya*, as an abstraction of the chief *rasa*, should be used of a particularly striking type of beauty’. There is an analogy between the derivation of the Sanskrit *lāvaṇya* from *lavaṇa*, ‘salty’, and the derivation of Arabic مَلِيح ‘pretty, handsome’ from مِلْح ‘salt, salty’.

The common interpretation by translators of *añimā* in the sūtra (and of *aṇu* in Vy. ad loc.) as containing a reference to (the size of) the *atom* (e.g. Deussen: ‘Atomkleinheit’; Woods: ‘atomization’) is dubious. Admittedly *aṇu* or *paramāṇu* are used in atomistic philosophical systems such as the Vaiśeṣika with the signification ‘atom’. However, in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems the terms *aṇu* and *paramāṇu* merely mean ‘very small objects’. Cf. *YS*, sūtra 1.40: *paramāṇu-parama-mahatvānto ’sya vaśīkārah* ‘His mastery extends from the smallest object to the greatest magnitude (i.e. the universe as a whole)’. The term *paramāṇu* in this sūtra is commonly translated as ‘atom’ (e.g. Woods: ‘... from the smallest atom ...’; G. Jhā: ‘... from the minutest atom ...’). An example of the use here of the term *paramāṇu* occurs in Gauḍapāda on *SK*, kārikā 7: ... *yathā dhūmoṣṇa-jala-nihāra-paramāṇavo gagana-gatā*



*nopalabhyan*te 'For instance the small particles (*paramāṇavaḥ*) of smoke, steam or frost, which are in the atmosphere (*gagana* = *ākāśa*, i.e. ether or sky), cannot be perceived'. This statement apparently presupposes that some *paramāṇus* can be perceived. Cf. also Gauḍapāda on *SK*, *kārikā* 23 (quoted above in the present note). Commenting under *YS*, *sūtra* 3.45, Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda explains the significance of *aṇu* in Vy. ad loc.: *sūkṣmād api sūkṣmataro bhavati* *icchātāḥ* ... *sarvasyādrśyo bhavati* 'he becomes at will more subtle than the (most) subtle (object)'. This is in consonance with a statement by Śāṅkara (the same person, as claimed by tradition, and argued by P. Hacker) in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2.4.7: *anuvam caisāṇ saukṣmya-paricchedau na paramāṇu-tulyatvam* 'That they (the *prāṇas*, here: the faculties of cognition and action) are *aṇu* means that they are limited (in size) and are subtle, and it does not mean that they are like an atom'. It may be noted that al-Birūnī does not render *paramāṇu* by an Arabic term which unequivocally means 'atom' in either of the two passages where the Sanskrit terms *paramāṇu* and *aṇimā* are translated, namely *YS*, *sūtras* 1.40 and 3.45. The word الهباء used by him in rendering *sūtra* 1.40 means *in the first place* 'grain of dust' (cf. R, p. 177, l. 6—transl. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 323; cf. R, p. 168, l. 14; R, p. 176, l. 9). On Arabic atomic theories see S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin, 1936 (an English translation of this work will shortly be published in S. Pines, *Collected works*, III).

<sup>225</sup> Cf. Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda under *sūtra* 3.45: *tenāṇimnā sarvam anupraviśati vajram api tathā sarvasyādrśyo bhavati* 'By this capacity of becoming of the size of a minute particle he can enter anything, even a diamond, and thus becomes invisible to any body'. In the Arabic phrase *تطيفه حتى يخفى أن شاء ويظهر أن شاء* the word يظهر ('may render it manifest') may perhaps correspond to *prādurbhāvaḥ* in the *sūtra*. Al-Birūnī, perhaps following the commentary he used, evidently considers that *aṇimā*, 'becoming minute (and consequently invisible) is opposed to *prādurbhāva*, 'becoming manifest'. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the text available to al-Birūnī had both *prādurbhāva* and *abhāva* on account of a copyist's redundant duplication. For the sense of 'emergence, production' (= *utpatti*) in which *prādurbhāva*, lit. 'manifestation', is actually used in this *sūtra*, cf. *sūtra* 3.9 (where it is opposed to *abhibhava*, 'becoming latent, suppressed'; cf. *SK*, *kārikā* 7; *NS*, ed. Ruben, IIIa.37; *NS*, IIIb.15. Cf. a parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52, allegedly quoting 'the author of *Kūṭāb Pātāñjali*', which reads merely: *التمكن من تطيف البدن حتى يخفى عن الاعين* 'the capacity to attenuate the body so as to make it hidden from eye-sight', in what is evidently a definition of *aṇimā*.

<sup>226</sup> *تخصيته* 'render it beautiful' corresponds to *rūpa*, 'beauty' (or alternatively, to *rūpa-lāvaṇya* if taken as a dependent cpd. to mean 'gracefulness of appearance') in *sūtra* 3.46 (see n. 224 above). This *sūtra* refers back to *kāyendriya-siddhir* ... 'perfections (or: attainments) (concerning) the body and the senses (follow) ...' in *YS*, *sūtra* 2.43. For the use of *rūpa* as referring to appearance, namely, both form and colour cf. *YS*, *sūtra* 3.21 (see n. 63 above).

<sup>227</sup> *تقويته* 'strengthen it' corresponds to *bala* 'strength' in *sūtra* 3.46 (cf. *sūtras* 3.23, 24). For a Buddhist parallel see *Abhidharmakośa*, ch. vii (cf. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., 240).

<sup>228</sup> *تصليه* 'harden it' corresponds to *vajra-saṃhanana* 'firmness (as that) of a diamond (or thunderbolt)' in *sūtra* 3.46. For a Buddhist parallel see reference in the preceding note.

<sup>229</sup> *حتى يكون ظهوره في أي صورة أراد* 'soften it (the body), coarsen it ... so that he can appear in whatever form he desires' seems to correspond to *prākāmya*, one of the eight perfections alluded to by *ādi*, 'etc.', in *sūtra* 3.45. Vy. ad loc. glosses it as *icchānabhighātāḥ* 'non-obstruction of (the fulfilment of) wishes', and Vāc. explains the latter: *nāśya rūpaṃ bhūta-svarūpa-mūṛty-ādibhir abhīhanyate* ... 'His outward appearance (*rūpa*) is not affected by the essential properties of the elements, such as corporeality (of the earth element) ...'. In the parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52, *prākāmya* seems to be referred to by *التمكن من الإرادات* 'the capacity (to fulfil one's) wishes'. The latter definition is in keeping with Vy. and Bhoja ad loc. Cf. also Gauḍapāda on *SK*, *kārikā* 23: *prākāmyaṃ prakāmato yad eveṣyati tad eva vidadhātī* 'The term *prākāmya* means the realization of any wish whatsoever'. Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.2.10: *yaṃ kāmāyate so 'sya saṃkalpād eva samutīṣṭhati* 'Whatever he desires, out of his mere act of wishful imagination it arises'.



