AL-BĪRŪNĪ’S ARABIC VERSION OF
PATAṆJALI’S YOGASŪTRA:
A TRANSLATION OF HIS FIRST CHAPTER AND A COMPARISON
WITH RELATED SANSKRIT TEXTS

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The first text of al-Bīrūnī (A.D. 973–c. 1050) published in Europe which contains a reference to his translation of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra is his Risāla fi fihrīst kutub Muḥammad ibn Zakariyya’ al-Rāzi, the relevant part of which was published by E. Sachau, Leipzig, 1876–8.¹ In his list of his own works, which is included in this Risāla, al-Bīrūnī states that this list comprises the works he has written up to the end of 427/1037.² Several years later Sachau published al-Bīrūnī’s India (London, 1887), in which al-Bīrūnī not only refers to his having translated this work of Patañjali,³ but also quotes from it copiously.⁴

The relationship of the latter work to the well-known classical sources of the Yoga philosophy has since been debatable. Sachau himself was led astray by the partial evidence constituted by the excerpts in the India to the extent of stating: ‘Al-Bīrūnī’s Patañjali is totally different from “The Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali” . . . and as far as I may judge, the philosophic system of the former differs in many points essentially from that of the Sūtras’.⁵ This view was regarded as certainly true and further elaborated by S. N. Dasgupta, who as late as 1930 postulated a distinct Patañjali as author of the text translated by al-Bīrūnī.⁶ Presumably Dasgupta did not have access to the MS of al-Bīrūnī’s translation, which had been discovered by Massignon in 1922.⁷ Sachau’s

¹ In his introduction to his edition of al-Bīrūnī’s "Chronologie orientalischer Völker von Alberuni (reprinted, Leipzig, 1923). The text in question is referred to on p. xxxv as "the translation of Patañjali’s book on the liberation from the entanglement" (see below, p. 308, note 51). The whole text of this Risāla was published by P. Kraus, Epitre de Bīrūnī contenant le répertoire des ouvrages de Muḥammad b. Zakariyya ar-Rāżī, Paris, 1936. The relevant portion of the Risāla was translated by E. Wiedermann, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, LX (Sitzungsberichte der Physikalisch-Medizinischen Sozietät in Erlangen, LII–LIII), 1920–1, 66 seq. Al-Bīrūnī’s translation of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra is mentioned once again in an appendix to this Risāla, the author of which is Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ghāḍafar al-Tibrīzī. According to Sachau (op. cit., p. xv) al-Ghāḍafar states inter alia that he attempted to read a portion of Patañjali’s book translated by al-Bīrūnī but could not understand it.
² P. Kraus, op. cit., 29; cf. Sachau, op. cit., p. xiii.
³ cf. Kitāb fi taḥqīq mā lī l-Hind or al-Bīrūnī’s India (Arabic text), Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as India, Hyd.), 6.
⁵ Sachau, 1, 264 (annotations).
⁶ S. N. Dasgupta, Yoga philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought, Calcutta, 1930, 64.
opinion was, however, contested by R. Garbe, who traced the excerpts in question to the known Patañjali's Yogaśūtra.\(^8\) He further claimed that the commentary on the Yogaśūtra contained in the excerpts could also be determined. This he identified at one time as the Yogaśāhāṣya of Veda-vyāsa (fl. between A.D. 650 and 850),\(^9\) and later—as the Rājamārtanda of Bhoja Rāja (c. A.D. 1018–60).\(^10\)

In 1956 H. Ritter prepared and published from the above-mentioned unique MS, which is very poor, a critical edition of the text of al-Birūnī's translation.\(^11\) The present undertaking is an attempted translation of al-Birūnī's Arabic version, based on a critical re-examination of Ritter's edition and a comparison with Sanskrit sources.

From the translation given below it will become abundantly clear that most of the Yogaśūtras themselves are traceable in the Arabic text, occurring generally in their original sequence. They have, however, been woven together with a commentary on the Yogaśūtra, assuming the form of a dialogue of questions and answers. A priori this form may possibly represent the structure of the original Sanskrit commentary or alternatively be an adaptation based on an Arabic usage. The evidence from al-Birūnī's own testimony is self-contradictory. On the one hand, in his introduction to his translation he appears to indicate that the incorporation of the commentary with the sūtras as well as the form of a dialogue are of his own making.\(^12\) But, on the other hand, in his conclusion he speaks of the book originally 'consisting of one thousand and a hundred questions in the form of verse'.\(^13\) It may be suggested that having found in the original commentary occasional questions and hypothetical objections introducing the sūtras, al-Birūnī further systematized this form into a series of questions and answers, lending a dramatic effect and a higher degree of readability to his translation.

The commentary used by al-Birūnī cannot be identified with any of the printed commentaries, despite a large number of similarities in the interpretation of the text. Thus al-Birūnī's translation of certain passages has an unmistakable resemblance to Veda-vyāsa's Yogaśāhāṣya or to Vācaspati-miśra's subcommentary (of about A.D. 850), called Tattvavaisāradi, on these passages. But these similarities can be explained as normal repetition due to borrowing from a common tradition.

Garbe was certainly wrong when he identified the commentary used by al-Birūnī as that of Veda-vyāsa, and even more so when in his later view he concluded that it was identical with Bhoja Rāja's. He argued that the latter and the relevant quotations in al-Birūnī's India used identical parables and

\(^8\) R. Garbe, Sāṃkhya und Yoga, Strassburg, 1896, 41.

\(^9\) R. Garbe, Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie, Leipzig, 1894, 63.

\(^10\) R. Garbe, Sāṃkhya und Yoga, 41.


\(^11\) R, 168 (l. 2).

\(^12\) R, 199 (ll. 1–2).
In fact the pertinent cases cited by him are also found in Veda-vyāsa’s and other commentaries and appear to have been drawn from a common tradition. Equally erroneous is the statement made by J. Filliozat as late as 1953. Speaking of Bhoja Rāja’s commentary he says: ‘C’est peut-être en partie dans ce texte, alors tout récent, qu’al-Bīrūnī s’est initié au Yoga de Patañjali sur lequel il a d’autrefois écrit un ouvrage en arabe’. In fact al-Bīrūnī’s text has more in common with Veda-vyāsa’s commentary than with that of Bhoja Rāja. It is quite possible that the source of the commentary in question is traceable to one of the numerous manuscripts of unknown commentaries housed in Indian libraries. A comparison of peculiar figures of speech (rather than topics discussed) and perhaps especially of the opening benediction (maṅgala), would be a useful clue for the detection of the source. But the possibility also exists that the source in question has been lost.

In two places in his translation al-Bīrūnī distinctly and explicitly quotes from what he refers to as ‘the commentator’. In one of them Ritter suggests for the indistinct text the reading b, namely ‘by Vyāsa’, the author of the Yogabhāṣya. This suggestion, however, may be objected to on the following grounds.

(1) In his India al-Bīrūnī invariably transcribes the name Vyāsa—although not occurring there as the name of the commentator in question—by using the Arabic letter س and not ص.

(2) A comparison of the two explicit quotations by al-Bīrūnī with Veda-vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya yields the following observations.

(a) In the case of the one quotation, where medical doctrines are referred to, only a small portion is paralleled in Veda-vyāsa.

(b) In the case of the other quotation, though similar Purānic geographical and cosmological material is handled both in the Arabic version and in Veda-vyāsa, still the description in the former substantially differs from that in the latter. Furthermore, these differences may serve as an argument for inferring that the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī had probably been written at a time when the bhāṣya of Veda-vyāsa had not yet attained any great sanctity or authority. The Arabic version is not much younger than the oldest known commentaries, and may represent a hitherto unknown line of interpretation.

Similarly, the fact that a number of sūtras—usually not essential ones—do not appear in the Arabic version suggests the possibility that the commentary

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14 See p. 303, n. 8, above.
16 R, 185 (1. 16), 188 (1. 3); cf. India, Hyd., 191, 192, 194, 196, 205 (Sachau, 1, 232, 234, 236, 238, 248).
17 R, 185 (1. 16).
18 Thus at least 18 times (e.g. India, Hyd., 102, 104).
19 R, 188 (1. 2 et seq.).
20 R, 185 (1. 16 et seq.).
21 Veda-vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya (henceforth abbreviated as V) on sūtra 3.26.
used by al-Bīrūnī had dealt with a very early version of the *Yogasūtra*, before interpolations were added. This possibility is further supported by considering al-Bīrūnī’s misunderstanding of the word *nidrā* ‘sleep’, in sūtra 1.10, as referring to dream (*ئذَرَِّ*). He would hardly have done this had his source included sūtra 1.38, which clearly speaks of *nidrā* ‘sleep’ and *svapna* ‘dream’ as distinct states.

It may be argued that the commentary in question could be related to the theistic developments evident in late commentators prior or posterior to al-Bīrūnī, such as Vācaspati-miśra (ninth century A.D.), Viśṇuabhisheka (sixteenth century A.D.), and Nīlakaṇṭha, who lived—as M. Eliade points out—when all India was full of mystical and devotional currents, and whose versions of the Yoga were shaped under the impact of Vedāntic ideas and bhakti (mystical devotion). For indeed, whereas the sūtras speak of the goal as *kaivalya* and define it as ‘the energy of thought being grounded in itself’, the Arabic version speaks of liberation and also of union with God. Indeed, the concept of God in the latter is a far cry from that of the sūtras themselves, which conceive of Him as a passive archetype of the Yogin, the object of a purely ‘intellectual’ devotion. But against such argumentation one should not ignore the fact that al-Bīrūnī was a Muslim, so that in this major characteristic of his translation as well as in its minor characteristics, which likewise exhibit a good deal of ‘islamization’, his own interpretation, conditioned by his own cultural orientation, might have been at work.

It is quite certain that the commentary in question was not an oral one, for in his introduction to his translation of the text, al-Bīrūnī himself refers to it as belonging to a group of texts which were read to him ‘letter by letter’.

Al-Bīrūnī’s incorrect rendering of the term *nidrā* in sūtra 1.10, mentioned above, can be accounted for only as due to his independent effort to understand the same sūtra. The latter consists of a definition of the term *nidrā*: *abhāva-pratyālambanā vṛttir nidrā* ‘Sleep is that mode of functioning of the mind which has as its object the conception of nothing’. However, a literal and uninitiated reading of the Sanskrit here could easily yield what al-Bīrūnī understood, namely: that mode of functioning of the mind which has as its
object a content which is absent (from the corresponding reality). That he naturally took to refer to the state of dream.\textsuperscript{30}

(2) Another brain-wave of al-Bīrūnī himself may account for what he made of sūtras 2.33–4. Here the expression \textit{vitarka-bādhane} is translated by Ballantyne: ‘in excluding things questionable’, and by Woods: ‘if there be inhibition by perverse considerations’. Al-Bīrūnī apparently renders it by ‘if things are known in their opposites and differences’.\textsuperscript{31} The expression \textit{pratipākṣa-bhāvanam} traditionally means ‘cultivation of the opposite’, the force of the context being that whenever perverse tendencies, such as anger and violence, should arise in the mind of the Yogan, he ought to cultivate their opposites, such as universal compassion, as an antidote. Presumably unaided by an oral tradition al-Bīrūnī here legitimately takes the expression to mean simply ‘vice versa’, i.e. ‘there is an effecting of the opposite’; and in view of the context he understands: ‘He who gives up violence will be recompensed by their opposites, namely the opposites of the earlier mentioned ignorance and causing of pain’.

(3) The succinct sūtra 2.22 reads: \textit{kṛtārtham prati naśītam apy anāśītam tad-anya-sādhāranaatvāt ‘ Though it (the object of sight) has ceased (to be seen) in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others (besides him)’. Al-Bīrūnī appears to have taken the word \textit{sādhārana} in the sense of a generic property, a universal, and hence an intellectum. And he takes \textit{kṛtārtha} to be its opposite—a sense-perceived object. He is consequently led to translate the sūtra: \textit{The sense-percepts do not possess permanent reality in the way the intellecta do ’.\textsuperscript{32} A Platonic-Aristotelian background is evident in this translation.

(4) In sūtra 2.6 al-Bīrūnī, presumably unaided by a teacher, takes a definition to be a mere illustration and consequently fails to understand the sūtra. Here the concept of \textit{asmitā ‘ the feeling of individuality or personality } is defined as \textit{dṛg-dārśana-sāktyar ekātmata ‘ the state in which the seeing agent and the sight function are identified as one self ’. Al-Bīrūnī takes this to be just a case illustrating the vṛtti (mode of functioning of the mind) called \textit{vikalpa ‘ false conception (based on language symbols)’,\textsuperscript{34} which he uniformly translates by \textit{unproven opinion’}.

\textsuperscript{30} R, 171 (l. 11).
\textsuperscript{31} R, 182 (l. 14). Perhaps al-Bīrūnī read here \textit{bodhana} for \textit{bādhane}.
\textsuperscript{32} R, 182 (ll. 15–16).
\textsuperscript{33} R, 181 (l. 20).
\textsuperscript{34} ‘ Vikalpa is the existence of abstract imagination on the basis of language symbols, as when we say “the intelligence of the purusha ” though we know that the purusha has no other essence than pure intelligence. Without such characteristic mode of chitta transformation abstract thinking would be impossible ’ (S. N. Dasgupta, op. cit., 276).
\textsuperscript{35} R, 178 (l. 13).
(5) In illustrating how the latent deposits of *karma* effect a change in condition, the commentaries on sūtra 2.12 include a reference to the celebrated story from the *Mahābhārata* of Nahuṣa, who, having replaced Indra as the chief of the gods, was later transformed into a snake by the Rṣi Agastya.\(^36\) Al-Bīrūnī also has the story, but he has reversed the role of the characters: "... and like Indra, chief of the gods (lit.: 'angels'),\(^37\) for having committed adultery with the wife of the brahmin Nahuṣa, he was cursed and turned into a snake after he had been a god."\(^38\) This mistake may be accounted for by al-Bīrūnī's misunderstanding a Sanskrit text (especially if it used the word *indra* both as a private name and as a name of an institution or title, such as in the expression *devānām indra*);\(^39\) but it could hardly be accounted for by postulating an Indian teacher who did not know this famous story.

The Arabic translation betrays a constant effort to bring the work as near as possible to the mentality of the Muslim readers. This is evident both in the selection of the terminology and the transposition of Indian philosophical notions and problems into similar ones grounded in Aristotelian and other streams of Muslim thought. Random examples are as follows.

(1) The term *karma-vipāka*, which had to be coped with in sūtra 1.24, is rendered by...\(^40\)

(2) In dealing with sūtra 1.41 the Indian epistemological triad of *ghraitr*, *grahana*, and *grāhya* is transposed respectively into the ḥaḳ, ḥara, and ḥaḳiyā of the Aristotelians.\(^41\)

(3) The Indian philosophical problem, implicit in sūtra 2.15, of what constitutes the real self (*ātman*) is analogous to a question discussed in Arabic philosophy as to whether it is the body (*badn*) or the soul (*nafs*) (or the bonds of the organism (man) (*insan*) that constitutes the essence of man. The form which this problem assumes in Arabic philosophy is reflected in the selection of terms in al-Bīrūnī's translation here.\(^42\)

Evidently, from the point of view of al-Bīrūnī and his readers, the Arabic work provides an operative or functional, though not literal, translation of the *Yogasūtra* with its commentary. This is often done by means of paraphrasing.

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\(^{36}\) *Mahābhārata*, v.17 ff., xii.342 ff., and with some variations xiii.99 ff. (Referred to, summarized, and discussed by Jacoby in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics*, s.v. 'Agastya').

\(^{37}\) cf. *India*, Hyd., 72: "... the class of deva whom we have explained as 'angels'" (Sachau, i, 95); cf. R, 168 (l. 7). In translating the term for gods by 'angels', al-Bīrūnī follows a long-established usage of translators of Greek texts into Arabic.

\(^{38}\) R, 179 (ll. 15–16).

\(^{39}\) cf. V on sūtra 21.2.

\(^{40}\) R, 173 (ll. 13–14).

\(^{41}\) R, 176 (ll. 11–12).

\(^{42}\) R, 178 (ll. 11–12).
An example is the rendering of the term maitrei ‘compassion’ in sūtra 1.34 by:

أن يريد الخير لكافة الخلق من غير استثناء ويمناهم 참 ويستطيع محبولهم عندهم

... that he should wish and desire well-being for all creatures without exception and rejoice in their attaining it’. 43

But al-Bīrūnī is also well equipped with a terminological apparatus, some of which is drawn from the tradition of Arabic translations from the Greek masters. That Aristotelian connotations, however, may constitute a pitfall can be seen from the following. In his treatment of sūtra 2.6, drg-darśanā-saṁtyor ekātmataivāṣmitā, al-Bīrūnī renders drg by عقل and darśana by عتمل, but he is then caught in a dilemma: while the union of these two is denounced by the sense of the sūtra here, it is commendable according to Aristotelian philosophy. He therefore slightly changes the two terms by qualifying them as follows: عقل المحسن والاعتلال البسيط ‘the corporeal knower and the simple (i.e. immaterial) act of knowledge’. 44

Al-Bīrūnī himself also coined new Arabic technical terms, this being another important aspect of his contribution in his work of translation. The following are examples: for klēśa ‘affliction’ — قل ‘weight’ 45; for buddhi ‘intelligence or the thinking organ’ — قلب ‘heart’. 46 His terminological apparatus, however, is not completely uniform. Thus, for instance, the same term عتمل is used to render at least three distinct concepts: (i) kriyā in the sense of rajás 47; (ii) karma 48; and (iii) sādhanā, the name of the second chapter of the Yogasūtra. 49

A better understanding and appreciation of al-Bīrūnī’s method of translation, as well as light on other aspects of his work, may still be expected from further clarification of the remaining textual ambiguities. Furthermore, the possibility exists that the commentary will be identified.


43 R, 176 (1. 3–4); cf. R, 185 (l. 11).
44 R, 178 (l. 14); cf. R, 197 (l. 5 et seq.).
45 R, 177 (l. 20); cf. R, 167 (l. 2).
46 R, 192 (l. 20).
47 R, 181 (l. 7).
48 R, 185 (l. 7).
49 R, 183 (l. 18).
50 The Arabic transliteration is باتنجلا, which may also stand for the adjectival form patañjala; cf. India, Hyd., 6, 102 ( = Sachau, i, 8, 132). However, in all probability al-Bīrūnī lengthened the first vowel in order to ensure an approximately correct pronunciation of the foreign name. Both in his present translation and in his India, he sometimes uses this method of transliterating a short Sanskrit a by an Arabic alif indicative of a long a, e.g. —پرهم brahman (R, 175 (l. 3)) (but پرهم لولا —پرهم لولا brahma-loka, India, Hyd., 191 (l. 1)). Cf. Sachau, i, 257 (annotations).
51 The printed text has اممال. The emendation اممال (lit. ‘weights, burdens’) is based on R, 177 (l. 20), where this word corresponds to kleśa in sūtra 2.2. For other descriptions by al-Bīrūnī of Patañjali’s treatise cf. p. 302, n. 1 (cf. R, 179 (l. 17), 180 (l. 9), 181 (l. 14), 189 (l. 4); India, Hyd., 61 (l. 12) for the expression ازبتيل كتب in تخلص النفس من (R, 5)}
The aspirations of men in this world vary, and the civilization of the universe is established in an orderly way through this variety. My resolution, nay my soul as a whole, is solely directed to teaching, since I have done with the pleasure of learning. This (i.e. teaching) I regard as the greatest happiness. Whoever has a correct knowledge of the situation will not blame me for my persistent efforts and for the burden of endeavour which I bear in translating, for the benefit of (my) equals and adversaries, from the language of India. Whoever does not know the situation will set me down as ignorant and attribute my toil to my wretched state. For every man has things upon which his intention and thought are fixed and he is opposed to that of which he lacks knowledge—until he reaches a rank in which his excusing himself may be permitted and no obligation that does not please him is imposed on him.

I went on translating from the Indian (language) books of arithmeticians and astronomers till I turned to books on wisdom preserved by their élite, and with respect to which the ascetics compete with a view to progressing upon the way to worship. When they were read to me letter by letter, and when I grasped their content, my mind could not forgo letting those who wish to study them share (in my knowledge). For niggardliness with regard to sciences is one of the worst crimes and sins. What is (written) black on white cannot but (constitute) a new learning whose knowledge should lead to the attainment of some good and to the avoidance of harm.

An introduction giving particulars about the state of these people and the state of the book.

These are people whose talk within their community is never free from (reference to) topics concerning transmigration and (to) the misfortunes of reincarnation and (to) unification and (to) generation not according to the mode of (ordinary) birth. For this reason their talk, when it is heard, has a flavour composed of the beliefs of the ancient Greeks, of the Christian sects,
and of the Ṣūfī leaders. Not one of them (i.e. of the Hindu community) is free from the belief that souls are bound in the world and entangled in its ties, and that only those which achieve the supreme goal in their endeavour are liberated from these (ties and obtain a state of) enduring permanence. Those (souls) which do not attain this (goal) remain in the world, tossed about between good and evil in the existent (things) until they are cleansed, purified, and liberated.

Their books are composed according to metres, and the texts are provided with commentaries in such a way that a complete and accurate translation is difficult, because the commentators are concerned with grammar and etymology and other (matters) which are of use only to a (person) who is versed in their literary languages (R, 168) as distinct from the vernacular. For this reason I was obliged to amalgamate in (my) translation the text with that over-lengthy commentary, to arrange the work in a way which resembles (a dialogue consisting of) questions and answers, and to omit (the parts which) are concerned with grammar and language. This is an apology which I offer because of the difference in size of the book in the two languages, if such a comparison is made. (I do this) in order that no one should think that this (difference) is due to remissness in (the rendering of) the meaning. Indeed he should be assured that it is due to a condensation of what (otherwise) would be troublesome (in its) proximix. May God bestow His favour upon the good.

This is the beginning of the book of Patañjali, text interwoven with commentary.

I prostrate (myself) before Him above whom there is nothing, and I glorify Him who is the beginning of things and to whom they shall return, Him who knows all beings. In the second place I exalt, with a humble soul and a pure intention, the angels and (other) spiritual beings who are below Him, and I call upon them to help me in my exposition—which I wish to keep short—according to the method of Hiranyagarbha.

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62 Lit. 'according to what it is'.
63 The name of the commentator is not mentioned. For reference by al-Birūnī to 'the commentator' cf. R, 185 (l. 16), 188 (l. 2); India, Hyd., 191 (l. 1), 192 (l. 6), 194 (l. 6), 196 (l. 15), 205 (l. 14) (= Sachau, 1, 232, 234, 236, 238, 248).
64 Lit. 'the speech'.
65 The Arabic has 'question and answer' in the singular.
66 Probably owing to a printing error the diacritical dot over the nun in ḥān is missing in the printed text.
67 Lit. 'then'.
68 I.e. gods (deva). See above, p. 307, n. 37; cf. R, 172 (l. 17), 173 (l. 3), 192 (l. 2). Also cf. India, Hyd., 68 (l. 17), 172 (l. 14). For a description of 'angels' (deva) as a subclass of 'spiritual beings' see India, Hyd., 68 (cf. Sachau, 1, 91).
69 Cf. R, 172 (l. 14). For a description of 'angels' (deva) as a subclass of 'spiritual beings' (الروحانيين) see India, Hyd., 68 (cf. Sachau, 1, 91). Sachau's identification of the latter term with deva (loc. cit.) appears to be erroneous.
70 In Vācaspati-miśra's subcommentary Tatyaavaiśāraḍā (henceforth abbreviated as Vāc.), under sūtra 1.1, the following statement is quoted from the Yogīyājāvalīkāsāṃrī: 'Hiranyagarbha and no other of ancient days is he who gave utterance (vaktā) to Yoga' (J. H. Woods,
The ancients have been deeply engaged in the study of the things through which the four objectives may be achieved. These (objectives) are: religion and conduct of life, property and ease, enjoyable living and pleasure, liberation and permanence. (In studying these the ancients) scarcely left for those who came later scope for discourse. However, my exposition excels in clearing up the ambiguities which they put down. It is restricted to (a study of) the means of bringing about the perfection of the soul through liberation from these bonds and the attainment of eternal bliss. Accordingly I shall say:

As regards things which perception does not apprehend, the attribute of not being apprehended can only be ascribed to them because of various

The Yoga system of Patañjali, with Veda-vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya and Vācaspati-miśra’s Tattsvaivādāra, Cambridge, Mass., 1927 (henceforth abbreviated as Woods), 5). According to the interpretation of Vāc, this implies that Hiranyagarbha preceded Patañjali. For a similar argument Mādhava invokes in his Sarvadārśanasangraha, ch. Patañjali-darśana, the above-mentioned quotation (misleadingly abbreviating the name of its source as ‘Yājñavalkyasmiśra’). Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.25 and Vācaspati-miśra’s Bhāmati under Brahmasūtra 2.2.37. Also cf. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī’s Maṇiprabhā (c. A.D. 1592) on sūtra 1.1: ‘Although an authoritative book was made by Hiranyagarbha, still since that was deemed too extended, an authoritative work conforming to that (book) is begun ’ (J. H. Woods’s translation in JAOS, xxxiv, 1915, 1 et seq.). According to the Mahābharata (Mbh., xi.349.65, quoted by P. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. I, Abt. 3, Leipzig, 1908, p. 17, n), Yoga was introduced by Hiranyagarbha, whereas Kapila is designated as the founder of Sāṅkhya. Elsewhere too there is reference to a connexion between Yoga and Hiranyagarbha (Mbh., xii.342.95, referred to by Deussen, op. cit., 17). See op. cit. for further references to Hiranyagarbha. Also see R. Garbe, Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie, 27 et. seq. 71

71 Lit. ‘ mention ’.

72 The four objects (مطالب) referred to in the text are the well-known ‘ aims of life ’ (puruṣārtha), namely: dharma ‘law’, artha ‘economic and political power’, kāma ‘pleasure’, and mokṣa ‘liberation’.

73 Ritter’s text has سیرة. In the Arabic script there is not much difference between سیرة and سیرة, which means religious tradition. Possibly al-Birûnî had in mind the word سینت. In India the meaning of dharma is uniformly expressed by the word ‘religion’. Cf. India, Hyd., 102, ونفس وغيره دوم ‘the word dharma means “reward” but in general it is used for “religion” ’ (Sachau, I, 132).

74 For the inclusion of ease (النعم) within the concept of artha cf. Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra, 6.2.1–3: ‘Peace and activity (śama-vyāyāma) constitute the source of acquisition and security (yoga-kṣemayor yoni). Activity is that which brings about the accomplishment of works undertaken. Peace is that which brings about security of enjoyment of the fruits of works (karma-phalopabhojana kṣemārādhanaḥ samah)’ (R. P. Kangle, The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra, I, Bombay, 1960, 165; II, Bombay, 1963, 368). Elsewhere the word النعم is used synonymously with the word راحة to refer to the concept of sukha ‘ease’, as opposed to dukhka ‘sorrow’ (R, 189 (l. 7); cf. 180 (l. 10)).

75 In his India al-Birûnî also uses the Sanskrit term mokṣa, e.g. India, Hyd., 53, ویسمون خلاقان بالغة مکا ‘they call its (the soul’s) liberation in the Indian language mokṣa’ (cf. Sachau, I, 70).

76 Ritter’s text has جعل. Emendation proposed: جعل. The translation conforms to this emendation.

77 The usual meaning of أسباب is ‘causes’.

78 All those who have not attained liberation are thought to be in a state of bondage.
modalities 79: (1) (their) essential smallness, as (in the case of) atoms,80 whose minuteness is the cause preventing them from (being apprehended by) the senses 81; (2) (their being) far away, for distance prevents perception when it extends beyond the latter's limit; (3) a barrier which conceals, e.g. a fence 82 which prevents the perception of that which is placed behind it, bones which are covered up by the flesh and the skin, and mixtures,83 which being inside the body cannot be perceived because of the veils (intervening) between them and ourselves; (4) their being remote from the present time either (because of their being) in the past, e.g. the former generations and the tribes which have perished, or (because of their being) in the future, e.g. things expected (to happen) in the time to come; (5) the deviating from the methods of cognition by means of which apprehension becomes perfected, as in the case of necromancy 84 whereby the state of hidden things is discovered. It is (in effect) known that the perfection of certitude can of necessity only be (obtained) through sense-perception, which is lacking in the case of hidden things. (R, 169) For what is absent can only be inferred from what is present, and that which can be attained only through arguments is not in the same (category) as that which is known through sense-perception. Similarly logical demonstration removes doubts as (effectively as) sense-perception. As long as ambiguities beset the soul, the latter is given over to perplexity and cannot give heed to that which (procures) its liberation from this entanglement and its deliverance from toil and bondage, and (gives) it an eternal sojourn, in which there is neither death nor birth.

Most of the intentions of the expounders 85 of books are (directed) either to the production of a comment 86 peculiar to them or to guidance towards an

79 For the present discussion of causes of non-perception cf. Iśvara-krṣya’s Sānkhya-kārikā, kārikā 7: aśīrāt samāpyād indriya-ghātān mano-vaśosvāhānāt/saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhīhāvāt samānbābhiḥārāca ca (anupalabdhi)7 (non-perception may be) due to excessive distance, (excessive) proximity, damage to the sense-organs, unsteadiness of mind, minuteness (of the object), the intervening (of another object), being outshone (by another object), and the mingling (of the object) with like objects '. Also cf. V on sūtra 1.49.

80 Read هیالات instead of Ritter’s ciL... This Arabic word has the primary meaning ‘ grains of dust ‘. Cf. Vācaspasi-miśra’s Tatthva-kaumudī on Sānkhya-kārikā, kārikā 7 (quoted in the preceding note): saukṣmyāt—yathendriya-sannikṛṣṭām paramāvadī pratihiṅka-śaṇā api na pāṣyati’ ‘due to minuteness’—as for instance (the case of an object) such as an atom, which (although) connected with one’s sense (of sight), even one whose mind is fixed (on it) cannot see ‘.

81 The Arabic has the singular.

82 For the example of the fence cf. e.g. Jānakīnētha’s Nyāyaśiddhāntamaṇḍari, Banaras, 1916, 40.

83 Probably the humours of the body are meant. Cf. Fākiḥat al-bustān, 1358: انشاء البلد - طواجه -

84 The MS may be read الموجز على الأصوات or الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات الموجز على الأصوات m. al-kalam, lit. ‘ speech, discourse ’.
objective which they endeavour to obtain. The aims are determined according to (the capacity of) the knower. As for knowledge, it is divided into two parts: the superior which leads to liberation, for it procures the absolute good, and that which is inferior relatively (to the first part) and which (refers to) the remaining objectives, which rank lower than (liberation). I shall try to see to it that, comparatively to the arguments set forth by (my) predecessors with regard to this hidden subject, my comment will have for the reader a status similar to that of sense-perception productive of conviction.

Question 1. The ascetic who roamed in the deserts and jungles addressed Patañjali, asking: I have studied the books of the ancients and their discourses about things hidden from the senses, and I have found them concerned with weak arguments which are beset with doubts and do not aim at demonstrations which have the same status as perception providing the calm of certitude and guiding towards the achievement of liberation from bondage. Is it possible for you to show me by arguments and demonstrations what is sought for in order that by grasping it I should be assisted against doubts and misgivings?

Answer. Patañjali said: This is possible. I shall give about this a brief exposition whose brief (compass) will convey many notions, using at the same time sound reasoning. For not every man likes or has the time for a lengthy exposition. Indeed boredom overcomes him speedily so that he grows tired of the exposition and abandons it. Listen then, since you have asked. That which you seek is praxis, which has (in the first place) causes and thereupon results and consequences and an agent (bringing) this (about). Accordingly you ought to have a true knowledge of each (factor) and criticize the various opinions concerning it, rejecting the erroneous views. A part of praxis is as it were activity, and another part is as it were desisting from activity. If you grasp this matter you will find that it includes knowledge. For (it consists in)
compression of that which spreads out from you towards external (things), so that you are not concerned with anything but yourself. (It also consists in) the quelling of the faculties of the soul, so that they should not cling to that which is not you. (It consists finally in) every (faculty) engaging in the work which is assigned to it by you. This activity comprises both knowledge and praxis.

Q 2. What is the state of a man who has compressed within himself the faculties of his soul and hindered them from spreading out?

Ans. He is not completely bound, for he has severed the bodily ties between himself and that which is other than himself, and has ceased to cling to things external to him. But on the other hand he is not prepared for liberation, since his soul is with his body.

Q 3. How is he (to be described) when he is in neither of the two states which have been mentioned?

Ans. He then is as he really is in his essence.

Q 4. This answer is not satisfactory as an explanation. Let me know whether he increases or decreases to any degree thereby, on the analogy of the expansion of leather in the rain and its contraction in the sun, so that he would decay and perish on account of the succeeding states which change him; or alternatively whether he does neither increase nor decrease, as is the case with air, in which case he would be inanimate without awareness of anything.
Both opinions contradict the basic (universally) accepted tenets, namely that the soul is alive and will not die, and is not subject to decay and annihilation.

Ans. The meaning of my statement, that he is as he (really) is, is that when these sense-faculties and psychic faculties return into him, they are united with him in a certain manner which consists in his adhering to them and belonging to their aggregate. This man used to be aware through his senses of what he perceived and used to know through the faculties of his soul, which were spread outside of it, that which is external to it, so that the return into him (of the sense-faculties and the faculties of his soul) did not add to him anything: he is exactly as he was before that.

Q 5. How many are the faculties of the soul which spread out of it?

Ans. They are five. The first of them is apprehension, which has three modes: (a) apprehension by means of the five senses; (b) apprehension by means of inferring for instance smoke indicating a fire which is behind a fence preventing it from being seen; (c) apprehension by means of hearsay accompanied by a consensus of opinion, for instance our knowledge that the city of Kanauj is on the bank of the Ganges river. For this (knowledge) is attained by means of information received and serves as a substitute for one’s apprehension of this (fact) by eyesight.

The second (faculty of the soul) is imagination, by means of which one knows a thing not as it really is. For instance when the rays of the sun fall on a (desert) plain in a certain manner and the thirsty man takes it to be water.

The third (faculty of the soul) is (conventional) opinion, which has no

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113 Ritter puts a question mark after 31B. In all probability the word should be read 31A deriving from the root 31C.

114 cf. sūtra 1.4: 31D-sārūpyam itaratra ‘At other times it (the self) takes the same form as the modes of functioning (of the mind)’.

115 Or ‘that which encompassed him’.

116 cf. V on sūtra 1.3: 31E-pratiṣṭha tadānim citi-baktir yathā kāivalyā; vyūthāna-citte tu sati tatākhi bhavanti na tatākhi’ At that time the energy of the mind is established in its own form, as in the state of kaivalya. But when the mind is in its emergent state, (the energy of the mind), although really the same, (does) not (seem) so’ and cf. Vāc. ad loc.

117 cf. sūtra 1.5: 31F-paścatauyah... ‘The modes of functioning (of the mind) are of five kinds...’.

118 Cf. pramāṇa in sūtra 1.6: pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtyah ‘Modes of correct knowledge, incorrect knowledge, comprehension of words, sleep, and memory’.

119 Cf. pratyakṣa in sūtra 1.7: pratyakṣ-sāmānyamānaḥ pramāṇāni ‘The modes of correct knowledge are perceptual, inferential, and linguistic’.

120 Ritter’s text has here a question mark. In all probability the word should be read 31C. Cf. anumāna of the corresponding sūtra 1.7.

121 Cf. āgama in sūtra 1.7.

122 Cf. viparyaya in sūtra 1.8: viparyayo mithyā-jñānam atadṛṣṭa-pratiṣṭham ‘Incorrect knowledge is false cognition which takes a form other than that of the object’.

123 Cf. vikalpa in sūtra 1.9: sādha-jñānānapāti vastu-bādayo vikalpaḥ ‘Conception based on communication lacks a (corresponding) object and results from perception of words’.
reality behind it, but in which one follows current habits of language. For instance the expression used by the general public 'the spirit's knowledge' which is used although the expression has no signification, and yet (the man) who employs it is not blamed, on account of (linguistic) habit.

The fourth (faculty of the soul) is dreaming which is man's knowledge of things which are (in reality) other (than what he knows), which have no subsisting reality corresponding to the knowledge in question.

The fifth (faculty of the soul) is memory which is the retention of what has been known by the knower without its being obstructed by forgetting.

Q 6. How can the quelling of the soul and the compression of its faculties away from external things be accomplished?

Ans. This may be accomplished in two ways. One of them is of a practical nature, namely habituation. For when a person has turned to a faculty of the soul itself, has painstakingly prevented it from rebellion, and has given it in trust to that which is the best for it perseveringly and applying himself to it continually—then, unless he repeats (this practice), a time of negligence may intervene between two periods, in which time the soul may lapse back to what is unsuitable. But by means of continuous application, as a
result of which affects disappear, and by means of habituation, the faculty in question will indubitably acquire this habit in a permanent fashion, and will be diverted from the tendencies it had when it lacked this habit.  

(R, 172)

The second way is intellectual, namely mental asceticism, which consists of contemplating the consequences with the eye of the heart, and considering the evil of the existents, which come into being and pass away. For nothing is worse than decay and passing away, these two being inherent in (the existents). The result of this way is that when the person knows the ill and the malignity in all things; his heart eschews all pursuits of this world and the next, his mind becomes free to seek liberation from them; he is relieved of questions and needs. For they are the causes of attachment to things existing in the world, and add to the evils of bondage, and prevent him from addressing himself single-mindedly to his liberation. When his ambitions are turned away from whatever there is in all the worlds, he has attained a stage transcending the three primary forces. The latter are such that no world can exist unless there is production by them. They generate nature by means of one of them and destroy it by means of another of them (these two forces being) pure in their two respective genera. (The third force) which is intermediate between the two partakes of the two others, and is on account of this capable

134 Ritter gives the Arabic word as التمعيد, and states that the MS is not clearly legible here.

The correct reading appears to be التمعيد.

135 Cf. śūtra 1.13: tatra shhitau yatno 'bhûtah ' Of these, repeated practice is the effort to remain in the state (of suppressed vṛttis); and śūtra 1.14: sa tu dirgha-kôla-nairantarya-sattkára-sevito drśha-bhûmi ' This (effort), however, is consolidated (lit. ' possesses solid ground '), when it is well attended to for a long time and without interruption'.

136 Cf. V on śūtra 1.12. In the corresponding quotation in India, (R, p. 172, n. 1 = Hyd., 60 = Sachau, I, 79) this word is corrupted into التعلم (Sachau: 'renunciation', 'via omissionis').

137 a term referring to a way of life characterized by abstinence as practised by the Sûfis. Cf. vairāgya 'detachment, passionlessness, renunciation' in śūtra 1.15: drśfânsaravika-visaya-vîtrâyasya vâśikâra-samjñâ vairâgyam 'Detachment is the consciousness of (self-) control on the part of one who is no longer thirsting for objects that are perceivable or promised by scriptures (lit. ' heard ')'.

138 a regular Sûfi term denoting non-discursive intuitive knowledge of the mystic.

139 The translation follows Ritter's reading here, اسوم. He, however, states that he is not sure of this reading. An alternative reading may be suggested: أستر 'free from'. Cf. Vâc, on śūtra 1.16: 'For nothing alive is ever free from connexion with bondage to birth and death' (Woods, 39).

140 i.e. the three gunas. Cf. śūtra 1.16: tat-param puruṣa-khyāter guṇa-vairâgyam 'The no-longer-thirsting for the guṇas that results from the knowledge of the self is superior to that detachment'.

142 Lit. 'on one side'.

143 Lit. 'on the other side'.

144 Replace original مطَرَق for Ritter's emendation مطَرَق. Cf. R, 181 (ll. 7-8).
of governance and maintenance. That person transcends (these forces) by slipping away from (all) three of them.

Q 7. How many kinds of conception are there? One or more than that?
Ans. There are two kinds. One of them is a conception of material (things) perceived by the senses. The second is the conception of the intelligibilia, which are devoid of matter.

Q 8. Which of the two kinds belongs to those who are spiritual and god-like?
Ans. Because they are of simple species, not having gross (or corporeal) bodies. The other kind is of greater value and price than is to be found among men.

Q 9. And what is the position of angels with regard to the two kinds?
Ans. It is like the position of the spiritual ones in confining themselves to the other kind, being free of anxiety as to being bereft of this (state), whereas the other spiritual ones do not enter upon it with the same integrity and freedom from thoughts about consequences.

Q 10. Is there or is there not a difference of rank in this state among the angels?

145 cf. India, Hyd., 30-1: L... ..,j..,j,...,.J...,. &... ,j.3 7,LW ,?J1. . ,.JL, W, . 7!.,...,.J...,. ... three powers... which are called sattva, rajas, and tamas... The first power is rest and goodness, and hence come existing and growing. The second is exertion and fatigue, and hence come firmness and duration. The third is languor and irresolution, and hence come ruin and perishing (Sachau, I, 40-1). For the equation of the three guṇas (qualities, constituents of Nature) with the three aspects or forms conceived in the doctrine of the trimūrti, the Hindu trinity, cf. e.g. Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava, 2.4: namas trimūrtaye tubhyam pṛāk srīteh kevalātmame/guna-traya-vibhāgāya pācād bhedam upesyaḥ 'Salutations to you, O Trinity, one before creation, afterwards divided for the sake of the division of the three qualities'. Also cf. W. Kirfel, Symbolik des Hinduismus und des Jjinismus, Stuttgart, 1959, 44; J. Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens, ii, Stuttgart, 1963, 65.

146 cf. sūtra 1.17-18: vitaruka-vicārāndāsmitā-rūpānugamā samprajñātāḥ 'The self becomes fully aware of objects by assuming the form of deliberation, reflection, joy, and egoism'; virāma-pratijñābhāya-pāravakā samśādā-īcchā 'By constantly dwelling on cessation until only the residual impressions remain in awareness, the self attains a different state'.

147 nsū'τάσος.

148 مقتل.

149...J.1 probably meaning here 'incorporeal'.

150 The answer to this question and a further question answered by the following appear to be lacking.

151 al-bisṭ probably meaning here 'incorporeal'.

152 cf. sūtra 1.19: bhava-pratyayo vidēha-prakīrti-layaṇām 'Those who experience the absorption-into-prakīrti characteristic of "vidēhas" (lit. 'the bodiless') attain the self which is aware of existence'.

153 al-akhir may alternatively be read as 'the last'.

154 al-furr may refer to one kind of concentration, or alternatively to a kind of men or spiritual beings.

155 cf. sūtra 1.20: śraddhā-virya-śmṛti-samādhī-prajñā-pārvaka īśaraṃ 'Others attain this only after (developing) faith, energy (i.e. firmness of will), mindfulness, concentration, and insight'.

156 See p. 307, n. 37 above.

157 al-akhir may alternatively be read as 'the latter'.

158 Lit. 'purity'.

159 cf. vidēga in sūtra 1.22 (next footnote).
Ans. There is certainly a difference of rank;\(^{160}\) (for) this is a characteristic of all groups, both spiritual and corporeal. Were this (difference in rank ever) lacking in them (one could not explain) why the emancipation of some of them is (relatively) speedier,\(^{161}\) while that of others is slower. There is no reason for the speediness except the persistence in a devoted \(^{162}\) activity, just as there is no reason for the slowness except remissness in this activity. Consequently there are degrees among them, and so a difference in rank results.

Q 11. Is there a way to liberation other than the two ways, namely habituation and asceticism?

Ans. (Liberation) may be attained by devotion.\(^{163}\) This is constituted by withdrawal \(^{164}\) from the body and (directing oneself) towards knowledge, certainty, and sincerity in the heart, and towards praise, exaltation, and laudation with the tongue, and action with the limbs.\(^{165}\) God alone and nothing else is aimed at in all these, so that succour should come from Him with a view to achieving eternal bliss.

Q 12. Who is this object of devotion who gives succour?\(^ {166}\)

Ans. He is God, who because of His pre-eternity and unity dispenses with action, which is required either by peace, for which one hopes and longs for, or by distress, of which one is afraid and which one endeavours to avoid,\(^ {167}\) and who is (withdrawn) from thoughts, for He transcends the repugnant contraries and that which being alike is beloved.\(^ {168}\) He knows eternally with His own essence.\(^ {169}\) For knowledge which supervenes (at a certain moment) has as its object that which (previously) was not known. Ignorance, however, cannot befall Him at any time or in any state.

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\(^{160}\) cf. sūtra 1.22 : mrdu-madhyaśīhīmatratvat tato 'pi viśeṣah. (This sūtra appears to be an interpolation reading tatrāpi, subsequently assimilated to sūtra 1.23 by reading tato 'pi.) ' There are grades of propinquity, according as the fervour is weak, moderate, or excessive.'

\(^{161}\) cf. sūtra 1.21 : īśvara-sānyogānām āśānannah ' Those whose fervour is intense attain the self which is near the goal'.

\(^{162}\) ' devoted ', or alternatively ' conducive to emancipation '.

\(^{163}\) Cf. praniḥdāna in sūtra 1.23 : īśvara-praniḥdhanā vā ' Or (the self near the goal) is attained by devotion to the Īśvara '.

\(^{164}\) Amend 'Τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ' for 'Τοῦ'.

\(^{165}\) Cf. sūtra 1.21 : tivra-sānyogānām āśānannah ' Those whose fervour is intense attain the self which is near the goal'.

\(^{166}\) Cf. sanskrit term. Cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.23 : ' By devotion (that is) by a special kind of adoration either mental or verbal or bodily ' (Woods, 49).

\(^{167}\) Cf. sūtra 1.24 : klesa-karma-vipākāsayaś | aparāśvabhyut parīśa-vidhott īśvarah īśvara is the supreme state of the self, having no contact with the substrata of the fruition of works (karma) based on the afflictions (kleśas) '.

\(^{168}\) For the idea of this expression cf. the term devaśca ' pair of opposites ', e.g. sūtra 2.48 ; Bhagavadgītā 2.45, 7.27. Cf. Sachau, I, 263 (annotations). Also cf. V on sūtra 1.24 : tasyāśvavāṃ sāmyāśkṣaye-vinirmuktam ' His pre-eminence is altogether without anything equal to it or excelling it ' (Woods, 50).

\(^{169}\) cf. sūtra 1.25 : tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajña-bijam ' In that state there is the unexcelled germ of the omniscient.'
Q 13. Since the liberated one is described by these attributes, what is the
difference between him and God, the Exalted One? 170 (R, 174)

Ans. The difference between them consists in the fact that the liberated one
is as described above in the present and the future time, but not in the past
which precedes his liberation. He is therefore like a deficient . . . ,171 as he does
not possess in the state which he has achieved the past time which has elapsed.
For his liberation does not (belong) to pre-eternity.172 God the Sublime, on
the other hand, possesses the attributes described above in the three parts of time
which are conceived by us, namely the past, the present and the future.173 For
He in His essence transcends time and its periods from pre-eternity to eternity
in the future.174

Q 14. Does He have other attributes than those you mentioned? 175

Ans. He has perfect sublimity in worth, not in place, because He transcends
location. He is the absolute perfect good desired by every existent,176 and He is
knowledge which is free from the pollution of heedlessness and ignorance.177

Q 15. Do you or do you not attribute to Him speech?

