

A Mountain of Saints and Sages: Muslims in the Landscape of Popular Religion in Late Imperial China

Tristan G. Brown

*The University of Cambridge and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology*¹

In the center of a bustling Chinese city in the north of Sichuan province stands the massive mausoleum of a Muslim saint. The Pavilion of Linger- ing Illumination (Jiuzhaoting 久照亭) is the resting place of the seventeenth-century mystic Khoja (Pr. “Master”²) ‘Abd Allāh (d.u.-1689), a twenty-ninth generational descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and the patriarch (*shizu* 師祖) of the Qādirīyah Sufi network in China.³ The shrine, which takes up over three acres (13,000 square meters) of land on Coiled Dragon Mountain (Panlongshan 蟠龍山) in the center of Langzhong 閬中 city—the seat of Baoning prefecture 保寧府 in impe- rial times—is now celebrated as a symbol of the region.⁴ Muslims to- day call the site “Shrine of the *Bābā* (Pr. Honorific Title of Sufi Saints)” (Babasi 巴巴寺).⁵ While being a site of Muslim devotion, over the cen- turies it became so esteemed that non-Muslim locals, too, referred to the structure by refined titles such as “Pavilion of Linger- ing Illumina- tion” or as simply the town’s namesake, “Baoning Temple” (Baoningsi

¹ Tristan Brown is a research fellow (2017-2020) at St John’s College, Cambridge. For the 2019-2020 academic year, he is a Visiting Scholar in History at MIT.

² Translations and terms in the article are given with the following abbreviations for clarity: Ar. for Arabic, Pr. for Persian, Ma. for Manchu, and Skt. for Sanskrit. If no abbreviation is given, the term is Chinese.

³ The term “pavilion” (*ting* 亭) in literary Chinese evokes a lush garden setting. The shrine was known by many names in imperial times, including “Baoning Temple” (Baoningsi 保寧寺) and “The Muslim Temple” (Huizisi 回子寺), but for consistency this study uses the title “Pavilion of Linger- ing Illumination,” which appears most frequently.

⁴ Langzhong was the name of a county based in Baoning prefecture. Because they shared the same administrative seat, the town was popularly referred to as Baoning.

⁵ *Sī* 寺, while usually referring to Buddhist monasteries, here is a translation of the Persian word *dargah*, meaning a shrine built over the grave of a Sufi saint.

保寧寺).⁶ The shrine was popularly perceived as significant for the entire prefecture.

While Muslims venerated the tombs of the saint and his disciples, a wide swath of local society found uses for the shrine. During the Qing, it marked one of the central places in Baoning where offerings for rainfall were performed. For the gentry of the prefecture, the shrine guaranteed good results in the civil service examinations. Further cementing the auspiciousness of its location, the region's largest Confucian Academy, Brocade Screen Academy (Jinping shuyuan 錦屏書院), was often depicted in writings and illustrations as near the shrine (Fig. 6). Qing officials regularly endorsed these understandings of the shrine's power in ceremonies and dedications. For frontier military garrisons, the shrine's cemetery became the resting place of many Muslim soldiers who died in the service of the Qing state. The shrine played important roles in the wider political and social milieu of the region during the Qing dynasty.

The Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination was one of around thirty-five major shrines maintained by the Qādirīyah across the northwest.⁷ This religious network straddled Muslim-dominated trading networks in furs, wools, and livestock that stretched between the empire's northwest and southwest.⁸ These trading networks were well-noted in gazetteers, and their profitability contributed to the economic power of Sufi lineages during the Qing.⁹ In addition to merchant capital, funds were

⁶ Though population figures for the Qing are difficult to estimate, it is clear that Muslims were and remain a minority in the area. A survey conducted in 1953 found that the county's population consisted of 530,216 Han and 2,538 Muslims. When applied to imperial times however, this ratio can be misleading. Many Han lived in the rural countryside, while most Muslims lived in the walled town, where they occupied a higher percentage of local residents and were a noticeable presence. *Langzhong xianzhi* 閬中縣志, ed. Sichuansheng Langzhongshi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (Chengdu, Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 125.

⁷ Ma Tong 馬通, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe* 中國伊斯蘭教派與門宦制度史略 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1986), 359–62.