<sup>230</sup> تخفيفه 'make it (the body) light' corresponds to *laghimā* ' (the capacity) to become light ' (cf. e.g. Vy. and Bhoja ad loc.). Cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's explanation of the term in his *Yogasāra-saṅgraha*, ed. G. Jhā, Bombay, 1894, 55: ... *tūlavat laghur bhavati yenākāśādiṣu saṃcarati* 'He becomes as light as a tuft (as of a reed; cf. *iṣikā-tūla*, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.24.3) and consequently is able to move hither and thither (*saṃcarati*) in the atmosphere (*ākāśa*, sky or ether) etc.'. The words يطير ويقع 'fly and descend' may, however, correspond to Vy.'s illustration of *prākāmya*, namely *bhūmāv unmajjati nimajjati yathodake* 'He dives underground and re-emerges (lit.: goes up and goes down) as if in water' (cf. *lokeṣu kāma-cārah* 'having the freedom to move about in the worlds', *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.6). The parallel in *Indiā*, Hyd., 52, reads: التمكن من تخفيفه حتى يستوى وطوه الشوك والرحل والتراب 'the capacity of rendering (his body) so light that it is indifferent to him whether he treads on thorns, on slime or on dust'. Cf. also Gauḍapāda on *SK*, *kārikā* 7: *laghimā mṛṇālī-tūlavayavād api laghutayā puṣpa-kesarāgreṣv api tiṣṭhati* 'The (capacity of) *laghimā* implies that one is able, on account of being even lighter than the particles (i.e. pollen) of the anther (*tūla*) of a lotus, to stand on top of the filament of a flower' (cf. *tūla* = *kamalottaram*, 'top of the lotus' (?), *Amarakośa* 2.9.106, ed. Bombay, 1890, 237). Cf. n. 213 above. For this particular form of levitation cf. W. Norman Brown, *The Indian and Christian miracle of walking on the water*, Chicago, 1928. For Jaina parallels of this and several other *siddhis* comparable to *aṇimādi* as treated by commentaries on the *YS* cf. Hemacandra's *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita*, 1.843–80 (esp. verses 852–62), in Amulyacharan and Banarsidas Jain, *Jaina Jātakas* (quoted in W. Norman Brown, op. cit., 16). For Buddhist parallels see n. 236 below.

<sup>231</sup> This corresponds to *mahimā* (cf. e.g. Vy. and Bhoja ad loc.). Cf. the parallel in *Indiā*, Hyd., 52: التمكن من تعظيمه حتى يره في صورة هائلة عجيبة 'the capacity to render (his body) huge so as to show it as a terrifying and wondrous shape'. Cf. Vāc. ad loc. explicating *mahimā*: *alpo 'pi nāga-naga-nagara-parimāṇo bhavati* 'Although small he becomes in dimension an elephant or a mountain or a town' (tr. Woods).

<sup>232</sup> الإدراك بالحواس 'to perceive with the senses' corresponds to the perfection designated by *prāpti*. In the parallel passage in *Indiā*, Hyd., 52, it is rendered as التمكن من علم ما يروم 'the capacity to know whatever he aspires (to know)'. The possibility of this interpretation of *prāpti* is implicit in a verse giving a traditional list of the eight perfections quoted from *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (11.15.4) by Vijñānabhikṣu ad loc. This verse reads: ... *prāptir indriyaiḥ* ... (lit.) 'perceiving with the senses' or '... reaching with the faculties' (either the senses or the five faculties of action, *karmendriyas*, namely, hand, foot, larynx, generation and excretion). Cf. also *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, V, sūtra 104. Cf. also *Yuktidīpikā* on *SK*, *kārikā* 23 (ed. Ramāśaṅkara Tripāṭhī, Vārāṇasī, 131; the passage is missing in the Calcutta 1938 ed.): *atrāṇimā mahimā laghimā garimetī bhūta-vaiśeṣikam; buddhes tu prāpty-ādi* ... 'In this (eightfold list of types of *aśvarya*, "freedom-to") *aṇimā*, *mahimā*, *laghimā* and *garimā* (i.e. the first four) have as their particular characteristic the reference to the elements, whereas *prāpti* etc. pertain to the mind (*buddhi*)'. On the face of it Vy. and all other commentators differ in the meaning they attach to *prāpti* since they illustrate it with a *karmendriya*, a faculty of action, rather than a *jñānendriya*, a cognitive faculty. Thus e.g. Vy. ad loc.: *prāptir aṅguly-agreṇāpi sprśati candramasam* 'The capacity of *prāpti* implies that he is able to touch the moon with a mere finger-tip' (cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's *Yogasārasaṅgraha*, ed. G. Jhā, Bombay, 1894, 55). Significantly the Sanskrit word *prāpti* can mean 'reaching' as well as 'knowing'. Analogously the Arabic الإدراك in itself can mean 'reaching' as well as 'perceiving'.

<sup>233</sup> لا يمانعه شيء في المرور ولا يزغره شيء في الوقوف. This seems to correspond to the perfection designated by *yatra-kāmāvasāyitva*. Cf. Gauḍapāda's explication of the term, under *SK*, *kārikā* 23: *brahmādi-stamba-paryantaṃ yatra kāmas tatraivāśya svecchayā sthānāsana-vihārān ācaratīti* 'He achieves whatever he wishes, from (the world of) *Brahmā* down to a clump of grass, standing still, being seated or moving about'. This interpretation of *yatra-kāmāvasāyitva* possibly results from the amalgamation of two previous interpretations of this compound. (1) According to one of them it may have meant the ability to reach one's destination wherever

one wills it to be. (This accords with the literal meaning of the compound.) (2) According to the other the cpd. may have meant the fulfilment of one's desires. (Cf. Vy.'s interpretation of the cpd.: *satya-saṅkalpatā* 'realization of one's act of wishful imagination'; also cf. the apparent substitution of *yatra-kāmāvasāyitva* by *yac ca kāmāvasāyitva* in Vācaspatimīśra's *Tattvakaumudī* on *SK*, kārikā 23, and by *yat-kāmas tad avasyati* in *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, loc. cit.). The text used by al-Bīrūnī seems to have adopted here the first and more plausible of the two interpretations. To this corresponds in the parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52: انطواء المسافات بينه وبين المقاصد 'the rolling up of the wide distance (in the plural in the Arabic) between oneself and (one's) destination (in the plural in the Arabic)'. (Possibly the الشاسعة should be placed after *yātrā* . . . and it appears to qualify the latter word rather than المقاصد.) Al-Bīrūnī may have read *yātrā* . . . and understood the whole cpd. as referring to the capacity to annihilate (lit.: to roll up, or fold up) the wide distance between oneself and one's destination.