Ans. Since He knows He must indubitably speak.178

Q 16. If he speaks because of His knowledge, what then is the difference
between Him and Kapila179 the knower and the other persons of knowledge who
spoke because of what they knew? 180

170 This question and the answer to it bear a resemblance to V on sūtra 1.24. Cf. also V on
sūtra 1.26.
171 The word is blurred in the MS.
172 Cf. India (quoted by R, p. 174, n. 1).
173 ‘ Future ’ is designated by two words: مستانف and آت.
174 Cf. kālenānavacchedāt in sūtra 1.26: sa pūrveśam api guruh kālenānavacchedāt ‘ He is also the
teacher of the ancients, for He is not limited by time ’.
175 For questions 14–18 and the answers to them cf. India, Hyd., 20 et seq. (= Sachau, I,
28 et seq.), referred to by R, p. 174, n. 4 et seq.).
176 Al-Birūnī uses here expressions deriving from Greek philosophical texts translated into
Arabic.
177 Cf. sūtra 1.25.
178 Cf. sūtra 1.27: tasya vācakaḥ pranavaḥ ‘ The word expressing Him is the sacred syllable
“ Om ” ’. Al-Birūnī may have understood vācaka here as referring to speech as an attribute of
God (tasya) and not to the sacred syllable ‘ Om ’ (pranava in the sūtra) as expressive of God.
In his translation al-Birūnī omits any reference to this sacred syllable.
179 The word Kīl occurring in the MS, which Ritter has replaced by الحكيم, was pretty
certainly an Arabic transcription of the Sanskrit name Kapila. Al-Birūnī probably transcribed it
Kīl or alternatively he might have used the Persian character for ‘ p ’, in which case the
transcription was Kīl. Cf. India, Hyd., 102. Also cf. India, Hyd., 54. Kīl الحكيم فانه ولد مع. Kīl
المرأة والحكمة ‘ the sage Kapila, for he was born knowing and wise ’ (Sachau, 1, 72). According
to Vāc, under sūtra 1.25 the earlier commentator Paścaśūkha described Kapila as ‘ the first
knower ’. Kapila is the well-known name of a celebrated ancient sage. Cf. R. Garbe, Die Sāmkhya-
Philosophie, 24 et seq.
180 Cf. India, Hyd., 71: रैस are the sages who, though they are only human beings, excel the angels on account of their knowledge. Therefore the angels learn from them,
and above them there is none but Brahman ’ (Sachau, 1, 93).
Ans. It is time which differentiates them. For the above-mentioned (persons) learned to know and spoke after (a time) in which they did not know nor speak; and through speech they transmitted to others what they knew. Consequently their speech and teaching are within a (certain) time. As, however, divine things have no connexion with time, God, may He be praised, knows and speaks in pre-eternity. It is He who addressed in various ways Brahmā and other primal (sages). To some of them God sent down a book, to others He opened a gate for intermediation (with respect to Him). Again to others He made a prophetic revelation so that they grasped in thought that which He bestowed upon them. (R, 175)

Q 17. Whence does He have this knowledge?
Ans. His knowledge remains in the same state throughout eternity. Inasmuch as He is never ignorant, His essence is full of knowledge and does not (need to) acquire knowledge which He did not have. According to what He says in the Veda which He revealed to Brahmā: ‘Praise and eulogize Him who spoke the Veda and was before the Veda’.183

Q 18. How can one worship Him who cannot be perceived by the senses?
Ans. His appellation establishes His existence. For only an (existent) thing is given a predicate; and a name is given only to a nameable (object).184 Though He is inaccessible to the senses, so that they do not grasp Him, the soul cognizes Him and thought conceives His attributes. This is the pure manner of worshipping Him. And as a result of constancy and diligence in this manner of worship some realization is achieved through the above-mentioned habituation, and hindrances are quelled (which prevent) the soul from being compressed and from compressing (its) faculties so as to prevent their spreading out and their attachment to what is not real.188

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181 cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.26. أؤئل is a translation of pūrveśām occurring in sūtra 1.26. The difference between Īśvara and Brahma is mentioned in Vāc. under sūtra 1.26. The way the Arabic version defines the difference between God and the ancient sages derives from sūtra 1.26, the commentaries on it, and probably also from the commentaries on sūtra 1.25.

182 es is probably a misreading of غبر which occurs in a parallel passage in India (R, p. 174, n. 9). The misreading may be due to the influence of the last part of the preceding name يأهmom.

183 cf. V on sūtra 1.24 and Vāc. under sūtras 1.24–5 with regard to Īśvara as the author of the Veda. With regard to Īśvara as the knower cf. Vāc. under sūtra 1.24 and sūtra 1.25 itself. Cf. India, Hyd., 21 (= Sachau, i, 29).

184 cf. sūtra 1.27. Also cf. V and Vāc. on the same sūtra with regard to a name as proof for the existence of the object named.

185 Lit. ‘ absent ’.

186 According to a parallel quotation in India (R, p. 175, n. 3): ‘felicity is achieved ’.

187 cf. R, 171 (l. 18 and 19). With regard to verbal and mental habituation cf. sūtra 1.28: taj-japas tat-artha-bhāvanam ‘Utterance of it serves to reveal its meaning ’.

188 مأهطم In Sufi terminology أله means God. With regard to ‘contraction’ and ‘obstacles’ here cf. sūtra 1.29: tataḥ pratyak-cetanādhiyamu ‘py antarāyabhāvam ca ‘From that comes knowledge of the intellect within and removal of obstacles’. Contraction seems to be the antithesis of vikṣepa ‘projection’ mentioned in sūtra 1.30.
Q 19. What are the hindrances which prevent the soul from attaining its own self? 189

Ans. The hindrances which (keep) the soul (away) from its proper pure activity are blameworthy moral qualities, which it acquires because of negligence 190 with regard to that which is obligatory, of sloth 191 in action, of procrastination, 192 of doubt 193 with regard to truth, of impotence 194 due to ignorance and of the opinion which (sees) the obligatory as not obligatory. 195

Q 20. The soul acquires blame because of these hindrances. Are there other hindrances which are not blameworthy?

Ans. (The soul) 196 is distracted 197 by preoccupation in the following six manners: its preoccupation with impulses which come to it without any intention on its part; its preoccupation with created beings 198 whose reincarnation 199 it expects; its preoccupation with disappointment in and despair with regard to its quest; 200 its preoccupation with change in the body 201 which is its chariot 202 . . . to it, or its occurrence is in it or in its actions. 203

Q 21. What is the way towards quelling and warding off 204 of the above? (R, 176)

Ans. The setting apart of one's thought towards God, the Exalted and Sublime One, (alone) to the point of not being aware of anything else that might distract him. 205

189 The expression 'attaining its own self' is close in meaning to the expression svarūpa-dāśānam apy āsya bhavati 'he gains insight into his own nature' in V on sūtra 1.29.

190 cf. prāmāṇa in sūtra 1.30: vyādhi-styaṇa-saṁśaya-prāmāṇāsyāvām-theobrückt-deutung-daršāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśāndarśā
Q 22. Is there a thing that ought to be wished for together with the thought which has been described?

Ans. He ought to wish and desire the welfare of all creatures without exception, rejoice in its being achieved by them, have compassion on the unfortunate and the afflicted, shrink from the works of the wicked and the evil. And he should (obtain) awakening for his soul so that his breath will not go away and be lost in the two states of (namely) its retention and expulsion.

Q 23. What is his state when he achieves this stage before liberation?

Ans. (At this stage) his psychic power overcomes his body, the bodily obstacles have been abolished and he is in control of his own self. If he wishes he makes it as small and subtile as a grain of dust, and if he wishes he makes it as big and extensive as the air. It is like to a crystal in which its surroundings are seen, so that the things are in it, whereas it is external to them. In the same way he contains that which encompasses him, so that when

For this answer cf. India (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3).

Here corresponds to maitri in sūtra 1.33: By cultivation of affection for the pleasant, compassion for the unpleasant, delight at good, indifference to evil, calm of the mind is attained.

Here corresponds to karuṇā in sūtra 1.33; and to duḥkhitā in V ad loc.

Here corresponds to muditā in sūtra 1.33; and to puṇyātmakēṣu in V ad loc.

Here corresponds to upekṣā in sūtra 1.33; and to apuṇyātmakēṣu in V ad loc.

This possibly corresponds to citta-prasādam in sūtra 1.33.

If Ritter’s suggestion is correct, a ष should probably be added: व्रित्तप्रकटः.

Al-Bīrūnī seems to have run the two sūtras 1.33 and 1.34 together. The word नेश्च्स corresponds to pṛāna in sūtra 1.34: His control extends from the smallest atom to the greatest magnitude.

For the present sentence and the following one cf. sūtra 1.41: kṣaṇa-vṛttar abhijātasyena maner grahīt-prahāna-grāhyāṇa tathā-tad-aśjjanati samāpattih 'Samāpatti is the presence in all (small and large) and the encompassing of all (large and small) on the part of the mind which has abandoned the functions of knower, knowing, and known, as a good gem shines on all and bears the image of all'.

The word विश्वरे corresponds to abhijāto maṇīḥ in the sūtra and to sphaṭika in V ad loc. (where the whole illustration is used in a somewhat different way).

The Arabic āḥāṭ b may also mean: 'that which he comprehends'. Cf. R, 170 (l. 19), 177 (l. 2).
union 221 between (the act of) knowing and the known 222 (is achieved) in him—
he being the knower—intellecction, he who intellects, and that which is intellected
become in him one thing.225 (R, 177) And withal he (subsists) within four 224
degrees whose glory and splendor 225 differ. The first is the lowest; it (consists in)
the apprehension of the three above-mentioned (i.e. the act of knowing, the
known, and the knower) qua names,226 attributes,227 and details which do not
constitute 228 definitions.229 When he transcends it, (reaching) definitions which
turn the particulars of things into universals,230 he achieves a second degree.231
He does not, however, cease in this (state) from (engaging in) details of (his)
knowledge of things. Then, when (engaging in) details is abandoned in his

221 The word علیا may correspond to samāpatti 'fusion' in sūtra 1.41.
222 'Known' is here in the plural in Arabic.
223 The terms العلیا and the العام, المقول، معقل، and grahā, grahyā, and grahitr (sūtra 1.41). The formula affirming the identity
in one subject of the second triad of Arabic terms is often used by the
Aristotelian philosophers, being applied to God.
224 cf. V on sūtra 1.46: sa caturdhopasahkhya-samādhī hiti 'Thus concentration has been
described according to its four subdivisions'. This refers to the kinds of concentration discussed
in sūtras 1.42-4. For what follows cf. India, Hyd., 53 (quoted by R, 176, n. 3) = Sachau, i,
69-70: 'The Hindus say: "If a man has the faculty to perform these things, he can dispense
with them, and will reach the goal by degrees, passing through several stages. (1) The knowledge
of things as to their names and qualities and distinctions, which, however, does not yet afford
the knowledge of definitions. (2) Such a knowledge of things as proceeds as far as the definitions
by which particulars are classed under the category of universals, but regarding which a man
must still practise distinction. (3) This distinction (viveka) disappears, and man comprehends
things at once as a whole, but within time. (4) This kind of knowledge is raised above time, and
he who has it can dispense with names and epithets, which are only instruments of human
imperfection. In this stage the intellectus and the intelligens unite with the intellectum, so as to
be one and the same thing:")'. This is what Patañjali says about the knowledge which liberates
the soul'. Also cf. India, Hyd., 51-2 (= Sachau, i, 68).
225 The reading of أحسام seems to be doubtful.
226 In the Arabic: اسم 'name' in the singular.
227 معنى 'attribute' in the singular.
228 Lit. 'give'.
229 This has a slight correspondence to sūtra 1.42: tatra śabdārtha-jñāna-vikalpaḥ sanskritā
savitrākā samāpattiḥ 'Of these (i.e. within the category of samāpatti) savitarka (the determinate)-
samāpatti is associated with concepts arising from the cognition of the meanings of words'
(tatra is absent in some versions). For اسم cf. śabda in the sūtra. However, al-Birūnī seems
to introduce here conceptions deriving from the epistemology of the Aristotelians. This also seems
to be the case in what follows.
230 cf. sūtra 1.49: śruṭānumāna-prajājāhyām sāmāṇya-vipāyā víśeṣārthatvāt. Wood's
translation here is apparently based on the probably incorrect reading anya (cf. Deussen, op. cit.,
518) instead of sāmāṇya 'universal': 'has an object other than the insight resulting from things
heard or from inferences inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular' (Woods, 94). Both
तत्त्वावशेष, 'details' and जरीयताः 'particulars' correspond semantically to víśeṣārtha here, whereas
' universals' corresponds to sāmāṇya. Al-Birūnī may have misconstrued the sūtra or the
commentary on it.
231 This differs from the second kind in Patañjali's sūtra 1.43: smṛti-parisuddhau svarūpā-
śākyāvārthamātra-nirbhāsā nirāvārtha-kā 'The nirāvārtha (non-determinate samāpatti) appears
to consist of the object alone, as if it had relinquished its own nature, when memory is purified (i.e.
done away with; or: 'when mindfulness is perfected')'.

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knowledge, and when he apprehends things as unified 232 and actualized according to time, he reaches the third degree. In this (stage), when existence is separated in his (mind) from time and ... 233 his knowledge of particulars and universals; then not (even) that which is as subtile 234 as an atom 235 is hidden from him. 236 He is superior to one who receives information 237 about a thing with regard to which something is hidden from him, so that the defect of a person who hears about (the thing) is not removed 238 by the (act of) hearing. 239 He can do without designating by names and attributes, 240 these being instruments of necessity and need. Thus he has reached the ultimate (stage) in the noble fourth degree, and deserves to be called truthful. 241

Here ends the first section, (dealing with) making the heart steadfastly fixed, 242 of Patañjali's book.

232 For 'when he apprehends things unified' cf. V on sūtra 1.43: eka-buddh-ypakramab 'the formation of a single mental-act' (Woods, 82).
233 Ritter indicates a lacuna here.
234 cf. sūtra 1.44: etayaiva savicārā nirvicārā ca sūkṣma-visayā vyākhyaṭā 'By this has been explained the savicārā and the nirvicārā samāpatti which has subtile objects'. (This translation is corroborated by V on sūtra 1.46. An alternative translation might be: 'By this has been explained the savicārā samāpatti; whereas the nirvicārā samāpatti may be explained as having subtile objects'.) Cf. also sūtra 1.45: sūkṣma-visayatevaṃ cālinga-paryavasānam 'These subtile objects include the uncharacterized'.
235 हृदय sometimes serves as a term designating 'atom'; cf. p. 312, n. 80. This, however, is not the case in Kalām terminology.
236 cf. Bhōja on sūtra 1.49: asyāṃ hi prajñāyāṃ sūkṣma-vyavahita-vipraṣṭhaṇām api visesāḥ spṛṣṭenaiva rūpeṇa bhāṣate 'When this (yogic) knowledge (has been attained), then (any) particular, even if it be subtile, hidden, or distant, becomes distinctly manifest'.
237 अत्यंत may alternatively be rendered by 'one who gives information'.
238 Lit. 'cured'.
239 For सत्रय, sūtra 1.49. The translation proposed in the Arabic text may require here the emendation of the second sā tu in R, 177 (l. 7) into ṣ. This statement appears to refer to a discussion similar to that of V on sūtra 1.49. Here السحَّر 'one who receives information' may refer to ṣāma of V on sūtra 1.49, and خِن 'is hidden' may refer to vyavahita 'placed apart, hidden'.
240 For ḍhōja, cf. sāda in V on sūtra 1.49.
241 The Arabic word مسائيق is often used as a designation of persons venerated on religious grounds. Thus it is applied to Muhammad's friend and father-in-law, Abū Bakr, who was the first Caliph. The description of the last state by the word 'truthful' corresponds to that of sūtra 1.48: ratyabharā tatra prajñā 'In this (calm) the insight is truth-bearing' (Woods, 94). Cf. India, Hyd., 57 (l. 12): 'En قمَرَ قُصْرُ رَتْبُهُ عَن رَتْبِ الصَّلَافِيَنَّ' (Sachau, 1, 76). Sūtras 1.49, 47, 60, 51 are not reflected in the Arabic text.
242 Lit. 'fixed in one place'. For إِلَّا وَأَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ أَلْقَبَهُ A ṣā tu in R, 183 (l. 21), corresponding to sūtra 3.2.
The following study contains a translation of al-Bīrūnī’s rendering into Arabic of the second chapter of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra cum commentary. (On this point see our translation of al-Bīrūnī’s rendering of the first chapter of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra.)¹ This translation is based on Ritter’s edition of the Arabic text.² Comparison has been made with the unique MS of Ritter’s text: Köprüülü, 1589, folios 412a–419a (written on the margins).³ We have also compared the text with parallel passages and expressions in al-Bīrūnī’s India.⁴ In some cases the passages in India are identical, while in others they show differences. Sometimes these differences are merely stylistic.⁵ In other cases there is a doctrinal divergence.⁶

Furthermore, an attempt has been made here to indicate the parallels between the Arabic version on the one hand, and the Sanskrit text of the Yogasūtra,⁷ as well as its extant commentaries,⁸ on the other.

The following is a list of those sūtras of the second chapter correspondence to which may be found al-Bīrūnī’s text: 1–18, 19 (†), 20–31, 33–40, 42–49, 52–55.

The following sūtras of the chapter under consideration do not seem to have been translated or to be reflected in al-Bīrūnī’s text: 32, 41, 50, 51. On the face of it, it is likely that these sūtras did not occur in the text available to al-Bīrūnī.

Some observations on al-Bīrūnī’s rendering of various terms and passages of the second chapter may be found in the introduction to our translation of the first chapter.

Chapter 2

(R, 177, l. 12) Question 24. What is the way to the degree which is sought for one who, lagging behind,⁹ has not yet reached it ?¹⁰ And how does one return to who has fallen from it through a fault which he (committed) with respect to it ?¹¹

Answer. If the heart of him who committed a fault were not gone in wretchedness,¹² he would not have declined from (the degree of) happiness ¹³ which he had achieved. As for the way of attaining it, in the case of the striving (aspirant), and the way of return to it, in the case of the one who forfeited it, it consists in the steadfast performance of acts of worship and in tiring the body, i.e. fasting, prayer, chants of praise and recitations ¹⁴ whereby reward and recompense are attained, and all that is directed towards the essence of God, may He be exalted, and by means of which one may come near Him.¹⁵

Q 25. What ¹⁶ results for man from (his) exertions, asceticism, and self-mortification ?

Ans. The result (consists in) his soul turning away from rebellion and (in) the quietude and tranquillity of his heart on account of the lightening of his afflictions.¹⁷

Q 26. What are these afflictions which burden ¹⁸ the heart ?
Ans. They are ignorance, (wrong) opinion, desire, hatred, and the attachments. The greatest of these is ignorance, which serves for them as a root and basis. Through them, or through most of them, man’s destruction comes about. Creatures have erred a long time because of them and have perished through them. In a self-mortifying ascetic, however, they subsist potentially and do not actively manifest themselves, just as seeds placed in a granary do not germinate, although the capacity for germination is latent in them; and as a frog stunned by a blow, when not in water, does not revive upon the (dry) land, though it be alive. For asceticism and self-mortification have weakened these (afflictions), so that they have been enfeebled, have withered and have come to the verge of being reduced to nothing. On the other hand, in the case of one who does not yet practise asceticism they are vigorous, strong and manifest. If he quells and attenuates one of these (afflictions), its place is occupied in force by another one whose evil has increased. Accordingly he does not gain anything by the removal of (one particular affliction).

Q 27. What is the meaning of these forces which afflict the heart and corrupt man? (R, 178)

Ans. Ignorance consists in representing a thing in a way contrary to its true reality. Thus (an ignorant person) regards the impure as pure, pleasure as good, distress as well-being, the earthy turbid body as eternal and as being man himself; he is ignorant of the fact that (man) is the soul rather than the body.

(Wrong) opinion is the confusion of things so that one does not differentiate between them and, because of the resemblance, imagines them to be one and the same thing. Thus one may have the (wrong) opinion that the corporeal subject which intellects and an abstract intellect are, with respect to existence, one and the same thing; (or) one may not distinguish between the light of sight and the light of the sun or that of a lamp, and may regard the two lights as identical.

Desire (consists in) coveting the goods of this world and the turning of one’s attention towards the pleasures of the senses like roses, sandalwood of Andhra (?), and the chewing of the betel leaves after meals for the sake of savour and (the arousing of) lust.

Hatred occurs whenever distress and pain are inflicted upon the body, or grief and anxiety upon the soul. This leads to aversion and to the manifestation of a hostile attitude towards them (bringing about) their subjugation with a view to cutting off the ties with them.

The attachments are accessories and additions to volitions and other (things). For instance in the case of lusting after women (R, 179): one cannot gain access to them except through accessories which help (in obtaining) success. Such (accessories) are presents (offered) when meeting them, constantly cleansing and perfuming oneself on account of their nearness, (trying to) make them bolder by playful (ways) and other (things) by means of which prestige is acquired in their (eyes) and love is won. (Another) example which (belongs) to the accessories of repugnant things is the (thought) of future death when reflection is applied to the various kinds of the causes (of death). When vigorous and dominant, all this hinders the heart from making an effort (to do) what is obligatory and find rest from the affliction. If, however, (the afflictions) have been enfeebled by means of the asceticism, the self-mortification and the abstinence referred to above, they become like unto roasted seeds which (cannot) be made to germinate through being sown in
the ground, and like unto stewed frogs which cannot be revived through being plunged into a water tank.\textsuperscript{64} Their corrupt and corrupting activity is (thus) annulled, so that it does not emerge into being. Thereupon they disintegrate like the simple (components) of the body when these return to their \textsuperscript{55} wholes.\textsuperscript{56}

Q. 28. What is the reason \textsuperscript{57} for effecting in these five burdensome \textsuperscript{58} forces the enfeeblement, the separation, and the removal referred to above?

Ans. The desire for liberation. For when (the forces) encompass and inundate the soul, it \textsuperscript{59} cannot but acquire \ldots \textsuperscript{60} Among them requital through recompense and \textsuperscript{61} compensation. Although in the other (world) these are imagined, in this world they are perceived by the senses and known.\textsuperscript{62} For instance Nandikesvara.\textsuperscript{63} When he offered many sacrifices to Mahâdeva, the greatest of the angels,\textsuperscript{64} he merited paradise and was transported to it in his corporeal form and became an angel. (Another) instance (is) Indra, chief of the angels. When he fornicated with the wife of the brâhmaṇa Nahuṣa,\textsuperscript{65} he fell under a curse and was transformed into a snake after having been an angel. While the soul is exposed to acquiring compensation, it will be necessarily entangled and will not \textsuperscript{66} find liberation from its bonds despite its being pre-occupied with it.

Q 29. Has entanglement a cause other than this, and in what way will you find compensation with regard to it?

Ans. Ignorance is in true reality the hindrance (preventing) liberation. The other (afflictions) that come after it,\textsuperscript{67} although they are factors (bringing about) bondage, go back to ignorance. The latter is their source and place of origin. Entanglement has no cause (R, 180) other than it. The soul vis-à-vis these factors \textsuperscript{68} may be compared to a grain of rice within its husk.\textsuperscript{69} As long as (the grain) has the husk with it, it has the disposition (required) for sprouting and for ripening, and it alternates between its being generated and generating.\textsuperscript{70} When, however, the husk is removed from it, these occurrences cease. It is purified (and thus becomes fit) for permanent existence in a (changeless) state.\textsuperscript{71} As for requital, it exists in the (different) kinds of beings in view of the fact that the soul \textsuperscript{72} repeatedly passes (through various changes) with respect to the length or shortness of the span of life and to abundance of or deficiency in well-being.\textsuperscript{73}

Q. 30. What is the state of the soul \textsuperscript{74} when it comes (to subsist) between rewards and the (consequences of) sins and thereupon is entangled in the trap \textsuperscript{75} of births for the purpose of (receiving) benefit or punishment?

Ans. It alternates according to what it has opted for and obtained, between comfort and discomfort, and oscillates between pain and pleasure.\textsuperscript{76}

Q 31. Are, then, all entangled \textsuperscript{77} souls equal in this matter or do their states differ?

Ans. Discomfort and pain only are the lot of the cognizant \textsuperscript{78} soul, since the comfort of this world is the discomfort of the hereafter.\textsuperscript{79} For in truth (comfort) can scarcely be obtained except through sinning in some respect.\textsuperscript{80} And also for the reason that the man endowed with knowledge grasps the essence \textsuperscript{81} of good and evil, and therefore comfort (obtained) by way of requital is transformed, as far as he is concerned, into discomfort.\textsuperscript{82}

Q 32. What ought he to do at this point?

Ans. (He ought) to turn away from that which generates entanglement and engenders (a specific) station \textsuperscript{83} (in existence).\textsuperscript{84}

Q 33. And what are they? \textsuperscript{85}

Ans. If the knower is not separated from the known (objects) he is with them, and consequently, because of this conjunction between him and them,
he is not liberated.\textsuperscript{96} For in truth this conjunction only exists because of a certain ignorance.\textsuperscript{97} But for the latter he would have been separated from the known (objects).\textsuperscript{88}

Q 34. How is this? (R, 181)

Ans. The intention with regard to each known (object) seen (by the knower) is the cognition of its elements\textsuperscript{89} (namely, the knowledge) to which of the five (elements) it (belongs). (By 'the five elements') I mean earth, water, fire, wind, and sky.\textsuperscript{98} (A further purpose is) the cognition (of the known object) with regard to its \textit{quale}\textsuperscript{91}; (i.e.) does it (belong to) the class of pure good or to the class of pure evil or to a class which is a mixture of the two?\textsuperscript{92} This cognition comes about through the intermediary of the senses.\textsuperscript{93} Now, the senses\textsuperscript{94} are untruthful on account of errors\textsuperscript{95} occurring in them. That, however, which has no truth in it is not known with certitude. And that which has become voided of certitude must have been overtaken by ignorance.

Q 35. How (can) the class of a known (object) be discerned?

Ans. If it is knowledge it (belongs to) the class of pure good; if it is activity it (belongs to) the intermediary mixed class; if it is persistence it (belongs to) pure evil.\textsuperscript{96}

Q 36. What is the cause which necessitates the conjunction between the knower and the known?

Ans. The knower, without the known, is in his essence\textsuperscript{97} a knower \textit{in potentia}; he is actualized only through the known.\textsuperscript{98} And it is for the sake of (the knower) that the known is known.\textsuperscript{99} For this (reason) the conjunction between the two is necessary.\textsuperscript{100}

Q 37. If it is through the known that the knower is a knower, how\textsuperscript{101} then will he (subsist) in the abode of liberation, since there is no known (object) there?\textsuperscript{102}

Ans. The knower becomes a knower through the known only in the stage of entanglement, which is far from true cognition. In it knowledge is like unto a fantasy which is acquired by means of strategems and of effort. For in it the known is within the sphere of hiddenness and concealment. In the abode of liberation, on the other hand, the veils are removed, the coverings are lifted, and the impediments eliminated. In it the (knower’s) essence is cognizant\textsuperscript{103} only and nothing but that.\textsuperscript{104}

Q 38. How is separation which replaces the conjunction (in question) achieved?

Ans. As long as a thing which (belongs to) the known (objects) is unknown the desire to know it keeps increasing until it (becomes) known, whereupon this desire subsides.\textsuperscript{105} The \textit{sensibilia} which are objects of knowledge are not, however, true reality which is as fixed as the \textit{intelligibilia}.\textsuperscript{106} When this is established with certitude which is not subject to any doubt, the conjunction (in question) comes to an end;\textsuperscript{107} the knower is separated from the known (objects) and in consequence is isolated and disengaged.\textsuperscript{108} This is the meaning of liberation.\textsuperscript{109}

Q 39. What happens to the knower when he is isolated and disengaged? (R, 182)

Ans. Seven things happen to him, three of them in the soul, namely immunity from committing sins and the disclosure . . . this . . . the . . .\textsuperscript{110} and four in the body, namely (a) regarding pleasures as pains, and (b) (considering) that the stuff\textsuperscript{111} (of the feeling) of pleasure is ignorance, and (c) that the comprehension of that necessitates the knowledge of the contraries of their causes,\textsuperscript{112} and (d) that the result of this is the effective\textsuperscript{113} removal of these causes.\textsuperscript{114}
Q 40. Whereby are these seven things achieved?
Ans. By means of the qualities which render the knower pure and holy. 115
Q 41. What are they and how many are they?
Ans. These are eight qualities. 116 The first of them, speaking in general terms, is refraining from evil. 117 Speaking in detail, it is abstaining from harming any living being, 118 and avoidance of lying, 119 of robbery 120 and of fornication, 121 as well as keeping aloof from mingling with this world 122 without making abandonment of (all) this conditional upon (a specific) time rather than another or (a specific) place rather than another. 123 In these matters one should not restrict oneself to the avoidance of the deed (but should also) avoid giving orders concerning (the execution of the deed) as well as being pleased with the doer (thereof). 124 Though the species of evil are many in respect of their magnitude, their forms and the quality of the motives (to which they owe their impulsion), all of them pertain either to greed or to anger or to ignorance. 125 Furthermore, their forms 126 differ (for they present both) the extremes of excess and deficiency as well as the intermediate degrees. 127 If things are known by means of their opposites and of what is different from them, 128 and if, furthermore, it is known that whenever one kills, and thereby, through ignorance occasions pain and distress to the (person) killed, (the consequence which) is not hidden is that his retribution for this (act) is likewise composed, as was his act of ignorance and the infliction of pain; 129 then, this being so, he who avoids killing is recompensed by the opposites of those two (i.e. ignorance and infliction of pain). 130 Then nothing attacks him in order to harm him. 131 For why should anything attack him, since (any) two antagonists are equal in his view so that he sees them as one form and as (having) one and the same degree. He does not pronounce judgement in favour of the snake and against the mongoose or vice versa. 132 As for falsehood, how base it is in its essence! Whoever holds that veracity is good and prefers it is rewarded in paradise with the highest of the latter’s degrees. 133 Whoever preserves his soul from the devil of robbery and the villainy of theft is given the capacity to perceive with his eyes the treasures 134 which are on the surface of the earth and those which are in its womb. 135 Whoever does not defile it (his soul) with fornication is granted the capacity to be able (to perform) whatever marvellous actions he desires. 136 In this places and times shrink for him. 137 Whoever sets himself apart from this world (R, 183) and does not mingle with it sees his state in the past before he entered (his) present form, so that he knows how (the state) was and where he was. 138

The second quality is holiness, outward and inward. Whoever intends to purify and cleanse the body 139 magnifies (?) 140 hereby its impurity and consequently he regards it with disgust, loathes it, and turns away from it to the love of what is not impure; hence he prefers the soul to the body. 141 Whoever fasts (abstaining) from food refines his body, 142 cleanses his limbs, and sharpens 143 his senses. 144 Whoever is content and is not greedy relaxes from fatigue and is set free from servitude. 145 Whoever recites 146 many (formulae of) praise to the angels and the spiritual beings 147 makes his heart familiar with (the particular angel or spiritual being) among them whom he aims at by means of these (formulae), and the communion between the two 148 becomes manifest. 149 Whoever applies himself assiduously to glorifying and extolling God 150 (achieves this:) his heart turns away from whomever is not (God), and he 151 returns to Him and abides with Him in peace. 152

The third 153 quality is quietude. 154 For whoever aspires to (obtain) a thing seeks it, and seeking is motion, and with motion (stirred) by desire comes the
cessation of ease. Hence when he renounces all things singly and generally, and does not attach his attention to any one of them, he is truly at rest.\textsuperscript{155} He is rewarded by not being harmed by heat or cold, by not suffering pain from hunger and thirst, and by not feeling any need; accordingly he is at peace.\textsuperscript{156}

The fourth \textsuperscript{157} quality is the quieting of breath through inhaling and exhaling of air and suspension of the two (i.e. of inhaling and exhaling) so that one becomes like one sojourning in the depth of water (and) doing without air.\textsuperscript{158} Whoever realizes this (has the following:) his heart is divested of whatever turbidity it contained.\textsuperscript{159} It is therefore able to do whatever it wishes.\textsuperscript{160}

The fifth \textsuperscript{161} (quality) is the compression of the senses (which are held) to oneself\textsuperscript{162} (and prevented) from spreading out, so that one does not apprehend anything but (that which is) inside (oneself) and does not know that beyond the subject that apprehends there is anything else.\textsuperscript{163} Thereby one is able to subjugate and dominate (one's) senses.\textsuperscript{164}

Here ends the second section (dealing with) guidance \textsuperscript{165} towards the praxis which \textsuperscript{166} has been treated previously in the first section.

**APPENDIX**

I. Some rectifications of Ritter's printed text.

(1) R, p. 167, l. 9: the MS has كَتَابُ الْحَنْبَلِ وَالْمَجْمُونِ rather than كَتَابُ الْحَنْبَلِ والْمَجْمُونِ as Ritter's text has it. Accordingly the translation ought to be: '... books of arithmetic and astronomy' rather than 'books of arithemeticians and astronomers' (cf. our translation, *BSOAS*, art. cit., 309, ll. 13–14).

(2) R, p. 168, l. 1: the MS hasذلك and not ذلك ولذا. Cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 311, n. 76, where the MS has been proposed as an emendation.

(3) R, p. 168, l. 20: the MS has الزجر الموجب not the الزجر. The reading الزجر الموجب is proposed.

(4) R, p. 169, l. 6: the MS has الإسلام and not الإسلام. Accordingly the translation ought to be: '... (according to) the sciences'. Cf. R, p. 167, l. 11: فلِمَ بَيْنَ الْعَلَمِ وَالْإِيمَانِ.\textsuperscript{167}

(5) R, p. 169, l. 16: the MS has كَثِيرُ في المعاني rather than كَثِيرُ من المعاني as R has it.

(6) R, p. 170, l. 4: the MS appears to have كَتَابُ الْجَيْبِ والْمَجْمُونِ rather than كَتَابُ الْجَيْبِ والْمَجْمُونِ suggested by Ritter. Possibly the word should be read كَتَابُ الْجَيْبِ. Accordingly the translation would be: '... has severed the ties of desire'. Cf. R, p. 178, l. 16: وَأَيْنَ كَتَابُ الْجَيْبِ فِي الْحَرْثِ عَلَى النَّعْمَةِ النَّافِيَةِ.

(7) R, p. 171, l. 4 from bottom: Ritter reads مَرْتَين which he amends to زمْتَين (cf. *BSOAS*, art. cit., p. 316, l. 2 from bottom: 'two periods'). The reading مَرْتَين seems preferable in view of R, 183, last line, where the correct reading appears to be مَرْتَين (rendered by us as 'occasions') rather than Ritter's مَرْتَين.\textsuperscript{170} In the context مَرْتَين and زمْتَين have practically the same meaning.

(8) R, p. 173, l. 13: the MS has طَارِقُهُ بِأَيْدِيهِ rather than طَارِقُهُ بِبَالُهُ. Accordingly the translation would be: 'because of his primordial (character)'. Cf. a parallel passage in *India*, Hyd., 20 (Sachau (tr.), 1, 27) where one MS has طَارِقُهُ بِبَالُهُ and the other طَارِقُهُ بِأَيْدِيهِ.

II. Some rectifications of our translation of the first section (*BSOAS*, art. cit., 302–25) with some additional references.

(1) art. cit., p. 312, l. 6: '... mixtures...—Arabic: أمْناَجَ. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 35, ll. 2–3: الْإِدَانَاتِ الْإِمْسَاحِيَةُ—translated by Sachau in a rather vague way: '... the... bodies, being from their nature compounds of different things...'. (Sachau (tr.), 1, p. 46, ll. 11–12).
(2) art. cit., p. 313, n. 92: For the reading ‘jungles’ here, rather than Ritter’s suggested ‘desert’, ‘waste lands’, cf. India, Hyd., p. 93, ll. 11–13, ‘... extending... in the latter text should be emended and accordingly the translation would be: ‘... anchorites... roaming in the jungles’ (rather than Sachau’s translation: ‘... anchorites... swim in the pools’; Sachau (tr.), 1, 121). Cf. the Sanskrit terms vānaprastha (derived from vana-prastha = ‘setting out for the forest’ in e.g. Nāgaji’s Vṛtti on YS 2.1), aranyājana ‘betaking oneself to (hermit life in) the forest’ (Chāndogypaṇiṣad 8.5.3), parivraj- ‘to wander (as a mendicant)’ (Bṛhadāranyaka-paṇiṣad 4.4.22). Also cf. Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra 4.2.41 (ed. W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928, 126): aranya-guḥā—pulinnādisu yogābhāṣā-sopadesah ‘The instruction is that yoga should be repeatedly practised in places such as forests, caves, and on river-banks’.

(3) R, p. 171, l. 2 from bottom: the MS has al-’amal wa-al-mu‘āmid. Ritter’s reading is the al-aman al-mu‘āmid. The reading as proposed in our article, p. 317, n. 134, is attributed to Ritter’s text. But comparison with R, 183, last two lines from bottom, shows that the two texts share a common reading. (Ritter’s reading is that the MS has retained, suggests the reading of the al-aman wa-al-mu‘āmid, in the reading of the al-aman al-mu‘āmid. The sentence should accordingly be rendered as follows: ‘But by means of continuous application, as a result of which division and multiplicity (lit. numbering) disappear, the faculty in question...’. The latter reading is retained, the translation would be: ‘... as a result of which affects and numbering disappear, the faculty in question...’.

(4) art. cit., p. 319, l. 2: after ‘rank’ close parentheses.

(5) art. cit., p. 321, l. 23: ‘... some realization is achieved through the above-mentioned habituation’. Replace by ‘the same realization is achieved as the one achieved by habituation’.

(6) art. cit., p. 342, l. 1: insert after ‘compression’ ‘within yourself’.

1 In BSOAS, xxxix, 2, 1966, 302–25. Incidentally, through misunderstanding the first introductory remarks in that study, a recent bibliographical work (Hajime Nakamura, Religions and philosophies of India: a survey with bibliographical notes, [Tr.] Hinduism, Tokyo, 1974, VII-217) confusion of the text of al-Biruni which is under consideration with a different work of his, the Risāla fi fihrist kutub Muhammad ibn Zakariya’ al-Razi. It may also be noted in passing that what has been listed as a Chinese version of a commentary on the Yogasūtra in another recent bibliographical work (K. Potter, Bibliography of Indian philosophies, Delhi, 1970, 528, No. 6326) turns out to be a text belonging to the Buddhist Yāgārā school (cf. review by T. Gelbmann in Asia Major, xix, 2, 1975, 276 f.).

2 H. Ritter, ‘Al-Biruni’s Übersetzung des Yoga-sūtra des Patañjali’, Oriens, ix, 2, 1956, 165–200 (henceforth abbreviated as R). The edition has been compared with the unique MS of the text.

3 We refer to the pagination known to Ritter. Since then the pagination of the MS has been changed: fols. 417a–42a instead of fols. 412a–419a.

4 Kūdū fi takhyīq màlî ‘t-Hind or al-Biruni’s India (Arabic text), Hyderabad, 1968 (henceforth abbreviated as India, Hyd.).

5 e.g. India, Hyd., 70, ll. 13–14: ‘... and Kircher, after the foreign commentators, understands the... to correspond to R, 170, ll. 14–15: ‘... Kircher’s reading...’.
has wishes tardy, edition corresponds U.L.L

Nagesa's ad (abbreviated. 12: loc. IV 10

For instance see the nine rules of virtuous conduct as given in India, Hyd., 56. These correspond in part to the description of the 'qualities' (हृदय), which refer to the astrological 'eight limbs, or stages' in Yogaśūtra, ch. 2, sūtra 29 et seq. (see R. 182-3).

* Alias Pātañjalaśūtrakṛtāni. Henceforth abbreviated as YS. References are made to the edition printed in P. Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, 1, 3, Leipzig, 1908, 511-43 (abbreviated as Deussen).

The following commentaries have been used.


Subcommentaries on I


(b) Vācspati Mīśra, Tattvavaiśākṛtā (c. A.D. 850). Edition: as in I(c). (Abbreviated as Vāc.)

Subcommentaries on I (b)


(d) Nāgadā Bhattachārya (= Nāgoji Bhattachārya), Bhāṣyaśūtrakṛtā (end of seventeenth century and first half of eighteenth century A.D. according to P. V. Kane and F. K. Gode). Edition: Jivanātha Mīśra (ed.), Pātañjalaśūtrakṛtā, Benares, 1907 (henceforth abbreviated as Bhāṣyaśūtrakṛtā).

(e) Nāgoji Bhattachārya (= Nāgadā Bhattachārya), Pātañjalaśūtrakṛtā-vṛtti. This is a separate commentary, patently different from the prec. though not unrelated to it. Edition: Dhumdhīrā Śāstri (ed.), Yogasūtra with six commentaries, KSS, 83, Benares, 1930 (henceforth referred to as Vṛtti). Edition: Dhumdhīrā Śāstri, Yogasūtra with six commentaries, KSS, 83, Benares, 1930.


Subcommentaries on II


IV Bhāvānganeśa, Pradīpikā (seventeenth or eighteenth century A.D. according to Dhumdhīrā Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

V Ananta, Yogacandrīkā (= Padacandrīkā) (nineteenth century A.D. according to Dhumdhīrā Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).

VI Saṅgītendraparasara, Yogasudhikara (twentieth century A.D. according to Dhumdhīrā Śāstri). Edition: in I(e).


IX Kṛṣṇavallabhāchārya, Bhāṣya (see II(a)). Edition: in II(a).

9 For the Arabic word میخین 'imālī here cf. the term manda 'slow-moving, tardy, sluggish' in Nāgāra's commentary on sūtra 2.1: yogādhikārās trividhā manda-madhyamottamāh kramavātiru-rukṣu-yuvājna-yogāśūtra-rāpāh 'Those appropriately engaged in yoga are of three kinds: the tardy, the middling, and the most excellent, namely the novice (or aspirant, lit: 'the one who wishes to climb'); the practiser (lit: 'the one applying himself'); and the adept (lit: 'the one who has mounted on', i.e. is in control of yoga) in successive stages'. Also cf. Baladeva ad loc.

10 There is some similarity between this question and the one formulated by Vyāsa in his
introduction to sūtra 2.1: katham evyāthā-citta ‘pi yogya-vaktab syid iti ‘How can even one whose mind is aroused be disciplined in yoga?’ Also cf. Bhoga’s commentary ad loc.

There is some similarity between this part of the question and Harinārandā’s Āranya’s gloss (in his subcommentary on Vāc. under sūtra 2.1) on the expression evyāthā-cittasya ‘Of the mind which has been aroused’: nirantarā-dhyānābhāsā-vairāgya-bhāvanāsanārthasya cetabah ‘Of a mind which is incapable of mentally cultivating meditation, repeated practice, and detachment without interruption’. The latter, however, does not necessarily imply the idea of relapse or backsliding, which is clearly expressed in the Arabic text.

Ritter’s emendation ठान्य has been adopted. The MS has वैसु has बा and not बा as Ritter’s text has it.

The term occurs in a similar context in India, Hyd., 21; tr. E. Sachau, Alberni’s India, London, 1910, reprinted Delhi, 1964, tr. 29 (henceforth referred to as Sachau (tr.)) in a passage parallel to one in the first chapter of al-Birūnī’s translation of the Yoga-sūtra (cf. R, p. 175, n. 3).

Lit.: ‘readings’. Cf. India, Hyd., 61: आत्मात्मानसि (Sachau (tr.), 80).

cf. sūtra 2.1: tapah-svādhyāyeyakaraṇa-prāṇidhānāni kriya-yogah ‘Yoga of ritual acts consists in asceticism, recitation of (formulae), and the directing of one’s mind to the ātara’. hundred and the ‘steadfast performance of acts of worship’: cf. kriya-yoga in the sūtra. Al-Birūnī appears to consider kriya-yoga as co-ordinate with the rest of the sūtra. Unlike all other translators, al-Birūnī correctly understands here kriya to mean ‘ritual act’ and not ‘activity’ in general. Cf. the use of the same term in sūtra 2.36 below: kriya-phalaya ‘the fruits of ritual acts’.

Also elsewhere. Cf. Bhagavadgītā 6.1: ‘kāryam karma karoti yaḥ na niraṅgir na ca kāryaḥ’ Also he who does action that is required (by religion) ... not he who builds no sacred fire and does no ritual acts’; and cf. ibid. 15.3: ārāyukṣer muney yogyam kāram kāraman ucayate ‘For the sake when he is a novice in Yoga the ritual act (karma) is called the means; for the same man when he is an adept quiescence is called the means’. Also cf. Saṅkara’s Brahma-sūtradāhāya 2.2.42, where a similar series of distinctly acts of worship is referred to as bringing about the dwindling away of one’s kleśas (cf. YS 2.2). As for the single occurrence of kriya in the YS in a different meaning, i.e. as ‘activity’ in the widest sense, in sūtra 2.18 (mābhikā-kriya-aśthi-śilam ... dṛṣṭayam), it is explicable as a reference to an old or common fossilized cliché. अनुसार ‘tiring the body’: cf. tapah, and its gloss as सार्वा-शःशः kāya-kās ‘emanating (or drying up) of the body’ (e.g. Baladeva, Rāmānandā ad loc., cf. Yājñavalkya’s pronouncement quoted in Madhava’s Sārvadārakasaṅgraha, ch. on the Pāṭalajāla-dārśana: ... सार्वा-शःशः prāṇaḥ tapasānam tapa uttamam ‘the drying up of the body is traditionally considered as the highest of all ascetic practices’ (Poona, 1951, p. 367). Elsewhere al-Birūnī seems to have rendered tapas by the अनुवाजत and the कृति, and the अनुवाजत and the कृति.


Also cf. ‘prayer, chants of praise and recitations’: cf. svādhyāya in the sūtra and Śv. ad loc.: svādhyāyaḥ prasāvadī-pavitrānmā yayo mokṣa-kāśāyānāmyam na vā The term svādhyāya stands either for repeated utterance of such purifying formulae as the syllable om, or for the study of doctrinal texts on liberation’ (cf. Saṅkara on Chāndogya upanisad 1.12.1). Gangānātha Jī’s translation of the term svādhyāya by ‘self-teaching’ (G. Jī, Yoga-darshana, Madras, 1934, 75) and J. W. Hauer’s by ‘eigenes Forschen in den heiligen Schriften’ (J. W. Hauer, Der Yoga, Stuttgart, 1958, 244) are over-restrictive and misleading. A. Daniélon’s rendering of the term by ‘self development’ (A. Daniélon, Yoga—the method of re-integration, London, 1949, 22) is even less justifiable. ‘Study’, i.e. ‘recite for the purpose of study’ is rather a specialized meaning of the Vedic term svādhyāya. Its derivation from the centre-meaning ‘individual recitation, rehearsing to oneself’ is plainly explicable given the cultural context of oral transmission (cf. the English ‘to read’ with its specialized meaning ‘to study’).

In the YS, however, the relevant meaning is ‘recitation’, especially if the statement in sūtra 2.1 is considered as applying the ancient Indo-Iranian triad of ‘deed, word, and thought’ (cf. Bhabu ad loc.). Thus tapas would represent bodily activity, svādhyāya—voice activity, and śvāra-praṇidhāna—mental activity, the triplet presenting a series of progressive interiorization. Cf. the parallel use of japa ‘repeated utterance’ in sūtra 1.28, and the relation of svādhyāya to इष्टदेवसामप्रयोग , ‘communion with the chosen deity’ in sūtra 2.44. For, as E. Conze puts it, ‘The mantra is a means of getting into touch with the unseen forces around us through an act which pronounces a commitment’ (E. Conze, Buddhism—its essence and development, London, 1953, 183). Also cf. the explicit classification of svādhyāya as a speech (vācy) activity in contradistinction from bodily (śvāra) and mental (māna) activities in Bhagavadgītā 17.15 and in Vatsyāyana’s commentary on Gautama’s Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.2. The employment of svādhyāya for yoga training can be traced
back to the Brähmanas (see Śatapathbrähmanas 11.5.7.1, referred to by H. von Glasenapp, Die Philosophie der Inder, Stuttgart, 1948, 218). In the Brhadaranyakopanishad (4.4.22) vadānu-vacana (recitation, or study by recitation, of the Veda) is presented, besides sacrifice, charity, asceticism (tapasa), and fasting, as means of knowing Him'. In his Yogasūtrasanāgraha Viśākhapatni treats svādhyāya as itself embodying the principle of withdrawal or interiorization: he presents a graduated classification of svādhyāya into (a) vocally expressive (vācika), (b) imperative, i.e., rites (ākhyāna) and (c) bodily movements (vipāyana), and (e) spiritual (sphāna), and (e) imparted by the commentator, 1923, 37; quoted by S. Lindquist, Die Methoden des Yoga, Lund, 1832, 119. Mādhava's Sarvaradānasanāgraha (Pātañjala-dārśana) includes tāntrika as well as śādika formularies (mantras) as illustrations of svādhyāya. Also cf. R., p. 173, l. 10 (tr. BOAS, art. cit., p. 319, Anś. to Q 11); India, H., p. 61, l. 2 (Sachau, tr., l. 80), p. 183, l. 6.