⁸ For a discussion of these Muslim networks, see James A. Millward, "The Chinese Border Wool Trade of 1880–1937" <<https://sites.google.com/a/georgetown.edu/james-a-millward/other-publications>>, last accessed 8 May 2019. See also Jonathan N. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1997), 70–71.

⁹ See for instance the following passage from Langzhong's county gazetteer:

No one dares slaughter farm cattle, but the Muslims of the town must slaughter cows and lambs. This place does not have many cows and lambs, so they have to be purchased from afar. Although pigs are raised by every family, there are still not enough to meet the needs of this locality. Therefore, many merchants buy animals from some places in

raised by the Qādiriyyah through the acquisition of farmland around the shrines.¹⁰ At any given time, a number of young men training in religious study were dispatched to each shrine from Hezhou 河州 (today Linxia 臨夏) in Gansu, the headquarters of the network, to oversee the shrines' upkeeps, provide lodging to sojourning pilgrims, and farm fields around the estates. Income now comes from other sources, but the system of novices-in-residence overseeing the shrines is still in place today.¹¹

This article is based on evidence drawn from the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination's distinctive records. The shrine holds an unmatched collection of Chinese, Persian, Arabic, and Manchu language inscriptions and records from the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries that, unlike the repositories of many northwestern Sufi shrines, survived through the great northwestern rebellion of 1862-1877 by virtue of its location in Sichuan, which saw less violence than neighboring Shaanxi and Gansu.¹² The ornate inscriptions and dedications discussed here were compiled for the wider public's consumption, and accordingly, these sources were prominently displayed at the entrance or around the shrine. Hagiographies of the saint and his disciples composed by

Wen County, Jiezhou, Gansu province and export them down along the Baishui River to sell to our local butchers.

農家所畜耕牛不敢宰殺，而城中回民不能不屠牛羊。本地牛羊無多，率自遠方販來。豬雖家家所飼，然亦不足以應本地之需。販者多於甘肅階州文縣所屬處採買，由白水江順流而下，鬻之屠家。

Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi 咸豐閩中縣志 (1851), 3:34.

¹⁰⁾ A 1935 Sichuan cadastral survey found that the Qādiriyyah was a major landlord in Baoning, with large farming estates held under the name of the *menhuan's* leader (Ar. *murshid*, *jiaozhang* 教長) in Gansu. Langzhong Municipal Archive, 345.758.04.

¹¹⁾ The circulation of these students was described in a 1948 survey of Linxia's Sufi communities. Li Weijian 李維建 and Ma Jing 馬景, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha* 甘肅臨夏門宦調查 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2011), 247. During my visits to the Baoning shrine from 2012 to 2016, the *murids* (Ar. "novices committed to the Sufi path") were Gansu natives. Today they mainly collect donations from pilgrims and tourists, who with the ease of transport, come in larger numbers today than they presumably did in the past. The novices largely cook for themselves, preferring Linxia-styled "noodle squares" (*mianpian* 面片) over local Sichuan fare, but attend mosque services on Fridays in town. Following the reassignment of the local mosque's *ahong* to another district in 2014, the senior of these students offered the Friday prayers while new candidates for the post were interviewed.

¹²⁾ The "Tongzhi-Reign Muslim Conflict" (*Tongzhi huibian* 同治回變) as it is known in Chinese was the largest of a series of military conflicts involving Muslim communities in the northwest during the nineteenth century. For more, see Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004). See also Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 103-66.



Figure 1: CHGIS, Version: 6. (c) Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies of Harvard University and the Center for Historical Geographical Studies at Fudan University, 2016. Note: The highlighted line running through the center of the map denotes the extent of the Manchu conquest as of 1645. The shaded area denotes the extent of the Qing by 1659.

Qādirīyah adherents during the Qing were held inside the shrine, constituting a less public archive that bears noteworthy differences from the more public inscriptions and dedications. Further materials, including the Qādirīyah's writings on the saint and his disciples, have been recently published in volumes of edited-selected documents. I have also drawn substantial information from local archives in Sichuan, gazetteers, dynastic histories, Islamic writings, and literary sources. Taken together, these records reveal the many identities and roles of an important religious institution in late imperial China.