<sup>234</sup> بل هي طائفة لأمره 'How (should it be possible for things) to make an impression upon him . . . Indeed they obey his command'. This corresponds to the perfection designated *vaśitva* 'control'. Cf. Vy. ad loc.: *vaśitvaṃ bhūta-bhūtikeṣu vaśibhavaty avasyaś cānyeṣāṃ* 'The capacity of "Control" implies that he controls the elements and their derivatives as well as the fact that he is not controlled (lit. "subdued", i.e. affected) by others'. Cf. also Bhoja ad loc.: *sarvatra prabhaviṣṇutā vaśitvam*; *sarvāṇy eva bhūtāni anuṣmāmitvāt* (v.1. *anurāgītvāt*) *tad-uktam nātikrāmanti* "Control" implies prevailing everywhere, namely, the elements follow him (i.e. are subservient to him) and do not violate his dictates'. To this corresponds in the parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52: خضوع الرؤوسين وطاعتهم 'the humility and obedience of those over whom he rules towards him'.

<sup>235</sup> وهو مقتدر على اعدامها وإيجادها. This corresponds to the perfection designated by *īśitva*, 'sovereignty'. Cf. its explication by Vy. ad loc.: *teṣāṃ prabhavāpyaya-vyūhānām īṣṭe* 'He is sovereign over the arising, dissolution and organization of the elements and their derivatives' (cf. *Tattvakaumudī* on *SK*, kārikā 23). To this corresponds in the parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52: التمكن من الرأس على أية فرقة طلب 'the capacity of ruling over any community he desires'. The Arabic term فرقة 'community, group' here may refer to *bhūta* in the sense of various classes of beings. Cf. the characterization of the perfection of *vaśitva* as preserved in Paraṇcōti muṇivar's *talapurāṇa* (= *sthala-purāṇa*) of Maturai (= Madurai) Temple (Paraṇcōti muṇivar, *Tiruvilaiyāṭarpurāṇam*, TCC ed., Appar Press, Madras, 1969, Paṭalam 33, verse 26, p. 244, ll. 3-4): *pūcal avuṇar puḷ viḷaṅku pūta maṇitar mutal ulakum / vācavāṭiy eṇmaruntaṇ vacamā kḷḷolui vacituvamām* 'Vaśitvam is the concept of bringing into subjugation the (whole) world beginning with the warring *asuras*, birds, animals, spirits, humans and the protectors (of the quarters), i.e. Indra etc.'

<sup>236</sup> هي طائفة لأمره. The possibility cannot be ruled out that this (rather than the previous phrase . . . لا يمانعه شيء في المرور 'Nothing can hinder him from going . . .') represents the *yatra-kāmāvasāya*. Cf. Vy.'s explication of the latter: *yathā saṅkalpas tathā bhūta-prakṛtīnām avasthānam* 'The constituent causes (i.e. the three *guṇas*) of the elements remain (*avasthānam*) as he wills'. Accordingly, the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī may have listed seven rather than eight perfections. Cf. Bhāvagaṇeśa's explication of *ādi* in the sūtra as referring to seven perfections only: *atra ca sūtre prākāmyaṃ vihāya saptaiva siddhaya 'nimāḍity anena grhītāḥ*; *prākāmyaṃ tu tad-dharmānabhighāta-sābdena grhītam iti viśeṣaḥ* 'The (following is) a peculiarity (*viśeṣa*). In this sūtra the expression *animādi* refers to seven perfections only, through the exclusion of *prākāmya* (= *icchānabhighātaḥ*, non-obstruction of one's wishes). For the latter has (already) been referred to (in the sūtra) by the phrase *tad-dharmānabhighātaḥ* ("non-obstruction by the properties of the elements")'.

Despite distinct similarities, the explication of the perfections in our Arabic text differs from the version in Vy., and *mutatis mutandis* from the versions in other commentaries as well as from the version in the parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 52. The divergences between the various traditional versions are considerable. Thus both in Gauḍapāda on *SK*, kārikā 23, and in Bhoja on *YS*, sūtra 3.45, the number of the perfections is nine. This appears to have been

brought about by the accretion of *garimā* (the capacity to become extremely heavy), possibly by an initial redundant duplication of *mahimā*. Cf. M. Takakusu, *La Sāṃkhya kārikā, étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise*, BEFEO, 1904, 1009 (= transl. in *Bulletins of the Department of Indian Philosophy*, no. 1, Madras, 1933, 32). Bhoja ad loc. also differs from Vy. in his explication of *īśitva* (= *īśīrtva*): *śarīrāntaḥkaraṇaśvaratva*, 'complete control over the body and the internal organ (i.e. *citta*, the mind)'. Cf. *YS*, sūtra 3.38; cf. sūtra 4.4: *nirmāna-cittāny asmitā-mātrāt* 'The constructed minds (accompanying the various bodies created by the *yogī*) arise from nothing but the sense of ego' (cf. Vy. and Vāc. ad loc.). The possibility cannot be ruled out that this explication corresponds to the sentence *يكون ظهوره في أية صورة أراد* ('He can appear in whatever form he desires') in our Arabic text. According to the traditional explanation an allusion to the list of eight perfections occurs already in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1.4. Specific individual perfections seem to be adumbrated already in *R̥gveda* 1.136. Further development of the concept of such powers occurs in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.2. The theme of the latter passage is later taken up by *Brahmasūtra* 4.4.8–9, and further refined and systematized by Śaṅkara ad loc. Cf. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.5.