...yāsā, which may be regarded as 'of a man famous for following the śāstra of the śāstrī, making the meaning of the teacher. Williams, 1928, 48: 'the complete surrender to God Saṁkhya Harāharānanda Araya, Yoga philosophy of Patanjali; Calcutta, 1963, 126). These translators, like most of the extant commentaries, were evidently misled by Viśāya, who exhibits in his restrictive interpretation here a bias in favor of the Bhāgavata bhāvi movement. Vy. ad. loc. śāvara-prāṇidhānam = sarva-krīḍayān paramagurute arpaṇām tad-phaṭa-sannāya śa, i.e., the dedication (or alternatively: attribution; for this interpretation of arpaṇa cf. both of Nāgesa Bhāta's commentaries on śūtra 2.1) of all actions to the Supreme Teacher, or the renunciation of their fruit (cf. Bhagavadgītā 3.30; 5.10 with Śaṅkara's versus Rāmānuja's com. ad. loc.; 9.27: 12.6: 18.56–6). Divergence from Viśāya's interpretation of the term, however, is already indicated in Vāc, under śūtra 1.23, where he discusses the term. The Sanskrit term in itself is applicable to three different levels or types of action: (a) (bodily) prostration of the body: e.g., Bhāgautgītā 11.44: āsanaṇaṇaṃ prayātiśayaṃ kāyaṃ . . . (b) (verbal) prayer: cf. Nārāyaṇa Tirtha on śūtra 2.1: prāṇidhānām = satya-dā-ṣaṁsā ṛṣitaḥ, i.e. a devotion generated by chants of praise, etc., (c) (mental) contemplation: cf. Harāharānanda Araya's com. on śūtra 2.1: śāvara-prāṇidhānam tu mānasāb saṃyoga iti, i.e. the term refers to mental 'Discipline' (the three-staged meditation); and cf. the same commentary on śūtra 1.23: sarva-karmāṇaṃ pātāṃ bādāṃ-rāpaṇaṃ prāṇidhānaṃ na tu karmāṇaṃprāṇidhānaḥ prāṇidhāna means that it has been systematized and rendered constructive or functional by Vāc. under śūtra 1.23. Here Viśāya had commented śāvara-prāṇidhānād = bhākti-viśeṣaṃ . . . = by supreme (rather than "special kind of"), pace Woods, H. Jacobi, and others) devotion. On this Vāc comments: . . . mānasād vāciket kāyaṭdaad "mental, verbal and bodily", correspondingly with (c), (b), and (a) above. This wide and integrated interpretation of the term here was later adopted by Saṃśāvendra Saravati's commentary on śūtra 2.1: śāvara tālīya ṣrīṣyātmantārāharāngo paramagurāṃ kāyaṃ-in-maṁbhir nirvṛtto bhāti-ciśeṣaḥ prāṇidhānaṃ. prāṇidhāna 'means supreme devotion performed by body, speech, and mind with regard to a teacher (or: teacher who has sportively assumed an essentially captivating body'). (cf. the Jainia division of dusprāṇidhāna 'misdirection' into mano- 'mental', vaig. 'speech', and kāya- 'bodily'. See R. Williams, Jainia, London, 1963, 135). Other commentaries, followed by some modern scholars (e.g. S. Dasgupta, Yoga as philosophy and religion, London, 1924, 142) viewed the meaning of śāvara-prāṇidhāna in śūtra 2.1 as being different from that of the same term in śūtra 1.23 (see e.g. Baladeva on śūtra 2.1), and various solutions were advanced to the problem ensuing from the assumed divergence of meaning (see e.g. Bhāgavagāṇa on śūtra 2.1). In translating śāvara-prāṇidhāna in śūtra 1.23 Al-Burjīn seems to have followed an interpretation similar to that of Vāc, ad loc. (see R., Anś. to Q 11, BOAS, art. cit., 319; also cf. R. p. 175, l. 8; India, H., 60). He then consistently translates the Sanskrit term in śūtra 2.1 in a similar manner. In translating the Sanskrit term in śūtra 2.1 he uses the words andāhāra 'understanding in accordance with the words (R., 177); and in translating the term in śūtra 2.1 he quite literally uses the words that may be regarded as 'of a man famous for following the śāstra of the śāstrī. Al-Burjīn's translation of (a) of śūtra 2.1 implies (a) an understanding of this śūtra as referring back to śūtra 1.23; and (b) an understanding of tapas, svādhyāya, and śāvara-prāṇidhāna as being closely interconnected in one well-integrated process. These two points are similar to the explanation propounded by H. Jacobi. The latter points out (a) that the pair of expressions svādhyāya and śāvara-prāṇidhāna of śūtra 2.1 corresponds to the pair of expressions tāj-japa ('repeated utterance of the symbolic syllable om') and tad-arthā-bhāvāna (contemplation on the meaning of the tāj) of śūtra 2. The remaining tāj-japa, i.e., the tāj-prāṇidhāna, shows a further correspondence in that tāj-prāṇidhāna follows svādhyāya (cf. also śūtra 2.32) in the same manner as tad-arthā-bhāvāna follows tāj-japa (H. Jacobi, 'Über das ursprüngliche Yogasystem', S.P.A.W, Phil-hist. Kl., 1929, 605, reprinted in his Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden, 1970, 531
On the wider understanding of the textual structure of the Yogasūtra and the interrelations between its chapters 1 and 2 see F. Staal, Exploring mysticism, London, 1975, 90–5; cf. R. Garbe, Sāṅkhya und Yoga, Strassburg, 1896, 40. For the meaning of the term prāṇidhāna relevant to the YS, cf. its use in Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra 3.2.41 as referring to one of the causes of recollection. It is defined by Vāyasyāna’s ad loc.: svamṛtyāna mānya dhārayaṃ prāṇidhānaṃ svamṛtya-līlāṅkārāvatāṃ vā prāṇidhāna is thefixing of the mind (i.e., with a desire to) in the field of attention (with a desire to), or alternatively: the pondering on the characteristics peculiar to the object desired to be recalled’. And cf. Vācapati Mīra’s Tattvakauumudī on Sāṅkhya-kārikā, kārikā 7: prāṇiśita-māndh ‘one whose mind is fixed on (an object which cannot be seen due to its minuteness)’; Bhāravi’s Kārītārjunya 6.39: prāṇidhāya cittam and Mallāṇātha’s ad loc.: viṣayāntara-parāhārānām anavatadvayam ‘fixing (his mind) on the self to the exclusion of (all) other objects’. Also cf. Sankara’s Brhadāvatārakābhdā 2.24: ‘... yad api tasya bhagavato bhagavānādi-lakṣyam ārādhnam anarjam anvayā-cītāntayaḥ śrīpṛṣeṣu tat api on prāśādyate śrūti-smṛtyor āśvārah prāṇidhānasya prāṇidhāhatiṣ ‘Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentrating of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhāgavata doctrine under the forms of the reverential approach etc.; for we have to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Smṛti and Scripture’ (tr. G. Thibaut, SBE). For Patañjali’s definition of īśvara see YS 1.24. For a general account of the term īśvara cf. J. Gonda, ‘The īśvara idea’ in his Change and continuity in Indian religion, The Hague, 1965, 131 seq.

The reading ma in the MS has been adopted instead of mā which occurs in Ritter’s printed text.

In the Arabic text the term prāṇidhāna seems to have rendered the term śīlā in sūtra below 2.45f., R. p. 183, l. 8, by ‘ṣāṣṭra’ samādhi can mean ‘adjustment, settling, fixing’, as well as ‘reconciling’ (cf. samādhi ‘union, reconciliation’). And see n. 182 below.

In the plural in the Arabic text. This passage corresponds to sūtra 2.3: avidyāsmītal-rāgadveśāhāniniśvā paśca klesāh ‘The five afflictions are ignorance, egoism, desire, hatred, and clinging (to life)’. Some editions and MSS omit the word paśca ‘five’ in this sūtra. (For the fivefold division of the klesās here cf. the expression paścā-klesā-bhedāṇam ... ‘whose parts are the five afflictions’ in the Śvetāsvatara-pūrvaṇiṣad 1.5, according to the reading adopted by the critical edition in R. Hauschild’s Die Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad, Leipzig, 1927, reprinted Nendeln, 1996, p. 4.) For a different list, of six klesās, cf. the Buddhist Dharmasamgraha ascribed to Nāgārjuna (ed. Kenji Kasawara, Max Müller, and H. Wenzel, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Aryan series, 1, Pt. v, Oxford, 1885, 14): 1. rāgā ‘desire’, 2. prātīghā ‘hatred’, 3. māna ‘pride’, 4. avidyā ‘ignorance’, 5. kudṛṣṭi ‘false belief’, 6. vicikśā ‘scepticism’. For further Buddhist groupings of klesās—of eight, and of ten, beside the widely adopted group of three (i.e. rāgā ‘desire’, dveṣa ‘hatred’, and moha ‘delusion’) see the Pāli–English dictionary s.v. kilesa (where, however, the Pali words rāga, dosa, and moha are incorrectly translated as ‘sensuality, bewilderment, and lust’). There is an obvious agreement of the Arabic text with regard to four out of the five klesās: ocreṣṭ ‘opinion’ does not prima facie accord with asmiṭa ‘egoism, ego-awareness’ (cf. below Anu. to Q 27). Vy. and Vāc. ad loc. describe all the five klesās as vipyarayaḥ ‘modes of erroneous knowledge’ (cf. YS 1.6, 8 with Vy. ad loc.: Sāṅkhya-kārikā 47 f. [henceforth abbreviated: ŠK] [reference is made to kārikās] with Vācapati Mīra’s Tattvakauumudī ad loc.; for an explanation: Jacobi, art. cit., 388–9). The latter or a similar term may account for the fact that al-Birūnī regards ēṃāṭr as one of the klesās. (In rendering viparyaya in sūtras 1.6, 8 above, R. 171, however, he used the Arabic word ʿīṣāra and for viñkalpa—i.e., whereas the reverse, i.e. the use of the latter Arabic term for the former Sanskrit term and of the former Arabic term for the latter Sanskrit term, would have seemed more appropriate.)
23 Vy. on śūtras 1.4 (cf. Vy. on śūtras 2.2; 10; 30; 4.27) also uses the simile of the seeds but refers to ‘burnt (daṇḍa)’ seeds rather than seeds in a granary. Cf. R. p. 170, l. 6. And see next note.

24 For this simile, and its juxtaposition with the preceding one, in the Arabic text here cf. Bāhsarvaṇa’s Nīṣyāhārṣana (tenth century), ed. Śvāmī Yogindrānanda, Vārṇāṣa, 1968, 576: tatra ye jīva api yadā yānā yadāṣṭram lāpam pachchānti teṣāṁ maṇḍākā-cūrṇāvāt api nīṣyāhārṣanā. As for those individuals who attain assimilation into the supreme brāhmaṇ while still possessing ignorance, they are reborn on account of the fact that their seeds of rebirth, i.e. of mundane existence, are unburnt, like the powder (i.e. minute seeds) of the maṇḍākā (plant), and in consequence of desire etc. (i.e. hatred and delusion—the three doṣas ‘faults’, cf. klesas) they become enmeshed in further rebirths. Evidently the word maṇḍākā here is a plant name, although its botanical identification cannot be attested as such. One word variant is to be noted, notably: (a) as kutanata (i.e. Cyperus rotundus L. according to Monier-Williams) in Śivadatta’s Śīvakosa (an early seventeenth-century lexicon of medicinal plants, ed. R. G. Harshe, ‘Sources of Indo-Aryan Lexicography’, 7, Poona, 1922, stanza 41); (b) as sonakā (i.e. either (i) Oryzolum indicum Vent., or (ii) Cyperus rotundus L.—according to Monier-Williams) in the Viṣṇu-prakāṣā (early twelfth century), quoted by Śivadatta in his self-commentary, ibid.). Further, in the Amarasvātaka (which does not have maṇḍākā as a plant name) we find in 2.4.131 (ed. A. A. Ramnathan, Madras, 1971, i, 294) kutanatam with several synonyms, all of which appear in Monier-Williams as Cyperus rotundus L. If ‘seeds’ are meant by cūrṇa above, then Cyperus rotundus L. is a more likely candidate than Oryzolum indicum L. (of the Bignon family), since the seeds of the former are approx. 1 mm. in diameter. (Cf. also Vy. under YS 4.25: yāhā prāvyasi trāṇāsvayabhodehaka maṇḍākā deha bhatāvāvātī ‘as the existence of seeds is inferred from the fact that a blade of grass sprouts from the rains . . .’. The Cyperus rotundus L. seems to have been known under the names musta and mustā (cf. Monier-Williams) to the Bower manuscript (fourth century); cf. its medicinal use in a mixture with pulverized iron (aśy-raftas) (A. F. R. Hoernle (ed. and tr.), The Bower manuscript (Archaeological Survey of India. New Imperial Series, xxii). Calcutta, Part ii, 1894–5, (ed. and tr.), p. 136, ii. 5–9 (translation), The Oryzolum indicum Vent., under the name evonakā (cf. Monier-Williams) also seems to have been known to this manuscript (Hoernle (ed. and tr.), Part ii, p. 36, l. 8 (text), p. 98, l. 12 (translation). Al-Bīrūnī may have found in the text of the commentary used by him the expression maṇḍākā-cūrṇa. This would account for the Arabic text here having 

‘as a frog stunned (or crushed) by a blow (or by beating)’; the Sanskrit word maṇḍākā commonly means ‘frog’; the word cūrṇa can mean ‘pulverized, pounded’. However, the mistake of maṇḍākā as referring to a frog rather than to the plant bearing of the same name seems to have occurred already in Vy. under YS 1.19 in an amplified version of the simile in question.

The latter reads: yāhah vaśatātī nd nd-bhāvam upagato maṇḍākā-deha punar amboda-vāriddhāraāsaṅkā maṇḍākā-deha-bhāvam anubhavatī ‘Just as in the absence of rains a frog’s body, after having been reduced to a state of earth, when sprinkled with water from a cloud experiences again the state of being a frog’s body’. This misunderstanding in Vy. of maṇḍākā as a frog’ may have been encouraged by the observable connexion of the revivification of plants with the advent of the rainy season, as expressed in the well-known ‘frog-hymn’, Rgveda 7.103.1–2: satapatāṇōna kāṣāyaṇa brahmavāc vratā-cīrāvāh | oceam parjñājanīvinām prá maṇḍākā avādiṣṇa | divyā dpo abhi yād enam dyan dhīni nā būsam sarasi bhrākaṃ / gadāv dha nā māyāv vaitē-nilām maṇḍākā-nilām vagnārā dhāva sim eti ‘The frogs having lain (dormant) for a year, as brāhmaṇs practise a vow (of silence), uttered forth their voices roused by the Rain deity. When heavenly waters have descended upon each of them lying like a dry leather bucket in a (dried-up) lake, the sounds of the frogs build up in concert like the loving of cows accompanied by (their) calves’. The simile under consideration recurs in Vy. under śūtras 1.27 and 2.17 where the corresponding passages significantly have udbhīja ‘a plant’ and udbhīja-bheda ‘a kind of plant’ respectively for maṇḍākā-deha ‘a frog’s body’. Accordingly Rāgahvānanda Sarvaśī’s (cf. Pāṇini’s aphorism on Vāc. under śūtras 1.27 and 2.17 offers the gloss: udbhījaṁ = maṇḍākādi. (Also cf. Nāgajī’s Vṛtti under YS 1.19, where the same simile has maṇḍī-rīpaḥ ‘having the form of earth’ for maṇḍī-bhāvan upagataḥ, and under YS 2.17.) The possibility cannot be ruled out that Al-Bīrūnī had the expression maṇḍī-bhāvan upagataḥ in a similar passage in the commentary used by him, and mistook the noun maṇḍī ‘lump of earth, clay’ for the verbal root meaning ‘to crush, pound, trample on, bruise’, and hence rendered it by the Arabic text here. Another meaning of Al-Bīrūnī’s having misunderstood the expression atispāte to mean ‘attacking, knocking out’. Such a meaning for this word seems to be attested through the expression prāṇā-spāta (Rāmāyana 1.58.22, crit. ed. G. H. Bhatt, Baroda, 1960). A similar misunderstanding—either by Al-Bīrūnī or by the commentary used by him—of the word maṇḍākā as referring to a frog rather than to the plant bearing that name may have occurred more than once in the Arabic text below in Ans. to Q 27 = R, p. 179, l. 6 (cf. Mahābhārata 12.204.16 (Poona ed.), for the simile of the ‘burnt seeds’.

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The Arabic text has here ḥāṣira 'one of those two', i.e. one of a pair of affixions. See following note.

There is a correspondence between (a) praesepus (‘dormant’, i.e. latent) in sūtra 2.4 and the state of potentiality of the affixions described in the Arabic text; (b) tanū (‘attenuated’, i.e. sublimated or weakened; cf. tanūkāraṇa ‘attenuation’ in sūtra 2.2) in the same sūtra and the state of weakness of the affixions mentioned in the Arabic text, (c) uḍāra (‘vigorously’, i.e. operative) in the same sūtra and the state of strength of the affixions mentioned in the Arabic text, (d) vicchīnna (‘interrupted’, i.e. intercepted, deferred) and the process of substitution of one affixion by another described in the last sentence of the same paragraph in the Arabic text. The rendering of vicchīnna by ‘interrupted’ is supported by Vy. on sūtra 2.4, which defines vicchīnna as the replacement of one kleśa by another.

An alternative rendering would be: 'he (himself) is the soul rather than (the body)'. Cf. India, Hyd., 30 (Sachau tr.), 40: 3.1.30. They call the soul purusa' ; BSOAS, art. cit., 307.

The sūtra 2.5: anityasvāci-dukkhānātmaṇaḥ nitya-śvāci-sukhātma-kuṭīṭāt avīdyā 'Ignorance is the apprehension of the impermanent as permanent, of the impure as pure, of pain as pleasure and of not-self as self'. There is a correspondence between adhīlaḥ and avīdyā, aśvāci and śvāci, kṛitiḥ and dhuḥka and sukha. The error referred to in the Arabic text, that the body is pre-eternal—or eternal—is to some extent paralleled by Vāc. on sūtra 2.5, where reference is made to the practice of drinking soma in order to become deathless. The misapprehension of the body as man himself, referred to in the Arabic text, derives presumably from a passage similar to Vy. on sūtra 2.5: tathānātmanāḥ ātma-kuṭīṭāt bhojanapakāraṇasyāya cetanātmaṇaḥ bhogādākhithānā yāvirē purusāpakāraṇaḥ vā manasya anātmanāḥ ātmākāriṭāḥ iti.' Similarly, apprehension of self in what is not self: 'an apprehension of self in what is not the self is the apprehension of self in what is an animate or inanimate extraneous auxiliary, viz. the body, which is rather the location of sense-experience, or the mind, which is rather a tool of the purusa'. And cf. Sādāśivendra Sarasvatī on sūtra 2.5. Apparently al-Birūnī rendered purusa according to its original meaning 'man'. It may be added that the distinction between the body and man was a commonplace of dominant trends of Greek and Arabic philosophy (cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 307). The words ād bhūtā and ād bhūtā reflect a Greek philosophical conception. See, however, the sixteenth-century a.d. commentary Maṇiprakārī of Rāmānanda on sūtra 2.5: tathā pūrvaśivāma dūkhiḥ bhogāvānuhā-śivānāḥ 'Similarly, the erroneous cognizance of the property of happiness in pleasure which is (ultimately tantamount) to distress on account of (its subsequent) transformation (into the latter)'. Al-Birūnī may have encountered an early version of this explanatory remark. But it should be noted that while the Istanbul text has here ādābhūtā and ādābhūtā, a parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52 has ādābhūtā and ādābhūtā. 'and yet is it not what we are to know? (Sachau tr., 1, 68: '... and perceives that to which it held to be good and delightful is in reality bad and painful'). This version seems to approximate more closely than that of the Istanbul MS, which may be corrupt, to the meaning of sūtra 2.5.

Here the idea of confusion between the states of the body and soul is, in spite of the difference of terminology, corresponds to sūtra 2.6: dṛg-dārśāna-saktiḥ ekātma-vijñānāt 'Egoism is the state in which the faculty constituted by the seeing-(agent, i.e. purusa) and the faculty constituted by the sight-(instrument, i.e. cīta) appear as being essentially one (i.e. identical).' (Deussen's version reads here Eva instead of Eva. The latter variant is, however, more plausible. It is supported by the semantically and syntactically similar use of Eva in sūtra 2.54. For śakti here, cf. sūtra 2.23). But al-Birūnī has ādābhūtā which he uses to render vīkāla (R., p. 171, l. 8) and perhaps vīparaṇya (R., p. 178, l. 1), whereas the sūtra here has āsmitā 'egoism, ego-awareness, feeling of personality', the concept of which implies but is not identical with 'wrong opinion'. Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 306.

For the expression the light of the eye 'cf. caksayasaktikākā in YS 3.21. For the underlying concept see Nārāyaṇa’s Mānamyodaya 2.2 (ed. C. Kunhan Raia and S. S. Suryana- rayana Sastri, Adyar, Madras, 1935, 9): caksya nāma sannikātāntara pātan tejo...' 'What is known as the sense of sight consists in the light situated inside the pupil of the eye'. And cf. for the varieties referred to in the Arabic text here op. cit., p. 155: tejas... arka-candriṇī-nākṣatram svayambhūti-rāpanayānendriya-rāpan ca 'Light (or: fire; German: Glut) is of two kinds: (a) that which has the form of the sun, the moon, (ordinary) fire, the stars, gold, etc. and (b) that of the form of the sense of sight'. Also cf. Gautama’s Nyāyāgarbha 1.1.12 and 3.39 (ed. W. Ruben, Leipzig, 1928); Annabhāṣa’s Tarakasārga ed. Y. V. Athalye, Bombay, 1960, 8, and notes ad loc. Also cf. S. Bhaduri, Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, second ed., Poona, 1975, 153-4: '... each sense is constituted of the physical substance whose specific quality it apprehends... the visual sense is composed of light (tejas), since it is the instrument of the
sensation of colour which is the specific quality of light; and similarly for the rest of the senses."

The word 'अहर्द्रा' may be an attempted transcription of अंध्रा, the name of a South Indian country, whose western border could have been conceived (in North India) as extending as far as the Western Ghāts (malayādīr). For the likelihood of the association of अंध्रा with sandalwood, see Daqūn's Daśakumāra-caritā, seventh ucchāyā, ed. Kāle, fourth ed., Delhi, 1966, 177. In India, however, the name अंध्रा seems to be transcribed as अंद्र (India, Hyd., 201, Sachau (tr.), t. 299 (Hyd., 135, Sachau (tr.), t. 173), and the derivative form अर्द्र (loc. cit.). Alternatively अर्द्र अहर्द्रा may be an attempt at transcribing candaṇādārī 'the Sandal mountain', or 'deriving from the Sandal mountain', referring to the Western Ghāts in South India, known as the source of the best sandalwood, and frequently referred to in Sanskrit literature. A further possibility is to read here अर्द्र तर्ड, i.e. deriving from the dardura mountain (well-known for its sandalwood, e.g. Kālādāsa's Raghunātha 4.51).

The MS may be read अंध्र, which is the form occurring in al-Birūnī's India, Hyd., 468: अंध्र तर्ड अर्द्र. The printed edition of Sānkara Bhagavatpāda has in the sūtra here the variant अर्द्राकारा 'born from, produced from' instead of अंध्राकारा, evidently due to replacement of the latter word by an easier synonym. Rāmananda Sarasvatī glosses: अर्द्राकारा अंध्रानुवेद विस्यकारोति 'It leans towards pleasure, i.e. it makes it its object'. This accounts for Woode's translation: 'Pleasure dwells on pleasure' and J. W. Hauer's: 'Die Sinnlichkeit erscheint im Bewusstsein als Lust' (op. cit., 244). (Cf. Vijnānabhaṭika, ad loc., and the translations by Ballantyne, G. Jhā, and Rējendrāśa Mitra.) But Vāyasa seems to explain the term अर्द्राकारा by अर्द्रानुवेदप्रधारां 'preceded by the memory of pleasure'. A similar idea to that expressed by the sūtra here seems to be presented by Kanāḍa's Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, sūtra 6.2.10: सुक्हद रङ्ग 'From pleasure (arises) desire'. (Cf. Sānkara on Bhagavad-gītā 2.27.) Evidently, the point of sūtra 2.7 of the YS, and of the whole section, is to claim that passions are caused, and to show what the cause is—i.e. sense-objects contact. Thus the sūtra introduces and justifies the subsequent technique of the removal of this cause, namely the graduated withdrawal from the contact of the senses with their objects.

In the plural in the Arabic text.

R has here a footnote reference number 4 which is apparently due to a printing error. Further apparently erroneous references to a footnote 4 on R, 178 occur in ll. 5 and 17 (after the fourth word).

The MS has सान्काराकारा followed by अंध्रानुवेद 'by the memory of pleasure'. We propose to read अंध्रानुवेद 'by the memory of pleasure'.

Or: 'their causes'. The sūtra may be interpreted in both ways.

Cf. sūtra 2.8: दुधक्कालकृति द्वेष 'Hatred is consequent upon pain'. The expressions प्राप्तिः 're cognition', उपायम् 'means', वधमान 'killers', अव्यापात 'antidotes', क्रोध 'anger' in Vy. on this sūtra correspond more or less to क्रांतिर्वा अव्यापात 'Kānti and antidotes' of the Arabic text here.

All of this has its counterpart in the Arabic text.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.9. There are two versions of this sūtra: (a) sva-rasa-viḍūya 'pātāhārāviṣādha bhīvinivādha 'Clinging (to life) persists (lit.: flows on) by force of one's own life-nature—not due to extraneous causes such as pain and pleasurable natures (or impulse; schol.: = rasa = samskāra, viṣāna, motivating latent impressions) and is similarly ingrained (cf. Sānkara Bhagavatpāda's gloss: rūdhāḥ bhīvinivātya aśīraḥ, i.e. "deep-seated, firmly fixed"); or alternatively: notorious, cf. Vijnānabhaṭika's gloss: rūdhāḥ = pratidāhāḥ, i.e. widely known) even in (the case of the) the learned'. (This version is commonly printed together with Vy. For the reading ārūḍha the meanings 'incurred' and 'intensive' may also be considered here.) (b) sva-rasa-viḍūya 'pi tāv-anu-nabandha bhīvinivādha 'Clinging (to life).
which is attached to the body, persists by force of one’s own nature (or impulse) even in the learned’. (This version, which was reprinted in Deussen, is attested in the editions printed by Ballantine in 1853, and later by Rājendralāla Mitrā with Bhoja’s commentary in 1883, and noted as variant in the Chowkhamba edition of 1930, pace J. W. Hauer, op. cit., p. 466, n. 3). Version (a) appears to be a corruption of (b), although the possibility cannot be ruled out that even tāwa-anubandha of (b) in turn is due to a commentatorial interpolation. The latter possibility would lend support to J. Filliozat’s rendering of the term abhinivesa in the YS by ‘obsessions’ (J. Filliozat, ‘The psychological discoveries of Buddhism’, in his Laghu-prakābho, p. 16, with a note by the present writer). Accordingly the term abhinivesa in the sūtras themselves would not be restricted to the meaning of ‘clinging to life’ i.e. fear of death, as interpreted by Vy., Bhoja, and other commentators. It would rather be a blanket-term for prima facie uncontrollable, congenital instinctive attachments, which differ from rōga and dveṣa in that they are (a) not temporary but continuous (cf. vātih) and (b) not caused by any extraneous motivation, but are natural, or—as amplified by commentators—are due to subconscioous pre-natal conditions, i.e. experiences in a previous life which left their latent traces (samskāras). Thus the case of fear of death would be a mere exemplification of the wider concept of abhinivesa. This would be in consonance with the general use of the term in Buddhism and the rest of the literature other than the commentaries of the YS (see, however, S. Dasgupta, Yoga philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought, Calcutta, 1930, 68). Moreover, Vyāsa himself seems to use this term in a wider sense: ‘adherence to a view’ (Vv. on sūtra 2.18; cf. S. Dasgupta, Yoga as philosophy and religion, London, 1924, 101). Also cf. the later Tattvasāmasa which uses the term synonymously with prasakti ‘attachment’ and defines absence of vairāgya (‘detachment’) as sattādādī-vidyārey abhinivesaḥ ‘clinging to objects such as sound’ (ed. J. R. Ballantine, Māraṇap, 1850, 6–7).

For the use of svarasa in the sūtra here cf. e.g. Āpadevī’s Mīmāṃsā śāśāparakṣā, ed. and tr. P. F. Edgerton, London, 1929 a.v. in glossarial index. For the opposition between svarasvādhā and anubhāvy in the preceding two sūtras cf. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinction between sāṃsārdhikā ‘natural’ and nainīttikā ‘dependent on an extraneous cause, induced’ (e.g. in Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, ed. Nārāyana Miśra, Vārānasi, 1966, 218; Annambhatta’s Tārakānāraka, ed. A. Foucher, Paris, 1949, 73). For vidyā ‘pi in the sūtra above cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.60. Al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic text may perhaps reflect an early commentary which understood abhisheka to stand for attachment in the wide sense, and which exemplified the concept by two types of ‘obsessions’ or inborn instinctive drives, i.e. the sexual desire and the fear of death, both of which were accounted for by experiences in a previous life which left their latent impressions. Al-Bīrūnī apparently used version (b) and took anubhāvy to mean ‘accessory’. This signification of the word is attested.

44 Arabic: الْلُّوْلَع.
45 lit.: ‘is expected death’.
46 In speaking of abhishekaVy. and other commentaries on sūtra 2.9 mention the fear of death, but Al-Bīrūnī’s text does not correspond to them.
47 Referring to the afflictions (klesas) enumerated in R, p. 178, l. 1.
48 ‘hāth’ is viewed by Al-Bīrūnī as a rendering of klesa. Cf. above R, 177.
49 cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.10: te pāśca kleśā daṇḍha-bīja-kalpāḥ ‘the five afflictions (when they have become) like burned seeds’. The simile of the burned seeds recurs in Vy. under sūtras 2.2, 11, 13, 26; 3.50; 4.28 (cf. Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣṭārabhāṣya 2.3.30). Nāgjūlī’s Vīrti amplifies: kleśā daṇḍha-bīja-kalpān vāyuḥ khaṇḍāḥ bhavanī ‘The afflictions are sterile like burned seeds’ (under sūtra 2.2; cf. Vāc. ibid.).
50 See n. 23.
51 i.e. the wholes of the elements, earth to earth, water to water, and so forth.
52 cf. sūtra 2.10: te pratiprasava-hṛdayāt sūkṣmatāḥ ‘When subtle they (i.e. the afflictions) should be relinquished by resorption’. For the meaning of pratiprasava cf. sūtra 4.33; puruṣārtha-kāyājñām guṇānām pratiprasavād kaivalyām svarāya-pratikṣil niti-sakti-niti ‘The state of kaivalya consists in the resorption (into prakṛti, ‘primordial Nature’) of the guṇas (constituent qualities) no longer (motivated by) the self for a purpose, or alternatively (it may be defined as) the state in which the faculty of consciousness is established in its own nature’. There does not seem to be sufficient justification for Deussen’s attempt to differentiate between the meanings of pratiprasava in the two sūtras; 2.10: ‘Diese (Klesa’s), soweit sie in ein latent, unbewusst sind, müssen überwunden werden durch eine (asketische) Gegenanstrengung (pratiprasava)’; 4.33: ‘Die Rückströmung der von den Zwecken des Purusa freien Guṇa’s ist die Absolutheit, oder auch sie ist die in ihrer eigenen Natur verharrende Kraft des Geleisteten’. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.2. Also cf. the use of the related term prasavo ‘production, evolution’ in SK 65.
53 i.e. the vṛtta of the sūtra 2.11: dhāraṇa-praśaṅgad-dvrttyāvahā ‘Their functions (i.e. their manifestations, or the afflictions in their gross and active phase) should be relinquished by meditation’.

54 Cf. R, p. 178. The word śāhā ‘glossy’ may correspond to sthāla ‘gloss’ in Vy. on sūtra 2.11.
55 Or: ‘they’?
56 According to R, several words here are wholly or partly illegible. Possibly two of the words are smāra ‘reward’, which occurs in the next sentence, and ājīm ‘remuneration’.
57 The MS has and not or the kātā and not which occurs in Ritter’s printed text.
punah
Cf. title, which snake. known occurs Bhoja, that punishment English other
Cf. Yoga History synonymes use ca pain
In Derrett whether 'unseen, 'angels' is 'sfitra 1.130; substratum
Buddhist the quotation Bhoja's Rājatarangini 1.130. Bhoj's com. on Manusmṛti 10.80. For vedaṇāya as applicable to both pleasure and pain cf. e.g. Annabhāta's Tarkasangraha, ed. Athalye, Bombay, 1930, 68; cf. Pujāyapāda's com. Sarvārthaśidhi on Umāvātī's Tattvārthādhiyanamāsūtra 9.32: vedaṇā-sādāb sukhe duhkhe ca vartāmanō. "The word vedaṇā is applicable both to happiness and to suffering. . . ." For the use of the term asya in the sūtra, cf. sūtras 1.24; 4.6. For the meaning of asya here, which is synonymous with sākāra 'latent impressions', and may also be rendered by 'vehicle' or 'substratum', cf. sūtra 1.24 and Vy. ad. loc. Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, 'Le Bouddhisme et le Yoda de Patañjali', Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, v, 1937, 231: '. . .bījas, germs, vśānāṃ, parfums, asyaṇīs, que Vyāsa explice par "gēsir jusque", sākārās, impressions: termes synonymes qui désignent une même chose considérée comme cause ou comme effet'. (For a view that sākārā should be rendered by 'motivations' rather than 'impressions' see A. Wayman, 'Buddhist Sanskrit and the Sāṅkhyakārikā', Journ. of Indian Philosophy, ii, 3-4, 1974, 392-3. Cf. S. S. Leī (ed. and tr.), Mahāyānasūtramālamkāra, Paris, 1911, p, 47, n. 1. For a distinction made sometimes by commentators on YS sūtra 2.13 between sākāra and vśānāṃ see S. Das Gupta, History of Indian philosophy, i, Cambridge, 1957, p. 263, n. 1.) And cf. Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English dictionary, s.v. asyaṇa; = 'stock'. The opposition between imaginary requital in the other words as perceived as presented in the Arabic text here may be due to a misunderstanding of the opposition between ḍrṣṭa 'seen, perceived, visible', and adṛṣṭa 'unseen, invisible' in sūtra 2.12 above. According to certain Islamic philosophers, e.g. Ibn Sinā, punishment in the after-life is an effect of the imagination. Similarly according to some Buddhist schools the infernal guards inflicting torments in hell are not real. Cf. Vasubhandhu's Vīṇādātikā, verse 3; Candrakīrti's com. on Nāgārjuna's Mādhūnyamadmatītras (Bibl. Buddhīes), St. Petersburg, 1913, 44-5. The mutual relationship between actions (karma) and the afflications (kleda) is amplified by Nāgāra on sūtra 2.3: karmābhī kleśā klecās ca kārmāṇīṣya anvavāt th bījānukuravad anadītevā na dodyāna. Afflictions are due to actions and vice versa, but the (circular) regress involved is no logical fault, for it is beginningless as encountered in the (stock example of) the case of the seed and the sprout (or the hen and the egg'). (For the logical concepts here see R. K. Matilal, The Nāgāra-nāyaya doctrine of negation, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 53.)

63 cf. India, Hyd., 70 (Sachau (tr.), i, 95) where the stories of Nandīśvara and Nahuṣa (below) are quoted from. Nandīśvara corresponds to Nandīśvara mentioned in VY. Bhoja, and Rāmānanda on sūtra 1.12, where also Nahuṣa is mentioned. The story of Nahuṣa occurs in the Brāhmanandīśvara Purāṇa (referred to by Rājendralāla Mitra, op. cit., 70). A story of Nahuṣa being turned into a snake by a curse is related in the Mahābhārata (Poona ed.), 12.329.30 ff. (Manu 7.41: Āsāvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita 11.14, 16; for further references see V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, The Purāṇa index, Madras, 1952, n. 216.) In this story, as known from the Hindu sources, it was Nahuṣa rather than Indra that was transformed into a snake. Al-Bīrūnī's mistake may be accounted for by his misunderstanding a Sanskrit text, especially if it used the word indra both as a private name and as a name of an institution or title, such as in expression derived from indica which occurs in Vyāsa's version of the story here. Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 307. For further references and a detailed account of the Nahuṣa legend which also occurs in the Purāṇas see J. Muir, Original Sanskrit texts, London, 1877, i, 307 f.

64 the word 'angels' is the usual Arabic translation for 'gods' in polytheistic, for instance Greek texts. Cf. India, Hyd., 72 (Sachau (tr.), i, 95); Hyd., p. 68, l. 17 (Sachau (tr.), i, 91). Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., p. 307, n. 37.

65 Ritter's text has قُسْمُ الْمَعْلُومَ. The MS has قول: Ritter's printed text has قُسْمُ الْمَعْلُومَ. We propose to read الْمَعْلُومَ (or possibly الْمَعْلُومَ).

66 the MS lists i.e. the klecā listed in sūtra 2.4 after avidya 'ignorance'.

67 cf. here Ritter's quotation from India, Hyd., 42 (Sachau (tr.), i, 55): عَلَّقُ اللّهُ الْمِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ المِلْلَةِ الْأَقْلَ اِلَّهَ māhānā labāhaha māhānā labāhaha māhānā labāhaha 'As long as the root (i.e. the affictions) persists there will be fruition of the karma-residuum in the form of birth into a specific class (or species), length of life, and kind of experience'. Ballantyne, G. Jhā, Woods, and Hauer take the demonstrative tad here to refer to māhā rather than to the subject of the preceding sūtra, i.e. karmāṇīṣya. This is implausible, both for syntactical reasons and in view of sūtra 4.8 where
vipäka recurs with reference to karma. The text of the YS seems to differentiate in its usage between jāti and janna, using the latter to refer to birth or rebirth as such (sūtras 2.12, 39; 4.1). For the use of the term vipäka here (also shared by Buddhism) cf. sūtras 1.24; 4.8. For the Arabic text here cf. India, Hyd., 31:

"... and upon the particular kind of its happiness, be it scantly or ample. The words 'suffering' which occur both in India and the translation of the YS can also be translated: ... and to well-being in adversity and prosperity'.

The relevant passage in India, referred to by R, has 'roh, 'spirit'.

Lit. 'the imprisonment'. R's emendation here, 'chhiṣak, is less plausible than that which occurs in the MS.

The MS has the तथि which occurs in R's text.

The triple ताप-सांस्कार-दुःख has the ताप which occurs in the MS, not the 'suffering'.

R reads here (cf. vīkeśin 'discriminative, wise' in sūtra 2.15: parīśāma-tāpa-sāṃskāra-duhkha: gūṣa-vṛti-virodhaḥ ca sarvāṃ duḥkha eva vīkeśināh 'To the discriminating person all is nothing but suffering, on account of (the types of) suffering constituted by (a) transmutation of pleasure into eventual suffering e.g. through hankering for it, (b) pain as such (or the anxiety to secure pleasure), and (c) latent impressions (i.e. past demerit which results in suffering), and because the functions of the gunas (which constitute the mind) are in conflict'. For the conflict between the three gunas cf. SK 12. Also cf. Vac. on sūtra 1.2 (= Woods's tr., 10) where mental restlessness (vīkṣepa) is explained as due to reciprocal antagonisms of the gunas which constitute the mind-stuff (citā). Ballantyne, however, unconvincingly takes vīkṣepa to refer to an opposition between the gunas and the goal of liberation: 'since the modifications of the Qualities are adverse (to the sumum bonum)'.

Thus takes parīśāma, or mean eminence ('Unbearable pain') of enjoyment. But our rendering by 'transmutation' may be supported by comparison with Bhagavadgītā 18.38 (quoted by Baladeva ad loc.): visajendra-yogyatā yat tad agra 'mātropamam/parīśāma viṣaj iva tat sukhām vājaṣmat smṛtaṁ 'Springing from union of the senses with their objects (that pleasure) which at the beginning is nectar, but is in mortality like poison, that pleasure is traditionally known as the rajus type'.

For parīśāma here cf. the parallel expression anubandha 'consequence', in the subsequent verse. Also cf. the idea in verse 5.22.) Moreover, parīśāma (unlike viparaśāma, see below) does not mean change, viscissitude, or impermanence as such, but maturing in time, transformation (cf. W. Liebenthal, Satākhyā in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegenw., Berlin, 1934, p. 36, n. 33). The idea expressed by the term parīśāma in the sūtra is also implicit in YS 2.5, above. There avidyā—a term rendered by T. Scherbatsky (in The conception of Buddhahood in India, reprinted, The Hague, 1966, 236) as 'naive realism' (as contrasted with 'philosophic insight')—is described as consisting inter alia in misapprehending as pleasure that which is (eventually or ultimately) suffering (cf. Sādāśivendra Sarasvatī's com. on YS 2.5): This is essentially also the force of Bhagavadgītā 5.22: ye hi sāṃsāra-kājāḥ duḥkha-gāṇoyata eva te/ādayantamāh kavantya na teṣa ramate buddhah 'For the enjoyments that are generated by (outside) contacts are nothing but sources of suffering / They have beginning and end, son of Kunti; the wise man takes no delight in them'. And cf. Āniruddha's commentary on Sāṅkhya-sūtra 2.1. A better understanding of the sūtra under consideration, especially with reference to the phrase gūṣa-vṛti-virodhaḥ, might depend on the understanding of the full meaning of the concept of duḥkha. In Sāṅkhya-Yoga as in early Buddhist writings, duḥkha appears to have been conceived as a real character of a constantly changing objective world; moreover, duḥkha itself seems to refer to unrest and commotion. Cf. lok-duḥkha in Kathopanisad, 5.11 and its antonym sukha 'restfulness', op. cit., 1.11 (cf. sukha in YS 2.46). (Cf. Scherbatsky, Central conception of Buddhism, reprinted, Calcutta, 1956, 40 et seq.) In the sūtra under consideration in the YS there seems to be an underlying construction referring to the threefold division of time: parīśāma-transformation, which of necessity involves pain, points to the future; tāpa—suffering centred in the present, and sāṃskāra—active traces of past experience, which are a source of pain. Reflection on the divisions of time may also be found in YS 1.26; 3.13, 16. Also cf. Abhidharmakośa, discussed in Scherbatsky, Central conception, 39. A somewhat similar threefold classification of duḥkha constitutes a well-known early Buddhist formula: (a) vipārīśāma-duḥkhatā 'suffering due to change or decay'; (b) duḥkha-duḥkhatā 'suffering due to the fact of being conditioned'. (For references see de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Paris, 1925, ch. vi, section 3. Also cf. Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, reprinted, Delhi, 1975, 157.) In their Buddhist application or adaptation the three terms of the formula have a conspicuous dependence on the triple fundamental truth of Buddhist metaphysics: impermanence, duḥkha 'suffering', and nonātmya 'unsubstantiality' respectively. In the sūtra under consideration in the YS the lack of coordination between the instrumental suffix in duḥkhaḥ and the ablative suffix in virodhaḥ, which would be unusual for the style of
the YS, may point to the possibility of guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāt being an accretion. Vijnānabhaiku, and his pupil Bhāvāyāgaśē, have here the implausible variant avirodhaī instead of virodhaī. The former commentator gives: dukha-samkhīrtai 'on account of suffering being involved'. He seems to refer to the Sāṅkhya theory that the guṇas, i.e., sattva, rajas, and tamas, are of the nature of sukhā 'happiness', dukkha 'suffering', and moha 'delusion' respectively (cf. Sk 12, and cf. Maṭṛtyupānīsad 6.10), which implies that dukkha is involved in all combinations and functioning of the three guṇas. The fundamental concept of dukkha has recently been subjected to some misguided and fanciful reinterpretations, with little regard to its ordinary meaning. An example is A. Danto's Mysticism and morality, Pelican Books, 1976, 57, where the concept is presented in terms of 'cosmic boredom' and the 'mere tedium' of having repeatedly to be reborn. Translations of the sūtra under consideration vary considerably; none of them is indubitable. A recent example is G. Feuerstein and Y. Miller in their essay 'The meaning of suffering in Yoga' in their A reappraisal of Yoga: essays in Indian philosophy, London, 1971, 88: 'Because of the [moment of] suffering in the "vibrations" (of the psychomental life), in the affliction (of life), in the subconscious impressions and because of the opposite movements of the primary energies—everything is nothing but suffering to the one who discriminates (vivekīm)'.

19 cf. Saṁkarṣaṇa’s commentary on Bhagavadgītā 18.38 (the verse itself is alluded to by Baladeva on YS 2.15, see previous note above): 'paramānā viṣay īva ... adharma-taj-janīta-naradhi-ḥetvāt ca pariṇāmā tad-udābhojya-pariṇāmānte viṣay īva... and (that pleasure) is consequently (in maturity, lit.: 'transformation') like poison, i.e. (because ... and) because of demerit and hell which is generated by it'.

20 cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.15: 'tathā caktaṁ nāṇapahātya bhūtaṁ udābhodhaṁ sambhavati hiṃsaṁkṛto 'ay atiśāh karanāy atiśāh. And similarly it has been said: "No enjoyment is possible without hurting (or, killing) some living beings"; so that there is in addition (to the mental latent impressions) a corporal latent residuum due to the act of inflicting injury (or, killing)'.

21 The MS has a section which is given in Ritter’s text as a note. The reading of this word is doubtful. An alternative reading could be given in Ritty’s text as 'revolution', i.e. the alternating succession 'of good and evil'.

22 Ritter’s text has here ‘चक्षु ’. The correct reading is ‘चद्र’ . Cf. India, Hyd. (see next note).

23 The reading 'मायां' seems preferable to 'मायां' as vocalized in R. Cf. India, Hyd., 60: ‘...सत्ता - च फलं सत्तां सत्तीयं अश्च तथां वच्छ सच्चतां सत्तीयं अश्च तथां वच्छ' which is translated by Sachau: ‘For he who accurately understands the affairs of the world knows that the good ones among them are evil in reality, and that the bliss which they afford changes in the course of recompense into pains. Therefore he avoids everything which might result in making him stay in the world for a still longer period’ (op. cit., i, 79; italics—ours, T.G. and S.F.). Also cf. next note. In India al-Bīrūnī also uses the term 'मायां as a Śūkṣmi term. Cf. India, Hyd., 60: ‘...सत्ता - च फलं सत्तां सत्तीयं अश्च तथां वच्छ सच्चतां सत्तीयं अश्च तथां वच्छ’ Further they (i.e. the Śūkṣmī) say: ‘...Between man and God there are a thousand stages of light and darkness’ (Sachau (tr.), i, 88).