Much scholarship on Islam in China has focused, with good reason, on questions of Muslim identity in the Qing dynasty and twentieth century.¹³ This article draws from these groundbreaking works to explore

¹³ Joseph Fletcher, "The Sufi Paths (*turuq*) in China," *Etudes Orientales* 13/14 (1994): 55-69, Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, Françoise Aubin, "La version chinoise de l'islam," *European*

how Muslims lived and practiced their religion on the ground within Chinese society. The sources examined in this study suggest that, at least in some areas, Muslims' ritual, economic, and social roles were more integrated into elements of the imperial state cult and Chinese popular religion than has been previously imagined. These observations contribute to the growing body of scholarly literature that has identified Daoism and popular religion as critical agents for the spread of Chinese culture and state administration into frontier regions.¹⁴ They also introduce a new framework for understanding Islam's historical practice in China through centering the moments, conversations, and rituals that capture the lived experiences of Muslims and their neighbors.

Research in Islamic studies suggests that the broad reach of this Qādiri shrine was far from exceptional. In regions of Eurasia where Sufi networks flourished alongside non-Muslim populations, shrines were often held to have efficacious powers for local populations and performed a range of interfaith religious roles. Throughout Asia, accommodations were made by Muslims to facilitate the spread of Islam into non-Muslim territories. Carla Bellamy has detailed the healing powers of the "ambiguously Islamic" Husain Tekri shrines of India's Madhya

Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie 30 (1989): 192-220, Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), Kristian Petersen, *Interpreting Islam in China: Pilgrimage, Scripture, and Language in the Han Kitab* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017), Jianping Wang, *Concord and Conflict: Hui Communities of Yunnan Society in a Historical Perspective* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1996). David G. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2005), Włodzimierz Cieciora, *Muzułmanie chińscy: Historia, religia, tożsamość* (Chinese Muslims: History, Religion, and Identity) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2014), Elisabeth Allés, *Musulmans de Chine: Une anthropologie des Hui du Henan* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2000), James D. Frankel, *Rectifying God's Name: Liu Zhi's Confucian Translation of Monotheism and Islamic Law* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai'i Press, 2011), and Sachiko Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang Tai-yu's Great Learning of the Pure and Real and Liu Chih's Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm* (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000). There has also been important new work on Islamic Central Asia: Kim, *Holy War in China*, Laura J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, 1760-1860* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), Rian Thum, *The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2014), and Kwangmin Kim, *Borderland Capitalism: Turkestan Produce, Qing Silver, and the Birth of an Eastern Market* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2016).

¹⁴ *Chieftains into Ancestors: Imperial Expansion and Indigenous Society in Southwest China*, ed. David Faure and Ho Ts'ui-p'ing (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 2013) and P. Steven Sangren, *History and Magical Power in a Chinese Community* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1987).

Pradesh, which attract both Muslim and Hindu pilgrims.¹⁵ In South Asia, shared sacred spaces between Muslims and Hindus could be fiercely contested in the legal arena and in popular memory, even as sacred affiliations were often blurred in everyday worship.¹⁶

Weaving in and out of local and national politics, the history of the shrine as documented in the following sections is complex but can be summarized as follows. After the destruction of much of Sichuan province in the Ming-Qing transition of the seventeenth century, the Qādirīyah Sufi network, arriving in the province with greatly needed merchant capital, helped the Baoning region rebuild. As the map in Fig. 1 conveys, Baoning played an important role in the Qing conquest of western China. Because it was the first major town in Sichuan captured by the Manchus, Baoning became the temporary capital of Sichuan province in the early Qing and remained a strategically important pivot point lying on the key communication routes that linked Beijing, Xi'an, and Chengdu for the rest of the dynasty. The Khoja was likely aware of the region's geopolitical significance, which provided opportunities for official sponsorship, but also attended to local concerns by stressing the importance of the town's *fengshui*. This served to address gentry anxiety over examination success and to attract potential pilgrims to a recognizably efficacious site. In the years that followed, the network of Sufi shrines that came into being between southern Gansu, southwestern Shaanxi, and northern Sichuan created pilgrimage routes that closely overlapped with trade routes. Qing officials and military officers