Non-ordinary psychic powers accruing to Buddhist ascetics (*bhikkhus*), several of which are paralleled in the *YS* and its commentaries, are frequently referred to in the Pali canon by the terms *abhiññā* (= Sanskrit: *abhiññā*), 'extraordinary cognitive skills', and *iddhi*. The latter is evidently cognate with Sanskrit (Vedic) *ṛddhi* 'prosperity, abundance, power', and is *not* Pali for the Sanskrit *siddhi* (pace M. Eliade, *Myths, dreams and mysteries*, London, 1968, 88). The following parallels occur in a typical descriptive list in the *Sāmaññaphalasutta*, *Digha-nikāya* PTS, London, 1890, I, 78 et seq.; cf. 212 et seq.). . . . *āvi-bhavaṃ tiro-bhāvaṃ, tiro-kudḍaṃ tiro-pākāraṃ tiro-pabbataṃ asaṃjāmaṇo gacchati seyyathā pi ākāse, paṭhaviyā pi ummujja-nimmujjaṃ karoti seyyathā pi udake, udake pi abhiṃjāmaṇo gacchati seyyathā pi paṭhaviyaṃ, ākāse pi pallaṅkena kamati seyyathā pi pakkhi sakuṇo, ime pi candima-suriye evaṃ mahiddhike evaṃ mahānubhāve pāṇinā parimasati parimajjati, yāva brahmalokā pi kāyena va saṃvatteti . . . so dibbāya sotadhātuyā visuddhāya atikkanta-mānusi-kāya ubho sadde suṇāti, dibbe ca mānuse ca ye dūre santike ca . . . so para-sattānaṃ para-puggalānaṃ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti, sa-rāgaṃ vā cittaṃ sa-rāgaṃ cittaṃ ti pajānāti, vīta-rāgaṃ vā cittaṃ vīta-rāgaṃ cittaṃ ti pajānāti . . . evaṃ samāhite citte . . . pubbe-nivāsānussati-nāṇāya cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti* ' (He) . . . becomes visible or invisible; untrammelled he goes through a wall or rampart or hill, as if through air; he dives into the earth and comes out of it, as if in water; he walks on water without sinking, as if on earth; he travels sitting cross-legged through the air, like a winged bird; even the moon and sun, so potent, so mighty though they be, does he touch and feel with his hand; he reaches in the body right up to the heaven of Brahman . . . With that clear supernal auditory sense-faculty, which is superhuman, he hears sounds, both human and supernal, whether far or near . . . He mentally perceives the minds of other beings, of other men, and recognizes them—he recognizes the attached mind as being attached and the unattached mind as being unattached . . . With his mind thus concentrated he applies and directs his mind to the recollection of his previous births'.

For further Buddhist parallels of various perfections see esp. *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa. Cf. E. Conze, *Buddhist scriptures*, Harmondsworth, 1959, 122 et seq.; Har Dayal, op. cit., 113 et seq.; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit.

<sup>237</sup> This seems to correspond to *sthūla* 'the gross', or *bhūta*- 'element' in sūtra 3.44 above (cf. *sthūla-bhūtāni* 'the (five) gross elements' in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1.61).

<sup>238</sup> السماء 'sky' is occasionally used by al-Bīrūnī to render *ākāśa*, 'ether, physical space'. Cf. R, p. 181, l. 2; *India*, Hyd., p. 32, l. 10. At times الهواء 'air' is also used by him for the same purpose. Cf. R, p. 176, l. 9. The Sanskrit word *ākāśa* (as well as its synonyms *kha*, *vyoman*, *gagana*) means both sky and ether (cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the study of Navya-nyāya logic*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951, 37). For al-Bīrūnī's rendering of the term by الهواء 'air' cf. Hermann Jacobi: ' . . . *ākāśa* ist also der Luftraum, die Luft, als verschieden vom Winde gedachte, *ākāśa* ist der feinste allerfüllende Stoff' (in his article 'Über *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, speciell

in der Vaiśeṣika Philosophie', *Kleine Schriften*, Part 2, Wiesbaden, 1970, 644).

<sup>239</sup> The Arabic *ليس بمتجسم* 'incorporeal' seems to correspond to *grahaṇa*, 'apprehension' or *indriya*, 'the senses', in sūtra 3.47 (see below n. 243), which apparently stands in contrast to *sthūla* in sūtra 3.44. Both sūtras, 3.44 and 3.47, seems to refer back to sūtra 2.18, where *drśya*, 'the world of objects', is said to be constituted by the *bhūtas*, the elements, on the one hand, and by the *indriyas*, the senses (and the five faculties of action: the functions of voice, hands, feet, generation and excretion), on the other. For the Arabic phrase here cf. *atīndriya* in *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, sūtra 2.23: *atīndriyam indriyaṃ bhrāntānām adhiṣṭhānam* (v.l. *adhiṣṭhāne*) 'The senses are themselves supersensuous; mistaken persons identify them with their physical seats (namely, the sense of sight with the "eye-ball" etc., cf. Vijnānabhikṣu ad loc.)'.

<sup>240</sup> Cf. R, p. 183, l. 5: *ومن صام عن الطعام . . .* 'Whoever fasts (abstaining) from food . . . sharpens his senses' (*BSOAS*, ch. II, 526, last para. but one). For the Arabic phrase here cf. . . . *indriya-siddhir aśuddhi-kṣayāt* . . . ' . . . the dwindling away of the impurities which leads to the perfection of the senses . . . ' in sūtra 2.43.

<sup>241</sup> The MS has *تعليها*. Our translation follows Ritter's text which has *تغلبها* in spite of the fact that this reading is not considered by him as correct. Another possibility would be *تعلمها* which in this context would have approximately the same meaning.

<sup>242</sup> For the use of the Arabic term *الموانع* 'impediments' here cf. *الموانع الجسمية* 'the bodily impediments', R, p. 176, l. 8 (transl. *BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 323). Also cf. R, p. 181, l. 16 (transl. *BSOAS*, ch. II, p. 525 and n. 104); *India*, Hyd., 61. Also cf. Vijnānabhikṣu under sūtra 2.43: *aśuddhir adharmas tāmaso guṇaḥ saivānimādi-śakter āvarako mataḥ* 'Impurity consists of demerit, namely, of the *tamas*-constituent; it is considered to be an obstruction to the capacity (or potentiality) of the powers of *aṇimā* etc.'.