24 This passage in the Arabic text probably corresponds to sūtra 2.16: 'हयम दुध्क्षम अयागता 'That which here is to be avoided (lit.: relinquish) is suffering yet to come'. For the technical use of 'हयम here to be avoided in Uddottakara’s Nyāyāvartika on Nyāyābhikṣa 1.11 the fourfold formula 'हयम-हनोपयागद्यांगताय ... ‘that which is to be relinquished (i.e. dukkha), the relinquishing (i.e. knowledge of reality), its means (i.e. the relevant philosophical science), and that which is to be attained (i.e. emancipation)’ also cf. Gaudapāda’s Agamaśāstra, verse 4.30: 'हयम-हनोपयाग-पक्षपानी विज्ञानयो ग्रामणात / ते तेम साधनार्तियो उपलब्धाभार तिसी मृत्यु 'That which is to be relinquished, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be turned away from the Agrāyāna (i.e. Mahāyāna). It has been recorded that apart from that which is to be known, the remaining three are amenable to perception' (cf. Vidhuśekeha Bhattacharya (ed. and tr.), The Agamaśāstra of Gaudapāda, Calcutta, 1943, 199). The āstakṣara ‘turn away’ in the Arabic text seems to correspond to 'हयम is to be relinquished ‘ or 'should be relinquished’. 'That which generates entanglement and engenders (a specific) station (in existence) is probably a rendering of a gloss on dukkha in terms of samśāra. The latter term has the meaning 'undergoing transmigration' as well as 'mundane existence, the world'). Cf. Bhaja on sūtra 2.16: 'सामसः-दुध्क्षम हात्यावम ... ‘mundane suffering is to be abandoned’; and on sūtra 2.17: 'हयमेस्या घण्याः तुण मिन्यार्जीयं सामसः अहतुः 'That is the cause of the suffering which is to be relinquished, i.e. of the mundane condition (samśāra) which consists in the transformation of the constituent qualities'.

25 The word 'मायां may refer to त्रित्यो 'entanglement' and 'मायां 'station', in which case the dual हा would be grammatically more correct. Alternatively, it may refer to त्रित्यो 'from that which'. In this case हा would be grammatically more correct.

26 This seems to be a translation of sūtra 2.17: 'द्रास्त्र-द्रास्त्रपयो समस्याः 'The cause of which is to be relinquished (i.e. the cause of suffering) is the conjunction between the seer (i.e. purusa) and (objects) seen (i.e. prakṛti). An alternative reading incorporates īva 'as it were' after samasya. For the term samasya here cf. Sk 20, 21. And see n. 88, below.
This seems to be a translation of śutra 2.24: 

tasya (viz. samagopaya, see last word of the preceding śutra) hetu avidyā 'The cause of that (conjunction) is ignorance'. An alternative reading of Bhoga's commentary (recorded in Jaenjandraśīla Mītra's critical apparatus) incorporates heyyam 'to be relinquished' but this is not reflected in al-Biruni's Arabic text.

Here corresponds to draṣṭṛ in śutra 2.17: ātmaka to samyoga ibid. Also 'ātmaka roughly corresponds to heyyam ibid. For the use of the term samyoga here cf. śutras 2.23, 25. The YS significantly use a different term, samagopaya, for 'contact' (as between the senses and their objects), in śutra 2.54, and in śutra 3.21 (according to a plausible variant reading), and for 'communion' with a chosen deity in śutra 2.44. Cf. SK 20, 21, 66 and Jaimini's Mīmāṃsāśūtra 1.1.4. To the term samagopaya as used in Śāṅkhyā, Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā corresponds the term samānkarṣa as used in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (e.g. Vaiśeṣikaśūtra 3.1.18).

For the term draṣṭṛ here cf. śutras 1.3; 2.20; 4.42 and SK 19. For the term draṣṭṛ cf. śutras 2.18, 21; 4.20, 22.

Either bhhā or kṣīna (or both) may refer to guṇa (which is elsewhere sometimes rendered by kṣīna). Cf. R, p. 191, l. 7. Cf., however, Vy. on śutra 2.18: tattvabhāvānta-guṇa-svāv-pāvadvhāramam... 'the determination of the nature of guṇaḥ (viz. specific objects of experience) as being desirable or undesirable...'. See also following note.

This may either reflect Vy. on śutra 2.18 (see preceding note) or the text of śutra 2.19: visēṣāvīśeṣa-līttamātrātītinī guṇa-parvānti 'The subdivisions of the constituent qualities (guṇas) are the particularized (vidēṣa; according to Vy.: the gross elements, the senses and the manas), the non-particularized (āvīśeṣa; viz. the subtle elements and the ahaṅkāra), the characterized (liśīmātra; viz. the buddhi), and the non-characterized (āvīśeṣa; viz. prakṛti).'

The expression guṇa-parvānti may correspond to tattvabhāvānta (lit., 'that is characterized by the elements'). The words ātmaka or ātmakī (lit., 'that is characterized by the elements') may be an attempt based on the commentary used by al-Biruni to translate the rest of the śutra. The possibility cannot be ruled out that al-Biruni may have discovered the view that one of the three guṇas, namely kriyā (= rajas) is a compound of the other two in this commentary used by him. But if this too should not have been the case, the conjecture may be put forward that this passage may have been due to a misunderstanding on his part of a definition of bhoga 'experience' similar to that occurring in Vy. on śutra 2.18: indrīyagatātītinī guṇa-svāv-pāvadvhāramam bhogā... 'experience is the determination of the nature of the guṇas (viz. in the form of specific empirical objects), which have not been distinguished (from the real self, the purusa) as being desirable or undesirable (cf. definition of experience in śutra 3.35: sattva-purusaḥ pratyayasaktiḥ sattvakārṇayog pratyayaśeṣo bhogā...). Experience is consistent in the lack of discrimination in (a given) mental perception (between the sattva) viz. the buddhi, the mind) and the real self which are absolutely distinct...'. Al-Biruni may have misinterpreted the difficult expression avībhāgānmanam (or a similar expression). He may have believed that in this context avībhāga, lit. 'lack of separation', refers to a mixture of guṇas. The correct interpretation of the Sanskrit words here is: 'characterized by lack of discrimination'. This clearly refers to the relationship between the purusa 'self', and the buddhi 'mind'. For the Arabic expression al-akhir al-ākhir (or both) as a rendering of sattva cf. the latter's meaning 'purity and goodness'. Cf. the term sattva-sthāh in Maitreyaparibhāṣā 6.30 (pace P. Deussen's rendering of sattva here by 'Realität' in his Schleich UPanisadh's des Veda, Leipzig, 1905, 350). Also cf. the moral interpretation of the three guṇas, or the application of their moral sphere, as in Mahābhārata 12.302.4 (Poono ed.). In the latter verse a correspondence seems to be brought out between the action of sattva and that of purusa (merit), the action of tamaś and that of adharma (i.e. pāpa 'demerit'), and the action of rajas and that of pṛṣṇa-pāpa (the admixture of merit and demerit). (Cf. E. H. Johnston, Early Śāṅkhyā, London, 1937, 22 seq. Johnston, however, seems to have overstated his point: 'In the earliest stage of Śāṅkhyā... the guṇas... have nothing to do with explanations of the multifariousness of phenomena; their sole function is to register the moral state of the individual as determined by his acta'; op. cit., p. 36.) This or a similar text in the commentary used by al-Biruni might account for his characterization of rajas as a mixture of sattva and tamaś. This in the Arabic μέτσελ in the singular.

The senses (indrīya) are mentioned in śutra 2.18.

In the Arabic μέτσελ in the singular.

Cf. śutra 2.18: prabhā-krīṣī-ṣṭhitī-śīlam bhūtendriyānākaṃ bhogāparvārthānāṃ drīṣyān... (The range of objects that are) seen (i.e. prakṛti) (consists of) that which (a) has as its function illumination, activity, and inertia (lit.: "constancy"), (b) is constituted by the elements and
the senses, and (c) has as its purpose experience and liberation. Deussen’s rendering of bhoga here by ‘enjoyment’ (‘Gemuß’) seems misleadingly too literal, and Hauer’s rendering by ‘devouring the world’ (‘Weltessen’) is rather bizarre. See e.g. Annaher’s definition of bhoga in his Dipikā commentary on his Terkasanagraha: . . sukha-dubhāKayata-sākeśkāhā i.e. ‘the direct apprehension either of pleasure or pain’ (A. Foucher, Le compendium des topiques, Paris, 1949, 24).

For the characterization of the three guṇas here cf. SK, 12: prakāśa-praṣṭitināmārthāḥ . . guṇdā. The guṇas have as their purpose illumination, activity, and restraint . . . ‘knowledge’ of the Arabic text corresponds to prakāśa ‘illumination’ in the sūtra, which is equivalent to sattva; ‘activity’ corresponds to kriyā ‘action’ which is equivalent to rajas; and ‘knowledge’ ‘persistence’ corresponds to sthiti ‘inertia, constancy’, which is the equivalent of tamas.

Ritter reads here नेमित्ता which presupposes a slight emendation. The MS has नेमित्ता which should probably be read ज्ञेनित्ता. A different characterization of the three guṇas occurs in India, Hyd., 31: 

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... of three powers potentially, not actually, which are called sattva, rajas, and tamas. . . . The first power is comfort (i.e. happiness, opposite स्वदेश), cf. R, p. 178, l. 11; and not ‘rest’ as Sachau translates here and goodness, and hence come creation (or production; not ‘existence’ as Sachau translates here) and growing. The second is exertion and toil (Sachau: ‘exertion and fatigue’), and hence come firmness and duration. The third is languor and irresolution, and hence come ruin and perishing. Therefore the first power is attributed to the angels, the second to the men, the third to the animals’ (cf. Sachau (tr.), 1, 40–1).


97 For the expression in this verse cf. R, p. 170, l. 11 (BSOAS, art. cit., p. 314, l. 15).

98 This appears to correspond to sūtra 2.20: द्रोणः द्रिकिर्मात्रां बुद्धो ‘pi pratyayānupasāyak ‘The seer is nothing but seeing and, though pure (i.e. undefiled by the guṇas), is cognizant of (lit. looks upon) mental percepts (pratyaya = pratīti). The YŚ uses derivatives such as drīti, citi in the sense of the nouns ‘of seeing, thinking’ (see L. Renon, ‘On the identity of the two Pratāpalīs’, Indian Historical Quarterly, xvi, 3, 1940, 590). Ballantyne understands by anupasāya ‘looking directly on ideas’, whereas Deussen, taking his lead from Vyāsa, understands by it: discerning ideas by means of the buddhi. In this context, however, I suggest the following: ‘The functions of the mind are permanently known, since their master, the self, is unmodifiable.’

99 This corresponds to sūtra 2.21: तद-नाथे एवं द्रीकिर्मात्रा ‘The specific character (ātman) of the seen (objects) (i.e. the evolution of the objects) is only for the sake of it (the seer, i.e. the self).’

Our translation follows Vy, who glosses ātman by svarāpa ‘specific character’. Rājendralāla Mitra’s translation, ‘Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle’ (and likewise Hauer’s) is obscure. Similarly Ballantyne’s rendering of ātman here by ‘entity’ and Gangānātha Jhā’s rendering by ‘the very essence’ are implausible. On the other hand, Dāma Prasadā and Woods’s rendering of ātman here by ‘being’ may be considered. For the meaning of ‘being’ is suggested by expressions such as ātma-lābhha ‘coming into being’ (cf. Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda on sūtra 2.21; Viśākhadatta’s Mudrākṣara, 1, verse 1), labdhamāka and pratilabdhamāka ‘having come into being’ (cf. Śāṅkara on Bhagavadgītā 7.27; Vy on sūtra 2.21). For the idea expressed by this verse cf. sūtra 2.18.

100 This sentence seems to reflect sūtra 2.23: svad-vānī-śaktīsyaj svarōṇapalabhoghābhih svamayog. Wood’s translation of this sūtra may be used with some modification: ‘The cause for the apprehension of what the power of the property and of what the proprietor are in conjunction’. In this interpretation of the sūtra Woods follows Vy, ad loc. and subsequent commentary. Deussen, however, understands the sūtra differently, translating it: ‘The Ursache des Wahrnehmens des Wesens des Besessenen (der prakṛti) vermisβ die Potenzen des Besessenen und des Besitzers (der prakṛti und des puruṣa) ist ihre Verbindung’. Evidently Deussen takes eva in both of its occurrences in the sūtra as a reflexive referring to prakṛti. The
use of the term *samyoga* here refers back to *sūtra* 2.17. The Arabic sentence here is, however, also in keeping with the theory of the commentators on *sūtra* 2.21. (See Vv. and Nagel’s *Bhāratināgocaitīya*.) In rendering this *sūtra* al-Bīrūnī used terminology of the Arabic Aristotelian. For the term *svāmī* in *sūtra* 2.23 cf. the term *prabhū* 'master, lord' used in YS 4.17 to refer to the *purusa*.

101 Or: ‘in what way’.

102 A somewhat similar objection may be found in Vy. on *sūtra* 2.24: *nau budsī-niyātīr eva mokesāḥ, ākāraṇākāraṇabābādād buddhi-niyātītē. tāc ākāraṇān samādhīkāraṇān darākān śivānīte* ‘Is release anything but the cessation of the thinking-substance? When there is no cause of non-sight the thinking-substance ceases. And this non-sight which is the cause of bondage ceases when there is sight’ (Wooda’s tr., 166). Despite a certain resemblance, the question suggested by *sūtra* 2.22 and the commentators ad loc. is different from the one posed in the Arabic text. The Sanskrit sources here do not question the continuance of the existence of the knower *qua* knower after he achieved liberation but that of the known objects after liberation (see *purusa* and *sabkāra*).

For the *sūtra* 2.22: *kṛtārtham prati nastam apya anastam tad anuka-śīdhārayatvāt ‘Though it (the object of sight, i.e. of experience) has ceased (to be seen) in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased (to be) since it is common to others besides him*.

103 'Cognizant' renders *vāmāṇa* The term *vāmāṇa* is rendered above by the word ‘knower’.

104 This statement contrasts with the answer to Q 36. The expression *vāmāṇa* usually means ‘infinite’. Ballantyne’s printed text has here a variant reading which incorporates *heym* ‘to be removed’ after *kētur* in the *sūtra*. Vv. ad loc.: *vīparṣaya-jītāna-vśāāntey arthāh; vīparṣaya-jītāna-vśāāntey sa na kārya-nīśṭhām puruṣa-ṣiṣṭām baddhi-bhūpin piśācit sādākārī puruṣa śrīvatate* ‘In other words, (ignorance) is the substance and expression from erroneous cognition; the intellect (buddhi) incorporated with subconscious impressions from erroneous cognition does not attain the self of the knowler, which is the goal of its actions, but returns again with its task yet unfulfilled’.

105 cf. *sūtra* 2.22: *kṛtārtham prati nastam apya anastam tad anuka-śīdhārayatvāt (see translation above, n. 102). Al-Bīrūnī appears to have taken the word *śīdhāraya* in the *sūtra* in the sense of a generic property, a universal, and hence an intellect; and he takes *kṛtārth* to be its opposite—a sense-perceived object. Furthermore, he may have misread *nasta* ‘destroyed’ as *nīṣṭhā* in the sense of ‘steadiness, well-founded perfect knowledge, certainty’. He is consequently led to translate the *sūtra* as: *śīdhāraya* ‘... and the intellect (buddhi) being united with other properties which are not in the universal, and hence in the intellect, the sense-percepts do not possess permanent reality in the way the intellect do. A Platonic-Aristotelian background is evident in this erroneous translation. Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 306. Alternatively, the statement in the Arabic text here is perhaps an attempt at interpreting *sūtra* 2.26, in which the word *avipūa* may correspond to... *niśṭhā* *nīṣṭhā*... *śīdhāraya*. *Sūtra* 2.26 reads: *vīcēkā-ṛṣṭīṣā seipla hāṇopīyaḥ ‘The means of this relinquishment is the undisturbed knowledge of the distinction (between purusa and purakrti)’. For the use of the term *vīcēkā-ṛṣṭīṣā* ‘knowledge of the difference’ in *sūtra* 3.49.

106 Or: ‘is abolished’.

107 The terms *ādāraṇa* and *ākāraṇa* belong to the vocabulary of the Śīfas. These terms may have been used by al-Bīrūnī to render *kāvalaya*, traditionally understood as ‘isolation’, in translating *sūtra* 2.25. See next note. On the meaning of the term *kāvalaya* see T. Gelbhum, ‘Sākhya and Sātrre’, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, r, i, 1970, 77 ff.

108 The last passage of the answer to Q 38 dealing with cessation of conjunction corresponds to *sūtra* 2.25 and commentators ad loc. *Sūtra* 2.25: *tad-abhāvat samyogadhiścēva hānanam tad drśē kāvalayaṃ ‘When there is no longer that (ignorance) there is no conjunction; (instead there is) relinquishment which consists in the *kāvalaya* (i.e. autonomy, independence) of the seeing (i.e. of *purusa*).’ *Vy. ad loc.: taṣyadākāranyābhāvād buddhi-puruṣa-samyagdhāva ityantiko bandhano-parama ity arthāḥ; tat hānanam; tad drśē kāvalayam puruṣyamśīdhārayabhāva puruṣa anayoga guñār ity arthāḥ ‘When there is no longer absence of the vision there is absence of conjunction of the intellect with the self, that is to say a complete ending of bondage. This is the cessation, the *kāvalaya* of the seeing, the unmixed state of the self; in other words, the state in which there is never again conjunction (of the self) with the *purusa*. Al-Bīrūnī’s use of the word *niṣṭhā* in this context may have been suggested by the Sanskrit *arthā* in the commentary used by him.
AL-BIRFINI'S ARABIC VERSION OF PATAÑJALI'S YOGASÚTRA

116 Here the MS is perforated, and several words are wholly or partly missing.

117 For al-Birfini's use of the term prâyà-āsmitā, see the reference provided in the text.

118 Possibly: the causes of the feeling of pleasure. For al-Birfini's use of similar expressions cf. below R, p. 182, l. 14; India, Hyd., p. 51, l. 17.

119 Janaka-vyapara-janakam.

120 Possibly: the causes of the feeling of pleasure. For al-Birfini's use of similar expressions cf. below R, p. 182, l. 14; India, Hyd., p. 51, l. 17.

121 Cf. sūtra 2.27: tasya saptakā prānta-bhāmau prajājāt 'At the highest stage the insight into this distinction between puruṣa and prakṛti is sevenfold'. Two variant readings here are prānta-bhāmikā and prānta-bhāmī instead of prānta-bhāmau. Woods seems to have adopted one of these two variants and followed Vy. ad loc. in interpreting tasya. Accordingly he translates: 'For him (there is) insight seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest'. The number seven which occurs in this passage of the Sanskrit text is in this sūtra. The subdivision into two groups of four and three respectively is found in commentaries such as Vy. and Bhaja ad loc. In the Sanskrit sources, however, the first of these two groups is related to kārya-vimuktī 'liberation from acts that have to be performed (or: from effort)'; the second of these groups is related to citta-vimuktī 'liberation from the mind-stuff'. The name of the latter group may correspond to the निष्ठ group in the Arabic text. The name kārya-vimuktī of the first group in the Sanskrit commentaries may have been read by al-Birfini: kāya-vimuktī. The word kāya 'body' would correspond to शान्त, the term by which that group is referred to by al-Birfini. It is by no means impossible that the Sanskrit source used by al-Birfini employed the term kāya-vimuktī. Moreover, it might have contained a list comprising seven terms, contrary to the lists of the extant Sanskrit commentaries, did not essentially differ from al-Birfini's list. In other words, this is one of the passages in al-Birfini's text which may provide a pointer to an otherwise lost Sanskrit tradition. The reading kāya-vimuktī suggested by al-Birfini's translation may indicate a way out of a difficulty posed by the following sentence in Vāc. ad loc. kvacl-pātaḥ kārya-vimuktī tīt 'A different reading is kārya-vimuktī': As kārya-vimuktī occurs in the text of Vy., which is commented upon by Vāc., it seems plausible that the 'different reading' mentioned by Vāc. may have been kāya-vimuktī. For the use of the term prajājāt in the sūtra cf. sūtras 1.20, 48, 49; 3.5.

122 The Arabic text corresponds to sūtra 2.28: yogāngas̄yānaḥ śaṣṭadhi-kṣaye jhāna-dīpti । a vīke-khyateḥ 'When, following the practice of the yoga stages, impurity has dwindled away, enlightenment arises, the knowledge of discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti'. In contrast to the Sanskrit original, the state of knowing appears, according to the Arabic text, to precede purity. For the use of the expression jhāna-dīpti in the sūtra cf. prajñāloka in sūtra 3.5.

123 Cf. sūtra 2.29: yama-niyamānasa-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraya-dhāyanā-sāmadhikāyayo 'śīvānām 'The eight stages (lit.: auxiliaries, aids) are restraint (or: cardinal rules of conduct), observance (or: vows), posture, regulation (lit. either: restraint, control), or: protraction') of breath, withdrawal (of the senses), fixation (of thought), meditation, and (final) concentration. Al-Birfini refers further on in the translation to all these constitutive parts. The expression नियमस्वरूपानां 'eight qualities (or: characteristics)', which corresponds to astāvānām 'eight parts (or: auxiliaries) in the sūtra, may have been suggested to al-Birfini by the Sanskrit expression astā-guṇa which was perhaps contained in the original commentary used by him, as a description of the asāṅga-yoga. The expression asā-guṇa can mean 'eightfold' and also having eight qualities'. For the use of the compound astā-guṇa to refer to the asāṅga-yoga cf. Mahabharata 12.317.5: vedēṣu asā-guṇānavam yogam dhāram manisvānaḥ / śākṣaṁ asā-guṇām prāhūr netarām... 'The wise declare in the Vedas that Yoga has eight characteristics (or: virtues); none other they declare than the subtle eightfold one...'.

124 E. W. Hopkins, 'Yoga-technique in the Great Epic', 'Journal of the American Oriental Society', xxii, 2, 1901, 340–1. (For a variant reading 'guṇānam instead of guṇaṁ here see the Poona critical edition of the Mahabharata, 12.317.) For the use of asāṅga in the YS to refer to ancillary, propaedeutic stages cf. the synonym upalākā 'aid' and the Mimāṃsaka definition of the term quoted in Bhāmaśārya Jhalakikar's Nyāyākosā, Poona, 1929, s.v.: mukhya-pāhājanakāte sati mukhya-pāhājanaka-vyāpāra-janakam angam 'asāṅga is the generator of that operation which generates the chief product, but it is not (itself directly) the generator of the chief product'. For an earlier and partly different list of yogāṅgas see Maṭhuraṇanaśāstrī 1.18: 'prāṇāyānam pratīchatāh dhīyanam dhiyāṇaḥ tarkaḥ samādhiḥ sad-anāgam ity ucyate yogāṅga 'Yoga is traditionally said to consist of the following six stages: regulation of breath, withdrawal of the senses, meditation, fixation of thought, contemplation, and (final) concentration'. A third version, differing from the previous one, appears in the above list as well as from the one in the YS occurs in Viśeṣyānaya's Bhāga on Gautama's Nyāyākosā 4.2.46 (ed. G. Jhā, Poona, 1939, 308). For a sixfold yoga, cf. also Jayanākara Tarkapāñcāna's Viśruti on Kanāda's Viśeṣyākosāstra 5.2.16. For further lists of yogāṅgas other than Patañjali's eight, see references in P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, v, Part ii, Poona, 1962, 1419; A. Janacek, 'The methodical principle in Yoga according to Patañjali's Yogasūtras', Archiv Orientální, xix, 1–2, 1961, 51... A. Zigmund-Cerbu, 'The Šadānta-yoga', History of Religion, iii, 1963, 128 seq.; and C. Pams, 'Osservazioni e riferimenti per lo studio dello sādānta-yoga', Annali, Istituto Orientale di Napoli, NS, xix, 4, 1969, 521 seq.

125 This corresponds to yama in sūtra 2.29. Cf. the characterization of yama by Viśruti
abstention from action’; and niyama by pravritti ‘engagement in activity’ in Nāgāra's Bhāṣyavacchādā in sūtra 2.32.

123 This corresponds to ahiṃsa in sūtra 2.30. Cf. India, Hyd., 60–61: ‘(Sachau (tr.), 1, 80: ‘keeping aloof from killing under all circumstances’); Hyd., 56: ‘abstaining from doing harm’. The term ahiṃsa is traditionally understood as a negative concept: abstention from injury to living beings, harmlessness, non-violence.

124 For an exposition of the meaning of this term as fundamentally a positive concept, i.e. ‘gentleness, benevolence’, though expressed by a private term, see J. Gonda, Four studies in the language of the Veda, The Hague, 1959, 95 et seq., and B. Williams, Jaina Yoga, London, 1963, p. xix.

125 This corresponds to satya in sūtra 2.30.

126 This corresponds to asteya in sūtra 2.30. Adopting R’s suggestion, this concept has been amended to "abstaining from malice towards all living beings, truthfulness, honesty, non-violence, gentleness, abstention from stealing, continence, and generosity (or absence of covetousness)’. Unlike Words who in translating this sūtra went so far as to make it uniformly negative (‘abstention from injury and from falsehood and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts’)118, Gonda translates: ‘the abstentions ... are: abstention from malice towards all living creatures, truthfulness, honesty, continence and non-acceptance of gifts’, op. cit., 97. Jacoby, op. cit., 25–6, notes that while the first four items here are paralleled in the Brāhmaṇica (Baudhāyana), Buddhist, and Jaina literatures, aparigraha is found in the YS and the Jaina literature only. The latter term, however, does occur in Bhāṣyavacchādā in sūtra 6.10.

127 cf. sūtra 2.31: ete jāti-dekā-kāla-samāyāva-varnānāṁ sūra-bhavaṁ-mahā-vratam ‘Unrestricted to class, place, time, or circumstances, these (enumerated in sūtra 2.30) constitute the great vow which is universal’. For the meaning of sūra-bhavahe here cf. the Jaina distinction between anvāraṇas and mahāvaṇas, conditional and unconditional vows respectively (Tailtṛṭkā-Śrīkumānasūtra 7.2, referred to by Jacoby, op. cit., 26). Deussen, however, takes sūra-bhavahe here to mean: applicable to all bhāmas, or stages (‘for all Stufen gültige’). For this meaning of sūra-bhavahe cf. Vy. on sūtra 1.1: yogah satādhihe sa ca sūra-bhavaṁ cittasya dharmaḥ ‘Yoga is attention. And attention is a property of the mind-stuff which exists on all levels’ (cf. Staal, op. cit., 120). Also cf. bhāmi in sūtras 2.27; 3.6. A variant reading of sūrabhavahe here is sūrabhāsam ‘ete is omitted in one variant reading and is replaced by te tu in another.

128 cf. kṣira-kāraṇāma-adhikāra ‘(Whether) performed or caused to be performed or approved of ... in sūtra 2.34. For the expression ‘giving orders ...’ cf. Bhoga ad loc.: kuru kuru iti prajyajaya-vyāpāreṣa saṃutpādaṁ kārihe ‘Caused to be performed’ means: brought about through an instigator’s (verbal) activity (such as the expression) ‘Do (it), do (it)’. Cf. Rāmānanda ad loc.

129 cf. etc. lōha-krodaya-moha-pārakāh ‘... motivated by (either) greed, (or) anger (or) delusion ...’ in sūtra 3.34. For al-Bīrūnī’s rendering of moha by ‘jehe’ ‘ignorance’ cf. e.g. the implicit identification of moha with avidyā by Bhoga ad loc. A parallel statement occurs in India, Hyd., p. 55, ll. 3–4.

130 The Arabic has aḥs in the singular.

131 cf. etc. maṛu-madhāyādhamātram ‘(Whether) slight, medium, or excessive ...’ in sūtra 3.34.

132 May this correspond to vitarka-bādhane in sūtra 2.33. Al-Bīrūnī may have read here bodhane ‘in case of knowledge’ instead of bādhane ‘in case of obstruction’ ... Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 306. See also n. 120 below.

133 cf. dhukkha-jānakantaka-phalitā ‘(they) have pain and ignorance as their unending fruits’ in sūtra 3.34. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: tathā ca hiṃsākah āvattā prabhaheṁ vaddhyasaṁ vīryam ākṣipati tatā ca sustrād-nipātenā dhukkhayati tato jīvād api mocyati ... dhukkhopadānā naraka-tīryak-pretādayuḥ dhukkham anubhavati ... dhukkha-vipākasā niyata-vipāka-vedanāyān iti. Thus for instance, a killer first eliminates the strength (i.e. resistance) of the victim (by overwhelming him); he then inflicts pain upon him by striking him with a weapon; and thereafter even deprives him of his life. ... On account of having inflicted pain he (the killer in his turn) experiences pain in hell, in (the life of) a beast or a ghost. ... For the fruition consisting of pain is to be felt as a fruition which has a fixed measure ...

134 This may correspond to pratipaka-bhāvanā in sūtra 2.33. The latter expression may have been understood by al-Bīrūnī to mean simply ‘vice versa’, i.e. ‘there is an effecting of the opposite’. Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 306. Also see n. 128 above. The whole of sūtra 2.33 reads: vitarka-bādhane pratipaka-bhāvanam *In case of obstruction (of the performance of the yamas
and niyama) by perversity, the (mental) cultivation of the (respective) antidotes (is to be practised)'. Translators vary here, though the main drift of the sūtra is quite clear. Ballantyne: 'In excluding things questionable, the calling up something opposite (is serviceable)'. Similarly Deussen: 'Wird das Zweifelhafte unterdrückt, so entsteht Bewusstwerdung des Gegenteils'.

Woods, however, translates: 'If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations (vitarka), there should be cultivation of the opposite'. The latter translation has the support of the context, since vitarka seems to be exemplified by ‘violence’ in sūtra 2.34 and contradicted with yama and niyama of sūtras 2.30, 32. It also follows the explanation offered by Vijnānabhikṣu ad loc.: *viparītāṁ tārkāṁ vicārāṁ yasya iti vitarka-saṁyaktāṁ hiṃsāduṣṭāṁ tāntikāti* 'The term vitarka is technical, referring to the intention to harm, etc., namely: those (phenomena) in which there are tarkas i.e. thoughts which are adverse (vi-).' (The usual meaning of the term vitarka is 'doubt.')

The whole of sūtra 2.34 reads: *vitarkāṁ hiṃsādāyāṁ kriyā-kārītanumodāyāṁ loka-krodha-moha-vāpyākāram vrudhātthādhihitāmaṁ dukhātāhānavatāṁ phalāṭi pratiṣākṣa-bhātrivāṁ* ‘The (mental) cultivation (i.e. contemplation) of the antidotes takes the form (iti): “The (perversions) pertaining to) violence, etc.—(whether) performed or caused to be performed or approved of, (whether) motivated by greed (or by) anger (or by) delusion, (whether) slight, medium or excessive—have pain and ignorance as their unending results (lit.: fruits).” The word iti here can function as quotation marks, or alternatively mean 'hence'. The latter alternative, which seems less plausible, has been adopted in the translations of Ballantyne, Woods, and Deussen. Accordingly we would have to understand: ‘The (mental) cultivation of the antidotes (is necessary) because the perversions . . . have pain and ignorance as their unending results.’ For a comparable Buddhist use of the term pratipakṣa occurring in the sūtra cf. D. Seyffert, Rage. ‘On a yoga treatise in Sanskrit from Qizil’, J.AOS, lxxxvii, 2, 1967, 168.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.35: *śīvattāṁ prāthānādhi yataṁ-piṇḍoḥ ‘When non-violence has been consolidated, hostility is abandoned in his proximity’.

In this context 132 Ibn 'Arabī certainly corresponds to sakula ‘mangoose’ in Vāc under sūtra 2.35: *śīvattāṁ prāthānādhi yataṁ-piṇḍoḥ ‘When non-violence has been consolidated (one attains) the property of being the recipient of the fruits of (meritorious) actions’. Also cf. Bhoga ad loc.: *śīvattāṁ prāthānādhi yataṁ-piṇḍoḥ ‘When the Jewels situated in all quarters present themselves to him’; and Śāṅkara Bhagavatīpūla’s gloss: atōdānaṁ darsayantī ‘. . . show themselves’. But the extant commentary do not explicitly mention the capacity of the yogin to see all the jewels that are upon the earth.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.36: *saṭya-pratīkhāyāṁ kriyā-prākṛṣṭyavatam ‘When veracity (is practiced) one attains the (mental) capacity of being truthful (color), etc.)'. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: *saṭya-dik-arthaṁ eva pratīkhāyāṁ bhoktānuḥ ‘The Jewels situated in all quarters present themselves to him’; and Śāṅkara Bhagavatīpūla’s gloss: atōdānaṁ darsayantī ‘. . . show themselves’. But the extant commentary do not explicitly mention the capacity of the yogin to see all the jewels that are upon the earth.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.37: *asteya-pratīkhāyāṁ sarva-ratnapāśānuṁ ‘When abstinence from stealing has been consolidated, all jewels become present (to him)’. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: *saṭya-dik-arthaṁ eva pratīkhāyāṁ bhoktānu ‘The Jewels situated in all quarters present themselves to him’; and Śāṅkara Bhagavatīpūla’s gloss: atōdānaṁ darsayantī ‘. . . show themselves’. But the extant commentary do not explicitly mention the capacity of the yogin to see all the jewels that are upon the earth.

133 Lit.: ‘are rolled up’. Cf. India, Hyd., 52: अन्तः क्रमसः नागः मुखः तदानुस्रावदेव नागम् ‘(Sachau tr.), i, 69: ‘The distances between a man and any far away place vanish’). Also cf. India, Hyd., 63: अन्तः क्रमसः नागः मुखः तदानुस्रावदेव नागम् ‘(Sachau tr.), i, 83: ‘If he wishes, the earth rolls itself up for him.’ The Arabic sentence under consideration may belong to a commentary on the next sūtra. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.39 quoted in the following footnote. Here uṣṇapatita-sarva-bhūtasya samādhī-śiddhi yasya sarvam ēkapātanām avatāram jāndī deḥāntare deḥāntare kālanāte ca ‘One
whose whole nature is surrendered to the śvara has perfection of concentration. By which (concentration) he knows as the whole thing really is all that he desires to know, in other places and in other bodies and in other times.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.39: aparigraha-śtārīye jānma-kathastān-sambodhah 'When generosity (or, non-possiveness) has been firmly established one attains insight as to the "how" of (other births)'. Cf. Vy. ad loc.: ko 'ham āsām katham aham āsām kintvā idām kathastān idām ke va bharjyātah kathām eva bharjyātmaya ity evam aṣya paraśatra-pratīkā-devaśya ātmānām eva samudarpanavartate 'Who was I? How was I? Or what (can) this birth be? Or how (can) this birth be? Or what shall we become? Or how shall we become?' Such a desire to know his own condition in former and later and intermediate times becomes of itself fulfilled for him (tr. Woods).

This corresponds to sūtra 2.40: ascuci śravya-juvyāpa parar āsāmaraṇaḥ 'From (practising) purity arises one's own limbs (and) absence of (bodily) contact with others'. Cf. Rāmānanda ad loc.: yo bāhāya-kauca-siddhas tasya śravye kāye bhuddhim apaśyata yogyāpa bhavati; ascuci-svābhāvo 'yam kāyo nātāka-nāka kārya iti... dāsa-dākīnaḥ... One who is perfected in outer cleanliness does not see (any) purity in his own body and is disgusted at it. This body is essentially impure; no pride should be taken in it. One who sees its defects...'. Cf. India, Hyd., i, 80: 'keeping clean the body', allegedly quoting the Bhagavatayi. The term the sūtra here seems to be paralleled by the concept of holiness and purity in India, Hyd., 56.

The word in the MS is blurred. The portion which is more or less legible looks: kṛ. This could be read kṛ or kīr or kīr. In the context both words can be rendered: 'magnifies'.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.41: kāyendṛya-siddhir asuddhi-keśayāt tapasahā 'From ascetic practices arises the demeaning away of the impurities which lead to the "perfections" of the body and the senses'. A reference to fasting may be found in Bhaja ad loc.: cāndrayātyaśe citra-kleśa-kosāḥ; tad-keśayā indriyānādām sākṣa-vyayākata-virāgya-vār-darśanādī-nāṁśrīyām āvīrbovacat kāryāya sathacakam avatva-mahattāvidīni 'Through (the performance of fasts) as the wounding away of the afflictions of the mind-stuff comes about; from this wounding away manifest themselves capacities of the senses, such as seeing subtle, covered, or remote (objects) (and capacities) of the body, such as (assuming) at will either bulk or the size of an atom'.

This corresponds to sūtra 2.42: santopād anuttama-sukha-lābhas 'From contentment arises the attainment of unsurpassed bliss'. Vijānabhikṣu's reading adopted here seems to be preferable to anuttama sukha-lābhas 'unsurpassed attainment of bliss' as Deussen has it.

The word may be a rendering of santōsa. For the expression the word asāsma is found in Bhaja ad loc.: ṛṇḍa-kauṣṭha loke yac ca dīvyaṃ mahān sukhām/ ṛṇḍa-kauṣṭha suhkhāyate nārāyaṇā ēvaḥākām 'Whatever sensual pleasure there may be in this world and whatever great heavenly pleasure there may be, they cannot equal the sixteenth part of the bliss (that arises) from the cessation of craving'. Also of Vijānabhikṣu on Vy. ad loc.: ṛṇḍa-kauṣṭha ki santōsaḥ; ṛṇḍa-pratibandhāyarte ca citra-kauṣṭha-vādānā-vādānā-samāyāh sukha-svābhāvata ca evāvīrbovacat na ca tath sukha viṣayēyakṣetyah' For contentment is the cessation of craving; when the obstruction (consisting of) craving has vanished, the fact that bliss is an essential property of the mind-stuff, on account of the presupposition of the essential satte in the mind-stuff), becomes manifest on its own accord, it does not depend on objects'. The above oft-quoted verse has been traced to the Mahābhārata (Poona ed., 12.168.36) by Woods (p. 189, n. 1).

For the expression: some may possibly be a rendering of sukha in the sūtra. For the expression cf. ṛṇḍa-pratibandhāyarte 'When the obstruction (lit. 'binding') of the craving has vanished...' in the passage from Vijānabhikṣu quoted above. For the common idea embodied in the sūtra cf. e.g. Mahābhārata (Poona ed.) 12.287.35a: viśtarabh kṣetra-samyuktah samksetpa ta sukhyāvahā 'Vast riches bring sorrow; res angusta, happiness' (Harrison, cit., 356-8). Cf. India, Hyd., 56.13.9: 'Vast riches bring sorrow; res angusta, happiness' (Harrison, cit., 356-8). Cf. India, Hyd., 56.13.9: "Vast riches bring sorrow; res angusta, happiness" (Harrison, cit., 356-8).
one is relieved from the degradation of servitude by the nobility of liberty.' (الظهير here is our proposed emendation of "الظهير" which occurs in the printed editions of *India.*)

144 The term "sadhya" has been rendered above by 'chants' (R, p. 177, l. 16).

145 By the term "al-Birini" regularly renders the Sanskrit terms *deva*, *devatá*. Cf. BSOAS, art. cit., 307, n. 37. In the present passage the term *devadá* is rendered both by the Sanskrit and the Arabic.

146 The man who recites the formulae and the angel or spiritual being.

147 This corresponds to sūtra 2.45: *sadhya-sádhāra-sámprayogāḥ* 'From recitation (of formulae) arises communion with the chosen deity'. The Arabic text seems to be closely related to Bhaja ad loc.: *abhipreta-mantra-japādi-lakṣāne svādhāya prakṛtyāmye yogāna istayah abhipretya devatāya sampagro bohavati sā devatā pratyaṣā bhavati arthaḥ'. *When the recitation consisting in (methods) such as muttering of selected formulae, has been perfected, the yogin possesses communion with the chosen, i.e. selected, deity. That is to say, this deity becomes visible*'. The word *istayah may be compared with the Sanskrit expression *pratyakṣā (variant: *pratyaṣā*-) bhavati in the passage quoted above. Both al-Birini and Bhaja interpret *svādhāya* as referring to the recitation of formulae. Cf. Vy. on sūtra 2.1. For the translation in the Arabic text here cf. "chants of praise and recitations" in Answer to Q 24 above, R, p. 177, l. 16; and cf. *sādāyān* in *India*, Hyd., 61 (Sachau (tr.), 1, 80: 'the reciting of the holy texts, praising God').

148 The term *ānanda* may also refer to a religious practice of Muslim mystics.

149 Or: 'his heart'.

150 This corresponds to sūtra 2.45: *sāmadhi-viddhir tāvāra-pravivhādūtī'. The perfection of concentration arises from the directing of one's mind to the īśvara'. Cf. sūtras 1.24 and 2.1. The term īśvara may be a rendering of the Sanskrit term *samādhi*. Cf. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī ad loc.: *sāmadhiś cittasya samādhiḥnaṃ praksāda iti yāvat samādhiḥ is the focusing (lit. 'putting together') of the mind-stuff, i.e. settling down peacefully'. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 55: *ānta kastuṃkta alipi, pi nekata samādhiḥ acalā buddhis tattva yogam avedagasya...* 'then the heart quietly rests on one thing, viz. the search for liberation and for arriving at the absolute unity...'. The related term *ānanda* is used by al-Birini to render the title of the first chapter *samādhi, R*, p. 177, l. 10 (tr. BSOAS, art. cit., 328: 'making the heart steadfastly fixed'), though the same term is also used by him to render *dhāraya* in sūtra 3.2 (R, p. 183, l. 20).

For al-Birini's understanding of the term *samādhi* cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.53: 'yadā śāṅkaraṁ nīcetā / samādhiṁ acadā buddhis tattva yogam avedagasya...'. *When thought stands motionless and immovable in concentration, then you will attain yoga*.

The expression *ānta kastuṃkta alipi, pi nekata samādhiḥ* seems to be a rendering of *tāvāra-pravivhādūtī* in the sūtra. For such an understanding of the latter term cf. e.g. Nārāyaṇa Tirtha on sūtra 2.1. *pravivhādūtī = stutī-dū-janita bhaṭṭih*. *The term pravivhādūtī means (a type of) devotion generated by chants of praise, etc.*

After (1) *yama group* and (2) the *nigama group* comes (3) *āsana* (yogic posture). Cf. Bhaja (introducing sūtra 2.46): *yama-nigamān utdāvanāna aha'. Having discussed the Restraints and Observances he (Patañjali) addresses himself to (the topic of) *Posture*.

144 This corresponds to sūtra 2.46: *sthira-sukham āsanaṁ* 'Posture is steady and easy'. The reading adopted by Deussen inserts the word *tāra* 'there', i.e. 'in that state') before *sthira-. But an examination of Vy.'s introduction to this sūtra would suggest that *tāra* belongs to the commentary and not to the sūtra itself. For the term *āsana* here cf. the parallel expression in *India*, Hyd., p. 55, l. 15: *netkāḥ cakrātāt: the complete suppression of motion*. For the concept of *āsana* as presented in the sūtra cf. Bhagavadgītā 6.13: *śūnantā kośa-rośva-ravvam dhārayaṁ acalaṁ śthārā...* 'holding the body, head, and neck erect and motionless (keeping himself steady...) (cf. Śvetāvatara-purāṇa, 2.8, and especially, op. cit., 2.9: *śmatyastu cēṭāḥ* "one who controlled his movements").

145 This may be a reflection of a commentary on the following sūtra (2.47): *prayañayānātīmakānaḥ-sāmāpathādyāmāḥ* 'This is achieved by relaxation of effort and (by) unlimited meditation'. (The variant reading *anañyata* 'unlimited' 'adopted here is preferable to the reading *anañyata* "unlimitedness" which Deussen has. *Wood's translation... with reference to Anañyata (i.e. Vāsuki, the Lord of Serpents) is scarcely plausible." The commentary used by al-Birini (which is not available to us) may have contained a discussion of *prayaña* 'effort', of its effects and of the consequences that its renunciation would lead to in relation to Posture. Cf. Rāmānuja on sūtra 2.47: *svādhāvibhyāh prayañachal ca latatvā āsana-vighatakāh tasyāparam āsanaṁ sidhyati...* 'It is natural effort that disrupts Posture, on account of movement; and (hence) it is by cessation of that effort that Posture is accomplished'. Also cf. Baladeva ad loc.: *... bahu-vaghānāntarāyān yadṛṣṭā kṛṣṭe saṅgāram-kampāṇādy āsana-aḥirāya na bhavatī bhāvaḥ...* 'that is to say, when after numerous attempts Posture has been performed, still there is no steadiness of Posture, on account of a stirring of the limbs' (also cf. Vijñānabhaiku ad loc.). For the use of the term *sañchayya* here cf. sūtra 3.38; for *samāpatty* cf. sūtra 1.41, 42; 3.42.
The word **स्नातन** has been rendered above by 'relaxes'. The whole sentence in the Arabic text here corresponds to sūtra 2.48: *tato dvandvānabhājītāḥ* 'Consequently (the yogin) is unaffected by the pairs (of extremes)'. Cf. India, Hyd., 56: 73-4: "and he will be occupied in such a degree that he does not perceive anything that gives pain, like heat or cold...". The examples of the pairs of opposites, or rather complements, found in al-Birūnī are also listed in Bhoja ad loc.: *tasmin āsama-jaye sati dvandvāhā śīloṣa-kusumānihātāḥ* 'When meditation on the Anahāra (e.g. the Auspicious) is considered, the yogin is not affected by pairs such as cold and heat, hunger and thirst'. These, as well as others, are not infrequently mentioned elsewhere in commentatorial explanations of *dvandvā* (cf. e.g. Medhātihī’s, Kullikā’s, and Govindaśāja’s com. on *Manuṣyaśīrṣa* 1.16; Vījñānabhaṅka on *Vy.,* under sūtra 2.32). As is evident from the examples, the oft-quoted traditional definition of *dvandvā* requiring that it be constituted by two mutually exclusive terms is too restrictive. Cf. Vījñānabhaṅka loc. cit.: *yadgaya śīloṣādīrāvat paraśara-viśuddhatvaṃ bhūlakīpi-pāsāyor nāttai tāhāpya mithunavat eva pārśvākṣāya-dvandvāt* 'Although (the defining condition of *dvandvā* i.e.) mutual exclusiveness (of the terms) is not satisfied in (the example) “hunger and thirst”, the latter is technically a *dvandvā*, just like the case of “a couple (of male and female)”'.

The concept of *dvandvā* and its illustration here appear to convey completeness, totality of external factors impinging on one’s senses. However, the full significance of the formation of pairs (*dvandvā*) in yoga, where it implies extraordinary forcefulness and efficacy, is in all probability not disconnected from the Vedic maxim that a pair means strength and a productive copulation (*dvandvāvai víṣyam... dvandvāvai mithunavai prayājanam—*quoted and discussed by J. Gonda, *Visvaśāṅvatāra and Śirasma: a comparison*, London, 1970, 56, 163, n. 304. For further discussion of categorical oppositions and various categories and distinctions between them two complementary classes, see J. Gonda, *The dual deities in the religion of the Veda*, Amsterdam, 1974, p. 22 et seq.). For the use of *anabhājītāḥ* in the sūtra cf. sūtra 3.45. Also cf. *Manuṣyaśīrṣa* 12.77: ‘... śīloṣādīrāvat...’ 'harmlessness (lit. ‘attacks, strikings’)...'.

The context of sūtra 2.49: *tasmin sati śava-pravāsāyogatī-vichedah prāsniprabhāt* ‘When this (i.e. Posture) has been accomplished, regulation of breath (consisting in) cutting off the flow of inhaling and exhaling (is to be practised)’. Cf. *Bhāgavatī* 4.29: *prāsādān-gati ruddhāv...’... checking the flow of inhaling and inhaling...’. The first person of the subjunctive in the depth or probability occurred in all probability in the commentary used by al-Birūnī.