¹⁵ Carla Bellamy, *The Powerful Ephemeral: Everyday Healing in an Ambiguously Islamic Place* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2011). See also Nile Green, *Making Space: Sufis and Settlers in Early Modern India* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012). For similar examples in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, see Agnes Nilufer Kefeli, *Becoming Muslim in Imperial Russia: Conversion, Apostasy, and Literacy* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2014), and Karen Barkey, "Religious Pluralism, Shared Sacred Sites, and the Ottoman Empire," in *Choreographies of Shared Sacred Sites: Religion, Politics, and Conflict Resolution*, ed. Elazar Barkan and Karen Barkey (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2014), 33-65. For the Mediterranean world, see Dionigi Albera and Maria Couroucli, *Religions traversées: Lieux saints partagés entre chrétiens, musulmans et juifs en Méditerranée* (Arles: Actes Sud, 2009).

¹⁶ While a record of violence is not prominent between Muslims and non-Muslims in northern Sichuan, I do not wish to paint an overly rosy picture of ethnic relations in Baoning. An invaluable Qing-era panel of the shrine was stolen in the early 2010s. On two occasions during a visit in 2013-2014, I witnessed fights over alcohol being sold at Muslim restaurants. Christians have also been in tension with the Muslim community, where they have often sought converts.

stationed in the region, such as Ma Ziyun 馬子雲 (d.u.) served as key patrons for the shrine from its beginning, and eventually the imperial court took note of the site's efficacious powers and publicly celebrated its virtues. Elite patronage attracted more patronage, and for the rest of the dynasty, the shrine was regularly sponsored by Manchu and Mongol bannermen and other provincial officials, becoming one of the central religious institutions of Baoning prefecture and even the whole of the Northern Sichuan military circuit (Chuanbeidao 川北道)—the respective state offices of which were all located at a short walking distance from the shrine.

This narrative is conveyed over four sections, each addressing one aspect of the shrine's role in the lives of the local, transregional, and empire-wide communities and institutions. Section one opens with the early development of Sufism among the Chinese-speaking Muslim communities and the political context behind the establishment of the Baoning shrine in the seventeenth century. Section two zooms in on the longstanding associations of Coiled Dragon Mountain with the founders of the Way of the Celestial Masters (Tianshidao 天師道) and famous medieval astronomers; this heritage was important for the legitimization of Sufi ownership over the site during the Qing. Section three examines the shrine's purported powers to improve examination performances and summon rainfall—powers that the Muslim community actively advertised. Section four reveals how patronage for the shrine from the imperial family and high-ranking officials helped substantiate the site's powers and legitimate Muslim participation in certain Qing institutions in the region, such as the Green Standard army 綠營兵.

This study uses the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination to situate Islam along the landscape of Chinese popular religion¹⁷ and, in doing so,

¹⁷) My use of the term Chinese "popular religion" draws on understandings of it encompassing a range of ever-evolving religious practices conducted beyond the strict tenets of Buddhism or Daoism. See Adam Yuet Chau, *Miraculous Response: Doing Popular Religion in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2008), 7-8. Many of the practices discussed here, such as *fengshui*, fit under Steven Bennett's term of "applied cosmology," or the mobilization of select laws in natural philosophy for calculated purposes in a ritual context. Steven J. Bennett, "Patterns of the Sky and Earth: A Chinese Science of Applied Cosmology," *Chinese Science* 3 (1978): 1-26. For more on divination in Chinese society, see *Divination et société dans la Chine médiévale: Étude des manuscrits de Dunhuang de la Bibliothèque nationale de France et de la British Library*, ed. Marc Kalinowski (Paris: Biblio-

envisioned a central role for minorities within the religious life and ritual calendar that defined both state orthodoxy and ritual legitimacy in the late imperial period. It further argues that we should understand the official status and state support of Islam under the Qing as tied to patronage for mosques and shrines with prominent histories, rather than specific schools or teachings of Islam.¹⁸ Of course, there were some Islamic groups that the state condemned over the course of the dynasty, usually under the category of “new teaching” (*xinjiao* 新教), but as has become increasingly clear, these condemnations typically arose in the wake of lawsuits presented by Muslims themselves asking the imperial state to define the contours of Islamic orthodoxy for their own communities.¹⁹ The imperial state’s lack of public support for a single version of Islamic orthodoxy, even as Islam was officially recognized as a legal and permissible “teaching” (*jiao* 教), meant that religious interpretations and ritual practices among Muslims across China could fluidly adjust to local environments and community needs.

thèque nationale de France, 2003). For more on geomancy in Islam, see Marion B. Smith, “The Nature of Islamic Geomancy with a Critique of a Structuralist’s Approach,” *Studia Islamica* 49 (1979): 5–38.