<sup>243</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.47: *grahaṇa-svarūpāsmītvānvayārthavattva-samyamād indriya-jayaḥ* 'From the application of Discipline to the proper character (i.e. nature) of perception, (its) inherence (i.e. pre-existence) in ego-awareness and (its) purposiveness there arises mastery over the senses'. Deussen, however, translates: 'Durch (Anwendung der) Allzucht auf Perception, Qualität, Ichbewusstsein, Abhängigkeit (von den Guṇa's) und Zweckbestimmtheit (der Sinnesorgane) erfolgt Beherrschung der Sinnesorgane'. This sūtra is paralleled by sūtra 3.44 above and seems to refer back to sūtras 2.18 and 2.43. In translating sūtra 3.44 above the reading *arthatva* (instead of *arthavattva*), suggested by the Arabic text, was proposed (see n. 221 above). On the other hand, the extant reading *arthavattva* is in consonance with *bhogāpavargārtham* in sūtra 2.18: *prakāśa-kriyā-sthūti-śīlam bhūtendriyātmakam bhogāpavargārtham drśyam* ' (The world of objects) seen (i.e. *prakṛti*) consists of the elements (on the one hand) and the senses (on the other); it possesses the characteristics of illumination (by virtue of *sattva*), activity (by virtue of *rajas*) and inertia (by virtue of *tamas*); and it has experience and emancipation as its purpose'. Cf. also sūtra 2.21. For the term *arthavattva* itself cf. *Yuktidīpikā* on *SK*, kārikā 17. For the term *grahaṇa* here as referring to perception cf. *grāhya* in sūtra 3.21. (In sūtra 1.41 the term seems to refer to knowing in general). For our interpretation of *anvaya* here cf. the tenet regarding the evolution of the senses from *ahaṃkāra* (the principle of *asmitā*) in *SK*, kārikā 24, and the Sāṅkhyā *sat-kārya* theory of causation, claiming that the effect is of the same essence as the cause, namely, the effect pre-exists, or is inherent, in its cause (*SK*, kārikā 9).

<sup>244</sup> *لكنه*, lit.: 'but'.

<sup>245</sup> This corresponds to *vikaraṇa-bhāvaḥ* 'extra-sensory perception' (lit.: 'existence or state of being without the instruments of perception, i.e. the sense-faculties'; cf. *vikaraṇatvam* in *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.31) in sūtra 3.48. The sūtra reads: *tato mano-javitvam* (v.l. *javatvam*) *vikaraṇa-bhāvaḥ pradhāna-jayaś ca* 'Therefrom result (also) swiftness of the mind, extra-sensory perception and mastery over *prakṛti*'. (*Pradhāna* is a synonym of *prakṛti*, Nature, Primordial Matter.) Cf. also Vy. ad loc.: *videhānām indriyānām abhipreta-deśa-kāla-viśayāpekṣo vṛtti-lābho vikaraṇa-bhāvaḥ* 'Extra-sensory perception consists in accomplishing the function of the senses with regard to (any) desired place, time or object independently of the body'. In translating *mano-javitvam* we follow Deussen, in spite of Vy.'s interpretation of this compound: *kāyasyānuttamo*



*gati-lābhaḥ* 'the attainment by the body of an unexcelled (speed of) movement (comparable to that of the mind)'. Vy. may have been misled by an irrelevant common usage of this expression. Both the idea and its expression are Rgvedic in origin (see H. Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rigveda*, s.v. *mano-jū*; cf. also *Īśā Upaniṣad* 4, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.2.4). Cf. the English expression 'quick as thought'. Vy.'s interpretation may probably be taken to imply that the expression in question in the sūtra refers to efficiency in the functioning of the *karmendriyas*, the faculties of action, such as account for the movement of hands and feet etc. For Buddhist parallels cf. e.g. *mano-java-gamana*, 'movement which is as swift as the mind' in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, 7.48a-b (transl. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1925, p. 113, n. 2). Cf. also Louis de La Vallée Poussin, art. cit., 240.

<sup>246</sup> The expression *القوى الثلاث* is used by al-Bīrūnī to render the concept of the three *guṇas*. Cf. e.g. R, p. 172, l. 7.

<sup>247</sup> For a parallel to this characterization of the three *guṇas* see R, p. 181, ll. 7-8 (cf. transl. *BSOAS*, ch. II, 525), where *rajas* is, however, referred to as *جنس الواسطة الممزوجة* 'the intermediary mixed class'.

<sup>248</sup> Cf. *pradhāna-jayah* 'mastery over *prakṛti*' in sūtra 3.48 (see n. 245 above). Cf. also Vy. ad loc.: *sarva-prakṛti-vikāra-vaśītvam pradhāna-jaya iti* 'Mastery over *prakṛti* consists in controlling all modifications of *prakṛti*'.

<sup>249</sup> *النفس* is rendered by 'the soul'. An alternative reading is *النفس* 'the breath'.

<sup>250</sup> The word is partly illegible. Ritter suggests the reading *وحيث*, 'and then', which makes sense but is not quite in keeping with the MS.

<sup>251</sup> *محدودها*. Cf. R, p. 177, l. 2 seq.: *وهي الإحاطة بالثلاثة المذكورة اسماً وصفةً وتفاصيل غير*... it '...it is a covering of the limited by exceeding the limits of the things' (i.e. the first degree) (consists in) the apprehension of the three above-mentioned (i.e. the act of knowing, the known, and the knower) *qua* names, attributes, and details which do not constitute definitions. When he transcends it, (reaching) definitions which turn the particulars of things into universals, he achieves a second degree' (cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 324). An alternative rendering of *محدودها* in the passage under consideration would be: 'according to their limits'.

<sup>252</sup> *كلیة*—lit. 'general'.

<sup>253</sup> Cf. *YS*, sūtra 3.49: *sattva-puruṣānyatā-khyāti-mātrasya sarva-bhāvādhiṣṭhārtvam sarva-jñārtvam ca*, 'From the application of Discipline to the full discernment between *sattva* (in this context: the *buddhi*, "intellect") and the *puruṣa* (self) there arise supremacy over all states of existence and omniscience' (for the syntactic structure of this sūtra and the use of the genitive cf. *YS*, sūtra 3.19). Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: *nirdhūta-rajas-tamo-malasya buddhi-sattvasya pare vaiśāradye parasyām vaśikāra-samjñāyām vartamānasya sattva-puruṣānyatā-khyāti-mātra-rūpa-pratiṣṭhasya sarva-bhāvādhiṣṭhārtvam, sarvātmano guṇā vyavasāya-vyavaseyātmakāḥ svāmīnaṃ kṣetra-jñāṃ praty aśeṣa-dṛśyātmatvenopatiṣṭhanta ity arthaḥ* 'He who is grounded in only the full discernment into the difference between the *sattva* and the self, and who is in the higher consciousness of being master in the higher clearness, and who has the *sattva* of his thinking-substance cleansed from the defilement of *rajas* and *tamas* is one who has authority over all states-of-existence. The aspects (*guṇa*) which are the essence of all things, which have both the determinations and the objects-of-determinations as their essence, present themselves as being the essence of the object-of-sight in its totality to their Owner, the Soul (*kṣetra-jña*)' (tr. Woods). Al-Bīrūnī's Arabic sentence here may reflect *sattva-puruṣānyatākhyāti-mātrasya* in sūtra 3.49 above. For *البدن* 'the body' referred to in the Arabic text, but not in the sūtra, cf. the expression *kṣetra-jña* in Vy. ad loc. above. The term *kṣetra* (lit. 'field') in such context is traditionally interpreted as referring to the body, namely the field of the working of the soul. Cf. Kālidāsa's *Kumāra-sambhava* (Bombay ed.) 6.77: *yogino yaṃ vicinvanti kṣetrābhyantara-vartinam* 'that which yogis discern as residing in the body'. Also cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 13.1, 2, 34. The Arabic *تفاد له الأشياء* 'things obey (the ascetic)' corresponds to *sarva-bhāvādhiṣṭhārtvam* in the sūtra; and *يعرفها* 'he (can) know them by their definitions and (can) grasp them in a universal (manner)'—to *sarvajñārtvam* in the sūtra.