Cf. India, Hyd., 55: ‘विनस्तनक तैत्तिरि तपा भवाष्ट्रस्य एवेकोत्पत्तिः' (trans. by Sachau, *Skt. Translators* 9.13). This seems to reflect sūtra 2.53: *dhāraṇam ca yogātā manushaḥ* ‘Consequently the following translation is also possible: ‘He is therefore able to do whatever he wishes’.

For the expression *प्रक्षेपनस्य स्वयं सीर्य शिशुराः* see B.S.O.A.S., art. cit., 314, n. 98 (where the word ‘cf.’ at the beginning of the sentence is missing).

This corresponds to sūtra 2.54: *sva-sva-viṣaya-samprayogāhāvāh caitanyā suvarṇaṅkuraṇa ivendrīrקבम प्रभयानभारः 'Withdrawal is the imitation, as it were, by the senses of the mind-stuff itself, when they are no longer conjoined with their objects’. (Some editions have the alternative reading *sva-viṣaya-citā...* at the beginning of the sūtra, cf. e.g. KSS, 190, p. 112.) Cf. *Chandrāvyogasūtra* 15.1: ‘...ātman arsāvdiriyai saṃpratibhāya...’ having made all his senses steadfastly fixed in the self’.

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This corresponds to sūtra 2.55: *tataḥ paramā vaśyatendriyāṁ* 'Consequently there is perfect subjugation of the senses'.

R's suggestion is not obligatory.

A less likely alternative translation is: 'towards a certain prazis which . . .' ( . . .).

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AL-BĪRŪNĪ’S ARABIC VERSION OF PATAṆJALI’S YOGASŪTRA: A TRANSLATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER AND A COMPARISON WITH RELATED TEXTS

By Shlomo Pines and Tuvia Gelblum

The following study contains a translation of al-Bīrūnī’s rendering into Arabic of the third chapter of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra cum commentary. (On this point see our translation of al-Bīrūnī’s rendering of the first two chapters of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra).¹ This translation is based on Ritter’s edition of the Arabic text.² Comparison has been made with the unique MS of Ritter’s text: Köprüli, 1589, fols. 412a-419a (written on the margins).³ We have also compared the text with parallel passages and expressions in al-Bīrūnī’s India.⁴ Furthermore, an attempt has been made here to indicate the parallels between the Arabic version on the one hand, and the Sanskrit text of the Yogasūtra,⁵ as well as its extant commentaries,⁶ on the other.

The following is a list of those sūtras of the third chapter correspondence to which may be found in al-Bīrūnī’s text: 1-4, 5 (?), 6-7, 10-11, 14, 16-21, 21a, 22-32, 34-55. On the face of it, it is likely that the sūtras which are not reflected in al-Bīrūnī’s text (viz. 5 (?), 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 33) did not occur in the text available to him; the possibility may then exist that they were later accretions. Sometimes a part of a sūtra is missing in al-Bīrūnī’s text. Thus, e.g. in sūtra 3.50 the phrase dosa-bija-kṣaye ‘when the “(cardinal) faults ” have dwindled away ’ is not reflected in al-Bīrūnī’s text.

On at least two points al-Bīrūnī appears to differ from all the commentaries available to us. He understands prāpti as ‘perception with the senses ’ (R, p. 191, l. 17) and ‘the capacity to know’ (India, Hyd., p. 52, ll. 14-15) rather than ‘the capacity to reach any place ’ (cf. commentaries on animādi in sūtra 3.45); and his cosmological description differs to a considerable extent from those occurring in the available commentaries on the Yogasūtra as well as in other Sanskrit sources quoted below. It may be supposed that on these points al-Bīrūnī followed the commentary utilized by him. Cf. BSOAS, ch. I, Introduction.

Some observations on al-Bīrūnī’s rendering of various terms and passages of the third chapter may be found in the introduction to our translation of the first chapter.

Chapter 3

(R, 183, l. 20) The sixth quality is quietude and tranquillity so that one is enabled to make one’s heart steadfastly fixed upon one object.⁷

The seventh quality is the prolonging of reflection upon the object on which the heart is, with great application,⁸ steadfastly fixed, so that one is not subject to multiplicity and (in consequence) is neither divided and split between (the various) occasions nor diverted to another object.⁹

(R, 184) The eighth quality is perfect concentration on this (very same) application so that reflection becomes one with its object.¹⁰

He in whom these eight qualities are conjoined and whose soul has been disciplined in the stages and the attainment of what is subtle and noble.¹¹ The latter three qualities which are referred to in the third chapter are, as it were, separate from the five (qualities described in the) first (place) because they are more remote from the senses and closer to the intellect.¹²

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and are on the brink of a mental representation of the *cognitum* stripped of matter which is among the ties of the sense.

Q 42. Does man reach through these (three qualities) the aim which is sought?

Answer. He that progresses in them is like one that progresses in years in (the space of time which ranges) between infancy and old age. Knowledge regarding them is one, for it spreads out from the knower to the known (objects) so that it is characterized by multiplicity. When he quiets it and cuts off from it the factors of spreading out, it becomes one and through the third (quality)—universal. He has not, however, reached (at this point) the degree of mental representation stripped of matter. The instrument for reaching this (degree) is repeated practice as has been (said) before.

Q 43. What is the reward for him who perseveres in, and patiently applies himself to, repeated practice?

Ans. (His) reward (consists) in knowledge of the past, the present and the future.

Q 44. Is knowledge concerning them one or three?

Ans. It is one, as clay is; for before being kneaded the latter was dust, and after that it (becomes) a jar. (Now) ‘clayness’ is one (and the same) in the three states even though the form differs, being manifest in some of them and being concealed in others. In the same way the form of this one knowledge differs according to the difference of the form of time in the three divisions of the latter.

Q 45. Is he recompensed in this world with things other than this also?

Ans. Names do not change when they pass from speech to thought or vice versa. For a jar is a jar when (its name) is uttered and it is (likewise) a jar when it is thought of. However knows things by their names and thinks of them according to their definitions and is accustomed to distinguish this and trace it to its true reality knows the language of birds. And whoever is accustomed to quieten and assemble knowledge knows his state in the past, before (his) descent into the body, and knows the hidden thoughts with regard to love and enmity, with a general knowledge—without knowing the beloved or the hated (object) with a particular knowledge.

(R, 185) Q 46. How does he perform his wondrous acts?

Ans. By means of thought and steadfastness. For he finds his recompense and reward in every case in which he applies his thought and to which (?) he directs his steadfastness; albeit every reward that falls short of liberation is not perfect and is not a pure good. Thus, whoever wishes to be hidden from the eyes applies his thought constantly to (his own) body and to the representation which he has concerning it, such as its beauty or ugliness, (its) being long or short, and (its) shape and configuration. (He then) directs his efforts to turning away the eyes of other persons and to constraining the sense of sight. Accordingly he becomes invisible to (other) persons. Similarly, whenever he applies his thought constantly to speech and to its constriction, his voice becomes inaudible so that it is no longer heard even if it be known (to be producing sound).

Whoever wishes to grasp the circumstances of his death, constantly applies (his) thought to (his) works, and his soul becomes suddenly prepared for the knowledge of what is unknown.

Whoever wishes to have a (mental) representation of Paradise and Hell, of the angels and the spirits that mete out punishment after death, as well as...
of the dead among his ancestors, should constantly apply (his) thought to them after having stopped his ears in such a way that no voice resounds in the hole of his ear, and after having closed his eyes in such a way that no visible object falls within the scope of his vision.

Whoever wants to strengthen his soul should constantly remember to rejoice in good and turn away from evil and to have pity on (the evildoer).

Whoever wants to strengthen his body directs (his) thought to the power (in question) and its localizations in it (i.e. the body). For by doing this constantly he will acquire a power which does not fall short of that of an elephant. Therefore if he directs his thought to the light of the senses after having subdued and constricted them, he receives as his recompense knowledge of the subtle things, (both) present and absent.

Whoever directs it (i.e. his thought) to the sun receives as his recompense comprehension of everything that is in the worlds so that he sees them.

The commentator has at this point an explanatory discourse describing the world and the Earths. It seems useful to quote this discourse in an exact manner. For it is one of the sciences current among them. In the description of the existent (things) he starts with the lowest section (proceeding) towards the uppermost. He regards darkness as the lowest (section). Its extent in (terms of) yojanas—a yojana (equalling) thirty two (R, 186) thousand cubits according to their (system of) measurement of distances; in our (measures) this is eight miles—is one koti (i.e. 10,000,000) and eighty five lakṣas (i.e. 8,500,000). According to our reckoning the total is eighteen thousand thousands and five hundred thousands (i.e. 18,500,000). For in their (system of numbers) koti is the term for ten thousand thousands (i.e. 10,000,000) and lakṣa—the term for one hundred thousands.

(The commentator) says: Above the darkness there is Naraka, i.e. hell. Its extent equals thirteen kotis and twelve lakṣas, which is equivalent to one hundred and thirty one thousand thousands and two hundred thousand yojanas. Above hell is again darkness, the extent of which is one lakṣa (i.e. 100,000) (yojanas). Above this (darkness) is an earth which, because of its hardness, is called Vajra, i.e. 'thunderbolt'. Its extent equals thirty four thousand yojanas. Above it (Vajra) is Garbha—i.e. 'the one that is the middle'—sixty thousand yojanas. Above it is Suvarna—i.e. 'the golden earth'—thirty thousand yojanas. Then (come) above it Saptā Pātāla—i.e. the seven Earth[s every one] of which is ten thousand yojanas (in extent) ... [The highest (of the pātālas) is] (an Earth) that has dvīpas. The midmost island is Jambu-dvīpa which we (inhabit). Then (comes) Plakṣa-dvīpa, then—Śālmalī (or Śālmalī)-dvīpa; then Kuṣa-dvīpa; then Krauṅca-dvīpa; then Śaka-dvīpa; then Puṣkara-dvīpa. The extent of Jambu-dvīpa (equals) one lakṣa (100,000) (yojanas), and (the extent of the island) which encompasses it equals two lakṣas (200,000) (yojanas). Then (come) four lakṣas (400,000) yojanas; and in this manner (the extent is) progressively doubled up to the most remote of them (i.e. of the islands).

In the interval between every pair of islands, i.e. earths, there is an ocean. The one surrounding the earth which we inhabit is Kṣaṇa, i.e. 'The Salty'; then Ikṣu, i.e. 'Sugar-cane Water'; then Sūrā, i.e. 'Wine'; then Sarpi, i.e. 'Melted Butter'; then Daḍhī, i.e. 'Curds'; then Keśa, i.e. 'Milk'; then Svādūdaka, i.e. 'Sweet Water'. The first of these oceans, namely, (the one called) Kṣara, is two lakṣas (200,000) (yojanas in extent), and (there is a progressive) doubling—in (the manner already) referred to—(of each of) the others.
Behind the Sweet (Ocean) is Lokāloka,\textsuperscript{121} i.e. ‘The Uninhabited’\textsuperscript{122} (Its extent) is ten thousand yojanas.\textsuperscript{123} Beyond it (R, 187) is the Land of Gold.\textsuperscript{124} (Its extent) is ten kotīs (100,000,000) (yojanas). Above it is Pītr-loka, i.e. the place where the ancestors dwell together. Its extent is sixty one lakṣas and thirty four thousand (6,134,000) (yojanas).\textsuperscript{125} Above it is (one) half of the egg Brahmanḍa,\textsuperscript{126} i.e. (the half) which contains the heavens and is at rest without any motion.\textsuperscript{127} Above Brahmanḍa is a darkness designated as tāmas,\textsuperscript{128} the extent of which is one koti and eighty five lakṣas (18,500,000) (yojanas).

In the middle of the island which we inhabit is Mount Meru,\textsuperscript{129} the habitation of the angels.\textsuperscript{130} One of the sides of the quadrangle\textsuperscript{131} (which it forms) is five kotis (50,000,000) (yojanas in extent). On its four sides are mountains, kingdoms, rivers and seas, which it would serve no useful (purpose) either to enumerate, for they are unknown, or to name, for these names are (given) in the Indian\textsuperscript{132} language.\textsuperscript{133}

He, then, enumerates the worlds (lokas). He mentions the Bhūr-loka, whose inhabitants are men, beasts and birds, and in which there are mountains, rivers and trees. It (extends) up to the sun. Then (he mentions) Bhuvār-loka, in which there are siddhas (?), gandharvas (?), and munīs (?).\textsuperscript{134} It (extends) up to the pole-star. (He) then (mentions) Mahar-loka, in which are the protectors\textsuperscript{135} of this world,\textsuperscript{136} such as Indra and his like. Then (he mentions) Jana-loka, in which there are masters from among the species of the angels.\textsuperscript{137} Then (he mentions) Tapo-loka, in which there are from among them\textsuperscript{138} naras (?) and kinnaras (?).\textsuperscript{139} Then (he mentions) Satya-loka,\textsuperscript{140} which is the place of the brahmāṇas receiving (their) reward. For this\textsuperscript{141} (reason) it is called Brahmadeśa,\textsuperscript{142} in the same manner as the place of the kṣatriyas receiving (their) reward is called Rāja-deśa.\textsuperscript{143} Then (he mentions) Brahma-loka,\textsuperscript{144} in which is Brahma.\textsuperscript{145} The extent of all the seven lokas (equal) fifteen kotis (150,000,000) (yojanas).\textsuperscript{146} Their totality is designated as Brahmanḍa in the same manner as we designate the (heavenly) spheres as ether.\textsuperscript{147} The explanation\textsuperscript{148} of the commentator ends (here). Let us go back to the text.\textsuperscript{149}

He\textsuperscript{150} says: Whoever directs his thought to the moon achieves knowledge concerning the arrangement of the stars, their positions and their actions.\textsuperscript{151}

Whoever directs it to the pole-star—it is in a complex of fourteen stars shaped as a sakvāra (?),\textsuperscript{152} i.e. the sofān\textsuperscript{153} out of whose skin hilts of swords are made\textsuperscript{154}—knows the motions of the stars.\textsuperscript{155} (R, 188) Thus all those who aspire (to know) something of (the matters) we have mentioned will discover it when they apply their thought to it.

Whoever wishes to know his own body should meditate continuously on the navel.\textsuperscript{156}

This too belongs to the commentator’s explanation.\textsuperscript{157} When food is digested in the belly, matter is produced from it to which (pertain) a sediment\textsuperscript{158} which is expurgated(?)\textsuperscript{159} and three residues which remain in the body. They are wind, bile and phlegm.\textsuperscript{160} (They) harm(?)\textsuperscript{161} seven\textsuperscript{162} things, namely the chyle, the blood, the flesh, the fat, the bones, the marrow and the semen.\textsuperscript{163}

As for the above-mentioned matter, it is transformed into blood. Out of the subtle (part) of the latter flesh is generated,\textsuperscript{164} and from its remaining gross (part)—all things that come forth from the body, such as sweat and hair and the nails. Then the fat of corpulence,\textsuperscript{165} is generated from the flesh, the bones from fat, the marrow from bones, and the semen, which (among) these is the noblest, from the marrow.\textsuperscript{166} Whatever is farther from matter is more excellent. The utility of comprehending the transformations of these things and of the manner of their generation and passing away,\textsuperscript{167} of (the ways in which) they are useful
or harmful, of the periods (in which) this (happens) and of (the relevant) measures (consists in) establishing the truth that (all) this is not good,\textsuperscript{168} nay that it is an evil. And this is a reason for being drawn towards the good. At this point we return to the text.

Whoever wishes to remove the harmful (effects) of hunger and thirst from himself should direct his thought to the hollow (part) of the chest and the larynx, (i.e.) the channel (through which) the wind (passes) by means of respiration.\textsuperscript{169}

Whoever wishes to dispense with motion should reflect on the ‘tortoise’, namely, the twisted veins above the navel likened to this (animal).\textsuperscript{170}

Whoever wishes to see the \textit{siddhas} \textsuperscript{171} among the ascetics,\textsuperscript{172} who were able (to achieve) the objectives\textsuperscript{173} and become, through knowledge and virtue, invisible\textsuperscript{174} and inhabit \textit{Bhuvar-loka}, should direct his thought to the light of the orifice which is (found) on the bone of the vertex. Thus he will see and behold(f)\textsuperscript{175} them.\textsuperscript{176}

Whoever wishes (to acquire) knowledge—let his thought be (centred) in the heart,\textsuperscript{177} which is its source and dwelling place,\textsuperscript{178} so that he should represent it united with the soul, without making a distinction between the two.\textsuperscript{179} For the soul knows (lit.: is knowing) and the heart lives. This should not be difficult for him, since he has totally\textsuperscript{180} emancipated\textsuperscript{181} it from this world. When he does this he will truly know his own self,\textsuperscript{182} and no object of the senses is concealed from him, even if it is hidden or remote.\textsuperscript{183}

Q 47. Is there beyond this\textsuperscript{184} requital by means of knowledge something that is nobler than it?

(R, 189) Ans. Why should not this be so? (For) this knowledge is not in truth knowledge; it is an impediment to true knowledge.\textsuperscript{185} We have already mentioned the consequences of the division of knowledge (which is) theoretical. Accordingly we shall now speak of the consequences of the division (of knowledge which is) practical.\textsuperscript{186} For the attainment of \textit{praxis}, together with knowledge, has fallen (to the lot of) the ascetic described above. He is at the point of achieving that which he seeks. If he wishes that he, except for his spirit, be transported in this entanglement, from his (own) body to another body, not in a way in which (one is) transported after death, but rather in virtue of his (own) will, volition and (free) choice, he is able to bring this about.\textsuperscript{187} This is because the bodies are nets for the spirits,\textsuperscript{188} with a view to requiting them for former good and evil (deeds) with ease or discomfort\textsuperscript{189} corresponding to the two (categories of deeds). Attracting (to oneself) the former and warding off the latter (involves) some wronging\textsuperscript{190} of people of one’s (own) species or (of those) of other species. (Hence) hostility\textsuperscript{191} brings about the guaranteed (necessity) of future retribution. On the other hand, the above-mentioned ascetic has borne to the full in his present mould\textsuperscript{192} that which he deserved for his past (deeds); and he refrains from acquiring (further \textit{karma}) in the future. In his case there is no guaranteed (necessity); he knows his soul: whence it has come and whither it will go. Accordingly he is able to move and transport it, and does not stick to the body (in which the soul) is harassed. For this (reason) also he is (able) to die in virtue of his volition whenever he wishes.\textsuperscript{193}

Q 48. Is he able to transport this garment\textsuperscript{194} with him (by means of) practices\textsuperscript{195} which others are unable to perform?

Ans. If the state of his body had been (like) that of the bodies of the common people with regard to grossness\textsuperscript{196} and sediment(s),\textsuperscript{197} he would not have been able to have it as his companion. It is, however, in a state in which no sediments or dregs are left.\textsuperscript{198}
In the body there are five categories of winds, two of which (are related to) the passage of breath, one of them entering on account of attraction and the other going out on account of expulsion. The third (wind) is present in all the places of the body, for it is one of its four basic constituents. As for the fourth (wind), it is through its (instrumentality) that there is motion: leaping and jumping. Taking its course, the fifth (wind) carries food and the (various) mixtures and transports them from one place to another in the body. Thus no place remains permanently in the same state.

(R, 190) If the above-mentioned ascetic grasps the 'leaping wind', constantly fixes his thought upon it, and strengthens it by making additions to it, his (downward) inclination is lessened. Consequently he (can) walk on flowing water and on shifting mud in the way someone else walks upon the face of the earth: he is not drowned and does not sink. He can (also) step bare-foot upon a piercing thorn without his foot being pricked, (the reason) for this being the absence of a (downward) inclination because of which he might have been affected by (this) harmful (object). This 'wind' has different dimensions in the (various species of) the animals that walk and (those) that fly, such as the deer and the tortoise (on the one hand), or the hen and the dove (on the other). In each of these two pairs (of species) in dimension may attain (such a degree) that each (of the species) may (appear to be) the contrary (of the other).

Similarly, whenever (the ascetic) strengthens the 'wind' that transports the mixtures, his body (as it appears) to others is ablaze like unto a flaming fire. Again, hearing (takes place) by means of air, being part of air. When (the ascetic) has a true knowledge of the two, and has habituated his thought (to apply itself) to the two, he hears sounds that are (produced) in the air, even if (these sounds) are distant from him in space.

Again, the body is heavy and air is light. Accordingly whenever his thought combines the two so that they become one, his body becomes (as) light as the things that, having been separated from a plant, are tossed about in the atmosphere by winds; the air does not penetrate its (the body's) weight, it can fly to whichever regions of the earth he wants, his flight being lighter than that of birds.

Q 49. Do all these (attainments) come together in (one) person or is every (ascetic) specialized with regard to his particularity and activity?

Ans. All these (attainments) come together in one (ascetic), for thought is one; and this assembler is called mahāvidēha. Whenever the ascetic reflecting on his (own) body is united (in thought) with air, he (is able to) fly because of the latter's lightness. (Similarly, if he is united) with fire, he is ablaze because of its light. Whatever the natural body be upon which he reflects he (achieves) with regard to it whatever he imagines and wills. For each of these bodies has three states. The first of them is (its) identity, as for example, in the case of Earth, for it is 'earth'. The second (state) is (that of the things) generated from a particular, which differ in form from it, as (for example) the minerals and plants which differ in form from the earth. The third (state) is the essence, as (for example) earthiness which is (a characteristic) common both to (the earth) and these (generated things).

When (the ascetic) truly realizes this with regard to both the generalities and the particulars of the elements, he is able to put an end to the harmful (effects) that they (may have) upon his body, such as (those due to) being burnt by fire, being penetrated by air, being drowned by water, being (held back by) the impenetrability of earth, and so forth. He has such power over his body that
he may render it subtle so that it is hidden or manifest according to his wish. (He can also) render it beautiful or ugly, strengthen it, soften it, coarsen it, or harden it so that he can appear in whatever form he desires. (He can also) make it light so as to fly and descend, skim (the ground) and soar. (He can also) make it (R, 191) huge so that whoever sees it is terrified. (He is also able) to perceive with his senses, even if (the object) perceived (by him) is far off from the place (where he is). Nothing (can) hinder him from going (his way) and nothing can shake him when he stands still. How (should it be possible for things) to make an impression upon him, (seeing) that he is able to annihilate them and bring them into existence? Indeed they obey his command.

Q 50. This is what (he is able) to achieve with regard to the five elements, namely, earth, water, fire, wind and the sky. But what (is he able to) achieve with regard to incorporeal (things)?

Ans. We have already said that his senses are purified so as to overpower the impediments (which) therefore cannot gain mastery over them so as to render them incapable of perception. In fact (the ascetic) can see without an eye, and hear without an ear. He transcends the three forces; the first two which (respectively) are pure good and pure evil, and the intermediate one as between the two, so that all of them are subordinate to his will, and consequently nothing that pertains to them exists in (something that is) other than he, unless he desires (something) to be there. The root of this matter is the study of the true reality of the body, the heart, and the soul. (For) then things obey (the ascetic) so that he (can) know them by their definitions and (can) grasp them in a universal manner.

Q 51. (Can the ascetic) attain in this science the highest degree (similar) to the one which he attains in (his) actions?

Ans. No. For the possessor of this knowledge, even though it is designated by this name, fails to achieve liberation if he deems the latter to be knowledge, the reason being that this (knowledge) is obtained through the senses. For knowledge is the cognition of the perishing and destruction of these cognizant followed up by its rejection. In a similar way as what is deemed to be knowledge prevents the (achievement of) liberation, rejoicing and glorying in it, being a sort of self-aggrandizement and pride, also prevent its (achievement). (There is also the case of the ascetic) to whom angels show themselves apprising him of their condition and state and calling him to Paradise. They describe the latter to him (informing him) that it is a native place of everything (that is) good and the treasury that includes with respect to trees and fruits whatever may occur to your mind, and women (of such a sort) that their sight gives all joy and delight; there is nothing harmful there (i.e. nothing that is excessively) hot or cold, and its inhabitants are immune from old age, illnesses, other affictions of the body and the basest needs. The soul (of such an ascetic may) be puffed up (R, 192) because of this call, and the signs of pride and vainglory (may) become manifest in him; he (may) suffer a setback (as far as) his degree (in the hierarchy is concerned) and his promise (may) be broken.

Q 52. How should he answer the angels in order to be saved from such (an untoward) happening?

Ans. He should say that the master of the world may be likened to a worm which has fallen into a huge jar (full) of coals (burning with) a blazing flame. These (coals) may (stand for) this world (whose) suffering is nothing but the disturbance and upheavals (which occur) in it (i.e. the world); any hope
of escape and deliverance from it is cut off. This was my state of being while I clung to this world. When, however, I withdrew from it, I encountered the shadow of a cloud, and (thus) obtained (some) little relief from fatigue and weariness. How should I, therefore, whenever my heart inclines towards Paradise, wish to be preoccupied with its delights. For thereby I should return to (my) bonds, and thus my endeavour to come near the realm of liberation would be lost.

Q 53. If what has been (referred to) above is not true knowledge, what is it then?

Ans. It is within the compass of what is the present of time, i.e. the now of it.

Q 54. What is achieved thereby?

Ans. Thereby is achieved cognition of the substance of a thing and of its genus, and thereupon of its quale, i.e. of the characteristics which distinguish one thing from another, thereupon of its place, its situation and its direction.

Q 55. What is the name of this knowledge, its object and its quale?

Ans. As for its name, it is 'crossing' and 'causing to pass over'. As for the object of this knowledge, it is everything that is either subtle or gross in its entirety. As for its quale, it is the universal grasp (which apprehends as) one whole and one species. Furthermore, it is only useful in its application which (consists) in encompassing the sensibilia and the objects of knowledge and total dissociation from them.

Q 56. When does liberation come about?

Ans. Soul in man is a divine pure undefiled substance; defilement of the heart comes about only because of its being tossed about between the three forces which have been referred to several times. As long, therefore, as the heart has not yet achieved a purification similar to that of the soul so as to be united through a union of attribute their mixture is useless and liberation does not come about.

Here ends the third section whose particular (subject) is recompense and the quale of requital.

NOTES

1 In BSOAS, xxxix, 2, 1966, 302–25 (henceforth abbreviated as BSOAS, ch. I) and BSOAS, xl, 3, 1977, 522–49 (henceforth abbreviated as BSOAS, ch. II).


3 We refer to the pagination known to Ritter. Since then the pagination of the MS has been changed: fols. 417a–424a instead of fols. 412a–419a.

4 Kitāb fi tāḥiq mā lī 'l-Hind or al-Biruni's India (Arabic text), Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as India, Hyd.).


6 The following commentaries have been used.

1 Vyāsa, (Patañjalayogasūtra-)Bhāṣya (written between A.D. 350 and 650, probably in the sixth century A.D., according to Winternitz). Edition: Rājārām Śāstri Bodas (ed.), BSS, Bombay, 1892. (Abbreviated as Vy.)
Subcommentaries on I


(b) Vācaspati Miśra, Tattvavaiśāradī (c. A.D. 850). Edition : as in I(c). (Abbreviated as Vāc.)

Subcommentaries on I(b)


(ii) Hariharānanda Āryāya (a.d. 1869–1947), Bhāsvati. Edition : in I(b)i.


(d) Nāgosa Bhaṭṭa (= Nāgosa Bhaṭṭa), Bhāṣyacchāryābhāṣyottti (end of seventeenth and first half of eighteenth century A.D. according to P. V. Kane and P. K. Gode). Edition : Jivanātha Miśra (ed.), Pātañjalyogadarāṇanam, Benares, 1907 (henceforth abbreviated as Bhāṣyacchāryā).

(e) Nāgosa Bhaṭṭa (= Nāgosa Bhaṭṭa), Pātañjalyogasūtra-yaśī. This is a separate commentary, patently different from the prec. though not unrelated to it. Edition : Dhumdhīrā Śaṅstri (ed.), Yogasūtra with six commentaries, KSS, 83, Benares, 1930 (henceforth referred to as Yaśī).


Subcommentary on II


IV Bhāvāgaṇeśa, Pradīpikā (seventeenth or eighteenth century A.D. according to Dhumdhīrā Śaṅstri). Edition : in I(e).

V Ananta, Yogacandrīkā (= Padacandrīkā) (nineteenth century A.D. according to Dhumdhīrā Śaṅstri). Edition : in I(e).

VI Sadāśivaendra Sarasvati, Yogasuddhākara (twentieth century A.D. according to Dhumdhīrā Śaṅstri). Edition : in I(e).


IX Kṛṣṇavallabhācārya, Bhāṣya (see II(e)). Edition : in II(a).

X Bhavadeva Yogasūtravrtti MS, Sarasvati Bhavan no. 29839 (in preparation for publication).

The term ḥamṣa in the Arabic. The term ḥammāl (pl.) (‘qualities, characteristics’) is used in al-Birūnī’s translation to render the aṣṭāṅgāni, ‘the eight stages (lit.: auxiliaries, aida’). For the first four of these as featuring in the Arabic translation of the second chapter of the Yogasūtra (R, pp. 182–3; cf. YS 2.28 et seq.) see BSQAS, ch. II, p. 526, 1.4 seq. For the term ḥamṣa as probably representing the Sanskrit term guṇa, which may have been contained in the commentary used by al-Birūnī, see art. cit., n. 116.

* Cf. sūtra 3.1: deśa-bandhāt cittasya dhāraseva ‘Fixed attention consists in restricting (or: binding) of the mind to (one) locus’. The term bandha here is variously glossed by the com-
mentaries: (a) = sambandha ‘relation’ (Vāc. ad loc.); (b) = bandhana, ‘binding, tying’ (Sāṅkara Bhagavatpāda ad loc.); (c) = sthīrakaraṇa, ‘steadying, making (something) firm’ (Bhoja, Rāmānandayati ad loc.); (d) = sāhāpāna, ‘establishing’ (Vijñānabhikṣu, Sādāśivendra Sarasvatī ad loc.); (e) = ekāgra, ‘one-pointedness’ (Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa ad loc.). For cf. especially (c) and (d). The same Arabic expression is used by al-Bīrūnī to render the Sanskrit term samādhī. See R, p. 177, l. 10: ‘for this and the related term samādhī below also cf. BSOAS, ch. II, n. 152.

Cf. Cf. R, p. 185, ll. 4, 6 and 7. Earlier the term and cognate terms have been rendered as ‘thought’. R, p. 173, l. 1: ‘and freedom from thoughts about consequences’ (BSOAS, ch. I, p. 318, l. 16) and al-Bīrūnī, ēsā ‘and who is (withdrawn) from thoughts’; R, p. 174, last line: ‘and thought perceived by him’ (ibid., p. 321, l. 8); R, p. 175, l. 7: ‘—and thought conceived by his attributes’ (ibid., p. 321, l. 21); R, p. 176, l. 2–2 below.

10 The म्स has anātmyātā that Ritter seems to require. The reading अन्यत्मा seems preferable. Cf. R, p. 171, l. 17: ‘—�न्यत्मा अन्यत्मा ‘—perseveringly and applying himself to it continually’; R, p. 171, l. 18: ‘तद्वप्र ‘—continuous application’ (also cf. R, p. 181, l. 1). Also cf. the term yatna in Rāmānandayati on sūtra 3.2: yatra dhārāṇā vījātā-vyrti-parīkāre yatnāḥpyē bhavati tatraiva yā pratyāyādām vrītāt yah na anapekṣita-visyata tad dhārāṇā ‘Fixed attention directed to a given locus requires effort in avoiding heterogeneous (mental) functions (i.e. other than the series of the one repeated perception). (On the other hand,) uninterrupted continuing of (such) functions, i.e. perceptions, directed to that very same locus, consists in having one and the same object (for cognition) without requiring effort, and that is meditation’. (Woods’s translation of this sentence, JAOS, xxxiv, 1914, 61, seems to be confused.) An idea similar to the one expressed here may have occurred in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī.

11 Lit.: ‘Number does not fall upon one’. For उ ‘number’ here cf. R, p. 171, l. 15, where the MS has which Ritter reads as अनात्मा ‘and the same’.

12 Cf. R, p. 171, l. 19, where the MS has अन्तमयम् which Ritter reads as अनात्मयम् ‘and the same’), but the reading अन्तमयम् अनात्मयम् ‘and the same’ is suggested by a comparison with the present expressions and by the similarity of context in the two related passages. See Appendix in BSOAS, ch. II, 528.

13 Ritter has here (see above) the अन्तरत (‘interior’), but the MS may be read as अन्तरत (‘interior’), and the latter reading seems to be preferable. Cf. R, p. 171, l. 17, where Ritter reads ‘in the interior which he amends to अन्तरत (‘interior’), but the reading ‘interior’ seems preferable in view of the अन्तरत here. See Appendix in BSOAS, ch. II, 527.

14 Lit.: ‘goes’.

15 Cf. sūtra 3.2: tatra pratyāyaika-lānatā dhāhyām ‘Meditation is the uninterrupted (lit.: one) continuity of thought concerning the same (locus)’. The word tatra in this sūtra may alternatively be taken to refer to dhārāṇā in the preceding sūtra rather than to deśa therein. Cf. the syntactic use of tatra in sūtra 1.25; and consider the relevant description ekātra ‘taken together (i.e. seen as one gradually evolving succession or extension)’ in sūtra 3.4. Bhavadeva’s commentary (Yogasūtrasṛtti, Sarasvatī Bhavan MS no. 29839) reads here: tatra tat... The sūtra would accordingly mean: ‘...uninterrupted continuity of the same thought (i.e. of the same percept to which dhārāṇā has been applied): dhārāṇā-viṣaya-viprayaka-jñāṇasya, Bhavadeva ad loc.)... For the expression viṣayakāh this may mean cf. Vy. ad loc.: pratyāyākārṇa-parārṇyayāḥ ‘unaffected by (any) percept which is different (from the one percept repeated in a succession); Bhoja ad loc.: jñāṇasya... . nirantarām upatiṇṭaḥ ‘the uninterrupted (i.e. continual, or: identical) emergence of thought’; Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa ad loc.: vyāky-antarārvirvakāhā bahū ‘without being intercepted by a different (mental) function’. The expression viṣayakāh may have been suggested by pratyāyānāraṇa (Vy. loc. cit.), or vyāky-antarā (Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa loc. cit.) or some similar expression; antara may among other things mean ‘amidst, between, gap, inter-
vening time or space, pause'. For the phrase cf. the quotation from the *Visṇu Purāṇa* (6.7.88b) in Vāc. on sūtra 3.1: nāpāyati yadā citatam siddhān manyetā tān tadā 'When the mind does not deviate (lit.: goes away) one deems it (i.e. dhāranā, "fixed attention") to have been accomplished'.

18 al-ḍālāl rendered as 'perfect concentration' may mean 'sincerity, sincere devotion' and so forth. Cf. R, p. 173, l. 6: al-ḍālāl-al-ala₸ al-ḍālāl 'perpetual (or application) in a devoted activity'. Also cf. R, p. 172, l. 6: al-ḍālāl al-ḍālāl 'addressing himself single-mindedly to his liberation'.

17 al-ḍālāl. See n. 9 above. Also cf. *India*, Hyd., 1964 (henceforth abbreviated as Sachau), i, 327.

16 *Lit.* : 'with what is reflected upon '.—This sentence corresponds to sūtra 3.3: *tad evārtha-mātra-nirbhāsaṃ svarūpa-sīyam ieva samādhiḥ*. 'Concentration is the same (meditation), (when) it appears as the object alone, and has seemingly relinquished its own nature'. Cf. sūtra 1.43. The renderings of nirbhāsa here as 'illuminating' (M. R. Yardi, *The Yoga of Patañjali*, Poona, 1979, 200), 'enlightens' (Rājendraśīla Mitra), or 'shining with the light of (the object)' (Rāma Prasāda) are inaccurate. The term nirbhāsa here may correspond to samādhi in sūtra 3.3 above, although the latter term has been rendered by al-Biruni in a preceding passage by 'inārātī al-ḍālāl il-mādīha wa al-mūkādemātā' (R, p. 177, l. 10)—'making the heart steadfastly fixed' (*BSOAS*, ch. I, p. 325, n. 242). Also cf. n. 16 above.

19 Cf. sūtra 3.4: *ekatra ekatra samyamaḥ*. 'The three (i.e. fixed attention, meditation and concentration) taken together (or: in one succession) constitute Discipline'. The commentary used by al-Biruni may have had here the word miliṭānām, 'joined together, jointly' (cf. Vijñānavihikṣa ad loc.: dhāraṇā-dhāraṇā-samādhiḥ miliṭānām tatra tatra sūtre 'naṣyā samījaya grahaṇam bhāvīyati'. A different technical term (i.e. samyama) will be used at various points in the (subsequent) sūtras (instead of fixed attention, meditation and concentration conjointly) or some similar expression. The reference in this context in al-Biruni's translation to eight (and not three) qualities does not seem to have a parallel in the relevant Sanskrit sources which are available. The term ekatra may have been understood by al-Biruni as referring to the subject (cf. 4 here) rather than to the object. The latter understanding, taking ekatra as meaning 'in one place, in one and the same locus, with reference to one and the same point', seems to be reflected in Vy. ad loc.: *ekavīvāyayi triṇi sthitānāṃ samyamaḥ ity ucyate* 'When the three means (under consideration) have one and the same object they are called Discipline (*samāyama*)'. Also cf. the use of ekatra in Vy. on sūtra 3.16, and Vy. on *tatra* in sūtra 3.2 (= *tasmin dekle* 'in the same locus'). Also cf. Bhāva gangesā on sūtra 3.4: *tad dhāraṇādī-ekatraikāv-vīvāyae kriyamāṇam samyamaḥ ity ucyate* 'When that triad consisting of fixed attention etc. is performed in one locātra, i.e. on one and the same object, it is called Discipline (*samāyama*)'; and cf. Bhāvadeva ad loc.

A curious combination of both of the above-mentioned meanings of ekatra has been resorted to in Ganganatha Jha's translation of sūtra 3.4: 'These three converging on any one substratum constitute Discipline'. An understanding of ekatra in sūtra 3.4 as meaning 'simultaneous application' seems to be suggested in M. R. Yardi, *The Yoga of Patañjali*, Poona, 1979, 56. This is implausible, since what the constituents or stages of *samyama* have in common is the same locus or object, but not the same moment of time.

20 *身心健康*. An alternative reading is: *身心健康*, in which case the translation would be: 'disciplining his soul in the stages'.

21 Cf. sūtra 3.6: *tasya bhāmīṣyau vinīyogab* 'It (i.e. samyama, "Discipline") is (to be) applied to the stages (or, alternatively: employed by stages)'. Here tasya clearly refers to *samyama* of sūtra 3.4 above. The word bhāmīṣy seems to refer to *sūtras* 1.42-44. See Vāc. on sūtra 3.3. Also cf. sūtra 2.27. The word *身心健康* here may perhaps represent a misunderstanding by al-Biruni of *vinīyoga* as meaning *yoga*, 'discipline'. Cf. Bhāva gangesā's gloss ad loc.: *nīyojanam yogyānāṃ kāryam* 'Yogis ought to carry out their commitment . . .'.
At this point a number of words in the MS are illegible.

Cf. Bhoja on śūtra 3.6: *tasya samyamaṣaya bhūmiṣu sthūla-sākṣmālaṃbana-bhūdena sthūtāru citta-vṛttiṣu viṣṇuṣyagah kartaraṣayā ‘Application of it, i.e. of Discipline, with regard to fixed functions of the mind, ought to be done to the stages distinguished according as the object is gross or subtle’. Also cf. śūtra 3.34. The expression to sūkṣma. Cf. the edition of R, p. 185, l. 14 below, which corresponds to sūkṣma in śūtra 3.26. The lacuna here may possibly have contained a reference to gross objects (*sthūlālaṃbana*).

"Lit. ‘fall’."

Perhaps the reference to intellect (‘intellect’) reflects *prajñāloka* in śūtra 3.5: *tad-jayat prajñāloka ‘From mastering it there arises the light of intelligence (or: insight)’. Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.: . . . *prajñā jītyaṃ samyag aabhāṣasyati arthah ‘. . . this is to say, intelligence properly illuminates the object which is to be cognized’. The difference between the three qualities and the preceding five referred to by al-Biruni is dealt with in śūtra 3.7: *trayam antar-angam pūrvebhyaḥ* ‘The three (i.e. fixed attention, meditation and concentration) are more directly effective (lit.: ‘internal, proximate, intimate’) than the preceding (five aids, namely, restraint, observance, posture, regulation of breath and withdrawal of the senses)’. Here antar-angam may correspond to ‘sfitra in the singular.

For al-Biruni’s use of the term ‘stuff’ cf. R, p. 182, l. 3, and see BSOAS, ch. II, n. 111.) This phrase seems to correspond to śūtra 3.8: *tad api bhar-angam nirbījasya ‘This (triad of aids, i.e. Discipline) is likewise (only) indirectly effective with regard to the Seedless (samādhī, i.e. the state of concentration bereft of consciousness of an object; cf. śūtra 1.51; Vy. on śūtras 1.2 and 1.56; Bhoja on śūtra 3.8)’. This would mean that in this phrase *mādāra* renders *bijā, lit. ‘seed’*. Cf. R, p. 172, l. 13 (ch. I, Ans. to Q 7) 

Cf. R, p. 172, l. 13 (ch. I, Ans. to Q 7) 

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Cf. Bhoja on śūtra 3.8)’. This would mean that in this phrase *mādāra* renders *bijā, lit. ‘seed’*. Cf. R, p. 172, l. 13 (ch. I, Ans. to Q 7) 

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Cf. Bhoja on śūtra 3.8)’. This would mean that in this phrase *mādāra* renders *bijā, lit. ‘seed’*. Cf. R, p. 172, l. 13 (ch. I, Ans. to Q 7) 

Cf. Bhoja on śūtra 3.8)’. This would mean that in this phrase *mādāra* renders *bijā, lit. ‘seed’*. Cf. R, p. 172, l. 13 (ch. I, Ans. to Q 7)
into the suppression of the functions of the mind) is due to the subliminal impressions’. The reference to ‘progress in years . . .’ may reflect a commentator’s attempt to illustrate the meaning of prāṇāta, ‘tranquil’, in the same sūtra. Cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.13: dehino ‘smin yathā dehe kvamāram yuvanam jāra/ tathā dehāntara-prāptih . . .’ The soul (merely) passes to another kind of body just as it (gradually) passes through childhood, youth and old age in its present body . . .’. (Cf. India, Hyd., p. 39, ll. 13–14). An alternative but perhaps less likely hypothesis as to the origin of al-Bīrūnī’s reference to ‘progress in years . . .’ is suggested by the following remark of Bhāvāgāneda on sūtra 3.5: ālokaḥ dīpith vṛddhit krameṣa bhavatīty arthāḥ ’Luminosity means light; the general sense is that (its) increase comes about gradually’. Al-Bīrūnī may have read vṛddha instead of vṛddhi. The word vṛddha may mean ‘old, aged’.

33 The MS has here ‘प्राणात’ Ritter’s reading is: प्रत्येक; we propose to read विपक्षम्.

34 This may reflect prāṇānta in sūtra 3.10.

35 The literal meaning of मद्यां is ‘factors of evil’.

36 The reading सचारा proposed by Ritter (with a question mark) in a footnote is impossible from a syntactic point of view.

37 The Arabic has here ‘في’ in ‘.

38 Cf. sūtra 3.11: sarvārthataikgratayoh kṣayodayasya citrasya samādhi-pariṣāmaḥ ‘The transformation of the mind (known as) “concentration” (samādhi) consists in the dwindling away of multiple-mindedness (lit. “many-object-ness”) and the rise of single-mindedness (lit. “one-pointedness”)’. In the Arabic version may correspond to samādhi which appears in the opening section of ch. 3, sūtras 1–4 as the third among the three states constituting the Discipline (sāmyama). The word वेद ‘sāmyama’ may correspond to ekāgraistā in sūtra 3.11. Similarly असाधी may correspond to sarvārthatā. Both ‘कल’ and sarva mean ‘all’, whereas the signification of artha is quite different from that of ‘कल’. With regard to the sāmyamas cf. R, p. 177, l. 6 (cf. our translation, BSOAS, ch. I, p. 324, n. 230), where it renders sāmānya, ‘universal’.

39 These words clearly refer to R, p. 184, l. 5: ‘. . . mental representation of the cognitum stripped of matter’, and for this reason have been translated in the same way. A literal translation would be: ‘pure (or: stripped-off) representation without matter’.

40 Cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.10: nirodha-samkārād nirodha-samkāṅbhīśyas-pāṣatadvāpekṣā prāṇāntavāhītā citrasya bhave ‘From the subliminal impressions of the suppression (of the functions of the mind) arises the tranquil flow of the mind which depends on skill in the repeated practice of (the emergence of) the subliminal impressions of that suppression’. Cf. also Vāc. under sūtra 3.5: sāmyama-vijayasābhīṣya-sādhanasya phalāma ṛṣita . . .’ (The purpose of the sūtra is to indicate) the result of that mastery over Discipline which has repeated practice as its means’. For the definition of abhivyāsa see sūtra 1.13. Earlier the word has been translated by us as ‘habituation’ (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 321, n. 137).

41 This corresponds to sūtra 3.16: pariṣāma-traya-sāmyamād atilānāgata-jīvanam ‘Through the application of the Discipline to the three transformations (i.e. the three mental functions mentioned in sūtras 3.9, 11 and 12, or alternatively, following commentators: dharma, “property”, lakṣaṇa, “time-variation” and avasthā, “condition” mentioned in sūtra 3.13) knowledge of past and future (is attained)’. The sūtra does not refer to knowledge of present time, but Vāc. on sūtra 3.14 and Vy. on sūtra 3.15 do.

42 Cf. the enumeration of different forms of clay in Vy. on sūtra 3.15. A discussion of the transformations of a lump of clay as well as a discussion in the same context of the three divisions of time—past, present and future—occurs in Vy. on sūtra 3.16 and in Vāc. on sūtra 3.14 and 15. The term धार्मिकताः here may correspond to ekāntrī; and तीर्थवर्ती to udāla in sūtra 3.14. The sūtra reads: tatra kāntoidvayopaṇāyadāharmānuvapiḥ dharmi ‘(A substance) possessed of properties is correlated to properties which are quiescent (i.e. past) or emergent (i.e. present) or uncharacterizable (i.e. future)’. For the use of the term anupāti, cf. sūtra 1.9.
In all probability ‘he’ is a reference to Q 43.

Apparent ‘names’ of objects as well as of persons.

Lit. : ‘when it is named’.

Lit. : ‘to separate this’ or ‘to distinguish this’. The Arabic text does not make it clear to what ‘this’ refers.

Lit. : ‘direct it’.

is a Qur’anic expression. See Sūrat a-Naml, šiya 16. The use of this expression may have been suggested by a passage in a commentary parallel to Vāc. under sūtra 3.17: evam ca pravibhāga-saṃyamad yoṣināk sarveśāṁ bhāvānāṁ paśu-mrga-sārāpa-vyagy-aprabhūrṇāṁ yānī rūṣāṁ tatāpy avyaktām padaṁ tad-arthas tat-pratyayas ceti ‘Thus through (applying) Discipline the yoṣi (comprehends) the sounds produced by all living beings, tame and wild animals, crawling animals, birds, etc., as well as the corresponding unmanifested speech, objects and (mental) percepts.’ Also cf. Bhoja ad loc. For the whole passage ‘Names ... birds’ cf. sūtra 3.17: abādārtha-pratyayāṇāṁ staretarādhyāśi sākṣaras; tat-pravibhāga-saṃyamad sarva-bhūta-rūṣa-jañānam ‘From the mutual superimposition of word, object, and (mental) percept a confusion (arises); by applying Discipline to the distinction between them understanding of sounds (produced by) all living beings is attained’.