¹⁸ This observation is in line with previous scholarship that has begun tracing this patronage pattern. Hodong Kim, “Profit and Protection: Emin Khwaja and the Qing Conquest of Central Asia, 1759–1777,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 71 (2012): 603–26; James A. Millward, “A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court: The Meanings of the Fragrant Concubine,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 53 (1994): 427–58; Onuma Takahiro, “250-Year History of the Turkic-Muslim Camp in Beijing,” *University of Tokyo Central Eurasian Research Series* 2 (2009): 1–67.

¹⁹ Jonathan Lipman has discussed a lawsuit brought by Ma Yinghuan 馬應煥 against Ma Laichi 馬來遲 (c. 1681–1766) in 1747 on the grounds of practicing heterodoxy (*xiejiao* 邪教) instead of orthodox Islam. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 68. Ma Zhu juxtaposed *Sharī‘ah* law (*jinglü* 經律) and Qing law (*Qinglü* 清律) in detailing a case of heterodoxy presented to Qing authorities. Ma Zhu, *Qingzhen zhinan* 清真指南 (1683; rpt. Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 1988), 418–28. Such cases were common through the end of the dynasty, and often produced legal rulings that stressed the maintenance of “legitimate” Islamic tradition, as seen in the following 1891 case from Yunnan:

[The court rules...] We forbid heterodoxy and thus anyone who enters the mosque to pray must follow the old regulations [of Islam]. From now on, if there is anyone spreading the “new teaching,” it is permissible for the gentry of the Han or of the Muslims to petition the court for an investigation.

禁止邪教，凡入寺禮拜，皆遵舊規。以後倘有再行新教者，准漢回紳耆稟官究辦。
Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu 中國回族金石錄, ed. Yu Zhengui 余振貴 and Lei Xiaojing 雷曉靜 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2001), 662.

Imperial Politics and the Establishment of Institutional Sufism in China

While mystical interpretations of Islam were likely present in China following the arrival of the religion during the Tang dynasty (618-907), the spread of institutional Sufi *ṭuruq* (Ar. “paths”, *menhuan* 門宦; Sufi religious orders) across western China was a distinctly Qing phenomenon.²⁰ Islam was already well established in China by the time institutional Sufism arrived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some Sufi movements became embroiled in political unrest that affected much of the northwest in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. State administrators applied the term “new teaching” to, in Jianping Wang’s words, “each new wave of Islam on its arrival, i.e., the Khafiyya and the Jahriyya (Sufi networks), with earlier strands of the faith called the ‘old teaching’ (*laojiao* 老教).”²¹ The first Sufi group to permanently establish a base within the territory of the recently vanquished Ming Empire (1368-1644) was the Qādirīyah, which, on account of its arrival in the early Qing, seldom received the epithet of “new teaching.” It is commonly thought that the introduction and spread of the Qādirīyah set the stage for the arrival and development of later Sufi networks in China.

As a central shrine of the Qādirīyah in China, Baoning’s Pavilion of Lingering Illumination was connected to a vast network of Sufi shrines and Muslim communities throughout the country. The renowned Muslim intellectual Ma Zhu 馬注 (1640-1711) visited Baoning in the early Qing, and later Muslim travelers, merchants, and pilgrims may have followed his route.²² Baoning was in fact called by some Chinese Muslims

²⁰ It is important to make a distinction when defining “Sufism” (Ar. *Ṭaṣawwuf*) in China between institutional Sufi orders (*ṭuruq*) and Sufi concepts transmitted through Arabo-Persian texts. Dror Weil has identified Arabo-Persian Sufi texts composed as early as the twelfth century circulating in China during the Ming and Qing eras. According to Weil, the most popular texts on Islamic mysticism by the seventeenth century were Najm al-Dīn Rāzī’s (d. 1256) *Mirṣād al-Ibād*, ‘Azīz al-Dīn Nasafī’s (thirteenth century) *Maqṣad al-aqsa*, and Nūr al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī’s (d. 1492) *Ash’at al-lama’āt* and *Lawā’ih*. Dror Weil, “The Vicissitudes of Late Imperial China’s Accommodation of Arabo-Persian Knowledge of the Natural World, 16th-18th Centuries.” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Univ., 2016), 144. Further, the Chinese term *menhuan* does not exactly correlate with the concept of Sufi *ṭuruq* and more precisely refers to the distinct corporate lineage organizations that the Sufi networks evolved into upon their arrival and dissemination in China.