<sup>254</sup> الافعال. Cf. الفِعْلُ المُخْلِصُ (R, p. 173, l. 6), 'a devoted activity', or alternatively, if read اَلْفِعْلُ الْمُخْلِصُ 'an act conducive to liberation'. (Cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 319, n. 162.) Also cf. R, 170-1: فَامَا الْعَمَلُ فَقَسَمَ مِنْهُ كَالْفِعْلِ وَقَسَمَ مِنْهُ كَتَرَكَ الْفِعْلَ فَإِذَا حَصَلَتْ الْأَمْرُ وَجَدْتَ الْعِلْمَ . . . فقد اشتمل هذا الفِعْلُ عَلَى الْعِلْمِ وَالْعَمَلِ مَعًا 'A part of *praxis* (عَمَلٌ) is as it were activity (الفِعْلُ), and another part is as it were desisting from activity. If you grasp this matter you will find that it includes knowledge (العلم) . . . This activity (الفِعْلُ) comprises both knowledge and *praxis* (عَمَلٌ)' (cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 313-14).

<sup>255</sup> حَس in the singular in Arabic.

<sup>256</sup> Arabic معلومات which is derived from the same root as عِلْمٌ rendered above by 'knowledge'.

<sup>257</sup> The MS followed by Ritter has وإساعها. We propose the reading وإتباعها.

<sup>258</sup> Apparently the rejection of the cognition is meant.

<sup>259</sup> Cf. *YS*, sūtra 3.50: *tad-vairāgyād api doṣa-bīja-kṣaye kaivalyam* 'In consequence of detachment from (either: from the perfections mentioned in sūtra 3.49, or: the full discernment between the *satva*, i.e. the *buddhi*, and the *puruṣa*), when the seeds of the defects have dwindled away, *kaivalya* (autonomy, independence of the *puruṣa*) comes about'. The term *doṣa* here is apparently synonymous with *kleśa* (cf. e.g. Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra*, ed. W. Ruben, Ia.2; cf. also Pali *dosa*, e.g. *Sāmaññaphalasutta* (section 91), *Dīgha-nikāya*, I, PTS, London, 1890, 80. For *kleśa* see *YS*, sūtra 2.3. Cf. E. Lamotte, 'Passions and impregnations of the passions in Buddhism', *Fest. I. B. Horner*, Dordrecht, 1974, 91 et seq. On the meaning of the term *kaivalya* see T. Gelblum, 'Sāṃkhya and Sartre', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, I, 1, 1970, 77 et seq. The Arabic برفضها 'its rejection' may correspond to *tad-vairāgyāt* in the sūtra. Al-Bīrūnī's explanation of this passage is based on conceptions current in Arabic Aristotelianism. The sentence فَاَمَّا الْعِلْمُ مَعْرِفَةُ دُثُورِ تِلْكَ الْمَعْلُومَاتِ وَتَلَاشِيهَا وَاتِّبَاعُهَا بَرُفْضُهَا 'For knowledge is the cognition of the perishing and destruction of these *cognita* followed up by its rejection' may be related to some extent to Vy. on sūtra 3.50: *tadā svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā citi-śaktir eva puruṣa iti* 'Then the self (*puruṣa*) is nothing but pure consciousness (lit.: the faculty of consciousness) grounded in its own nature'.

<sup>260</sup> 'Glorifying in it' may refer either to what is deemed knowledge, or alternatively to 'liberation'.

<sup>261</sup> 'Its' may refer either to what is deemed knowledge, or alternatively to 'liberation'.

<sup>262</sup> The Arabic has الملائكة 'the angels'. This term is used by al-Bīrūnī to render the Sanskrit *devāḥ* 'gods'. Cf. e.g. R, p. 173, l. 2.

<sup>263</sup> In Arabic جَنَّة, an Islamic name for Paradise.

<sup>264</sup> Ritter reads مشتلة. The MS has مشملة. We propose the reading مشتملة.

<sup>265</sup> In the singular in the Arabic.

<sup>266</sup> Cf. *YS*, sūtra 3.51: *sthāny-upānimantraṇe saṅga-smayākaraṇaṃ punar aniṣṭa-prasaṅgāt* 'At the invitation by those-in-high-places (i.e. the gods, cf. Vy. ad loc.) (the yogī should) avoid attachment and pride, for this would inevitably involve the recurrence of undesirable consequences'. The term *sthānī* is explained by Vy. and other commentaries as involving a reference to the gods (*devas*). Evidently the term is derived from *sthāna* in the sense of 'position, status, rank, office'. Hence *sthānī* literally means '(high) office-bearer'. Cf. *Maitrī Upaniṣad* 1.4: . . . *sthānād apasaraṇaṃ surāṇaṃ* ' . . . the departure of (individual) gods from (their respective station (*sthāna*), i.e. functional post, category or role; cf. *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* 1.2)'. The concept of *sthāna* may be further elucidated by referring to *Śaṅkara* on *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.28: *sthāna-viśeṣa-saṃbandha-nimittāś cendrādi-śabdāḥ senāpaty-ādi-śabdavat, tataś ca yo yas tat tat sthānam adhirohati sa sa indrādi-śabdair abhidhiyata iti* 'In fact (*ca*) a word such as *indra* has as its ground for application (the condition or contingent quality of) being related to a specific office (*sthāna*) just as (is the case of) the word "Commander-in-Chief". Hence it is the individual who occupies the specific office that is denoted by the word *indra* etc.'. (For the meaning of *nimitta* in this passage cf. the term *pravṛtti-nimitta* discussed in B. K. Matilal's *Epistemology, logic and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis*, The Hague, 1971, 30 et seq.) The term *sthāna* is also synonymous

with *vasati* which is the name of a special *loka* according to followers of the Purāṇas. (Cf. *Nyāya-kośa*, s.v. *sthānam*.)