For al-Birūnī’s use of the term हृदयली क्षीतिकराणं (tr. p. 167, l. 15; p. 184, l. 21; p. 193, l. 16).

This corresponds to sūtra 3.18: samakāra-sākhētikarāṇāṁ pūrya-jīti-jañānam ‘A knowledge of the classes of being into which one was born in the past arises from a direct apprehension of (one’s) subliminal impressions (when Discipline has been applied to them—cf. Viṭṭhānābhikṣu ad loc.)’. Cf. sūtra 2.39 and its rendering by al-Birūnī, R, p. 183, ll. 1–2 (tr. BSOAS, ch. II, 526).


This corresponds to sūtra 3.19: pratyayasya para-citta-jañānam ‘From (the application of Discipline to) the mental percept (of another person, cf. Vāc. and Saṅkara Bhagavatpāda ad loc.; or: that one has another person, cf. Bhoja ad loc.) there arises a knowledge of the mind of the other person’. On an alternative understanding of this sūtra the Discipline (saṃyama) is applied to the direct apprehension of the mind (sākhēkāra) in the preceding sūtra of the mental percept in question. For Bhoja’s interpretation of this sūtra cf. Manu 8.25–6:

By external signs let him (a king desirous of investigating law cases) ascertain the internal disposition of men, by their voice, colour, motions, aspect, eyes and gestures. The internal (condition of the) mind is apprehended through the aspect, the motions, the gait, the gestures, the speech, and the changes in the eyes and the face.’

For Buddhist parallels see e.g. Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa 7.99 (referred to by Louis de La Vallée Poussin in ‘Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali’, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, v, 239). Cf. Fr. Heiler, Die buddhistische Verankerung—eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, München, 1922, 34–5, for further comparative discussion under ‘Kardiongösae’. For a description of a practical application of this non-ordinary cognitive capability (abhījnā in Buddhist terminology) cf. Dalālākṣita-Sūtram, ed. J. Rahder, Paris, 1926, 35: sa para-sattvānāṁ para-pudgalanāṁ cetāsāvāma cittām yathābhātanam praṣāṇāti, sarāgam cittām sarāga-cittāṁ iti yathābhātanam praṣāṇāti, virāgam ... praṣāṇāti ... ‘Merely with his mind, he (the Bodhisattva) correctly recognizes the mind of other beings, other men,—he recognizes a mind which is attached as a mind which is attached and he recognizes a mind which is not attached as a mind which is not attached ...’. Cf. Ākāṅkṣeya-Sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, i, 34 (tr. in H. C. Warren, Buddhist in translations, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, 304); Sanyutta-nikāya, 271
The notion of para-citta-ājñāna may be adumbrated in Rgveda 10.136.6c: "kātasya viśedā 'The long-haired ascetic' knows the intentions (cf. kātā-vedāh, Rgveda 1.104.3; tr. Geldner: "Gedankenleser") (of the aparāsēs, gandharvas and wild animals').

82 מַעְרַכָה מִלִּיָּה. For al-Būrīnī's use of the term מִלִיָּה cf. R. p. 184, l. 9 (see n. 38 above). Also cf. India, Hyd., 31: "המִלִיָּה"—the conversions in the world are the five elements'. And see the following note.

83 The MS has here in the first (from) engaging in details of (his) knowledge of things (BSOAS, ch. I, 234, and see n. 231, loc. cit.). For the idea expressed in the Arabic sentence under consideration, see the terms מִלִיָּה and גֶּורָם יִצְוָּת which render the Sanskrit terms sāmānyam, 'universal, general' and viśeṣa, 'particular', respectively, cf.Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda on śūtra 3.20: ... sāmānyam viśeṣām na punah ... viśeṣām ... He (the yogī) knows in a general manner ... but (he does not comprehend) the particular ...'. Cf. also Rāgahavānanda Sarasvatī on the same śūtra: jñānāyān pratyaśyo dvivedah sāmānyam deha-kāydām-vacchañcchino viśeṣā ca, tatrādyā yogyi-dhi-vigsaya ity abha raktam iti viśeṣa objects in knowing are of two kinds: (a) general, and (b) particular, i.e. determined (lit.: delimited) by location, time, etc. (i.e. nimitta, "instrumental cause", and ahuṁkara, "circumstantial condition"); of the two it is (a) that constitutes the content of a yogī's cognition. (Vivāka) states: "... enamoured", etc. (see the following note).

84 This corresponds to śūtra 3.20: na tat sālambanam tasyāvīṣayābhātāvātī (But) that (knowledge) does not include knowledge of the supporting object, since the latter is beyond its range'. (Not all extant commentaries regard this as belonging to the śūtra text; some read na ca tat, and Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda's text reads na ca instead of na tat). Al-Būrīnī's text here also reflects Vy. ad loc.: raktā-pratyaśyān jñānāī; amuṣmīnā ālambane rākta iti na jñānāī (this reading incorporates the version occurring in Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda's text as well as the emendation of raktam pratyaśyām into raktā-pratyaśyām)— He (i.e. the yogī) has the (mental) percept "(the other person) is enamoured", but he does not know of what particular object he is enamoured.' The word rākta can signify 'being affected with a strong feeling towards', 'being delighted with, having pleasure in' (cf.Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda ad loc.), as well as 'being attached or attracted to, being in love with' (cf. Vy. on śūtra 3.13: yathā purusa ekaṃyām striyām raktā na śeṣe na vikratā bhavati). For instance, a man (may be) in love with one woman without (necessarily) being indifferent to all other women'. For use ('hostility, hate') in the Arabic text cf. dviṣṭa in Bhāvanā ad loc.: pratyaśe rakta-dviṣṭād-citta-mātra sanyāmāt para-citta-mārāyena jñānām "From the (application of) Discipline to the (mental) percept"—i.e. to nothing but another's mind as affected by love or hatred—there arises a knowledge of the mind of the other person and of nothing else'.

For a similar assertion to that made in śūtra 3.20 cf. Vasubandhu's Vīśnottikā Vījñapti-sthānatisidhā, verse 21 (in ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1925, 10): para-citta-vidām jñānām ayahārtham kathāṃ ? yathā sva-citta-jñānām ... 'How does a knowledge of those who know another (person's) mind not involve a correspondence to an object?'—Just as is the case of the knowledge of one's own mind ... Also cf. Śrīharṣa's Īśvaranātha-khaṇḍakāhādya (ed. Vārāṇasi, 1961, 64): pratiyāte tasmād sāmānyam yān nāma kāhyt paraśah ca ātmanānāsti, kāhyat vacārya ity ādī. tatra parasya buddhi-viśaya vīkākā-vaśaya vīśeṣato vinigamanaṁ vinā naiva pratiyāte 'One only knows only that another person is thinking something or other or is desirous of speaking something or other. But the object of that individual's thought or the object of his desire for expression is not specifically known in the absence of any determinant' (cf. P. E. Granoff, Philosophy and argument in late Vedānta: Śrī Harṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakāhādya,}
Dordrecht, 1978, 168). In this connexion, cf. also Udayana’s *Nirukṣaksarṇa-jalali* (ed. Benares, 1950, 46): *arthenaiva vikaśe hi nirikāratayā dhīyām* 'Knowledge is specific only by virtue of its object, as it is itself without any particular form’.

55 Lit. ‘the wonders of his acts’.

56 In the plural in Arabic: عَمَلُ (‘steadfastness’) can also signify species of magic. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 104, l. 5: ‘الْمَعْلُومُ والْمَأْثُومُ’—‘spells and incantations’, which apparently corresponds to the Sanskrit term *mantra*.

57 The Arabic has الَّيْلِ. It is not quite certain to what object the nominal suffix refers.

58 This beginning of the answer does not reflect any passage contained in the commentaries which have been consulted.

59 Cf. *rūpa* in sūtra 3.21 (see the following note). This word can signify ‘outward look or appearance’ (cf. Bhadārāṇyaka *Upaniṣad* 4.5.12) in a wide sense encompassing visible aspects such as beauty as well as shape. Cf. al-Birūnī’s expression ‘rendering it beautiful or ugly’ (below, B, p. 190, l. 22), which corresponds to *rūpa* ‘beauty, shapeliness’ in sūtra 3.46.

60 Lit. ‘sight’.

61 Lit. ‘eye’.

62 Lit. ‘hidden’.

63 This corresponds to sūtra 3.21: köśa-rūpa-saṅyamit tad-grihya-sakti-stambhe cakṣuh-prakāśasayoge ’ntardhānam ‘From the application of Discipline to the form of (one’s own) body there arises (the latter’s) invisibility (lit.: disappearance) when the contact (between the body and) the light (issuing from the spectator’s) eye is severed, (which is tantamount to) the suspension of the (body’s) capacity to be perceived’.

64 Lit. ‘hidden’.

65 This corresponds to sūtra 3.21a: etena śabādya-antar-dhānam uktam (which is in some of the editions part of Vy.’s commentary) ‘In the same way (i.e. by the corresponding application of Discipline) may be explained the disappearance of the sounds etc. that one makes’. (‘Etc.’ refers to the notion that other persons cannot in the circumstances alluded to perceive the yogi by means of their remaining senses.) For the syntactic structure of this sūtra, cf. sūtra 1.44.

66 Lit. ‘the quality’ or ‘the how’.

67 The Arabic term أَعْمَّال undeniabley renders the Sanskrit term *karma*. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 272: ‘وَزِمَ آخَرُونَ أَنَّ المُثْنِيْرَ هوُ كَرَمٌ يَأْيُوهُ’ Others maintain that the disposer is *karma*, i.e. action’.

68 The reading ‘bене’ here is not quite certain. In a different context Vy. has the word *akasmät* which signifies ‘suddenly’, and Vāc. in yet another context has the word *sahasā* which possesses the same meaning.

69 Ritter’s text has مَعْلُومَة. We propose to amend مَعْلُومَة to مَعْلُومَة. Our translation of this sūtra follows commentaries such as Bhāvāṅgaṇaśa ad loc.: *sopakramān = itera-vṛgana phala-hetub, i.e. yielding results speedily. Deussen, however, understands it somewhat differently: he translates the first part of the sūtra: ‘Whether the work (of an earlier birth) has begun or not (to fructify) . . . ‘ (Mag das Werk (einer früheren Geburt) angefangen haben oder nicht angefangen haben (seine Frucht zu bringen) . . . ’). The term *aparânta* (‘death’) is understood by Vāc. as contrasting with *parânta* which refers to the dissolution of the universe (*pralaya*) (see Vāc. ad loc.). Vījñānakabikṣu ad loc., more plausibly, contrasts the term *aparânta* with *pûrânta* (‘first, earlier end’, i.e. ‘the beginning’) cf. the use of the term *aparânta* in sūtra 4.32 (‘am letzten Ende’—tranal. Deussen), the expression *pûrâparâvaśêthâ* (‘the preceding and succeeding conditions’) in Vy. on sūtra 3.13, and the parallel use in Pali of the corresponding pair of terms *parânta* and *pubbanta* to refer to the future and the past respectively. The words *aparânta* the text used by al-Birūnī do not correspond to *arihystbhyaḥ* in the sūtra. Instead of *aparânta* the text used by al-Birūnī.
may have read here parānta. Cf. the expression pūrvānta-parānta-madhyeṣu, 'concerning the past, future and present', in Vy. on sūtra 2.39. The word parānta can signify 'the utmost limit' as well as 'the posterior limit', i.e. 'death'. (Also cf. the meanings para = 'being beyond, surpassing'; anda = 'certainly.') Accordingly the Arabic expression may reflect al-Birunī's interpretation of parānta-jaṇa as meaning 'the (knowledge of) that which is beyond the ultimate knowledge'. (The traditional and in all probability correct interpretation of aparānta-jaṇa is 'knowledge of death'. Cf. e.g. Vijñānahākhṣa ad loc.).

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the passage that follows apparently has no connection with the knowledge (svarga) mentioned in the Arabic text whereas the corresponding passage in Vy. constitutes a description of the ariṣṭa, 'portent'. For the term ariṣṭa as used in the sūtra cf. Mahābhārata (crit. ed.) 12.305.8 et seq., where a descriptive list of the portents (ariṣṭāni) of approaching death is given in some detail.

11 Cf. also (exemplified) in passage 274, which may be beyond, may have been applied to the death of a certain body, or may be preferable to the latter (Regeste 3.23: maṇḍya-puruṣaṁ yāmānāṁ paśyati piṁn atāta kāsaṁat paśyati; tattādādaiśvam svaryaṁ kāsaṁat siddhaṁ kāsaṁat viparableṁ kāsaṁ iti ' (Of the three kinds of portents) the kind pertaining to (i.e. issuing from) oneself is (exemplified) by the not hearing any sound within one's body, on closing one's ears, or not seeing any light (within one's body) on closing one's eyes; the kind pertaining to other creatures by the seeing of the messengers of Death (officers of Yama), or by suddenly seeing one's departed ancestors; and the kind pertaining to the gods—by suddenly seeing Heaven or the siddhas, or alternatively—by apprehending the reversal (of everything)'.

12 The reading पद्मेष्टम् पुष्पादिक्ये कथितं सुभूतम् नदिति because of ब्रह्म 'body' that follows, and despite the occurrence of नदिति नदिति in an analogous context; cf. R, p. 176, l. 6 (trans. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 323, l. 7).

13 Or alternatively: 'in the good'. The Arabic has بابر 'from the evil'. The Arabic has بابر with the pronoun in the singular. According to the dictionaries the phrase بابر means 'be chez, être au désespoir de (R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes, Leiden-Paris, 1967, I, 771). Our translation has been suggested by the corresponding Sanskrit term karuna 'compassion' in Vy. The Arabic sentence as a whole corresponds to sūtra 3.23: maṇḍya-ādiṣu balāni ' (From the application of Discipline) to (mental attitudes) such as friendliness (arise) powers'. The word སྐྱིལ of the sūtra is explained by Vy. as referring to karuna, 'compassion', and muditā, 'sympathetic joy'. The Arabic text does not take into account the negation contained in this Sanskrit passage. The expression بابر أعراب عن the Arabic is on a par with the expressions
The Arabic text does not seem to contain an explicit reference to *maitri* of the sūtra; possibly *sūtra* reflects both *muditā* and *maitri*. Cf. R., p. 176, l. 3: ‘... to wish and desire the welfare of all creatures without exception, rejoice in its being achieved by them...’ (BSOAS, ch. I, 323). The sūtra under consideration appears to be based on sūtra 1.33.

82 Lit.: ‘places’. Cf. ḍesō, ‘locus’, in sūtra 3.1 above, which Vy. explains by reference to examples such as *nābhi-cakra* ‘the centre (lit.: circle, sphere)’ of the navel. Also cf. sūtra 3.29 et seq. below.

83 Ritter’s text has *kho*. We propose the emendation *khi*.

84 This corresponds to sūtra 3.24: *baleṣu hasti-balādīnī* (From the application of Discipline) to powers there arise the elephant-power and so forth’. Vy. on this sūtra speaks of ‘elephant-power’, of ‘Vaināteya’s (i.e. Garuḍa’s) power’ and ‘wind-power’. These may possibly be a reference to powers centred in the human body. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that al-Bīrūnī makes a distinction between strengthening the soul and strengthening the body (in which the cakras are located). This distinction does not occur in the commentary by Vy. which we have taken in the commentary used by him. For an early adumbration of the concept of cakras see *Bhyādāranyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.12: ‘so yathā sarvaśām apāyām samudra ekāyanaṃ evaṃ sarveṣvam sparśānāṃ tvay ekāyanaṃ evaṃ sarveṣvam gandhānāṃ nāsikē ekāyanaṃ evaṃ sarveṣvam rūpāṇāṃ cakṣur ekāyanaṃ...’ It is just as the ocean is the sole locus of all water, thus the skin is the sole locus of all touchings, thus the nostrils are the sole locus of all smells, thus the eye is the sole locus of all sights...’

85 This corresponds to sūtra 3.25: *pārvṛtya-ādokā-naśāt sūkṣma-vyavahito-viprakṛtya-jānānāṃ* (From the application of the light of (sense-) activity there arises knowledge of subtle, concealed or remote (things))’. (Cf. *Śākhāyakīrthi* (ŚK), kārīkā 7, on causes of the non-perception of things.) According to Vy. this sūtra is based on sūtras 1.35-6 (which are missing in al-Bīrūnī’s rendering). Sūtra 1.35 reads: visya vyavāti vā pārvṛtyo utpannaḥ manasāk śhiti-nilabdhiṣki ‘Alternatively any (sense-) activity, as it arises, which possesses an object leads to stability’. The Sanskrit word nilabdhiṣki may account for the Arabic *rizq* ‘after having subdued and constituted them’. Possibly this sūtra was quoted in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī under sūtra 3.25. Sūtra 3.36 reads: viśokā vā jyotishāṃ ‘Or alternatively (a sense-activity which is characterized by) absence of sorrow and illumination (leads to stability)’. While sūtra 3.25 mentions the well-known three categories of things, i.e. the subtle, the concealed and the remote, al-Bīrūnī mentions two only: the subtle that are present and the subtle that are absent. This deviation may be accounted for by the assumption that al-Bīrūnī read *avyavahita* (‘unconcealed’) instead of *vyavahita* (‘concealed’). Deussen’s implicit interpretation of *nyāsa* in sūtra 3.23 as synonymous with *samayana* is questionable.

84 Ritter reads *vala*. Our translation presupposes the emendation *vala* ‘and his eye...’ If this emendation were adopted the translation would be: ‘... he receives as his requital the comprehension of all that is in the worlds and the visual perception of the latter’.

87 This corresponds to sūtra 3.26: *bhuvana-jānānāṃ śeṣe saṃyamat ‘From the application of Discipline to the sun arises knowledge of the worlds’.

88 The MS has *al-‘alamārā‘* ‘the worlds’, *al-‘alamārā‘* ‘the worlds’ (and vice versa). Ritter has inserted into the printed text the emendation *al-‘alamārā‘* (i.e. ‘the learned Vyāsa’. This is supposed to refer to the well-known commentator on the *Yās.* This emendation is highly implausible. Cf. *BSOAS*, ch. I, 304. By the term ‘world’ al-Bīrūnī seems to render the Sanskrit term *loka*. Cf. *India*, Hyd., 44: ‘यह सीता लोक / अमृतारुपिन्यासोऽस्मिन भूवनाऽर्जययोऽस्मिन शाङ्कानिर्देशितस्त्रय साणि तत्त्वावस्था विद्यामालारुपाये’ (tr. Sachau, i, 59: ‘The Hindus call the world *lōka*. Its primary division consists of the upper, the lower and the middle. The upper one is called *svar-lōka...*’). Al-Bīrūnī also refers to the list of seven *lokas* as the heavens’, *India*, Hyd., p. 189, l. 1: ‘लोकसौं सातोऽस्मिन भूवनाः सर्व आङ्ग्लानाम चक्रेष्ठोऽस्मिन शाङ्कारुपिन्यासोऽस्मिन शाङ्कानिर्देशितस्त्रय साणि तत्त्वावस्था विद्यामालारुपाये’ (tr. Sachau, i, 231). In the *India* al-Bīrūnī gives an account of Purānic versions of the constitution of the world, pointing out deviations by the ‘commenta-
tor of the book of Patañjali (see India, ch. xxi). The word "لازمل" or "الأرزاني" here and elsewhere seem to render the Sanskrit term bhûmi (in the plural) as used by Vy. on sūtra 3.26 and other commentators. Cf. R, p. 181, l. 14; p. 186, l. 9; India, Hyd., p. 191, l. 9; p. 195, l. 2.
89 i.e. among the Indians.
90 Lit. : 'side' or 'direction'.
91 Cf. India, Hyd., 44: 'The world is divided in the first place into highest, lowest and middle' (والعالم يقسم قسمة أولية إلى صفgay وواصة) - This represents the Sanskrit tamas, transcribed as in India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 18.
Cf. below R, p. 187, l. 3.
92 'lowest of the lowest'.
93 أصل السلمان—lit. : 'the lowest of the lowest'.
94 جوزن. In India al-Biruni only mentions the plural form: جوزن. Cf. Sachau, Annotations, 311. Sachau's conjectured forms for the singular are spurious.
95 Ritter reads هو whereas the MS has وهو.
96 "The reader must learn that they have a measure of distance yojana which is equal to 8 miles or 32,000,000 yards" (Sachau, i, 167). Sachau translates as 'yard'. Cf. A. L. Basham, The wonder that was India, London, 1951, 503-4.
97 The Arabic كورك represents the Sanskrit koti, 'ten millions'. A scheme of the Indian order of numbers is set out by al-Biruni in India, Hyd., 137 (Sachau, i, 175).
98 Sanskrit laksya, '100,000'.
99 For the passage as a whole cf. India, Hyd., 194: ... هو أن مفسر كتب باتنجل ما أراد: 'And the world is divided first into highest, lowest and middle' (والتراكيب تقسم إلى أدنى الوسط واكل). The commentator of the book of Patañjali, wishing to determine the dimension of the world, begins from below and says: "The dimension of darkness is one koti and 85 laksya yojana, i.e. 18,000,000 (emend: 18,500,000—T.G. and S.P.) yojana" (Sachau, i, 237).
100 Al-Biruni uses here the Muslim term -
101 'Then follows Naraka, i.e. hells, of the dimension of 13 koti and 12 laksya, i.e. 131,200,000 yojana' (Sachau, i, 236). In this parallel passage the Arabic word for 'hell' is in the plural.
102 Cf. India, Hyd., loc. cit.: ثم طاغة كثيف واحد وذلک 10,000,000 yojana 'Then follows darkness, of one laksya, i.e. 100,000 yojana' (Sachau, loc. cit.).
103 في سحر رز لصدفان إفراس وهم الأناشة أو السماحة المسبكة is in the Arabic transcription. Cf. India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 11. But the term is transcribed by بصر in India, Hyd., 90 (last line); also cf. India, Hyd., p. 324, l. 15; p. 508, l. 12.
104 Cf. India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 11: وهو أرض زرلصالابا وهم الأناشة أو السماحة المسبكة وهم ملك شديد في الحضد ... 'Then follows darkness, of 85 laksya, i.e. 1,000,000 yojana'. Which Sachau translates, loc. cit.: 'Above it lies the earth of Vajra, so called on account of its hardness, because the word means a diamond, and the molten thunderbolt, of 34,000 yojana'. The correct reading seems to be السماحة المسبكة (or: "held fast, grasped") rather than المسبكة السماحة المسبكة ("the solid earth") (Sachau, i, 119). Also cf. India, Hyd., p. 508, l. 12, and Indra's common epithet vajra-dhara ('vajra-bearer') and vajra-pāñi ('holding the vajra in his hand'). The term vajra has in fact the two meanings 'thunderbolt' and 'diamond' mentioned by al-Biruni.
105 The primary meaning of garbha is 'womb'. It can also be applied to some part of the interior of a building, etc. The term garbha is represented in the Arabic text by كر. The transcription of the Sanskrit ga by the Arabic ك is in keeping with al-Biruni's usage: cf. e.g. hiranyakagarbha—بيروت كريبينب . R, p. 168, l. 8. Cf. India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 12, which has almost the same transcription of garbha: 'Above it lies the middle earth Garbha of 60,000 yojana' (Sachau, i, 236).
106 Represented in the Arabic text by صور. The Sanskrit word swarga means 'gold'.
Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 12: 2, 30,000 'Above it is the golden earth
3,000' (Sachau, loc. cit.).

108 The text is here reconstructed by Ritter in accordance with *India*. The Arabic MS is damaged at this point. Only `الأرض` can be read. Ritter’s reconstruction, which is in all probability correct, reads
أرضْ السبع كل وحدة عشرة آلاف جزء
الاَرْضُ السِّبْعَ كُلْ وَحِدَّةٍ عِشْرَةٍ أَفَامَ جُزْء
The Sanskrit *ṣāpta* 'seven' is represented in the Arabic here as `bhiimir` (‘earth, soil’), each of which has a thickness of 1,000 *yoganas*. Cf. W. Kirfel, *Die Kosmographie der Indier nach den Quellen dargestellt*, Bonn, Leipzig, 1920, 143. The term *ṣapta* *pāṭalāni* occurs in Vy, on sūtra 3.26 as referring to the following list: *mahātala*, *rasātala*, *atala*, *sūtala*, *vītala*, *talātala*, and *pāṭalā*.

At this point the MS is damaged. The words 'the highest' render *समुद्रता दत्तिष्ठान...* which occurs in the corresponding passage in *India* (Hyd., p. 194, l. 14) but not in our MS. The word *समुद्रता* has not been inserted into Ritter’s text. This word possibly parallels the word नाट्यम् *the eighth* in Vy, on sūtra 3.26. The 'eighth' is *this earth* (bhāmīma iyum), designated in Vy. as *vasumanit*. The words 'Arabian seas' are likewise missing in the MS and have been inserted in Ritter’s printed text; *समुद्रता* is read in the corresponding passage in *India* (Hyd., p. 194, l. 14); 'Arabian' does not.

The term *dīvpa*, lit. ‘island’, also designates the seven concentric zones, separated by oceans, of Indian traditional geography. Cf. D. C. Sircar, *Cosmography and geography in early Indian literature*, Calcutta, 1967, Plate II. The term *dīvpa* is also rendered in *India* (e.g. Hyd., p. 194, l. 4) by *जगत्ता* 'island'. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 191, l. 11: "...*दिवपा* is their word for *island*." The word *dīvpa*, which is attested in *Bṛhādāraṇyaka* and *Sāmaveda* (6.3.97) and 7.20.4 is derived by Pāṇini (*Cāndrakīrti*, 2nd ed., Poona, 1977, vol. v, part 2, 1523 et seq.

The reading of the MS *hasta* could be retained. But Ritter’s emendation *hasta* or this is a possible doubling of *vasta* or *vastapāta* as indicative of the *ksetram*.

The term *ṣapta* *pāṭalāni* occurs in Vy, on sūtra 3.26: *tataś ca dīvpaṇā dīvpaṇāḥ śāka-kuśa-krāuca-sāmala-gometha-pukarda-dvīpāḥ*. Then (come) the islands Śāka, Kuśa, Krauca, Sāmala, Gomeda and Puṣkara, each double the preceding. (The K.S.S. 1935 printed edition reads *magadha* instead of *gomedha*.)

Lit.: ‘every two islands’. i.e. continents.

110 Cf. *Vṛṣṇi Purāṇa* as quoted by W. Kirfel, *Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude* (*Bhuvanavimāna* — Die kosmographischen Traktate der Purāṇas — Versuch einer Textgeschichte), Bonn, 1954, 24, l. 6:...
111 For this progressive doubling cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.26: *tataś ca dīvpaṇā dīvpaṇāḥ śāka-kuśa-krāuca-sāmala-gometha-pukarda-dvīpāḥ* *Then (come) the islands Śāka, Kuśa, Krauca, Sāmala, Gomeda and Puṣkara, each double the preceding* . (The K.S.S. 1935 printed edition reads *magadha* instead of *gomedha*.)

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113 Cf. *Vṛṣṇi Purāṇa* as quoted by W. Kirfel, *Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude* (*Bhuvanavimāna* — Die kosmographischen Traktate der Purāṇas — Versuch einer Textgeschichte), Bonn, 1954, 24, l. 6:...
114 *tksu-rasoda...* may correspond to *uda* (‘water’).
115 *ṣurū*, represented in the Arabic MS by *سَرْب* (*sura*).
116 *sarpis*, represented in the Arabic MS by *سرِب* (*sārbi*).
117 *dadhi*, represented in the Arabic MS by *دَدَح* (*dadhi*).

The word *svādu* in the compound svādadhaka can also mean ‘molasses’ (lex.). For the list as a whole cf. the one given in *India*, Hyd., 193.

Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 194, l. 15: "...*dādhi*... Behind the Sea of Sweet Water is Lokāloka which may be interpreted as ‘lacking places where (people) dwell together’, i.e. uninhabited, in which sociability is absent. Sachau’s rendering of *dādhi* by ‘not gathering place’ (t, 236) may be too literal. For the use of *dādhi* cf. below,
R., p. 187, l. 1: "the place where the ancestors dwell together". For the above etymological derivation of lokaloko cf. the meanings of loka: (i) "the space in which to live, Lebensraum" (cf. J. Gonda, Loka—world and heaven in the Veda, Amsterdam, 1966, 60, and passim); (ii) "community, society" (as in the expression loka-saṅgha, Bhagavadgītā 3.20; cf. Rāmānuja's gloss of lokah, op. cit., 14.14, as samabhā 'communities') respectively. For different etymological derivations of lokaloko see (i) Kālidāsā, Raghuvansṣa 1.68 (cf. Śabdakalpa-druma s.v.: ākāśaśāśna śāśna ca 'visible and invisible'); and (ii) Bhāgavata Purāṇa (quoted by H. H. Wilson, The Vishnu Purāṇa, 3rd ed., Calcutta, 1961, p. 167, n. 6): "lok'o lokā ca ... vyavasthāpayate 'the world is separated (thereby) from what is not the world'. Also cf. J. Gonda, op. cit., 154. Cf. also Devī-Bhāgavata Purāṇa 8.14.4 for the etymological explanation of the name lokaloko as 'beneath any community (saṅgha); cf. cf. above) of living beings'.

128 Lit.: 'that in which there is no habitation'.

129 Cf. India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 15 (see n. 121 above). Also cf. al-Bīrūnī's quotation from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa in India, Hyd., p. 195, l. 15. Wo Razwa na Lokālokā 'who is bereft of all bhūjān (possibly Earth, possibly the earth)' is a mountain of the height of 10,000 yojana, and of the same breadth' (Sachau, i, 237).

130 In the parallel passage in India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 15, Aṛḍa lokha is also referred to but is supposed to have the extent of one koṭi of yojana's only.

131 Cf. India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 16: 'above it the Pīrāloka of 6,134,000 yojana' (Sachau, i, 236). According to India, Hyd., p. 191, l. 1 et seq., 'the commentator of the book of Patañjali has heard that the dwelling place of the ancestors (the Sanskrit word is transliterated: pīrīna) is in the sphere of the moon. This doctrine is based on the assertions of the astronomers. Thus he (the commentator) placed their dwelling place in the first heaven. He ought to have substituted it for Bhūrloka but he did not do so. (Instead) because of this addition, he left out the Svarloka which is the place of reward'. For the conception of the moon as a dwelling place of departed souls cf. e.g. Kauśitakī Upaniṣad 1.2 (with schol.).

132 Cf. India, Hyd., p. 194, l. 17: 'The totality of the seven lokas, which is called Brahmāṇḍa, has the dimension of 15 koṭis, i.e. 150,000,000 yojana' (Sachau, i, 237). Also cf. India, Hyd., 179–80 (Sachau, i, 221), where al-Bīrūnī treats of the brahmāṇḍa. Sachau's translation of the passage contains an error (possibly due to a misprint). It also is rendered: '... they believe that the earth is at rest'. The correct translation should be: 'they believe that the heavens are at rest'.

133 In the plural in the Arabic.

134 Represented in the Arabic by تَمِيمُونَةَ .

135 Ritter's printed text has جملة مرود which Ritter identifies with the Sālmaīl island referred to above. The MS may be read جملة مرود. In our opinion there is no doubt that this should be read جملة مرود or جملة مرود جل. Al-Bīrūnī refers to جملة مرود in India, Hyd., p. 200, l. 14; p. 201, l. 2; p. 202, l. 16; p. 203, l. 13; p. 204, l. 8; p. 206, l. 7.

136 Cf. India, Hyd., p. 201, l. 8, where Āryabhāṭa is quoted as saying that Mt. Meru is 'the realm of the angels' بَلَكَةِ الْمَلَائِكَةِ (bilkha mlaike).

137 Ritter's printed text has جملة مرود which Ritter identifies with the Sālmaīl island referred to above. The MS may be read جملة مرود مرود جل. In our opinion there is no doubt that this should be read جملة مرود or جملة مرود جل. Al-Bīrūnī refers to جملة مرود in India, Hyd., p. 200, l. 14; p. 201, l. 2; p. 202, l. 16; p. 203, l. 13; p. 204, l. 8; p. 206, l. 7.

138 According to his n. 2 on p. 187 the MS has جملة مرود جل. Our reading جملة مرود can be proved as correct by reference to India, Hyd., p. 205, l. 14 et seq. This passage also proves that at this point several words are omitted in the Istanbul MS. The passage in question reads: جملة مرود جل. We may be translated: '... thus the commentator of the book of Patañjali, who goes beyond (attributing) the square (shape to Mount Meru, transforming it) into an oblong. He fixes (the length of) one of its sides at 15 koṭis yojana, which is 15,000,000, and that of the other at five koṭis, i.e. the third of the former'. In his translation Sachau (i, 248) refers to 'three sides' whose length is five koṭis. This translation has no warrant in the text.
The printed text has been emended to correspond to the MS. Our emendations are based on *India*, Hyd., p. 196, l. 10; p. 218, l. 3; p. 421, l. 6. Cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 421, l. 6: "Vidyadhara" (Mount Vindaya) rose even to the neighbourhood of Paradise and the dwellings of the Vidyadhara, the spiritual beings (Sachau, i, 92). For a definition of the term *vidyadhara*, lit. 'holder of the skill', cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 69, l. 10: "Vidyadhara is a demon-sorcerer, who exercises a certain witchcraft, but not such a one as to produce permanent results" (Sachau, i, 91). Cf. Richard C. Temple, 'Hindu and non-Hindu elements in the Kathasaritsagara', *The Indian Antiquary*, LVII, March 1929, section 2, a: 'Vidyadhara and white magic' (pp. 46-7). For a definition of *gandharva* cf. *India*, Hyd., p. 69, l. 9. 1.4: "sacred hill and mountain, and men who make music before the Deva. Their harlots are called Apaaras" (Sachau, i, 91). As for *siddha* and *muni*, they are characterized in *India* (Hyd., p. 70, l. 16 et seq.) as follows: "They are mountebanks, who lived among the people of that time. They would go from place to place, teaching the people to find out the secrets of the future. They were called siddhas, because they could do all sorts of wonderful things. They were also called munis, because they lived in the woods and mountains, and were considered to be very holy men." After the Deva comes the class of the Pitaras, the deceased ancestors, and after them the Bhutas, human beings who have attached themselves to the spiritual beings (Deva), and stand in the middle between them and mankind. He who holds this degree, but without being free from the body, is called either Revi or Siddha or Muni, and these differ among themselves according to their qualities. Siddha is he who has attained by his action the faculty to do in the world whatever he likes, but who does not exert himself on the path leading to liberation. He may ascend to the degree of Revi* (Sachau, i, 93). Also cf. Vy. and Bhoja on *YS*, sūtra 3.32; *Bhagavadgītā* 10.26; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.3.33 and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 11.14. For our proposed reading siddha here cf. also the description of siddhas as inhabiting *Bhuvan-loka* in *R*, p. 188, ll. 16–17 (transl. below).

138 Ritter emends كَبَر: However, the MS has كَبِر. There is a blur in the MS: the last letter can also be read كَبِر. We propose to read كَبِر.

139 The Arabic has which is not usually used by al-Biruni in this translation in a cosmological context.

140 A few of the names referred to of mountains, kingdoms and seas which surround Mount Meru on its four sides occur in *India*, Hyd., 205.
capital and a city of importance. (such as Indra and his like) in our MS, cf. e.g. the expression imdrādi-loka-pālānām ... in W. Kirfel, Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude (Bhuvanavinīṣa), Bonn, 1954, p. 10, verse 27b.  

Possibly referring to the 'angels'.  

The Arabic MS has 'Ritākā. Ritter's suggestion that this represents vairāja (R, p. 187, n. 6) is most improbable. Our interpretation has been put forward tentatively. The collocation of nara and kinnara in a list of classes of demi-gods is attested, e.g. in Mahābhārata (see S. Sorensen, An index to the names in the Mahābhārata, reprint, Delhi, 1963, s.v. kinnara). Cf. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 11.14. The kinnaras ('kinnara') are mentioned in India, Hyd., p. 69, l. 6, where they are characterized as 'having human shapes but horses' heads, being the contrary of the centaurs of the Greek, of whom the lower half has the shape of a horse, the upper half that of a man' (Sachau, t. 91). Possibly al-Būrīnī had encountered in his source a Sanskrit compound in which kumāra was the second component. The term kumāra can signify a class of demi-gods (see S. Sorensen, op. cit., s.v.; cf. J. Gonda, Viṣṇuism and Śivaism, London, 1970, 139). A further conjectural reading would be the compound nṛtya-kumārī, which means 'a dancing maiden' and may designate an apsara (a class of mythological beings comparable to the nymphs of Greece, who are supposed to be the mistresses of the gandharvas). Cf. W. Kirfel, Das Purāṇa vom Weltgebäude, Bonn, 1954, 71, verse 19b: nṛtyantya 'psaraso yānti sūryasyānu nīcārāh ('Dancing apsaras follow the sun, moving by night').  


The MS has ʾīlā. Ritākā. Ritākā.  

In the Arabic this is represented by two separated words: ʾīlā. Ritākā. Ritākā.  

The Sanskrit brāhma- is transcribed by al-Būrīnī both as ʾīlā. Ritākā. Ritākā. (cf. India, Hyd., p. 191, l. 6: ʾīlā. Ritākā. Ritākā. for brahma-loka) and as ʾīlā. Ritākā. Ritākā. (cf. India, Hyd., p. 101, l. 2: ʾīlā. Ritākā. Ritākā. for brahma-purāṇa). As observed by Sachau with regards to India, 'the transliteration is not always uniform, as sometimes a short Indian a has been rendered by a long ā in Arabic' (Sachau, Annotations, 257). The expression brahma-loka means 'the country or region of the brahmanas'. The expression occurs in Manu, II, where it is, however, used to refer to a region of this earth. Cf. also Bhīmaśeṣa. Yalakīka. ʾīlā. ṣāhānān (quoting Agni Purāṇa): prajāpatyaṁ brāhmaṇānāṁ smṛtaṁ ṣāhānāṁ kriyāvatām; kaśtriyaṁ tathā caityaṁ prajāpaṁ svāmīṁ antāntāṁ; gandharvam śūdra-jātvāṁ parichāykināvān śy ādi 'The world of Prajāpati is recorded as the locality of the brahmanas who engage in ritual, the world of Indra—as that of the kaśtriya who do not shrink from battle, the world of the gandharvas—as that of the classes of śūdras who follow a routine of service.'  

Ritākā. Ritākā.  

In two words: ʾīlā. Ritākā. Cf. India, Hyd., p. 191, l. 6.  

Transcribed ʾīlā. Ritākā. Cf. India, Hyd., p. 198, l. 17. For the passage cf. India, Hyd., p. 191, l. 5 et seq.: 'This is a further reference to the loke above the world, specifying in its name of the three worlds. As the seventh, Satyaloka, is in the Purāṇas also called Brahmaloka, he placed the Brahmaloka above the Satyaloka, whilst it would have been much more reasonable to think that in this case one and the same thing is called by two different names. He ought to have omitted the Brahmaloka, to have identified Pitrloka with Bhūrloka, and not to have left out the Svarloka' (Sachau, t. 233). The triple set of bhūr, bhuvah and svar, which were used as vyāhītis (sacred explanations) as well as names of lokas, may be traced back to Chāndogya Upaniṣad 2.23.2: prajāpatir lokān abhyatapat: tebhyaḥ bhidtekbhyas trayaḥ vidyā samśravaṇaṁ, tāṁ abhyatapat, tasyaḥ abhidtekbhyāṁ śāny akṣaraṁ samśravaṇanāṁ bhūr bhuvah svar tī 'Prajāpati brooded upon the worlds. From them, when they had been brooded upon, issued forth the three-fold knowledge (i.e. the three Vedas). He brooded upon this. From it, when it had been brooded upon, issued
forth these syllables: bhūr, bhūvah, svar (representing earth, atmosphere and sky, respectively).

An example of a later Purānic seven-fold version of the list of lokas occurs in Agnī Purāṇa: bhūr bhūvah svar mahaś caiva janaś ca tapa eva ca / satya-loka ca sapta-loka tu parikīrtitah (quoted in Śādakapādṛama, s.v. lokāḥ). Cf. also Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.33 for an early attempted systematization of the lokas of men, the fathers (piṭras), the gandharvas, gods by virtue of merit (karma-deva), gods by virtue of birth (śijāna-deva) as well as of one who is versed in the Veda (śrotṛiya); cf. brahma-deśa represented in R, p. 187, l. 12?), etc.

146 Cf. India. Hyd., p. 196, l. 14: वर्द्धिते जयमात्राः परितृप्तः अनुमति। This sum, however, is more than thrice the sum which we have mentioned on the authority of the commentator of the book of Patañjali. This statement presupposes that the total extent of the seven lokas has been given in the text. It is, however, missing in the Hyd. as well as Sachau’s editions.

In Arabic أثْر. This term is derived from the Greek aithér. It signifies in Arabic either (1) the area in which the heavenly spheres exist and the substance of which they are made—this appears to be the meaning of the term as used here by al-Biruni—or (2) one of the four terrestrial elements, the elemental fire which forms a zone situated above the zone of the lowest heavenly sphere.

147 Lit. ‘discourse’—कालम्.


149 Cf. śūtra 3.27: चंद्रेरीवेकाक्षमांन, ‘(From the application of Discipline) to the moon arises the meaning of the arrangement of the stars’.

The MS has كُونُ which is also Ritter’s reading. Our reading شکوره is proposed in view of the following passage in India, Hyd., p. 198, l. 13 seq.: वर्द्धिते जयमात्राः परितृप्तः अनुमति। अरुण अम्भों चाकरो भूवाः अभिशिष्ट अधिकारी वायुः। अधिशिष्ट इस प्रकार है चप्टबाणी। ‘The Hindus tell rather ludicrous tales when speaking of the figure in which they represent these stars, viz. the figure of a four-footed aquatic animal, which they call Śākvara and also Śīśumāra. I suppose that the latter animal is the great lizard, for in Persia it is called Susmār, which sounds much like the Indian Śīśumāra. Of this kind of animal there is also an aquatic species, similar to the crocodile and the skink’ (Sachau, i, 241). (The word अरुण above, which is misspelled as अरुण in Hyd. ed. means ‘based on false beliefs, legendary’ rather than ‘ludicrous’; pace Sachau.) This constellation has a connexion with the pole-star, as is evident from the subsequent passage: वर्द्धिते जयमात्राः परितृप्तः अनुमति। ‘Fourteen of these stars he placed round the pole in the shape of a śīśumāra, which drive the other stars round the pole’ (Sachau, i, 242). Although the Arabic transliteration of śākvara in India (in the passage quoted above) is शारकर and not śākvara as proposed by us with regard to the text under consideration, it should be borne in mind that al-Biruni’s transliteration of Sanskrit short a is not always uniform, as it has been sometimes rendered by him by a long a in Arabic (cf. Sachau, Annotations, 257). The association of dhrura (which is also used to refer to a Vedic ceremonial vessel connected with soma rituals) with śīśumāra and śākvara (the latter represented by the derivative śākvarah (schol.: = atyanta-śaktimān, ‘very mighty’, i.e. as strong and potent as a śākvara) is traceable back to Taittirīya Āranyaka 2.19, where the three words occur together in a context which, although different, is not without connexion (in view of the underlying microcosmic-macrocosmic equivalence): sa vā eṣo divyaḥ śākvarah śīśumāraḥ śākvarah tvam aṣi dhruryasya yajpayati aṣi tvam bhāhāḥbhāpati aṣi. That is the celestial extremely potent (schol. on śākvarah) śīśumāra. ... (O, śīśumāra !) thou art dhrura (schol.: indestructible), thou art the dwelling place of dhrura, thou art the ruler of (all) beings ...’. Cf. especially Śāṇyana ad loc.: anena māntradenānukho bhūtā dhrura-মাতাম সাপ্তামূম্বরা-রূপেম তম উপাীতীত ত. (Uttering) this (sacrificial) formula, looking up, gazing at the circle (মাতাম, used also as a visual meditational aid), one should worship it in the form of a śīśumāra.’ Detailed descriptions
of the constellation under consideration occur in various purāṇas. Cf. Viṣṇudharmottara I.106.4 et seq. (quoted from a MS by G. Bühler in his review of Sachau’s translation of al-Biruni’s India in The Indian Antiquary, xix, November 1890, 395–6). According to G. Bühler, this passage referred to by al-Biruni as ‘Viṣṇudharma’, was the source of the description in India of the constellation in question (Hyd., p. 198, l. 13 et seq. Cf. Sachau, i, 242).

The passage reads:

...  

... dhruva-s̡hāna-nipīṣṭā ca tārakāś ca caturāsda //  

... utānāpādas tasyuṭha vijñeyah [smoṭ̣taro hanub //  

yaṅa dharas tu vijñeyo dharmo mārthānam ādītaḥ //  

[kṛdā nārāyaṇaḥ cāste aśvinau pūrva-pādabh //  

vāruṇaḥ cāryām caiva paścome tasya sakthiḥ //  

śīnaḥ saṃvataraus tasya mitra ‘pānaṃ samārītah] //  

pucche ‘gniś ca mahendrās ca mārīcaḥ kaśyapo dhruvaḥ //  

dhruva-s̡hāḥ [sevar grajṛkṣāvām ekśīthāḥ prakārirāḥ //  

... śīmuṇḍa-nībaddhāṇām tārakānām pṛthak pṛthak //  

nāma-dheyaṇi vijñāya drṣṭvā ca vimale ‘mbare //  

āyur abhyadbhakṣan jived vargān ś ca caturāsda //  

āho-rātra-kṛtā pāpāt tat-kaṇād vipramucayate //  .

(And Brahmac created) fourteen stars placed near the pole-star ... Know that Uttānāpāda is its upper jaw, know that Yajña is its lower (jaw), that Dharma resides in its head; [Nārāyaṇa is seated in the heart, the two Aśvin in the fore-feet; Varuṇa and Aryanman are its hind-most haunches, Saṃvatara its penis, and Mitra occupies its anus]. In the tail are Agni, Mahendra, Mārica Kaśyapa as well as Dhruva (the Pole-star). Those among the stars and planets which are situated near the Pole-star are collectively called Svar (?) ... He who knows severally the names of the stars contained in the śīmuṇḍa and has seen them in the pure sky will live fourteen years beyond (his allotted period of life) and is forthwith liberated from sins committed during the day or night’. The text in square brackets was reconstructed by Bühler by comparison with Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.12.33 et seq. (cf. op. cit., 2.9.1 et seq.). Bühler’s translation has been adopted with modifications. According to Bühler the śīmuṇḍa denotes the alligator (loc. cit.). The pertinent penultimate verse above is significantly identical in corresponding passages in Matsya Purāṇa and Vāyu Purāṇa (cf. Bühler, op. cit., p. 397, n. 62). Cf. also Bhāgavata Purāṇa 5.23.4 et seq.

153 According to the dictionaries سفین is a term denoting the rough skin of various aquatic or amphibious animals, notably of the crocodile and of the ṣṭūrma whose skin is put upon the hilts of swords. Cf. Fāḍa ‘Kēḥte līhān and Lane’s Arabic dictionary, s.v.

154 Ṡnān ‘taken ’.

Cf. sūtra 3.28: dhruve tad-gati-jiśānām ‘ (From the application of Discipline) to the pole-star arises knowledge of the motions of the stars’.