²¹ Jianping Wang, *Glossary of Chinese Islamic Terms* (London: Routledge, 2012), 86-87.

²² Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad*, 142 and Ma, *Qingzhen zhinan*, 4.

an “Eastern Mecca” (*Dongfang maijia* 東方麥加) by the twentieth century, if not earlier.²³ On a global scale, Baoning was one node in a vast Qādirīyah network of *zāwīyah* (Ar. Sufi lodges) that stretched from China to Morocco. Pilgrims who entered the shrine beheld a large collection of Islamic calligraphy as well as hand-copied Arabic and Persian manuscripts.

The shrines of the Qādirīyah across China’s northwest hold the tombs of prominent Islamic clerics who died during the Qing dynasty. Baoning’s Coiled Dragon Mountain in Sichuan holds the tomb of Khoja ‘Abd Allāh. Xixiang’s 西鄉 Root of the Transcendent Temple (Xiangensi 仙根寺) and Ancient Deer Temple (Lulingsi 鹿齡寺) in Shaanxi were the original resting places of Khoja ‘Abd Allāh’s student, Qi Jingyi 祁靜一 (1656-1719). As the Chinese “disseminator” of the Qādirīyah, Hezhou-native Qi Jingyi was said to have also studied under the famous Central Asian teacher Khoja Āfāq (1626-1694).²⁴ Finally, Hezhou’s Great Shrine (Da gongbei 大拱北) in Gansu is the site to which Qi Jingyi’s relics were moved and where the leadership of the group was and remains located.²⁵

There are scant historical records that convey the precise identity of Khoja ‘Abd Allāh dating from his lifetime; most sources have survived from the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, when the events of the saint’s life had been long digested and filtered into public memory. The *Qingzhen genyuan* 清真根源 (*The Root of Islam*), compiled by the sixth-generation Qādiri teacher Qi Daohe 祁道和 (d.u.) during Tongzhi reign (1862-1874) and published in 1924, records that the Khoja arrived from

²³ Li Yi 李滄, “Ronghe yu shengcheng: Babasi zhuandiao tu’an wenshi de wenhua jiedu” 融合與生成：巴巴寺磚雕圖案紋飾的文化解讀, *Minzu Yilin* 民族藝林 1 (2014): 72-77. Shrines like the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination allowed for Muslims living in Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Gansu to perform the Islamic religious duty of pilgrimage without physically traveling to Mecca. For more on pilgrimage in Chinese Islam, see Petersen, *Interpreting Islam in China*.

²⁴ Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 59. Alexandre Papas provides rich detail on Khoja Āfāq in his important study on Sufism and politics in the northwest. Alexandre Papas, *Soufisme et politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan: étude sur les Khwajas Naqshbandis du Turkestan oriental* (Paris: Jean Maisonneuve, 2005). Khoja Āfāq’s grand tomb is located in Kashgar, where it remains one of the holiest places in the region. Though Khoja Āfāq’s tomb is far from Gansu, Shaanxi, and Sichuan, the Chinese branches of the major Naqshbandi Sufi groups and members of the Qādirīyah trace their spiritual lineages back to him.

²⁵ The term *gongbei* is a derivative of the Persian word *gonbad*, which literally means “dome.”

Mecca at Guangzhou on the southeastern coast.²⁶ He was said to have travelled to Yunnan and the northwest, spending time in Hanzhong 漢中, Shaanxi province.