The word *upanimantraṇa* in the sūtra, which means 'invitation', also connotes 'inducing to come near, seeking to attract, coaxing, alluring'. Cf. *upamantrayate* 'entices (sexually)' in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.8.1: *yoṣā vāva, gautama, agniḥ; tasyā upastha eva samit; yad upamantrayate sa dhūmah; yonir arcīḥ; yad antaḥ karoti te 'ngārāḥ; abhinandā visphuliṅgāḥ* 'Woman, verily, O Gautama, is the (sacrificial) fire. Her lap is the kindling wood; what invites (i.e. entices) is the smoke, the vulva the flame; what one inserts is the coals; the pleasures are the sparks'. For the term *saṅga* cf. its use in a physical sense ('adhesion') in sūtra 3.39. Rājendralāla Mitra renders this term in sūtra 3.51 by 'association' ('Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evil recurring'). The choice of this particular meaning of *saṅga* is implausible, since it would be contradicted by sūtras 3.32: ... *siddha-darśanam* '... (the perfection of) holding visible converse with the *siddhas*', and especially sūtra 2.44: ... *iṣṭa-devatā-samprayogaḥ* '... (the perfection of) communion with the chosen deity'.

The term *smaya* 'pride, arrogance' in the sūtra is paralleled by the Arabic تكبر, افتخار, جبروت and the term *upanimantraṇa*, 'invitation, call to attract'—by the Arabic الدعوة; the term *sthāni*—by the Arabic الملائكة; and *aniṣṭa-prasaṅgāt*—by the Arabic راجعت رتبته واختلفت عدته 'he may suffer a setback as far as his degree is concerned, and his promise (or vow) may be broken'. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: *tatra madhumatīm bhūmim sāksāt kurvato brāhmaṇasya sthānino devāḥ sattva-suddhim anupaśyantāḥ sthānair upanimantrayante bhor ihāśyatām iha ramyatām, kamanīyo 'yaṃ bhogaḥ, kamanīyeyaṃ kanyā, rasāyanam idam jarā-mṛtyum bādhat, vaihāyasam idam yānam, amī kalpa-drumāḥ, puṇyā mandākinī, siddhā maharṣayaḥ, uttamā anukūlā apsarasah, divye śrotra-cakṣuṣi, vajropamaḥ kāyaḥ, sva-guṇaiḥ sarvaṃ idam upārjitaṃ āyusmatā, pratipadyatām idam akṣayam ajaram amara-sthānam devānām priyam iti* 'The purity of the *sattva* in that Brahman among these (four) who has directly experienced the (second) Honeyed (*madhumatī*) Stage is observed by those-in-high-places, the gods. With their high-places they invite him. "Sir, will you sit here? Will you rest here? This pleasure might prove attractive. This maiden might prove attractive. This elixir checks old age and death. This chariot passes through air. Yonder are the Wishing Trees; the Stream-of-heaven (*mandākinī*) confers blessedness; the sages are perfected; the nymphs are incomparable and not prudish. Eyes and ears (will become) supernal; the body like diamond. In consequence of your peculiar virtues, Venerable Sir, all these things have been won by you. Have entrance to this high-place which is unfading and ageless and deathless and dear to the gods"' (tr. Woods). It may be relevant to note in this context that 'lust after women' (الولوع بالنساء) is also an example used in al-Bīrūnī's Arabic text (R, 178, last line) to exemplify 'the attachments' (العلائق), a term corresponding to the particularly deep-seated 'affliction' (*kleśa*) known as *abhiniveśa* (lit. 'clinging'); cf. *YS*, sūtra 2.9 (according to Bhoja's version): *svarasa-vāhī viduṣo 'pi tanv-anubandho 'bhiniveśaḥ* 'Clinging, which consists in being attached to the body, persists by force of one's own impulse even in the learned'.

<sup>267</sup> صاحب الدنيا. One of the meanings of this expression is 'master of the world'.

<sup>268</sup> In Arabic مَثَل which literally means 'likeness'.

<sup>269</sup> This simile is paralleled to some extent in Vy. on sūtra 3.51 (see n. 273 below). Cf. also Vy. on sūtra 2.33. Cf. also Manu 12.76, where *kumbhipāka* 'being burned (or boiled, roasted) in a jar' is mentioned in a list of torments which characterize the hells (*naraka*).

<sup>270</sup> أَلْمَهَا. The MS has أَلْمَهَا. Ritter reads أَلْمَهَا with a question mark. The reading أَلْمَهَا 'instrument' is also possible. For the reading أَلْمَهَا cf. R., p. 178, l. 3 from foot; p. 180, l. 10.

<sup>271</sup> The MS followed by Ritter has أَلْمَهَا. We propose the emendation الغمام. Cf. *Fākihāt al-Bustān*, 891: الظل اسم من اظل الغمام والشجرة. Also cf. the expression *dharma-meghaḥ samādhiḥ*, 'the concentration known as the cloud of merit' in *YS*, sūtra 4.29. Cf. E. Senart, 'Bouddhisme et Yoga', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, XLII, 1900, 353.

<sup>272</sup> حتى—lit.: 'so as to'.

<sup>273</sup> Cf. Vy. on *YS*, sūtra 3.51: *evam abhidhīyamānaḥ saṅga-doṣān bhāvayed ghoreṣu saṃsā-rāṅgāreṣu pacyamānena mayā janana-maraṇāndhakāre viparivartamānena kathaṅcid āsāditaḥ kleśa-timira-vināśo yoga-pradīpaḥ; tasya caite tṛṣṇā-yonayo viṣaya-vāyavaḥ pratipakṣāḥ; sa khalv ahaṃ labdhālokaḥ katham anayā viṣaya-mrga-tṛṣṇayā vāñcitas tasyaiva punaḥ pradīptasya saṃsārāgner ātmānam indhanikuryām iti svasti vaḥ svapnopamebhyah kṛpāṇā-jana-prārthanīyebhyo viṣayebhya iti* 'Thus addressed let him ponder upon the defects of pleasure. "Baked upon the horrible coals of the round-of-births, and writhing in the darkness of birth and of death, I have hardly found the lamp of yoga which makes an end to the obscurations of the hindrances. And of this (lamp) the lust-born gusts of sensual things are enemies. How then could it be that I who have seen its light could be led astray by these things of sense, a mere mirage, and make of myself fuel for that same fire of the round-of-rebirths as it flares up again? Fare ye well! Sensual things (deceitful) as dreams and to be craved by vile folk!"' (tr. Woods, 286). Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.