Cf. sūtra 3.29: ṅābhī-ccaṅkā kāya-vyūha-jiśānan ‘ (From the application of Discipline) to the navel-circle (or -wheel, cf. Bhoja ad loc.) arises knowledge of the arrangement (i.e. structure) of the body ‘. For the use of vyūha, ‘formation, arrangement of parts, disposition, organization ’ cf. sūtra 3.27 above. Bhavadeva ad loc. glosses it with the synonym samsthāna, and Bhoja— with sanniveṣa. Cf. J. H. Woods, op. cit., p. 224, n. 1. Taking cakra here to refer to ‘a wheel of sixteen spokes which is named “nave’ ’, (ṅābhī-samsthāna ytt castehāram cakram) Bhoja ad loc. explains: ṅābhī-cakram sarvāsya madhya-vartī sarvataḥ prasārāṇāṃ nyādyānāṃ mula-bhāthām; atas tatra kṛ̤lavadhānanya sargasrah sanniveṣa gathāvad abhādy ‘The nave-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes; therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body ’ (transal. Rajendralala Mitrā). Also cf. the significance of cakra as referring to centres or localizations of psychic power in the body as
expounded in late Upaniṣads and Tāntric texts dealing with varieties of kuṇḍalini-yoga. See P. Deussen, Sechzig Upanishad’s des Veda, Leipzig, 1921, 675; P. V. Kane, op. cit., v/2, 1136 et seq.; M. Eliade, Le yoga, immobilité et liberté, Paris, 1954, 237 et seq.; S. Lindquist, Die Methoden des Yoga, Lund, 1932, 190; H. v. Glasenapp, Der Hinduismus, München, 1922, 293 et seq.; Sanjukta Gupta et al., Hindu Tantrism, Leiden, 1979, 170 et seq. In accordance with the Tāntric theory of cakras the nābhi-cakra corresponds to the maṇi-pārakram, the third cakra in the following scheme: (1) ādāra (at the base of the trunk), (2) svādhīshtānam (sexual centre), (3) maṇi-pārakram (navel-brow), (4) anākālām (heart-centre), (5) viśuddhi (throat-centre), (6) ṛṇā (the centre between the eye-brows) (cf. Hansa Upanisad 2). Cf. Maṇiprabhā ad loc. Accordingly Svāmi Nārāyaṇaṭīrtha comments in his Svārthabodhini ad loc.: kīyasya mādhyābhāge yan nābhi-cakram ādāra-līṅga-cakrākhyām upari sthitena daśa-patram; tasmān sanyāmād dehasya sanniveśaṁ jānāti ‘The “navel-wheel” which is (situated) in the middle part of the body is the “(lotus) of ten petals” which is situated above the cakras of the ādāra and līṅga (= svādhīshtāna); through applying Discipline to it he knows the structure of (his) body’. (For the metaphor of the lotus as having the same reference as cakra here cf. Vy. on sūtra 3.34.) Also cf. Yogasudhākara ad loc.: kīyasya mādhyābhāge yan nābhi-cakram maṇi-pārakākhyām daśa-dalaṁ. . . ‘The nābhi-cakra (situated) in the middle part of the body is (the lotus) of the ten petals known as maṇi-pārakara’. . . T. R. V. Murti has suggested (in a conversation—T.G.) that underlying the sūtra is the idea that the navel is the focal point of feeding an embryo, and hence it is the origin of the structure of the body that grows. For the symbolic significance of the navel as the life-centre in the Hindu ceremony of initiation cf. H. Zimmer, Hindu medicine, Baltimore, 1948, 120–1. One cannot rule out the possibility that the term cakra in the sūtra merely refers to the shape of the navel and is bereft of tāntric signification (cf. Bhāvāganaḍa ad loc.).

115 Lit. ‘discourse’.
116 Ritter reads तिल. The reading which is proposed is नभल ‘sediment, sediments’. तिल may correspond to mala ‘excreta, bodily secretions or impurities’; तिल—‘residue’—to prasāda ‘residue’. Cf. Bhoga ad loc.
117 Ritter’s text in keeping with the MS has म. . . . Ritter does not propose any emendation. Our reading तिल and interpretation are borne out by तिल ‘remain’ which occurs in the next sentence.

118 The three residues correspond to the three dosas (humours)—śāta (‘wind’), pitta (‘bile’) and śleṣman (= kapha) (‘phlegm’)—listed or referred to by all the commentators on the YS known to us. Cf. Āgnivesa’s Caraka Saṁhitā (ed. and tr. Ram Karan Sharma et al., Vārāṇasi, 1977), Vimāna section, ch. i, para. 5 (1, 113): doṣāḥ punas trayo vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇāḥ; te prakṛtiḥbhātā śariropakārākāh bhavanti, vikṛtām āpannas tu khalu nānāvāhikāh vikāraṇāh śāryam uttāpyantā ‘Doṣas are three, viz. vāta, pitta and kapha. During their normal state, they sustain the body. When vitiated, they afflict the body with various types of diseases’ (tr., op. cit.).

119 This renders नभल which is Ritter’s reading. If this is correct it may be connected with the fact that in Sanskrit texts the three humours in question are frequently referred to as doṣas ‘defects’ (from the root dus, ‘to harm, damage’). Cf. Vy. ad loc.: vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇas trayo doṣāḥ ‘The humours (doṣa) are three: wind, bile and phlegm’. An alternative reading would be म. ‘establish, sustain’. For this cf. Vāc. on sūtra 1.30 in which the three humours, here called dhatus, are said to sustain (dhaṇāṇa) the body: dhatavā vāta-pitta-śleṣmāṇāḥ śārīrā-dhārānāt ‘The humours (dhatu)—wind, bile and phlegm—are so called because they sustain (dhaṇāṇa) the body’. Also cf. India, Hyd., 274: ‘See the educated Hindus’ that know the body, a compound of antipathetic humours, requires sleep for the purpose of resting, and for this purpose that all which nature requires, after being duly asleep, should be duly replaced. So, in consequence of the constant dissolution, the body requires food in order to replace that which had been lost by emaciation’ (Sachau, i, 324). Apart from this, of course, al-Bīrūnī appears also to use the term म. for rendering the concept of humours. Cf. R, p. 168,
I. 17 (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 312, n. 83). The theory of the three humours has its earliest attestation in Atharvaveda-Parishiṣṭa (68), according to G. M. Bolling, ‘Diseases and medicine (Vedic)’ in J. Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, Edinburgh, 1911, iv, 763a.

162 The MS and Ritter’s text have لينة. Possibly this should be emended to لينة. The list of the ‘things’ corresponds entirely to the list of dhātu (lit. ‘layers, strata’, i.e. constituents of the body or secretions generated by food) occurring in Nāgāsa Bhaṭṭa’s Bhāgyachārīyā ad loc.: rasa-lokiṭa-māṁsa-snāye-asthi-majjā-śukrāṣi ‘chyle, blood, flesh, tendon, bone, marrow and semen’. This suggests that al-Bīrūnī’s ‘commentator’ was dependent at least in this matter on the tradition upon which Nāgāsa Bhaṭṭa drew. The list given in Vy. ad loc. differs in that teuk ‘skin’ takes the place of rasa. It is worth mentioning that one of the MSS of Vy. has rasa instead of teuk. The context shows that this variant is spurious. The list used by al-Bīrūnī’s ‘commentator’ also corresponds to the one occurring in the Caraka Saṃhitā, Viṃāna section, ch. v, paras. 7–8 (op. cit., i, 174), where snāya is replaced by its apparent synonym medas (‘fat, adipose tissue’), and lokita—by its synonym śonita. For an early occurrence of the medical term dhātu, see Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad 6.5.1 (see n. 166 below).

164 The Arabic word is بُضْي. It is translated to مَسْرِم in the Arabic.

165 For this passage cf. Caraka-Saṃhitā, Śūtrasthāna section, ch. viii, para. 4 (op. cit., i, 568): tatrāhāra[4] prasadākhyo rasah ko mahākṣyam abhinivartate. kītāt sveda-mātra-purīṣa-vātā-pitta-sleṣmānāh karākṛi-nāśikāṣya-loma-kītā-prajanaṇa-mālāh keśa-śmaṇīra-loma-nakāhādayaś cāṣiyanāh yuṣyanti. yuṣyanti te dhāra-ṛasaḥ rasa-rudhira-māṁsa-medaḥ-asthi-majjā-śukrāṣām... ‘Food (after digestion) turns into (1) (its essence) called “residue” (prasāda) and (2) refuse called “secret” (or “excreta”, mala). From (2) develop sweat, urine, excrement, “wind”, “bile” and “phlegm” secretions of the ear, eye, nose, hair-follicles, and the generative organ; as well as parts (of the body) such as hair of the head, beard, hair on the body and nails. From (1) develop “sediments”, chyle, blood, flesh, fat (adipose tissue), bone, marrow, semen and energy...’

Cf. also Śāṅgadharā-Saṃhitā, Calcutta, 1975, 70, ch. i, v. 16: rasāḥ raktam tato māṁsaḥ māṁśāḥ medaḥ prajñāye / medas ʾṣṭi tato majjāḥ majjāyāḥ śukra-samhāvah ‘Essence (of food)→blood→flesh→fat→bones→marrow→semen’. Cf. Manu 5.135 for a list of twelve impurities (mala) of human bodies. (For further related references from Sanskrit medical texts cf. C. Dwarkanath, Introduction to Kāśyapikātā (sic), Bombay, 1959, p. 324, nn. 722–4.) The physiological theory underlying our Caraka passage is adumbrated as early as Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad 6.5.1: annam aśītaṃ tṛdhā vidhiyate, taṣaṃ yaḥ athavādhū bhātūśaḥ tatra purīṣaḥ bhavati, yo madhyamaṇaḥ tāhām, yo ’ṣṭiḥṣas tāḥan mahaḥ ‘Food, when eaten, becomes divided into three parts (dhātus). That which is its coarsest (part) becomes the excrement; that which is medium, flesh; that which is finest, the mind’. The Arabic word rendered as ‘generation’ is كَبْكَةُ الْأَنْفُسُ وَالْفَسَادُ كَةُ is the Arabic title of Aristotle’s work which in the Latin version is entitled De generatione et corruptione.

166 Ritter’s text reads بَعْضِ. We propose to read بَعْض. Cf. BSOAS, ch. II, p. 534, n. 31; YS, sūtra 2.5; R, p. 185, l. 11; R, p. 189, l. 6. Cf. also Indira, Hyd., 82 (Sachau, i, 68). For the idea expressed by this passage as a whole cf. Maitri Upaniṣad 1.3: bhāgyavati asthi-carmā-snāyamajjā-māṁṣa-śukra-śonita-sleṣmānāḥ-śītikā-svā-mātra-purīṣa-kapha-samghāte durgādhih nib-sāre ‘smīt kārīṁ kim kāmopahogatāḥ ‘Sir, in this foul-smelling unsubstantial (or devoid of all essence) body, a conglomerate of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, eye-secretion, faces, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, how can one enjoy desires?’ Comparable passages are common in the Buddhist literature.

167 According to Ritter the MS has either صلصة or صلصة. We emends to صلصة. In our view the MS should be read صلصة. In the case of the referring to the placenta, xalnax, epiglottis, back of the neck, root of the tongue, throat’. Cf. Sūtra 3.30: kauṣṭha-kūpe kyūt-papidū-nyertīḥ ‘(By applying Discipline) to the hollow (part) of the throat (one achieves) cessation of hunger and thirst’. The term may mean ‘a hollow place, vacuum’, which would correspond to kūpa (lit. ‘well, pit ’). 2.5 may also mean ‘a space’, which would correspond to pradeka ‘place, region’, which
occurs in the heart, the body is a region of the throat in the shape of a cavity (or well). (Cf. also Bhoja ad loc.) For the mention of 'wind' and 'respiration' in the Arabic text cf. the reference to प्राया in Bhoja ad loc.: प्रायीत्वत यत् सांपकत्व क्षुत्प-पीपायत्य प्रायद्र भवान्ति 'By the contact of the vital airs with it (i.e. the hollow of the throat) (the sensation of) hunger and thirst emerge'; for 'chest' (सद्) cf. उरस in यू. on सुत्र 3.31. Also cf. Maitri Upaniṣad 7.7 (quoting Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.1.5): एषं तपमपहता-पाप्नान्द्रोर्म विमत्युर्य अक्षुः-पीपायत्सत्यासंकलिपत्सत्याकामाः ‘He is the self (atman), cleansed of evil, free from age, free from death, free from hunger and thirst (अक्षुः-पीपायत्), who (possesses the power of) having his intention realized, who (possesses the power of) having his wishes realized (सत्याकाम, and not “whose desire is the real” as usually translated)

Cf. सुत्र 3.31: कूर्मा-नादयाम स्थायिरम् ‘(By applying Discipline) to the tortoise-shaped (artery) (one achieves) steadiness’. For the meaning of स्थायिरम cf. सूत्रस 2.45, 46. Cf. also alolupatvam ‘steadiness’ (lit.: “non-swerving”) in Śvetāvatara Upaniṣad 2.13: laghutvam अरोग्यम् alolupatvam varṇa-प्रसेदम् सवर्ण-सास्थ्याम् c/ गंधनाः सहो मात्रा-परिश्रमम् अलहं yoga-pratyāhāram prathamāṃ vadanī ‘Lightness, healthliness, steadiness (v.l.: alolubhatvarn ‘non-covertuousness’ is evidently less plausible), clearness of complexion (lit.: “purified, clarified colour”), loveliness of voice, a pleasant odour, and scanty urine and faces—these, they say (i.e. is recorded by tradition), are the first (indications, results, of) the progress of yoga’. For ‘हो वर्णन’ ‘namely, the twisted veins’ in the Arabic text cf. Vījñānabhikṣu ad loc.: कुलापिता-सरपवद्व वास्तितायाम् कृमसंकलिपत्सत्याकामाः ‘the cakra of the artery (नादी) which has the name “the lotus of the heart” and has the shape of a tortoise on account of its being positioned like a coiled serpent’. Cf. Sanjukta Gupta et al., op. cit.: ‘The mystical physiology envisages a series of lotus centres (cakra) and nodes (ग्रन्थिः) arranged up the (mystical) spine, and a system of veins (नादी) through which passes the vital air (प्राया or वायु)’. Crucial points in the body are occupied by deities and other symbols which historically arise from the macrocosm-microcosm equivalence’ (p. 164): ‘The mystical body contains a vast number of veins (नादी) which are considered to be the connecting links between the senses and the mind. Moreover, they are activated by the passage of the breaths. If the yogi stops the passage of the breaths through the nādi, he thereby stops the activities of the senses and severs the connection between the mind and external sensory objects, which are what distracts him from concentrating on the essence of his individual self’ (p. 168).

For a definition of siddha in India see n. 134 above.

Al-Bīrūnī’s use of the term रागद् seems to be equivocal. It appears to render both yogi and siddha; it may also mean ascetic in general. Cf. Al-Bīrūnī’s use of the term रागद् to render the state of being endowed with siddhiṣ (cf. रागद् ‘siddha-hood’, R, p. 193, l. 1, in rendering siddhayah, YS, सुत्र 4.1). Also cf. India, Hyd., p. 494, l. 7: रागद् ‘राज्ञा जग्गका येह राज्यद् जोकाएं अन्य के रागद् लिखित उत्तर राज्यद् अन्तः अर्धां अन्तः...’ ‘A man who is a yogi, i.e. a sākhid, who intellects the creator...’ Also cf. R, p. 189, l. 3 et seq.: दाखल अन ज्ञानि जो केवल सुधोत्सुका राज्यद् जोकाएं अन्य के रागद् लिखित उत्तर राज्यद् अन्तः अर्धां अन्तः...’

The al-Bīrūnī term अवक्षतिसिद्धिः असिद्धिः is also used by Al-Bīrūnī to render purushārtha. Cf. R, p. 168, l. 9 (= BSOS, ch. I, 311).
175 Ritter's text has here which seems to be a correct reading of the MS. However, the word seems to be redundant as it has approximately the same meaning as (‘will see them’). Possibly should be emended to (‘will consult them’). Cf. Bhoja on sūtra 3.32: tāṁ paśyati taś ca sa sambhāṭaṁ ity arthaḥ ‘The meaning is that he (the yogi in question) sees them and holds conversation (or, if the variant reading sambhāṛata is adopted: will meet intimately) with them’. The word darśana (lit.: ‘seeing, sight’) in the sūtra itself (see next note) can also mean ‘meeting intimately face to face, audience, interview, holding visible converse’. For the theme underlying siddha-darsana here cf. Śāṅkara on Brahma-sūtra 1.3.33: bhavati āy asmākam opraṭyaṣkam api ciraṁ-tanāṇāṁ pratyākṣam. tathā ca vajjishādyo devādibhiḥ pratyākṣam vajvaharaṇīti smanyate. yas tu brūyād idāniṁ-tanāṇāṁ ita pūrveśaṁ api nāsti devādibhir vayavahartum śāṃkhyam iti sa jagad-vaiśeṣitaṁ pratiśedhet ... tasmād dharmol-karṣa-vāśe ciraṁ-tanāṁ devādibhiḥ pratyākṣam vajvajakrur iti iliṣyate. api ca smanarti svādhīnyād iṣṭa-devatā-sampṛṣṭṣaḥ ity-ādi ‘For also, what is for us imperceptible was perceptible for the ancients; thus it is recorded that Vyāsa (the author of the Mahābhārata) and others used to meet the godhead with (προσώπεις) face to face. But if some would assert that, as for those now living so for the ancients also it was impossible to meet with gods and the like, they would deny the variability of the world ... We must therefore believe that the ancients, in consequence of pre-eminent merits, held visible converse with gods and (προσώπεις). The emīti also says (YS, sūtra 2.44): ‘through study (is gained) union with the beloved godhead’ ’ (P. Deussen, The system of the Vedānta, transl. Charles Johnston, Chicago, 1912, 38–9). (In this translation the supplied word προσώπεις may be replaced by sīdhā.)

176 For this passage cf. sūtra 3.32: mūrdha-jyotiśa siddha-darsanam ‘(By applying Discipline) to the radiance in the head (i.e. in the brahmarandhra opening, acc. Bhoja ad loc.) (one achieves) the sight of (or visible converse with) the sīdhas’.

177 Cf. sūtra 3.34: hṛdaye citta-samveṭ ‘(By applying Discipline) to the heart (one achieves) awareness of the mind’. For the idea that thought is located in the heart cf. e.g. Bhādārāvyāka Upanisad 2.4.11: saroṣnām vidyādām hṛdayam cāyaṇam ‘The centre of all knowledges is the heart’. Cf. also Chāṇḍogya Upanisad 8.6.6 (= Katha Upanisad 2.3.16): sātaṁ ca ca hṛdayasya nādyah, / tāṣām mūrdhānam abhinibṛṭaṁ, / tayodhim āyān asvaṛṭtvar that, / vidyādām cāyaṇam ca hṛdayam cāyaṇam. (By going upwards through it, one goes to immortality, (whereas) the others are for going in various directions). Also cf. the mystical significance of the series of nāníhr, hṛdayam, ṭaṅkṣaṁ, mūrdhaṁ in the late Brahma Upanisad 2. For the use of the term samveṭ here cf. Vy. on sūtra 1.35; Śāṅkara’s Upāskāra on Kaṇḍa’s Vaiśeṣikasūtra 7.2.26. Cf. also pratisamsavedī ‘witness’ in Vy. on sūtra 2.17.

178 Cf. Śā. under sūtra 3.34: tad . . . vācā mānasāḥ ‘It is the dwelling of the mind’.

179 This reflects sattva-puruṣa-yogāntarāmokārayoḥ pratyākṣaṁvīśe bhogāḥ in sūtra 3.35 (see n. 182 below). ‘heart’, which in the preceding sentence rendered hṛdaya, apparently corresponds to sattva (i.e. buddhi) (cf. above R, p. 183, l. 20, where to citta in sūtra 3.1; R, p. 191, l. 10, Ans. to Q 50); to puruṣa (cf. R, p. 191, l. 20, Ans. to Q 50).

180 Ritter correctly states that the text may be read either or. This makes no substantial difference as far as the meaning of the sentence is concerned.

181 Or: ‘emptied’.

182 knows his own self in its true reality ‘corresponds to puruṣa-jñānam ‘knowledge of the self’ in sūtra 3.35. In this sentence (and not to puruṣa) corresponds to puruṣa. (For cf. R, p. 170, l. 11 (= BSOAS, ch. I, 314)). Al-Bīrūnī does not seem to have understood the doctrine concerning the utter distinctness of puruṣa and prakṛti, of which sattva (i.e. the buddhi) is a part, and the ultimate goal which is achieved by full awareness of this distinctness. Sūtra 3.35 as a whole reads: sattva-puruṣa-yogāntarāmokārayoḥ pratyākṣaṁvīśe bhogāḥ; parābhāṣya-svābhāva-samānyatī puruṣa-jñānam ‘Experience (results from) the lack of differentiation in conceiving sattva and puruṣa, which are utterly distinct. By applying Discipline to (the idea of) an end unto oneself, rather than having something else as an end, one
acht a knowledge of the puruṣa’. A less plausible reading of the sūtra has ... parārthakatāt svārtha ... This reading underlies e.g. Wood’s translation. For the significance of the expressions parārtha and svārtha here cf. Sāṅkhya-kārikā, kārikā 56.

183 Ritter’s emendation of ‘Gar’ instead of ‘Garab’ is possibly correct.

Deussen, who seems to take prātibha as an adjective-like qualifying term of the compound (namely, taking the compound to be descriptive rather than aggregative), translates: ‘Daraus entstehen intuitive Wahrnehmungen von (übernatürlichem) Hören, Fühlen, Sehen und Schmecken’. His interpretation is less plausible on two counts. First, it excludes the mind (manas) when all the other senses are represented in the syntactically co-ordinate types of percepts. Secondly, his interpretation is not in keeping with the occurrence of the term prātibha as a discrete phenomenon in sūtra 3.33 (prātibhād vā suraṃ ‘Or as a result of (the application of Discipline on) intuition everything can be known’) as well as in the following difficult verse in the Mahābhārata (cf. crit. ed., 12.232.21–2; quoted by E. W. Hopkins, ‘Yoga-technique in the Great Epic’, JAOŚ, xxii, 2, 1901, 344). The latter reads: pramoκo (v.l. pramoκo) bhrama āvartō ghrāṣaṃ śravaṇa-darine ādhibutāt rasa-sparśa śīloγe mūrdayātik hā / prattibham upasanghīnā cūpy upasanghaṃkha (v.l. upasanghyā) yogatā (tāṇa) tatwavid avaṅṛtya ātman eva nivartatayat ‘Bewildernent (or: exultation), dizziness, giddiness (āvarta, lit. “circling, spinning round”), wondrous smelling, hearing, seeing, tasting, and feeling, (i.e. the tactile sense), (the sensation of) feeling hot and cold, (the taking of) the form of (inducing of) becoming invisible—having checked (these) obstacles as well as (the power of) intuition (prātibkhā), which are generated by yoga, the knower of ultimate reality ignores them and turns away towards the self’. Cf. Āṣṭāṅkottara Upaniṣad 2.11. The term prātibha is defined by Viṣṇuṇābhakṣu on sūtra 3.36: upadēśād-nairayeyyena sāmṛta-mānasāḥ yathārtha-jñānaṃ ā (a purely) mental fact—corresponding cognition of what is subtle etc. (i.e. hidden, remote, past or future; cf. Vy, ad loc.) irrespectively of (prior) information’. It further characterized as being a sudden (abhamāt) revelation (epkuraṇa), the manifestation of the object as in a flash of illumination) in his Yogaśaṃgraha, op. cit., 53. Like the other types of cognition mentioned in the sūtra it is characterized as occurring independently of one’s will (kīmāmāṃ vināpi jñayate) ‘they come about even without one’s will’, Viṣṇuṇābhakṣu on sūtra 3.36. A proflane non-yogic example of prātikha occurs in Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī (Benares, 1996 ed., 21): kathāṃ tarhi prātikhaṃ anātārthārā-grāvī ēko mē bhṛitāganeti pratyaκeκaṃ artha-jaṃ iṣyaṃ bhavadbhīḥ (Opponent:) ‘On your theory, namely, that a percept (pratyaκaṃ) is generated by an object, how would you account for the case of an intuitive perception (prātibha) in the form ‘My brother will turn up to-morrow’ which apprehends an object of the future (i.e. an object which does not yet exist)?’ ‘”. For further elucidation of the concept of prātibha and epistemological discussions aimed at establishing prātibha as a distinct pramaṇa (a means of knowing) or subsuming it under other pramaṇas or classifying its types, see Yuktīdikī on SK, kārikā 4; Ćakrādhara’s Nyāyamañjarīgrāhābhāṅga, ed. N. J. Shah, Ahmedabad, 1972, 38; Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra, ed. Ruben (NYS), IIIb.33 (and n. 144); Viṣvanātha Nyāyapañcānana’s Bhāṣāpariccheda with Siddhāntamuktāvalli, verses 65–6. Cf. also
Gopinath Kaviraj, ‘The doctrine of pratibhā in Indian philosophy’ in his Aspects of Indian thought, Burdwan, 1966, 1 et seq. For the interpretation of śūtra 3.36 cf. also Vy. with Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda on śūtra 1.35.

185 This corresponds to śūtra 3.37: te samādhāna upasargā vyutthāhre siddhayāḥ ‘They (i.e. the cognitive capabilities listed in the preceding śūtra) are obstacles in the context of concentration (although they are) perfections in the context of the state of empirical consciousness’. Meaning, ‘impediment’, corresponds to upasarga in the śūtra. Early attestations of this term in comparable context are found in Maṭri Upaniṣad 7.8: jñānopasargāḥ (schol.: jñānotpati-vighātaḥ hetavah ‘factors hindering knowledge from coming about’), and in the Mahābhārata (see quotation in the preceding note). Other meanings which may be pertinent: (a) ‘affliction, trouble, disturbance, disruption’ (cf. the verb upasaj in Bhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 3.1.6, and Halayuḍha’s Abhidhāna-ratnamālā, London, 1861, 15); (b) ‘complication’ (in medical sense, cf. Suśruta 2.429.13); (c) ‘deflecting factor’, as in grammatical usage; cf. the verse quoted by Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakāśīstra (ed. P. L. Vidyāraṇya, Darbhanga, 1960, 2): upasargaṇa dhāte-ratho bālā na anuśaya niṣpate... ‘By the preposition (upasarga) is the meaning of the verb drastically deflected (as exemplified in the words pratihāra, dhāra, samādhāra, etc.)’... ‘for example, viñkepa, ‘distraction, deviation’, with reference to pratibhā in the above-quoted Mahābhārata verse (see preceding note); (d) epiphenomenon, by-product (cf. upasajerajhāta in Vy. on śūtra 1.1).

The corresponding to the Greek theōrētikos; also corresponds to the Greek praktikos.


186 Cf. śūtra 3.38: bandhā-kāraṇa-sāthihīyāt pracāra-saṃvedanāc ca cītasya para-śāri-rāveśah ‘From the loosening of the cause of bondage and from awareness of the movements (i.e. working, processes, or procedures of the passing, of the mind) there arises (the capacity of the mind to enter another’s body’. (For the meaning of saṃvedana here cf. sva-buddhi-saṃvedana in śūtra 4.21; cītasaṃviti in śūtra 3.34; saṃvedana in Gautama’s Nyāyaśīstra Va.31, ed. Ruben, 140.) For the meaning of pracāra as ‘condition, conduct, working’ with reference to mind cf. Gauḍapāda’s Āgamaḥāṭa 3.34. Cf. also the use of this term in the Kautilya’s Arthashastra (ed. R. P. Kangle, Bombay, 1970, Part I, ‘Glossary’): ‘activity, function, work’, or ‘sphere of activity’.

According to E. W. Hopkins, cītasya para-śāri-rāveśah of this śūtra is comparable with the narration with some detail in the Mahābhārata (crit. ed., 13.30.1 et seq.) of ‘a very clear case of the exercise of hypnotic power... exploited as yoga-power’. For an analytical description of the passage in question see his ‘Yoga-technique in the Great Epic’, JASOS, xxii, 358 et seq.

187 Cf. the expression dhanvantar (the) ‘ālātma (the) (schol.): according to Kāśyapa in al-Shahristānī’s account of the doctrines of Empedocles in Kitāb al-nilal wa-l-nilal, ed. M. Tawfiq, Cairo, 1948, ii, 266.

188 For the use of the word ālātma synonymously with the word śūtra to refer to sukha ‘ease, bliss’, and of the word ūtsa ‘discomfort, suffering’ cf. B, p. 180, l. 10 (cf. BSOAS, ch. II, p. 524, l. 41; p. 311, n. 74).

189 This translation of the Arabic word ʿudhāl is not quite certain. The idea is in keeping with doctrine of karma.

190 The MS has either vàmā or vàmā. Ritter’s text has vàmā. The reading proposed here is vàmā.

182 Lit.: ‘the mould in which he is’.

191 Cf. India, Hyd., p. 62, l. 13 seq. Qo la an lādāden shākāk al-awrāj al-lāṣfī fi lākāk al-maʿāfah al-mātتش al-lāṣfī: dīrājī al-halālī ka ʿiṣfatiḥa; Qo la an lādāden shākāk al-awrāj al-lāṣfī fi lākāk al-maʿāfah al-mātتش al-lāṣfī. The body is a snares for the spirits with a view to bearing to the full (one’s) recompense. He who reaches the stage of liberation has already borne to the full in his (present) mould the recompense for the acts of the past. He then ceases to acquire a title to a recompense in the future. He sets himself free from the snare; he can dispense with his mould and move freely (or: be harassed) in it without being enannar. Moreover, he is able to transport (his soul) to
wherever he wishes whenever he wishes, not in a manner (in which one is transported after) death. For as the gross cohesive bodies do not pose an obstacle to his mould, how much less would his own body be an obstacle to his spirit'. The rendering may reflect a Sanskrit expression similar to anajjamāna, lit. 'not clinging, remaining unattached, no longer stuck' in the Sāmasaṃphala-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, ii, 88 (quoted in n. 236 below).

194 Cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.22: vāśīṣyā jīvāni yathā vihāya / navāni grahdāt naro 'parāni / tathā sarvāni vihāya jīvāni / anāhī samājī navāmi dehi 'As leaving aside worn-out garments / A man takes other, new ones, / So leaving aside worn-out bodies / To other, new ones goes the embodied (soul)' (transl. Edgerton) = Indiu, Hyd., p. 39, l. 18: 'Les cadrans ne passent jamais / Le cadrant est transporté de son corps, après ce qu’il est devenu, il entre dans une autre, un autre corps, comme le corps, après qu’il ait devenu un obstacle, le remplace par un autre'. (Cf. J. Gonda, ‘The Javanese version of the Bhagavadgītā’, Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 75, Batavia, 1935, 49 et seq.)

195 This may refer to ascetic practices. An alternative translation would be ‘actions’ (karma in the singular or the plural). Cf. Āmalā in Indiu, Hyd., p. 63, l. 10; R, p. 193, l. 3.

196 al-akhtāna—This may represent the Sanskrit term aṭṭhā ‘gross’; cf. also Indiu, Hyd., p. 63, l. 17.

Ritter’s text has نظر. We propose the reading نظر. Cf. R. p. 188, l. 4. The term seems to refer to mata, i.e. the excreta, bodily secretions and impurities (notably excrement, urine, nose-mucus, ear-wax, eye-rheum, perspiration, nails and hair). Cf. Caraka-Sān̄hitā quoted in n. 166 above. The theory underlying the passage seems to be adumbrated in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 2.13: laghavatam .. vraya-prasādam .. nira-purisam alpaṃ yoga-pravṛttiṁ pratikāmāṃ ‘Brightness ... clearness of complexion (lit. ‘purified, clarified colour’, cf. prasāda as opposed to mata in Caraka-Sān̄hitā, see n. 166 above) .. scantly urine and faeces, these they say, are the first (stage, results or signs of) progress of yoga’ (cf. n. 170 above).

198 Ritter has نظر. We propose to read نظر. Cf. Indiu, Hyd., p. 286, l. 5 seq.: نظر .. جذب أعجوان وهو .. نظر الذي .. نظر الذي .. نظر الذي .. (each breath (i.e. prāṇa in its wider meaning) is composed of (1) apāṇa, i.e. breathing in (lit. ‘attraction’), of air, and (2) prāṇa, i.e. letting it out. The two (acts) are also termed niḥśeṣa and ucchṣeṣa (respectively). However, if one of the two is mentioned, the other is (implicitly) included, just as in mentioning the (word) ‘days’ (one includes also the corresponding nights)’. For this definition of prāṇa and apāṇa cf. Saṅkara on Chāndogya Upaniṣad 1.3.3: nāca prāṇi nāca śaktībhūyāḥ vāyūm bahir niḥśreyasya sa prāṇakhyo vāyor vṛtti-viśeṣah; yad apāṇitya aprasāvitaś tāhāyān evaṁś kāraṇāt abhāyāt vāyūm so ‘pāno ‘pāṇākhyo vṛtti ‘The special function termed prāṇa is the fact (expressed by the verb) pravṛtti, i.e. that one lets the air go out through the mouth or the nose; the function termed apāṇa is the fact (expressed by the verb) apravṛtti or aprāṇasvita, i.e. that one attracts (i.e. draws) in air through the mouth or the nose’ (cf. also Saṅkara on Brahma-sūtra 2.4.42). The Arabic إِسْرَائِيل ‘letting go, sending out’ corresponds to niḥśreyasya; جذب ‘attracting, drawing’ to abkāraṇā in this definition. Al-Birüni uses إِسْرَائِيل and جذب also in rendering praccardana ‘breathing out’ and vidhārana ‘holding of breath’ in YS, sūtra 1.34 (R, p. 76, l. 6). Evidently al-Birüni’s sources reflect an Indian commentatorial tradition other than the one that conceived of prāṇa as breath in the upper part of the body and of apāṇa as breath in the lower part of the body accounting for evacuation. On the controversy as to the meaning of prāṇa and apāṇa cf. P. V. Kane, op. cit., v, ii, 1434 et seq.; M. Eliade, op. cit., Appendix III, 2; F. Edgerton, The beginnings of Indian philosophy, London, 1965, p. 104, n. 1; A. H. Ewing, ‘The Hindu conception of the functions of Breath’, JAOS, xxxi, 1901, 249–308; G. W. Brown, ‘Prāṇa and Apāṇa’, JAOS, xxxix, 1919, 104–12; J. Fillionot, La doctrine classique de la médecine indienne, Paris, 1949 (English trans., Delhi, 1964), ch. v; idem, ‘Les origines d’une technique mystique indienne’, Revue Philosophique, cxxvi, 1946, 208–20.

500 More or less lit. ‘(As for) the third no place in the body is free of it’. This is in keeping
with the Sānkhya conception of vyaña. Cf. Gauḍapāda on SK, kārikā 29: śaṁśa-vyayaṭy ākāśavād vyānah 'The vyaña is so called since it pervades the body like ether'. It is not clear what 'basic constituents' in the Arabic sentence here refers to.

201 'the winds' represent the Sanskrit term vāyavāh (lit. 'winds') which can be used to refer to the five prāṇas (vital) breaths 'discussed in this passage. Cf. prāṇāyaṁ vāyavāh paśca 'the five vital airs (lit. 'winds')'; prāṇa etc.' (cf. Bhādarāyana Upaniṣad 1.5.22). In the Arabic passage under consideration the first wind corresponds to apāna (see n. 199 above), the second to prāna, the third to vāyaṇa, the fourth to udāna, and the fifth to samāna. They are mentioned in Vy. on sūtra 3.39 in the following order: prāṇa, samāna, apāna, udāna, vāyaṇa; and in Bhoja ad loc.: prāṇa, apāna, samāna, udāna, vāyaṇa. The text of YS itself refers to udāna and samāna only (sūtras 3.39-40). The account of the five prāṇas in the Arabic text partly corresponds to the one occurring in India, Hyd., p. 35, l. 6 seq.: 'विवेकानृति' (lit. 'wisdom' of ज्ञान; also Mishra 1972, p. 6). This account is not based on the one occurring in Vy. on sūtra 3.38. The characterization of the fourth wind here bears some resemblance to Gauḍapāda on SK, kārikā 29: ārdhekāraṇaṁ utkāraṇaṁ unnayanād vā udānah 'The udāna is so called since (it accounts for) ascending, lifting up, or bringing up'; also cf. utkāraṇitā, lit. 'upward movement', in sūtra 3.39 (see below) glossed by Bhoja as udgacchati 'goes up'. For the characterization of the fifth wind (cf. Gauḍapāda, loc. cit.: āhārdī-nayanād samāṇ yānaye samānā 'The samāna is so called since it carries i.e. equalizes (i.e. digests) food (and drink)'; cf. also Prāṇa Upaniṣad 4.4. The expression samāṇ yānaye can also be understood 'leads to every place equally, i.e. distributes equally'.

202 amṛtān, lit. 'lightened'.

203 ākkāṣa is an Arabic term which when applied to heavy bodies (i.e. bodies other than air or fire) refers to the tendency to move downwards. The term ākkāṣa is apparently used by al-Birūnī as an equivalent of sanaya 'non-adhesion' (cf. sūtra 3.39).

204 Cf. sūtra 3.39: udāna-jayād jāsa-parka-kauḥkākāḥive samāna utkāraṇitā ca 'From the mastery over the udāna there arises absence of adhesion to water or mud or thorns or similar (objects) as well as upward movement'. According to Vy. the 'upward movement' (ukāraṇitā) specifically refers to the ascension at the time of death. Cf. Prāṇa Upaniṣad 3.7: athaikāyordvāde udānā pūrṇeṇa pūrṇa-lokaṁ nayaṁ pāpeṇa pāpeṁ uhayāyāvṛte eva mānasā-lokaṁ 'Now, rising through one of these (arteries, nādi, namely the sūmūmā, according to Maitri Upaniṣad 6.21), the udāna leads in consequence of merit to the world of merit; in consequence of demerit to the world of demerit; in consequence of (a balanced mixture of both) to the world of humans'. According to Bhoja, on the other hand, 'upward movement' during the yogī's life-time is meant.

205 This remark, which is apparently intended to clarify the effects of 'absence of inclination', has, as far as is known, no parallel in the commentaries on YS.

206 This corresponds to sūtra 3.40: samāna-jayāt pracjgulanam 'From the mastery over the samāna there arises radiance'. Cf. Prāṇa Upaniṣad 3.5: madhye tu samānah; esa hy etad hetu 'anam samāna nayaṁ, tasmād eteti saptārelo ḍhavanī 'In the middle is the samāna. It is this that equalizes whatever is offered as food. From this arise the seven flames'. In later systematized versions of the concept samāna accounts for 'the digestive abdominal fire (anāla)' (cf. A. Foucher, Le Compendium des topiques (Tarka-saṅgraha) d'Annambhaṭa, Paris, 1949, 28 and 32).

207 This term translates ākāśa. Elsewhere, however, the latter is also rendered by the word anāla 'heaven' (cf. India, Hyd., p. 140, l. 1: 2 śakti i.e. heaven'). For a

209 Cf. Vāc. on sūtra 3.41: sarva-śrotāyām ābānkarīkāyām āgy ākāśam karaṇa-śāśkuli-vivarāṇa pratiṣṭhā ‘Each sense of hearing, although derived from ābākāra (the principle of individuation or ego-formation), has the (part of the) ākāśa which is (contained in) the hollow-space of the auditory canal as its basis’.

209 i.e. hearing and air.

210 For ākāśa cf. ārādhā ‘...—R, p. 171, l. 15 (= BSOAS, ch. I, 316); R, p. 184, l. 11.

211 This corresponds to sūtra 3.41: śrotāyāyōh sambandha-samyamād divyam śrotam ‘From the application of Discipline to the relation between the sense of hearing and ether arises a supernal sense of hearing’. Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.: sūkṣma-vyavahīta-viprakṛṣṭa-sābdabrahma-samartham bhavati ‘He becomes able to perceive sound which is subtle, hidden or remote’. For the meaning of divyam śrotam cf. śrāvana in sūtra 3.36; also cf. Bhagavadgītā 11.8: na tu mām ākṣyase dṛṣṭam | anenaiva svacaksāya | divyam dadāmi te caṣṭah | paśya me yogam aśīvaram ‘But thou canst not see Me / With this same eye of thine own; / I give thee a supernatural eye: / Behold My mystic power as God!’ (transl. Edgerton).

212 A possible, though not very probable, reading might be the term ārādhā as in Ritter. In that case the translation would be: ‘If (the body) does not in its locomotion traverse the air’. This reading is not very satisfactory in view of the expression ‘and ārādhā being penetrated by air’ occurring in R, p. 190, l. 20. For the latter expression cf. Nyāyāsūtra, 4.2.18 (ed. G. Jhā, Poona, 1939): ākāśa-vyatīthāditi ... and Vātasyāyana ad loc.: antar bhakti cāyār ākāśena samāvigno vyattihinānaḥ ‘Both inside and outside the atom is penetrated, i.e. permeated, by ākāśa’. Also cf. Rajendralalā Mitra’s remark on sūtra 3.42: ‘The rationale of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last [sūtra 3.41]; the body is kept down by ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it’ (op. cit., 155). Cf. R, p. 190, l. 2 (see n. 220 below).

213 This corresponds to sūtra 3.42: kāyākāśayōh sambandha-samyamād laghu-tālā-samāpatteś cākāśa-gamanam ‘From the application of Discipline to the relation between (one’s) body and ether and from the identification (cf. samāpatti in sūtras 1.41, 2.47) with the lightness of (a piece of) cotton there arises the (capacity) to move through ether (i.e. air-space)’. The term samāpatti could also have in this context the meaning ‘attainment’. In that case the translation would be: ‘... attainment of the lightness of cotton (lit. “light cotton”)’. One of the meanings of tālā is ‘cotton’. It has, however, also other botanical significations, one of which may account for al-Birūnī’s translation: ‘... as the things that, having been separated from a plant, are tossed about in the atmosphere by winds’. As a rule the Sanskrit tālā here is translated by ‘cotton’ (cf. Woods, Rajendralalā Mitra, G. Jhā, Rama Prasadā, Yājñ, Drivedi, Bangali Baba, Harirāhānanda Ārānya, Deussen, F. Feuerstein). However, the word may mean ‘tuft (or plume, as of a reed)’. Cf. Vāc.’s description (under sūtra 3.45 below) of laghiṇā, ‘levitation’, which he compares with īṣṭkā-tālā, ‘tuft of a reed’ (‘the floating about of a tuft of a reed’) mahān āpi laghu bhāṣṭreya-tālā īṣṭkās āvihāt ‘Despite being big, he becomes light and floats about in space (“ether”) like a tuft of a reed’ (cf. also Viśnunābhaṁku under sūtra 3.45 below). Monier-Williams’s Sanskrit–English dictionary gives picu, tālā as well as the cpd. picu-tālā (L.) all as meaning ‘cotton’. F. Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary gives tālā-picu as well as karpāsa-picu as meaning ‘cotton’. It notes that in Pali both these cpds. are used together as symbols of lightness and raises the question: ‘There evidently was some difference between the two, but what? ’ (s.v. karpāsa). The evidence referred to above as well as al-Birūnī’s rendering of the sūtra in question, would suggest that tālā can indeed be different from karpāsa, in that the latter means ‘cotton’ while the former refers to some other fluffy substance (such as air-borne seeds) readily detachable from plants and observably floating up and down in the air, possibly including visible pollen (?). Cf. also n. 230 below. Moreover, Gaudapāda, who uses the term tālā in a botanical context (on SK, kārikā 29), uses elsewhere (on SK, kārikā 17) a different term, tālī, for ‘cotton’ in the context.
of listing the various items that together constitute a bed. In the Amarakosa lexicon (2.4.42 and 2.9.106, ed. Bombay, 1890, 89 and 237) the term tūla is attested as signifying inter alia the top of the lotus (?) (kamalottaram) and as being synonymous with various plant names, notably kusumikam, vaknī-sīkham and mahā-rajaman. Significantly all the latter three names can refer, according to Monier-Williams, to safflower, i.e. the thistle-like Carthamus tinctorius. Cf. the English expression ‘light as thistle-down’. For early attestations of tūla in a botanical sense see Atharvaveda 19.32.3 and Chāndogya Upanisad 5.24.3. Also cf. Aśutṣeya Aranyaka 2.1.8.1 (cf. Chāndogya Upanisad 6.8.3) where tūla is opposed to mūla (‘root’).

According to both Vāc. and Vijnānabhikṣu the particle ca in the sūtra under consideration signifies the introduction of an alternative (= vā; cf. Wood’s translation). This is implausible. For the sūtra as a whole cf. Chāndogya Upanisad 7.12.2: ... yuvād ākāśasya gataṁ tatrasya yathā kāmā-cāro bhavatī ya ākāśam brahmeti upōtē ... ‘As far as ākāśa goes, so far he moves freely, he who reverences (or: contemplates on) ākāśa as brahman’. For ākāśa-gamanam cf. Eγyeda 10.136.4; for parallels in the Buddhist literature see references in Har Dayal, The Bothavatav doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature, repr. Delhi, 1975, p. 116, n. 131.

214. An alternative translation could be: ‘(so as to belong) to (one) person’. شخص. may also be translated: ‘individual’.

215. This may possibly, though not necessarily, reflect a Vedicāntic conception regarding the oneness of consciousness.

216. مهادي. Cf. mahāvidēḍa occurring in sūtra 3.43: bhār akalpita vyttir mahāvidēḍa; tataḥ prakāśāvavara-koṣayaḥ ‘The external (i.e. extra-corpooreal) mode of functioning which is (not merely) imagined, is (known as) the Great Incorporeal One; therefrom (or, alternatively: as a result of the application of Discipline to it) the dwindling away of that which obstructs the light (cf. sūtras 2.52, 4.30) (comes about)’. For the use of vyttir here cf. the use of pravṛttī in sūtra 1.35. Al-Biruni does not seem explicitly to refer to the phenomenon mentioned by Vy. ad loc. of the yōgi entering the bodies of other individuals. For prakāśa as a characteristic of sattva and knowledge cf. e.g. TŚ, sūtra 2.18; SK, kārikā 12; Bhavavadītī 14.6. For the term āvaraṇa as used here cf. sūtra 2.52. Cf. also Gauḍapāda’s Āgamaśāstra, ch. iv, kārikā 97 (ed. Vīdhushakēha Bharatadharya, Calcutta, 1943, 209).

217. The MS has 26. (The base of ल is longer than is usual) Ritter reads: 26. (The translation corresponds to the reading) 26. (This Arabic expression may render the Sanskrit sanskola, found in commentaries (e.g. Vy. on sūtra 3.45; cf. e.g. Manu 2.2; Brahmāsūtra 4.4.8; Nyāyaśāstra, ed. Ruben, IIIa.25, IVa.64, b.2, 34), which denotes a mental act which is both cognitive and conative (cf. T. Gelblum, review of N. S. Junankar’s Gauṭama: the Nyāya philosophy in BSOAS, xlv, 2, 1982).

218. Ritter’s printed text has 26. (The base of 26 is longer than is usual) Read: 26. (The translation corresponds to the reading 26.) 26. And 26. 26. (The Arabic 26 may render the Sanskrit sanskola, found in commentaries (e.g. Vy. on sūtra 3.45; cf. e.g. Manu 2.2; Brahmāsūtra 4.4.8; Nyāyaśāstra, ed. Ruben, IIIa.25, IVa.64, b.2, 34), which denotes a mental act which is both cognitive and conative (cf. T. Gelblum, review of N. S. Junankar’s Gauṭama: the Nyāya philosophy in BSOAS, xlv, 2, 1982).