In 1684, the Khoja received an invitation from a Muslim Qing officer named Ma Ziyun to travel to Baoning, where Ma had taken up the post of regional commander (*zongbing* 總兵) of northern Sichuan. Ma had transferred to Baoning from a previous position in Hanzhong, where he first met the Khoja.²⁷ Upon his arrival in the Baoning area, the Khoja stayed as a guest in a spare room of Ma's stationed *yamen* 衙門 (government office). Most sources emphasize that the Khoja was struck with the beauty of northern Sichuan's patchwork of mountains and rivers and decided to become a resident teacher until his death in a Buddhist temple, the Temple of the Iron Pagoda (Tietasi 鐵塔寺). Although it is not stated in *The Root of Islam* why he wished to move to the temple, we can imagine the Buddhist temple serving as a neutral public space where the Khoja could interact regularly with Baoning locals outside of the governmental office or the local mosque. The shrine's records emphasize the fact that the Khoja taught astronomy, medicine, and various forms of divination, impressing locals with the depth of his knowledge. The extensive interactions with Buddhists that are recorded in the Qādirīyah's hagiographies of the saint may explain the distinct adoption of celibacy for its religious hierarchy in China—a tradition that has been maintained to the present.²⁸

Unlike the Gansu and Amdo (Qinghai) regions, which had sizable Muslim populations by the Qing dynasty, Sichuan's Baoning was not an obvious choice for a base of a major Sufi network. The historical and political context around the Khoja's arrival in China clarifies this. Baoning was located at a strategic point in the north of Sichuan along the

²⁶ Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 231–45.

²⁷ Correspondence between Ma Ziyun and the Qing court has been preserved in the *Veritable Records*. For an overview, see *Daqing lichao shilu: Sichuan shiliao* 大清歷朝實錄: 四川史料, ed. Wang Gang 王綱 (Beijing: Dianzi keji daxue chubanshe), 170–85. Ma Ziyun supported the construction of mosques across the country, including several in Hubei province. *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu guji ziliao xuanbian buyi* 中國南方回族古籍資料選編補遺, ed. Ma Jianzhao 馬建鈞 and Zhang Shuhui 張菽暉 (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2006), 167–69; 170–71.

²⁸ A number of *ḥadīth* (Ar. “Verified Record of the Prophet”) discourage celibacy. Hasan Shuraydi, *The Raven and the Falcon: Youth Versus Old Age in Medieval Arabic Literature* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 251–52.

old transport and communication routes that constituted what the Tang poet Li Bai 李白 (701-762) once called “the difficult road to Shu (Sichuan).” As the map in Fig. 1 shows, the Manchu conquest of west China extended just to the outskirts of Baoning in 1645. Baoning proceeded to serve as the temporary capital of Sichuan and administered the provincial examinations (*xiangshi* 鄉試) for almost twenty years (1646-1665), before Chengdu was restored as the provincial capital.²⁹ In brief, during the first decades of the Qing, many scholars were attracted to the region for its role in administering Sichuan and holding the provincial exams.

For similar reasons, large garrisons of soldiers and elite military officials were stationed in the area. During the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (1673-1681), the Kangxi Emperor, likely recalling its pivotal role in the Qing conquest of Sichuan, declared that Baoning’s position along the transport road from Xi’an to Chengdu made it the most critical place in the province.³⁰ A Qing military garrison was established near the Hall of the Perfected Warrior (Zhenwudian 真武殿) on Coiled Dragon Mountain, which later became the site of the Khoja’s tomb.³¹ This Daoist

²⁹ The Sichuan governorship 四川巡撫 and the commissioner for undertaking the promulgation of imperial orders and for disseminating government policies 四川承宣布政 were established in Baoning in 1646, the Sichuan provincial surveillance commissioner 四川提刑按察使 in 1647, the western Sichuan circuit attendant 川西道台 in 1649, and the northern Sichuan circuit attendant 川北道台 as well as the Sichuan provincial director of education 四川提督學政 in 1651. For a complete list of early Qing administrative posts established in Baoning, see Liu Xiancheng 劉先澄, *Langyuan jikao* 閬苑紀考 (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2011), 178-81. In the five examination years when Baoning served as the site of the provincial exams, 1652, 1654, 1657, 1660, and 1664, a large number of northern Sichuan locals received the *juren* 舉人 degree, including twenty-eight examinees from the town of Baoning (out of a total of 305). Liu Xiancheng, *Gongyuan chunqiu* 貢院春秋 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2013), 46-50.

³⁰ *Da Qing lichao shilu: Sichuan shiliao*, 143.