<sup>274</sup> For the expression العلم الحقيقي cf. above R, p. 189, l. 2.

<sup>275</sup> This passage in the Arabic reflects sūtra 3.52: *kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoḥ saṃyamād vivekajaṇi jñānam* 'From the application of Discipline to moments and their sequence there arises knowledge generated by discrimination'. Especially cf. Vy. ad loc.: *tasmād vartamāna evaikaḥ kṣaṇo na pūrvottara-kṣaṇāḥ santīti tasmān nāsti tat-samāhārah. ye tu bhūta-bhāvinaḥ kṣaṇās te pariṇāmānvitā vyākhyeyāḥ. tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmam anubhavati, tat-kṣaṇo-pārūdhāḥ khalv amī dharmāḥ. tayoḥ kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoḥ saṃyamāt tayoḥ sākṣātkaraṇam. tataś ca vivekajaṇi jñānam prādurbhavati.*—'Thus in the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or later moments. Therefore there is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly the whole world passes through a mutation in any single moment. So all those external-aspects of the world are relative to this present moment. By constraint (*saṃyama*) upon moments and their sequence both are directly perceived. And as a result of this, the (intuitive) knowledge proceedings from discrimination comes about' (tr. Woods).

<sup>276</sup> The MS, followed by Ritter, has فيه. 'Thereby' renders in Q 54 به and in the Ans. فيه. It is possible that فيه should be emended to به.

<sup>277</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.53: *jāti-lakṣaṇa-deśair anyatānavacchedāt tulyayoḥ tataḥ pratipattiḥ* 'Therefrom results (the capacity) to discern two (things which are) so similar that their difference with regard to (their) genus, (their) individual characteristic and (their) location cannot be determined'. The Arabic الجنس, 'genus', corresponds to *jāti* in the sūtra; العلمات الفاصلة بعض الأشياء من بعض 'the characteristics which distinguish one thing from another'—to *lakṣaṇa* in the sūtra; 'its place, its situation and its direction'—to *deśa* in the sūtra.

<sup>278</sup> مجاز, which sometimes may mean 'metaphor' seems to have been chosen by al-Bīrūnī here because of its etymology: 'crossing'. It may be relevant to note that مجاز may also mean 'bridge'. The term مجاز corresponds to *tāraka* 'deliverer', lit.: 'causing to cross over' in *YS*, sūtra 3.54 (see below). Cf. the expression *tirthaṅkara*, lit. 'maker of a crossing (or ford)' in Jaina terminology used for referring to a saint. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 395: وسمي جميعها تارة وهو اسم مشتق من ترن وهو المجاز والمعبر اما هؤلاء فكانهم جازوا شتر الدنيا وحصلوا في النعيم واما الكواكب All of them (i.e. the stars and the saints shining among them alike) are named *tāra*, which name is derived from *tarana*, namely, a crossing (المجاز) and a ford (المعبر). As for those (saints)—on account (reading لانهم instead of كانهم) of their having crossed over beyond the evil of the world and achieved thereby felicity (النعيم); and as for the stars—on account of their crossing through the sky in a circular motion'. (Sachau wrongly renders المعبر here by 'the idea is that . . .')—Sachau, II, 64.)

<sup>279</sup> Ritter's reading التعبير has been accepted in spite of the fact that the MS permits also other readings. Cf. المجاز والمعبر 'a crossing and a ford' in *India* quoted in the preceding note. Both المجاز and التعبير seem to refer to *tāraka*, 'deliverer', in sūtra 3.54. Also cf. Vāc. under sūtra 3.54: *saṃsāra-sāgarāt tārayatīti tārakam* 'It is called "the deliverer" because it delivers from (lit. "takes across") the ocean of the round-of-rebirths'. A different derivation, from *tāraka*,

'pertaining to the star' (whose light precedes that of the sun-rise) seems to be suggested in Bhoja on sūtra 3.33.

<sup>280</sup> الإحاطة is Ritter's reading adopted by us because of the passage in R, p. 191, l. 1. The MS has there *فهي الإخلاط الكلية*. This may be rendered: 'It is the universal humours'.

<sup>281</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.54: *tārakam sarva-viṣayam sarvathā-viṣayam akramam ceti vivekajam jñānam* 'The knowledge generated by discrimination (which knowledge is referred to in sūtra 3.52 above) is (called) "Deliverer", has as its object everything in every respect, and is simultaneous (lit. : is bereft of sequence)'. The term *tāraka* in the sūtra is paralleled by المجاز والتغير in the Arabic version; *sarva-viṣayam*—by جميع ما لطف أو كثف بأسره; *sarvathā-viṣayam*—by الإحاطة الكلية *جملة واحدة* (*sarvathā* has the meaning 'entirely, completely' as well as 'in every way'); *akramam*—by بنوع واحد.

<sup>282</sup> جوهرة generally means 'pearl'. The usual word for 'substance' is جواهر. Cf. above R, p. 192, l. 12.

<sup>283</sup> The MS appears to have الاول rather than أولى which occurs in Ritter's text. Cf. e.g. R, p. 181, ll. 2-3, 7-8; R, p. 191, l. 7. Al-Bīrūnī regularly employs the words القوى الثلاث الأُول 'the three primary forces' to render the notion of the three *guṇas*, 'constitutive qualities'. Cf. also *India*, Hyd., 30 and 335.

<sup>284</sup> Cf. sūtra 3.55: *sattva-puruṣayoh śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam* 'Kaivalya ("autonomy, independence, liberation") comes about when *sattva* (i.e. *citta*, "the mind") and the self are equally purified' (cf. *YS*, sūtra 4.33). النفس 'the soul' corresponds to *puruṣa* in the sūtra (cf. R, p. 170, l. 8; p. 177, l. 19; cf. *India*, Hyd., 30: يسمون النفس بورش 'They call the soul "puruṣa"'); and القلب 'the heart'—to *sattva* (i.e. *citta*, 'the mind', a synonym of *buddhi* and *manas*) in the sūtra (cf. R, p. 177, l. 10; p. 183, l. 20; and cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 33, l. 12). Also cf. Vy. ad loc. : *yadā nirdhūta-rajās-tamo-malam buddhi-sattvam* . . . 'When the *sattva* of the mind has been cleansed of the defilement of *rajās* and *tamas* . . .'.

<sup>285</sup> المكافأة which occurs in the MS. Ritter has the incorrect reading المجازة. The meanings of المجازة and المكافأة are identical.