219. 26. (The Arabic 26 may render the Sanskrit sanskola, found in commentaries (e.g. Vy. on sūtra 3.45; cf. e.g. Manu 2.2; Brahmāsūtra 4.4.8; Nyāyaśāstra, ed. Ruben, IIIa.25, IVa.64, b.2, 34), which denotes a mental act which is both cognitive and conative (cf. T. Gelblum, review of N. S. Junankar’s Gauṭama: the Nyāya philosophy in BSOAS, xlv, 2, 1982).
For the distinction made in the present and the preceding sentence of the Arabic text between the five elements (e.g., Earth), on the one hand, and perceptible objects generated from, or constituted by, them (e.g., minerals), on the other, cf. _Visuddhimagga_, ch. ix, para. 38 (ed. Dharmananda Kosambi, Bombay, 1940, 208): _evampi nibbāpetum asakkontena pana dhātu-viniśhābhoga kūṭābbo; katham? ambo pabbajita, tawm elassa kujjhamāno kassa kujjhisi? kim kesaṇam kujjhasi, udāhu loṇāṇam, nakkhāṇam . . . pe . . . muddessa kujjhisi? atha vā pana kesādānu pathavidhātuyā kujjhasi, apodhātuyā, tejodhātuyā, vāyodhātuyā kujjhisi? . . . ' But if he is still unable to bring about the cessation of it (i.e. of his own anger), he should try (the analytical method of) resolution into the elements. How? My friend, you who have renounced the world, (tell me) when you are angry with this man, what is it you are angry with? Are you angry with the hair of the head, or with the hair of the body, or with the nails, etc.? . . . Or is it the urine you are angry with? Or alternatively, are you angry with the Earth-element in the hair of the head and the rest? Or are you angry with the Water-element, or with the Fire-element, or the Wind-element (in them)? . . .

The Arabic text characterizes 'air', i.e. 'ether'. Both Vāc, and Vījñānabhiśkuṣa on _sūtra_ 3.44 contain a quotation which is comparable to _Nī ś IVb.22_ (ed. W. Ruben). The latter reads: _avyayādhiṣṭamōka-vibhuvānī cākāśa-dhārman 'The properties of ether are uniformity throughout (aryāha, lit.: "having no structure"); transl. Ruben: "indivisibility"—"Near- or non-existence"; Vījñābhiśkaṇa: "It is not repelled"; G. Jhā: "absence of transfiguration or displacement") uninstructiveness and omnipresence'. Vījñānabhiśkuṣa, loc. cit., defines _aryāha as pravirālikaraṇam_, (the property of) rendering things separated from each other, set out in space). The possibility cannot be ruled out that a similar characterization of _ākāśa_ occurring in the commentary used by al-Birūnī underlies the use of _ākāśa_ and _ākāśa_ in the Arabic text. It should also be borne in mind that one of al-Birūnī's reasons for choosing the words _ākāśa . . . ākāśa_ may have been their phonetic similarity.

Impenetrability 'renders the _ākāśa_ which may correspond to _varaṇam_, obstructiveness, resistance' in Vāc, under _sūtra_ 3.44; but cf. also _mūrti, ‘corporeality in_ Vy., on _sūtra_ 3.45: _mūrtī na niraṇaḍādhi . . . ‘. . . does not obstruct by its corporeality' (see below). The term _mūrti_ is glossed by both Vāc and Vījñānabhiśkaṇu ad loc. as _sūnyāsidhiṣṭam kāthinaṃ, ‘natural (as distinct from induced) hardness'. The sentence in the Arabic text here corresponds to _tad-dhārmanābhikātah, (the state of) being unaffected (lit.: "no longer harassed"); cf. _sūtra_ 2.48 and _SK_, kārīka 1) by the properties of those (elements) in _sūtra_ 3.45 (see also next note). Cf. also Vy. ad loc.: _pythi mūrtī na niraṇaḍādhi yoginā ṣūtrāḍā-kriyān śīlām apy anuprasīdisatī nāpāb niṣatād kālayānti nāgān viṣi dahati na vāyāḥ praṇāyā vahati; anavāraṇātmaṇy eṣy ākāśe bhavati avṛtā-kāyaḥ siddhānāṁ apy adṛṣṭe bhavati. ‘In spite of its corporeality earth does not obstruct the activity of a yogi's body etc. He penetrates even the rock. The water, moist as it is, wets him not. The fire, hot as it is, burns him not. The wind, motile as it is, moves
him not. Even in ether, which conceals not, his body is hidden (lit.: “becomes covered” or “obstructed” from sight) so as to become invisible even to the siddhas’.

possessed of ‘refines his body’; R, p. 183, l. 5 (= BSOAS, ch. II, p. 526, l. 32); cf. also Indias, Hyd., p. 57, l. 1. This corresponds to avimā, ‘the capacity to become minute’ in sūtra 3.45 (see below). Cf. also sūkṣma in Gaudapāda on SK, kārikā 23: aṣay bhāvo ’ṣimā sūkṣmo bhūtāvagati vicarati ‘(The term) avimā (means the state of being of the size of) a minute particle; by becoming subtle (he is able to) move about (freely) in the universe’. Sūtra 3.45 reads: tato ’ṣimādī-ḥādubhāvāh kāya-sampat tad-dharmānaḥbhāgīkatā ca ‘Therefrom follow (1) the manifestation of (the capacities) of becoming of the size of a minute particle etc. (i.e. according to Vy., laghīmā, becoming light, i.e. levitation; makhīmā, becoming huge; āprāti, the capacity to reach distant objects; prākāmya, complete fulfilment of one’s wishes; vaiśītva, complete control over the elements, iśīrvatam (= iśītvā), lordship, i.e. the capacity to create, destroy and arrange the elements, kīmāvaiśītvā, the capacity to determine things according to one’s wishes), (2) the perfection of the body, and (3) the impossibility for these properties (i.e. the properties of the yogī) to be affected’. (3) May also be rendered: ‘the impossibility for the properties (of the five elements—referring to bhūtā in sūtra 3.44) to be affected (cf. sūtra 2.48)’. This presupposes that tat in this sūtra is an accretion. Al-Birūnī’s text appears to have adopted the latter interpretation: nāḥiṣṭuḥ . . . [it is like] a thread . . . [it is] bigger; . . . the elements . . . he is able to put an end to the harmful (effects) that (they may have) upon his body, such as (those due to) being burnt by fire . . . and so forth’. Possibly a less plausible interpretation is the one propounded by Bhoja ad loc. and others, according to whom tat in the sūtra refers to kāya, ‘the body’. (Following Bhoja, Deussen translates: ‘. . . Trefflichkeit des Leibes und Unverletzlichkeit seiner Eigenschaften’.) The expression kāya-sampat is explicated in sūtra 3.46: rūpa-lāvaysa-bala-vajra-sañjñhananatātāvī kāya-sampat ‘Perfection of the body consists in shapeliness (rūpa, beauty of “form” or “colour”; cf. varṣa-prasādam, “clearness of complexion” in Śvekāvatara Upaniṣad 2.13 in a comparable context), strength and adamantine firmness’. For a Buddhist parallel cf. Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (ch. VII), where ‘strength’ (bala) and ‘a body whose bones are like a diamond’ (vajra-sūkṣṭha-liṅgirati) are referred to as two constituents of the fourfold ‘perfection of the material body’ (rūpa-kāya-sampat) (cf. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., 240). Cf. also Rasīravacālajjī (ed. Mira Ray, New Delhi, 1976), verse 160: saṃ-māsāya prajñogya vajra-deho bhaven naraḥ ‘By the use (of mercury) for six months one will be endowed with a thunderbolt-like body’. The Sanskrit word lāvaya is derived from lāvaya ‘salty’ (cf. Pāṇini 5.1.123). Cf. D. D. H. Ingalls, ‘Words for beauty in Classical Sanskrit poetry’ in Fest. W. Norman Brown, ed. E. Bender, New Haven, Connecticut, 1962, 99: ‘By way of explanation one may observe that lāvaya is one of the six tastes or flavours (rasa) . . . But lāvaya is the flavour (rasa) par excellence, for one adds salt not sweetness to food to bring out its taste. Since the word rasa is used . . . of everything one’s interest, curiosit y or aesthetic sense, it is appropriate that lāvaya, as an abstraction of the chief rasa, should be used of a particularly striking type of beauty’. There is an analogy between the derivation of the Sanskrit lāvaya from lavay, ‘salty’, and the derivation of Arabic ملابس ‘pretty, handsome’ from ملابس ‘salt, salty’.

The common interpretation by translators of avimā in the sūtra (and of asū in Vy. ad loc.) as containing a reference to (the size of) the atom (e.g. Deussen: ‘Atomkleinheit’; Woods: ‘atomization’) is dubious. Admittedly asū or paramāṣa are used in atomistic philosophical systems such as the Vaiśeṣika with the signification ‘atom’. However, in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems the terms asū and paramāṣa merely mean ‘very small objects’. Cf. YS, sūtra 1.40: paramāṣa-paraṇa-mahatātāno ’ṣya vaśikāraḥ ‘His mastery extends from the smallest object to the greatest magnitude (i.e. the universe as a whole)’. The term paramāṣa in this sūtra is commonly translated as ‘atom’ (e.g. Woods: ‘. . . from the smallest atom . . . ’; G. Jhā: ‘. . . from the minutest atom . . . ’). An example of the use of the term paramāṣa occurs in Gaudapāda on SK, kārikā 7: . . . yathā dhūmośma-jala-nirāśvara-paramāṣaṇā gāgana-gatā
nopalabhyante ‘For instance the small particles (paramāṇavah) of smoke, steam or frost, which are in the atmosphere (gagana = ākāsā, i.e. ether or sky), cannot be perceived’. This statement apparently presupposes that some paramāṇus can be perceived. Cf. also Gaudapāda on SK, kārikā 23 (quoted above in the present note). Commenting under YS, sūtra 3.45, Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda explains the significance of āyu in Vy. ad loc.: sūkṣmād āpya sūkṣmataro bhava-tīchchhāt... sarvasyādyārga bhavati ‘he becomes at will more subtle than the (most) subtle (object)’. This is in consonance with a statement by Śāṅkara (the same person, as claimed by tradition, and argued by P. Hacker) in his commentary on Brahma-sūtra 2.4.7: ayutvam caipīṃ sāukṛṣya-pariccheda v paramāṇa-tulyatvatam ‘That they (the āyuṣas, here: the faculties of cognition and action) are āyu means that they are limited (in size) and are subtle, and it does not mean that they are like an atom’. It may be noted that al-Birūnī does not render paramāṇu by an Arabic term which unequivocally means ‘atom’ in either of the two passages where the Sanskrit terms paramāṇu and asimā are translated, namely YS, sūtras 1.40 and 3.45. The word used by him in rendering sūtra 1.40 means in the first place ‘grain of dust’ (cf. R, p. 177, l. 6—transl. BSOAS, ch. I, 323; cf. R, p. 168, l. 14; R, p. 176, l. 9). On Arabic atomic theories see S. Pines, Beiträge zur islamischen Atomlehre, Berlin, 1936 (an English translation of this work will shortly be published in S. Pines, Collected works, III).

225 Cf. Śāṅkara Bhagavatpāda under sūtra 3.45: tenānīma sarva anuvravātāt vejra apī tathā sarvasyādyārga bhavat ‘By this capacity of becoming of the size of a minute particle he can enter anything, even a diamond, and thus becomes invisible to any body’. In the Arabic phrase تَنَّئَىِّمَا the word (may render it manifest?) may perhaps correspond to prādurbhāvah in the sūtra. Al-Birūnī, perhaps following the commentary he used, evidently considers that asimā, ‘becoming minute (and consequently invisible) is opposed to prādurbhāva, ‘becoming manifest’. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the text available to al-Birūnī had both prādurbhāva and abhāva on account of a copyist’s redundant duplication. For the sense of ‘emergence, production’ (= upatīti) in which prādurbhāva, lit. ‘manifestation’, is actually used in this sūtra, cf. sūtra 3.9 (where it is opposed to abhāva, ‘becoming latent, suppressed’; cf. SK, kārikā 7; NS, ed. Ruben, IIIa.37); NS, IIIb.15. Cf. a parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52, allegedly quoting ‘the author of Kitāb Pītāja’, which reads merely: अन्तः कृमि तेन प्रश्न धनं तेन इत्ययि ‘the capacity to attenuate the body so as to make it hidden from eye-sight’, in what is evidently a definition of asimā.

226 ṭikṣyī ‘render it beautiful’ corresponds to rūpa, ‘beauty’ (or alternatively, to rūpa-lavayya if taken as a dependent cpd. to mean ‘gracefulness of appearance’) in sūtra 3.46 (see n. 224 above). This sūtra refers back to sāyendriya-siddhir... ‘perfections (or: attainments) (concerning the body and the senses)’... in YS, sūtra 2.43. For the use of rūpa as referring to appearance, namely, both form and colour cf. YS, sūtra 3.21 (see n. 63 above).

227 तिरुतो ‘strengthen it’ corresponds to bala ‘strength’ in sūtra 3.46 (cf. sūtras 3.23, 24). For a Buddhist parallel see Abhidharmakośa, ch. vii (cf. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., 240).

228 ṭulasi ‘harden it’ corresponds to vejra-sanhanana ‘firmness (as that) of a diamond (or thunderbolt)’ in sūtra 3.46. For a Buddhist parallel see reference in the preceding note.

229 ṭulasi and ṭulasi ‘soften it (the body), coarsen it... so that he can appear in whatever form he desires’ seems to correspond to prākāmya, one of the eight perfections alluded to by ābā, ‘etc.’, in sūtra 3.45. Vy. ad loc. glosses it as iva-kānabhiṣhātaḥ ‘non-objection of (the fulfilment of) wishes’, and Vāc. explains the latter: nīṣya rūpaṃ bhūta-saṅrāpa-mūrti-dāhār abhikṣyate... ‘His outward appearance (rūpa) is not affected by the essential properties of the elements, such as corporeality (of the earth element)...’. In the parallel passage in India, Hyd., 53, prākāmya seems to be referred to by nīṣya of abhishekam from the adhyatma ‘the capacity (to fulfil one’s) wishes’. The latter definition is in keeping with Vy. and Bhoga ad loc. Cf. also Gaudapāda on SK, kārikā 23: prākāmyaṃ prakāmyata yad evesyati tath eva vidadhiti ‘The term prākāmya means the realization of any wish whatsoever’. Cf. Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad 8.2.10: yaṃ kāmayate so iva sankalpād eva samuttiṣṭhati ‘Whatever he desires, out of his mere act of wishful imagination it arises’.

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make it (the body) light ' corresponds to laghimā ' (the capacity) to become light ' (cf. e.g. Vy. and Bojhā ad loc.). Cf. Vijñānabhaṅkṣu's explanation of the term in his Yogānāra-saṅgraha, ed. G. Jhā, Bombay, 1894, 55: ... távala lañghur bhatati yenaññādiyā sañcārati. He becomes as light as a tuft (as of a reed; cf. iṣīkā-ṭāla, Cāndogya Upaniṣad 5.24.3) and consequently is able to move either thither and thither (sañcārati) in the atmosphere (ākāsā, sky or ether) etc.' The words ' fly and descend ' may, however, correspond to Vy.'s illustration of prākāmya, namely bhūmāv unnajāti nimajāti yathadoke. He dives underground and re-emerges (lit.: goes up and goes down) as if in water ' (cf. lokēṣu kāma-cārāḥ ' having the freedom to move about in the worlds ', Cāndogya Upaniṣad 8.1.6). The parallel in India, Hyd., 52, reads: ' the capacity of rendering (his body) so light that it is indifferent to him whether he treads on thorns, on slime or on dust '. Cf. also Gauḍapāda on SK, kārikā 7: laghimā mrśalī-tālāvayavād api lañghatayā paśpa-keesārārey api iñśhati ' The (capacity of) laghimā implies that one is able, on account of being even lighter than the particles (i.e. pollen) of the anther (tāla) of a lotus, to stand on top of the filament of a flower ' (cf. tāla = kamalottaram, ' top of the lotus ' (?), Amarakośa 2.9.106, ed. Bombay, 1890, 237). Cf. n. 213 above. For this particular form of levitation cf. W. Norman Brown, The Indian and Christian miracle of walking on the water, Chicago, 1928. For Jaina parallels of this and several other siddhas comparable to āśīmādi as treated by commentaries on the YS cf. Hemacandra's Triṣṭoṭiśālākāṣara-pancaratna, 1.843–80 (esp. verses 852–62), in Amulyacharan and Banarsidas Jain, Jaina Jātakas (quoted in W. Norman Brown, op. cit., 16). For Buddhist parallels see n. 236 below.

This corresponds to mahimā (cf. e.g. Vy. and Bojhā ad loc.). Cf. the parallel in India, Hyd., 52, it is rendered as ... ' the capacity to render (his body) huge so as to show it as a terrifying and wondrous shape '. Cf. Vāc. ad loc. explicating mahimā: alpo 'pi nāga-naga-nagara-parimagā bhatati ' Although small he becomes in dimension an elephant or a mountain or a town ' (tr. Woods).

prāpti. ' to perceive with the senses ' corresponds to the perfection designated by āśīma. In the parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52, it is rendered as ... ' the capacity to know whatever he aspires (to know) '. The possibility of this interpretation of prāpti is implicit in a verse giving a traditional list of the eight perfections quoted from Bīhāra-viśeṣa Purāṇa (11.15.4) by Vijñānabhaṅkṣu ad loc. This verse reads: ... prāpti indriyaiḥ ... (lit.) ' perceiving with the senses ' or ' ... reaching with the faculties ' (either the senses or the five faculties of action, karmendriyaḥ, namely, hand, foot, larynx, generation and excretion). Cf. also Śāṅkhya-sūtra, V, sūtra 104. Cf. also Yuktidipikā on SK, kārikā 23 (ed. Ramāśāṅkara Triṣṭiṭhi, Vārāṇasi, 131; the passage is missing in the Calcutta 1938 ed.): atrāyīma mahimā laghimā garimeti bhāta-vaiśeṣikam; buddha tu prāptyā-dādi ... ' In this (eightfold list of types of aśīvarya, "freedom-to") āśīma, mahimā, laghimā and garimā (i.e. the first four) have as their particular characteristic the reference to the elements, whereas prāpti etc. pertain to the mind (buddhi). On the face of it Vy. and all other commentators differ in the meaning they attach to prāpti since they illustrate it with a karmendriya, a faculty of action, rather than a jñāṇendriya, a cognitive faculty. Thus e.g. Vy. ad loc.: prāptir ānuguly-āgrevāpi spratir caṇḍanam asam' The capacity of prāpti implies that he is able to touch the moon with a mere finger-tip ' (cf. Vijñānabhaṅkṣu's Yogānāra-saṅgraha, ed. G. Jhā, Bombay, 1894, 55). Significantly the Sanskrit word prāpti can mean ' reaching ' as well as ' knowing '. Analogously the Arabic درؤ in itself can mean ' reaching ' as well as ' perceiving '.

This seems to correspond to the perfection designated by yatra-kāṁvāśayīta. Cf. Gauḍapāda's explanation of the term, under SK, kārikā 23: brahmādi-stamba-parayantaṁ yatra kāmaṁ taprāvāyayā svacchāya śāhāsena-nihārāṁ ācaratī ' He achieves whatever he wishes, from the world of Brahms down to a clump of grass, standing still, being seated or moving about '. This interpretation of yatra-kāṁvāśayīta possibly results from the amalgamation of two previous interpretations of this compound. (1) According to one of them it may have meant the ability to reach one's destination wherever...
one wills it to be. (This accords with the literal meaning of the compound.) (2) According to the other the cpd. may have meant the fulfilment of one’s desires. (Cf. Vy.’s interpretation of the cpd.: satya-saṅkalpatā ‘realization of one’s act of wishful imagination’; also cf. the apparent substitution of yattra-kāmāvasāyātā by yac ca kāmāvasāyātā in Vācaspatimāra’s Tattvakaukumudi on SK, kārika 23, and by yat-kāmas tad avayātā in Bhāgavata Purāṇa, loc. cit.). The text used by al-Bīrūnī seems to have adopted here the first and more plausible of the two interpretations. To this corresponds in the parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52: ‘the rolling up of the wide distance (in the plural in the Arabic) between oneself and (one’s) destination (in the plural in the Arabic)’. (Possibly the phrase should be placed after the word ‘al-Bīrūnī may have read yatārā . . . and understood the whole cpd. as referring to the capacity to annihilate (lit.: to roll up, or fold up) the wide distance between oneself and one’s destination.

231 How (should it be possible for things) to make an impression upon him . . . Indeed they obey his command ‘. This corresponds to the perfection designated vasitvā ‘control’. Cf. Vy. ad loc.: vasitvāṃ bhūta-bhaktiketu vasitvatah avayātā cāgneyaṃ ‘The capacity of “Control” implies that he controls the elements and their derivatives as well as the fact that he is not controlled (lit. “subdued”, i.e. affected) by others’. Cf. also Bhoja ad loc.: satvaratā prabhāviṣyata vasitvāṃ; sarvāṇi eva bhūtanā anugāmitāt (v.1. anuśāsata) tad-uksam nātikramanti ‘ “Control” implies prevailing everywhere, namely, the elements follow him (i.e. are subservient to him) and do not violate his dictates’. To this corresponds in the parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52: ‘the humility and obedience of those over whom he rules towards him’.

232 This corresponds to the perfection designated iśīīrtvā, ‘sovereignty’. Cf. its explication by Vy. ad loc.: teṣāṃ prabhāviṣyaya-yaśākārāṁ iṣṭe ‘He is sovereign over the arising, dissolution and organization of the elements and their derivatives’ (cf. Tattvakaukumudi on SK, kārika 23). To this corresponds in the parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52: ‘the capacity of ruling over any community he desires’. The Arabic term ‘Yaṣā ‘community, group’ here may refer to bhūta ‘in the sense of various classes of beings. Cf. the characterization of the perfection of vasitva as preserved in Paraṅciti muṅjivar’s talapuruṣa (= sīlaba-purāṇa) of Maturi (Madurai) Temple (Paraṅciti muṅjivar, Tiruvaiyāḻarpuruṣam, TCC ed., Appar Press, Madras, 1969, Paṭalai 33, verse 26, p. 244, ll. 3-4): pūcaḥ avuṇvar puṭ viṣṇuṣu pāṭa maṣṭilā ucuṣām vacevaṣīt evamānany vacamā kūṭāi vacitvānām ‘Vaṣitvām is the concept of bringing into subjugation the (whole) world beginning with the warring asuras, birds, animals, spirits, humans and the protectors (of the quarters), i.e. Indra etc.’.

233 ‘is a characteristic feature of the human personality. Nothing can hinder him from going . . .’ represents the yattra-kāmāvasāyātā. Cf. Vy.’s explication of the latter: yatāhā saṅkalpas tathā bhūta-prakṛitiṁ avasthitām ‘The constituent causes (i.e. the three guṇas) of the elements remain (avasthitām)’. Accordingly, the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī may have listed seven rather than eight perfections. Cf. Bāhāvagūṇaśa’s explication of ādi in the sūtra as referring to seven perfections only: atra ca sūtra prakāmyān viṣṇya sarpaśīva nadiṣyanti ‘nīmāditya anena gṛhiḥ; prakāmyān tu tad-dharmānabhabhītaḥ-sādvedā gṛhitam iti viṣṇya ‘The (following) is a peculiarity (viṣṇya). In this sūtra the expression animaṇḍi refers to seven perfections only, through the exclusion of prakāmya (= icchānabhabhūtaḥ, non-obstruction of one’s wishes). For the latter has (already) been referred to (in the sūtra) by the phrase tad-dharmānabhabhītaḥ (‘non-obstruction by the properties of the elements’).

Despite distinct similarities, the explication of the perfections in our Arabic text differs from the version in Vy., and mutatis mutandis from the versions in other commentaries as well as from the version in the parallel passage in India, Hyd., 52. The divergences between the various traditional versions are considerable. Thus both in Gaudapāda on SK, kārika 23, and in Bhoja on YS, sūtra 3.45, the number of the perfections is nine. This appears to have been
brought about by the accretion of garimā (the capacity to become extremely heavy), possibly by an initial redundant duplication of māhinā. Cf. M. Takakusu, La Sāṃkhya kārikā, étudiée à la lumière de sa version chinoise, BEFEO, 1904, 1009 (= transl. in Bulletins of the Department of Indian Philosophy, no. 1, Madras, 1933, 32). Bhoja ad loc. also differs from Vy. in his explication of sūtra (≡ śūrtva): sārāṅgatakāraṇeṣa-vatva, ‘complete control over the body and the internal organ (i.e. citta, the mind)’. Cf. TS, sūtra 3.28; cf. sūtra 4.4: nirmāṇa-cittān asmi-lā- mātrāt ‘The constructed minds (accompanied by the yogī) arise from nothing but the sense of ego’ (cf. Vy. and Vāc, ad loc.). The possibility cannot be ruled out that this explication corresponds to the sentence ‘He can appear in whatever form he desires’) in our Arabic text. According to the traditional explanation an allusion to the list of eight perfections occurs already in Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad 1.4. Specific individual perfections seem to be adumbrated already in Āgveda 1.136. Further development of the concept of such powers occurs in Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.2. The theme of the latter passage is later taken up by Brahmasūtra 4.4.8–9, and further refined and systematized by Śaṅkara ad loc. Cf. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 11.5.

Non-ordinary psychic powers accruing to Buddhist ascetics (bhikkhus), several of which are paralleled in the YS and its commentaries, are frequently referred to in the Pali canon by the terms abhihīhā (= Sanskrit: abhijñā), ‘extraordinary cognitive skills’, and idāhī. The latter is evidently cognate with Sanskrit (Vedic) idāhī ‘proficiency, abundance, power’, and is not Pali for the Sanskrit idāhī (pace M. Eliade, Myths, dreams and mysteries, London, 1968, 88). The following parallels occur in a typical descriptive list in the Śāmasīna-phalasūtra, Dīgha-nikāya PTS, London, 1890, 1, 78 et seq.; cf. 212 et seq.). . . . āvī-bhāvam tiro-bhāvam, tiro-kudām tiro-pākārām tiro-pabbatām asajjamāno gacchati seyyathā pi ākāsā, paṭhasvāya pi ummujsu-nimśūjgam karoti seyyathā pi udake, udake pi abhijjāmāno gacchati seyyathā pi paṭhasvāyan, ākāsā pi pāllamkēna kamati seyyathā pi pakkhi sakuno, ime pi candima-surige evam mahādhikhe evam mahānubhāve pāpinā parimamati parimajjati, yāva brahmaloke pi kāya na samavattī . . . so dibbāya sotadhāyugī visuddhāya atikkanta-mānuṣikāya ubho sadde suṇāti, dibbe ca mānuṣe ca ye dāre santike ca . . . so para-sattani-para-puggalānaṃ cetā cetā paraico paṭijñātī, sa-rāgān vi cītān sa-rāgān cītān ti paṭijñātī, vītā-rāgān vītā-rāgān ca cītān vi rāgāṇ ca cītān ti paṭijñātī . . . evam samāhite cītā . . . pabbthi-viśāmavissati-nāhīya ca abhināhācarati abhinimmāmītī (Ho) . . . becomes visible or invisible; untrammelled he goes through a wall or rampart or hill, as if through air; he dives into the earth and comes out of it, as if in water; he walks on water without sinking, as if on earth; he travels sitting cross-legged through the air, like a winged bird; even the moon and sun, so potent, so mighty though they be, does he touch and feel with his hand; he reaches in the body right up to the heaven of Brahmā . . . With that clear supernal auditory sense-faculty, which is superhuman, he hears sounds, both human and supernal, whether far or near . . . He mentally perceives the minds of other beings, of other men, and recognizes them—he recognizes his attached mind as being attached and the unattached mind as being unattached . . . . With his mind thus concentrated he applies and directs his mind to the recollection of his previous births’.

For further Buddhist parallels of various perfections see esp. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa. Cf. E. Conze, Buddhist scripture, Harmondsworth, 1959, 122 et seq.; Har Dayal, op. cit., 113 et seq.; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit.

227 This seems to correspond to sthāla ‘the gross’, or bhūta ‘element’ in sūtra 3.44 above (cf. sthāla-bhūtāni ‘the (five) gross elements’ in Sākhya-sūtra 1.61).

228 .ensure clear that ‘sky’ is occasionally used by al-Birūnī to render akāsā, ‘ether, physical space’. Cf. R, p. 181, l. 2; Indica, Hyd., p. 32, l. 10. At times ‘air’ is also used by him for the same purpose. Cf. R, p. 176, l. 9. The Sanskrit word akāsā (as well as its synonyms kha, vyaman, gapanā) means both sky and ether (cf. D. H. H. Ingalls, Materials for the study of Nāṣya-nyāya logic, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931, 37). For al-Birūnī’s rendering of the term by ‘air’ cf. Hermann Jacob: ‘... akāsā is also of the Luftraum, the Luft, as verschieden vom Winde gedachte, akāsā ist der feinsten allerflüchtigen Stoff’ (in his article ‘Über tejas, vāyu, akāsā, speziell

239 The Arabic ʿليس مَنْ جَمَّسَ ‘incorporeal’ seems to correspond to grahana, ‘apprehension’ or indriya, ‘the senses’, in sūtra 3.47 (see below n. 243), which apparently stands in contrast to sthūla in sūtra 3.44. Both sūtras, 3.44 and 3.47, seems to refer back to sūtra 2.18, where drṣyā, ‘the world of objects’, is said to be constituted by the bkhūtas, the elements, on the one hand, and by the indriyas, the senses (and the five faculties of action: the functions of voice, hands, feet, generation and excretion), on the other. For the Arabic phrase here cf. atindriya in Sāṅkhyaśūtra, sūtra 2.23: atindriyāṃ indriyaṃ bhūtānāṁ adhiṣṭhānām (v.l. adhiṣṭhāne) ‘The senses are themselves supersensuous; mistaken persons identify them with their physical seats (namely, the sense of sight with the “eye-ball” etc., cf. Vijñānabhinīṣṭha ṣadoc.)’.

240 Cf. R., p. 183, l. 5: ‘Whoever fasts (abstaining) from food . . . sharpens his sense’ (BSOAS, ch. II, p. 526, last para. but one). For the Arabic phrase here cf. . . . indriya-siddhāḥ asuddhi-kuṣaṭi . . . ‘. . . the dwindling away of the impurities which leads to the perfection of the senses . . . ’ in sūtra 2.43.

241 The MS has عَلَى مَا. Our translation follows Ritter’s text which has عَلَيْ مَا in spite of the fact that this reading is not considered by him as correct. Another possibility would be عَلَيْ مَا which in this context would have approximately the same meaning.

242 For the use of the Arabic term اَلْوَانَ ‘impediments’ here cf. the Arabic ‘the bodily impediments’, R., p. 176, l. 8 (transl. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 323). Also cf. R., p. 181, l. 16 (transl. BSOAS, ch. II, p. 525 and n. 104); India, Hyd., 61. Also cf. Vijñānabhinīṣṭha sūtra 2.43: asuddhāḥ adhānaras tānusau gusāvaiśvānīmadā-sūdrāḥ avāraṇo mataḥ ‘Impurity consists of demerit, namely, of the tamas-constituent; it is considered to be an obstruction to the capacity (or potentiality) of the powers of āsīmā etc.’.

243 Cf. sūtra 3.47: grahaṇāṃ svārāpāsāmīṣāṇevārthavatāt-saṃyamāduḥ indriya-jayaḥ ‘From the application of Discipline to the proper character (i.e. nature) of perception, (its) inference (i.e. pre-existence) in ego-awareness and (its) purposiveness there arises mastery over the senses’. Deussen, however, translates: ‘Durch (Anwendung der) Allzucht auf Perception, Qualität, Ichbewusstsein, Abhängigkeit (von den Guṇa’s) und Zweckbestimmtheit (der Sinnesorgane) erfolgt Beherrschung der Sinnesorgane’. This sūtra is paralleled by sūtra 3.44 above and seems to refer back to sūtras 2.18 and 2.43. In translating sūtra 3.44 above the reading arthavatā (instead of arthavatāta), suggested by the Arabic text, was proposed (see n. 221 above). On the other hand, the extant reading arhatvata is in consonance with bhogāpavargarthaṃ in sūtra 2.18: prakāsa-kriyā-sthiti-śilān bhūtendriyagāmakāṇaṃ bhogāpavargarthaṃ drṣyāṃ ‘(The world of objects) seen (i.e. prakṛti) consists of the elements (on the one hand) and the senses (on the other); it possesses the characteristics of illumination (by virtue of sattvā), activity (by virtue of rajas) and inertia (by virtue of tamas); and it has experience and emanation as its purpose’. Cf. also sūtra 2.21. For the term arthavatāta itself cf. Yuktidipikā on SK, kārikā 17. For the term grahaṇa here as referring to perception cf. grahāya in sūtra 3.21. (In sūtra 1.41 the term seems to refer to knowing in general). For our interpretation of anvaya here cf. the tenet regarding the evolution of the senses from ahaṅkāra (the principle of asmiṣṭa) in SK, kārikā 24, and the Sāṅkhya sat-kārya theory of causation, claiming that the effect is of the same essence as the cause, namely, the effect pre-exists, or is inherent, in its cause (SK, kārikā 9).

244، لِكِ: ‘but’.

245 This corresponds to ekārava-bhāvah ‘extra-sensory perception’ (lit.: ‘existence or state of being without the instruments of perception, i.e. the sense-faculties’; cf. vikaraṇatvatvaṃ in Brāhmaṇasūtra 2.1.31) in sūtra 3.48. The sūtra reads: tato mano-javitvaṃ (v.l. javatvaṃ) vikaraṇa-bhāvah pradhānā-jaṇayat ca ‘Therefrom result (also) swiftness of the mind, extra-sensory perception and mastery over prakṛti’. (Pradhāna is a synonym of prakṛti, Nature, Primordial Matter.) Cf. also Vy. ad loc.: vidhānāṃ indriyānām abhiṣṛṣṭa-deśa-kāla-viśayagṛhyaḥ yrti-lābho vikaraṇa-bhāvah ‘Extra-sensory perception consists in accomplishing the function of the senses with regard to (any) desired place, time or object independently of the body’. In translating mano-javitvaṃ we follow Deussen, in spite of Vy.’s interpretation of this compound: kāyangānutama
gati-lābhaḥ 'the attainment by the body of an unexcelled (speed of) movement (comparable to that of the mind)'. Vy. may have been misled by an irrelevant common usage of this expression. Both the idea and its expression are Ṛgyedi in origin (see H. Grassmann, Wörterbuch zum Rigveda, s.v. mano-jā; cf. also Iṣā Ṛṣipaniṣad 4, Muṣḍaka Ṛṣipaniṣad 1.2.4). Cf. the English expression 'quick as thought'. Vy.'s interpretation may probably be taken to imply that the expression in question in the sūtra refers to efficiency in the functioning of the karmendriyas, the faculties of action, such as account for the movement of hands and feet etc. For Buddhist parallels cf. e.g. mano-java-gamana, 'movement which is as swift as the mind' in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa, 7.48a–b (transl. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1925, p. 113, n. 2). Cf. also Louis de La Vallée Poussin, art. cit., 240.

246 The expression  the ālāmālām of the ālāmālām is used by al-Birūnī to render the concept of the three guṇas. Cf. e.g. R, p. 172, I. 7.

247 For a parallel to this characterization of the three guṇas see R, p. 181, I. 7–8 (cf. transl. BSOAS, ch. II, 525), where rajus is, however, referred to as the intermediary mixed cast.

248 Cf. pradhāna-jayāḥ 'mastery over prakṛti' in sūtra 3.48 (see n. 245 above). Cf. also Vy. ad loc.: sarva-prakṛti-vikāra-vāsītvam pradhāna-jaya iti 'Mastery over prakṛti consists in controlling all modifications of prakṛti'.

249 The soul is rendered by 'the soul'. An alternative reading is the breath'.

250 The word is partly illegible. Ritter suggests the reading 'ksetra' and then ', which makes sense but is not quite in keeping with the MS.

251 Also used here.

252 Cf. R, p. 177, I. 2 seq.: 'योंक्षेत्रस्त्रां यज्ञ यज्ञविद्यास्त्रां सत्त्वस्त्रां ज्ञातः प्रकृत्यतः... it (i.e. the first degree) (consists in) the apprehension of the three above-mentioned (i.e. the act of knowing, the known, and the knower) guṇa names, attributes, and details which do not constitute definitions. When he transcends it, (reaching) definitions which turn the particulars of things into universals, he achieves a second degree' (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 324). An alternative rendering of the usage in the passage under consideration would be: 'according to their limits'.

253 Cf. YS, sūtra 3.49: satyā-puruṣāntāḥ-khyātiḥ-mātrasya sarva-bhāvādhiḥstṛtvam sarvajñātṛtvam ca, 'From the application of Discipline to the full discernment between satyā (in this context: the buddhi, 'intellect') and the puruṣa (self) there arise supremacy over all states of existence and omniscience' (for the syntactic structure of this sūtra and the use of the genitive cf. YS, sūtra 3.19). Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: nirṛthu-rajasa-tamo-malaśya buddhi-satvasvāya pare vāi ārādaye parāsāya vāsītvā-saṣāyāyā rāja-vāsatvā svāhā prāthānāya sarva-bhāvādhiḥstṛtvam, sarvātmāno guṇā yaśasāya-yaśasāyānāmākāh sāvāmāna ksetra-jānām praty aṣṭa-yoginatvamadatparamātmanā iti arthaḥ 'He who is grounded in only the full discernment into the difference between the satyā and the self, and who is in the higher consciousness of being master in the higher clearness, and who has the satyā of his thinking-substance cleansed from the defilement of rajas and tamas is one who has authority over all states-of-existence. The aspects (guṇa) which are the essence of all things, which both have the determinations and the objects-of-determinations as their essence, present themselves as being the essence of the object-of-sight in its totality to their Owner, the Soul (kṣetra-jāna) (tr. Woods). Al-Birūnī's Arabic sentence here may reflect satyā-puruṣāntāḥ-khyātiḥ-mātrasya in sūtra 3.49 above. For the ādīn 'the body' referred to in the Arabic text, but not in the sūtra, cf. the expression kṣetra-jāna in Vy. ad loc. above. The term kṣetra (lit. 'field') in such context is traditionally interpreted as referring to the body, namely the field of the working of the soul. Cf. Kālidāsa's Kumārasambhava (Bombay ed.) 6.77: yo gosī yon欢喜vānte kṣetra-bhāvāntara-vartanam 'that which yogis discern as residing in the body'. Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 13.1, 2, 34. The Arabic  the ādīn 'things obey (the ascetic) 'corresponds to sarva-bhāvādhiḥstṛtvam in the sūtra; and  he (can) know them by their definitions and (can) grasp them in a universal (manner) 'to sarva-jñātṛtvam in the sūtra.'
AL-BİRÜNİ'S ARABIC VERSION OF PATAÑJALI'S YOGASŪTRA

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Also cf. R, § 170-1. 1:  'A part of praxis (अभिषेकन) is as it were activity (विनिमय), for praxis comprises both knowledge and praxis (मेयतय) (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 313-14).

255 Arabic معلومات which is derived from the same root as علم rendered above by ' knowledge '.

256 The MS followed by Ritter has َاتباعها. We propose the reading َاتباعها.

257 Apparently the rejection of the cognition is meant.

258 Cf. YS, sūtra 3.50:  'tad-vairāgyaḥ api doṣa-bhīja-kṣaye kaiwalyam ' In consequence of detachment from (either : from the perfections mentioned in sūtra 3.49, or : the full discernment between the sthānas, i.e. the buddhi, and the puruṣa), when the seeds of the defects have dwindled away, kaiwalya (autonomy, independence of the puruṣa) comes about. ' The term doṣa here is apparently synonymous with klesa (cf. e.g. Gautama's Nyāyaśāstra, ed. W. Ruben, I, 2; cf. also Pali doṣa, e.g. Sāmaññaphalasutta (section 91), Di̊g̊ha-nikāya, I, PTS, London, 1890, 90. For klesa see YS, sūtra 2.3. Cf. E. Lamotte, ' Passions and impregnations of the passions in Buddhism ', Fest. J. B. Horner, Dordrecht, 1974, 91 et seq. On the meaning of the term kaiwalya see T. Gelblum, ' Sāṃkhya and Sartr ', Journal of Indian Philosophy, I, 1, 1970, 77 et seq. The Arabic مَار={(s) its rejection } may correspond to tad-vairāgyata in the sūtra. Al-Bīrūnī's explanation of this passage is based on conceptions current in Arabic Aristotelianism. The sentence َُاتباعها For knowledge is the cognition of the perishing and destruction of these cognita followed up by its rejection َاتباعها may be related to some extent to Vy. on sūtra 3.50:  'tadā svarūpa-pratiṣṭhā citi-āktar eva puruṣa iti ' Then the self (puruṣa) is nothing but pure consciousness (lit.: the faculty of consciousness) grounded in its own nature َاتباعها.

259 'Glorifying in it ' may refer either to what is deemed knowledge, or alternatively to 'liberation'.

260 Its ' may refer either to what is deemed knowledge, or alternatively to 'liberation'.


262 Arabic جَنَّة, an Islamic name for Paradise.

263 In Arabic مَأَثْر. The MS has َاتباعها. We propose the reading َاتباعها.

264 In the singular in the Arabic.

265 Cf. YS, sūtra 3.51:  'sthāny-upamānaṁ sāṃ-sāmyoṣṭhakaraṇaṁ punar anīṣṭa-prasenaṁ gūt: At the invitation by those-in-high-places (i.e. the gods, cf. Vy. ad loc.) (the yogi should) avoid attachment and pride, for this would inevitably involve the recurrence of undesirables consequences '. The term sthānī is explained by Vy. and other commentaries as involving a reference to the gods (devas). Evidently the term is derived from sthāna in the sense of 'position, status, rank, office '. Hence sthānī literally means ' (high) office-bearer '. Cf. Maññi Upaniṣad 1.4:  'sthānād apiṣṭhakaraṇaṁ evaṁyata '... the departure of (individual) gods from (their respective station (sthāna), i.e. functional post, category or role; cf. Kaśyapīki Upaniṣad 1.2) '. The concept of sthāna may be further elucidated by referring to Śaṅkara on Brahmasūtra I.3.28: sthāna-viśeṣa-vibhāsanaṁ parīśīlaṁ adhīryati iti ' In fact (ea) a word such as ādīra has as its ground for application (the condition or contingent quality of) being related to a specific office (sthāna) just as (is the case of) the word 'Commander-in-Chief '. Hence it is the individual who occupies the specific office that is denoted by the word ādīra etc.'. (For the meaning of nimmīta in this passage cf. the term pravṛti-nimmīta discussed in B. K. Matīḷa's Epistemology, logic and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis, The Hague, 1971, 30 et seq.) The term sthāna is also synonymous
with vasati which is the name of a special loka according to followers of the Purāṇas. (Cf. Nyāya-
kośa, s.v. sthānam.)

The word upānimantra in the sūtra, which means ‘invitation’, also connotes ‘inducing to come near, seeking to attract, coaxing, alluring’. Cf. upānimantra-yate ‘entices (sexually)’ in Chāndogya Upaniband 5.8.1: yaṣā viśva, gautama, agniḥ; tasya upanakta eva samīt; yad upāniman-
\( \text{\textit{yate}} \) sa dhāmāḥ; yonir arciḥ; yad anādak karoti te 'gārīgh; abhinādārī vighulīgāh ‘Woman, verily, O Gautama, is the (sacrificial) fire. Her lap is the kindling wood; what invites (i.e. entices) is the smoke, the vulva the flame; what one inserts is the coals; the pleasures are the sparks’. For the term sānga cf. its use in a physical sense (‘adhesion’) in sūtra 3.39. Rājendralāl Mitra renders this term in sūtra 3.51 by ‘association’ (‘Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evil recurring’). The choice of this particular meaningful sense of sānga is implausible, since it would be contradicted by sūtras 3.32: ‘. . . sīddha-dārāṇām ‘. . . (the perfection of) holding visible converse with the sīddhas’, and especially sūtra 2.44: ‘. . . iṣṭa-devatā-saṃprayaṅgah ‘. . . (the perfection of) communion with the chosen deity’.

The term smaya ‘pride, arrogance’ in the sūtra is paralleled by the Arabic تکبر, ṣlname, ‘arrogance’ and تکبر تهمات ‘in the word’; the term smaya ‘invitation, call to attract’—by the Arabic المثه ‘the term sthānī—by the Arabic المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه المثه mitha ‘he may suffer a setback as far as his degree is concerned, and his promise (or vow) may be broken’. Also cf. Vy. ad loc.: tatra madhumatīn bhūmiṁ sāksātvarudho bhārīmanasya sākāhino devāh sattva-kūdākham anaspāyaṇtah sthānāṁ upānimantrayante bhror īhāyaṁ iha ranyatāṁ, kamanīyo ‘yam bhogah, kamanīyeyam bāṇyāṁ, raśāyanam idam jāṁaṁtyam bādāte, vaiśāyakam idaṁ yānam, ami kalpa-drūmāh, punyāḥ mandākīṁ, siddhāḥ mahāraṣṭaṁ, sattamā anukūlā aparaṇaḥ, diye rōtra-ca[k]ęṣyat, vajropaṇah kāyāḥ, vau-guṇah sarvam idam ṣpaṛjatāṁ āgyaṁati, pratipadāyā-
\( \text{\textit{tām}} \) idam akṣayaṁ ajaram amara-sthānaṁ devānāṁ priyaṁ iśit. The purity of the sattva in that Brahman among these (four) who has directly experienced the (second) Honeyed (madhumati) Stage is observed by those in-high-places, the gods. With their high-places they invite him. ‘Sir, will you sit here? Will you rest here? This pleasure might prove attractive. This maiden might prove attractive; this elixir checks old age and death. This chariot passes through air. Yonder are the Wishing Trees; the Stream-of-heaven (mandākīṁ) confers blessedness; the sages are perfected; the nymphs are incomparable and not prudish. Eyes and ears (will become) supernal; the body like diamond. In consequence of your peculiar virtues, Venerable Sir, all these things have been won by you. Have entrance to this high-place which is unfading and ageless and deathless and dear to the gods ‘‘ ’ (tr. Woods). It may be relevant to note in this context that ‘lust after women’ (the wolof ‘nosana) is also an example used in al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic text (R, 178, last line) to exemplify ‘the attachments’ (المَاكْتَسَبْ), a term corresponding to the particularly deep-seated ‘affection’ (klesā) known as abhīnivesā (lit. ‘clinging’)’. Cf. YS, sūtra 2.9 (according to Bhoja’s version): svarasvā-vaṁ viśuṇu ‘pi taw-anu[am]bandaḥ bhīnivesāh ‘Clinging, which consists in being attached to the body, persists by force of one’s own impulse even in the learned’.

697 صاحب اللذّا. One of the meanings of this expression is ‘master of the world’.
698 مَعْنَى which literally means ‘likeness’.
699 This simile is paralleled to some extent in Vy. on sūtra 3.51 (see n. 273 below). Cf. also Vy. on sūtra 2.33. Cf. also Manu 12.26, where kumbhipāka ‘being burned (or boiled, roasted) in a jar’ is mentioned in a list of torments which characterize the hells (naraka).
700 The MS has ‘. . . اَلْبِنْيَة’ with a question mark. The reading اَلْبِنْيَة ‘instrument’ is also possible. For the reading اَلْبِنْيَة cf. R., p. 178, l. 3 from foot; p. 180, l. 10.
701 The MS followed by Ritter has اَلْجَمَام. We propose the emendation اَلْجَمَام. Cf. Fākhāt al-Bustān, 891, اَلْجَمَام. Also cf. the expression dhārma-megabh samādhīḥ, ‘the concentration known as the cloud of merit’ in YS, sūtra 4.29. Cf. E. Senart, ‘Boudhisme et Yoga’, Revue de l’Histoire des Religions, xliii, 1900, 353.
702 حَيْثُ—lit. ‘so as to’.
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