³¹ Imperial records contain several references to Coiled Dragon Mountain from the early Qing. One example from the first month of Kangxi 19 (1680) reads as follows:

A notification to the Deliberative Council of Princes and Ministers: General Zhao Liangdong and his armies have penetrated deeply into Sichuan. Baoning, Chongqing, and Kuizhou shall quickly be pacified. The generals such as Wu Dan and Wang Jinbao, though they have arrived at Baoning, had to establish a camp facing Coiled Dragon Mountain. As this happened, we fear a delay. Now, it is proper to face Coiled Dragon Mountain and divide the soldiers to strengthen the ramparts. Dispatch another army, ford the Zhaohua River, and make a fortification under the Jinping Mountain. With the combined forces of the Manchu and Han soldiers, we are planning to capture Chongqing and Kuizhou.

諭議政王大臣等：將軍趙良棟等軍，深入四川。保寧、重慶、夔州諸處，速宜平定。將軍吳丹、王進寶等軍，雖抵保寧，必於蟠龍山相對立營。果爾，則恐稽時日。今宜

edifice may have been used to garrison some of the soldiers. A late Qing gazetteer claims that “Arab” (*Alabo* 阿拉伯) soldiers from the “Muslim Dominion” (*Huijiang* 回疆) were stationed in this camp in Baoning at the start of the Qing. This gazetteer reference suggests literati awareness of Muslim participation in the Qing armies on the western frontiers. As we will shortly see, there were indeed many Muslim soldiers serving in the Green Standard garrisons of the western regions—a quotidian reality of frontier governance of which the Qing state was well-aware.³²

The fact that these soldiers were encamped just outside Coiled Dragon Mountain has further significance. This mountain has for centuries been associated with martial power, both through the cult of Zhenwu, an alternative name of Xuanwu 玄武, during the Ming and through the graves of Muslim generals and soldiers during the Qing. Many of these graves remain today. The creation of Qing military camps near Coiled Dragon Mountain may have been linked to the site’s strategic significance as the sole conduit into Baoning from the north as well as to the mountain’s religious significance through its longstanding ties to martial power—factors that were of course mutually reinforcing.

Baoning’s importance as the site of a large military garrison during the early years of the Qing conquest brought in soldiers who participated in frontier campaigns. Local gentry perceived that noticeable numbers of those soldiers were Muslim. At the same time, the construction of a large examination hall and accompanying academies during the years that the town served as Sichuan’s provincial capital elevated the importance of the region for the early generations of scholar-officials in Sichuan during the Qing. In other words, with many regions of the province either scarcely pacified or largely destroyed, Baoning attracted a diverse group of cultured and military elites during the early

面蟠龍山，分兵堅壘。別遣一軍，渡昭化江，壁錦屏山下。滿漢兵合勢，以規取重慶、夔州。

Da Qing lichao shilu: Sichuan shiliao, 128. Some of the historical contexts for this conquest, including references to Zhao Liangdong, are found in Nicola Di Cosmo, *The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth-century China* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001).

³² *Nanbuxian xiangtuzhi* 南部縣鄉土志, in *Sichuan daxue tushuguan guancang zhenxi: Sichuan difangzhi congkan* 四川大學圖書館館藏珍稀：四川地方志叢刊, Vol. 3, ed. Wang Xiaobo 王曉波 (Chengdu: Ba-shu shushe, 2009), 387. The topic of Muslims in the Qing military is the subject of Hannah Theaker’s recent dissertation. Hannah Theaker, “Muslims, Movement, and the Military: Changing Governance of a Sino-Tibetan Frontier in 19th Century Gansu” (Ph.D. diss., Oxford Univ., 2018).

Qing. Not unlike the great Islamic scholar Ma Zhu, who found reason to visit Baoning precisely at this time, the Khoja was drawn to Coiled Dragon Mountain in the 1680s, likely with an awareness of its significance.

The Cultural Heritage of Coiled Dragon Mountain

One of the most distinctive features of Sufism in China was its sustained engagement with Daoism and *Yin-yang* cosmology, including Chinese geomancy (*fengshui*).³³ Up until now, scholars have been largely unable to identify where, when, or why that engagement began. The Qādirīyah's selection of Coiled Dragon Mountain as the site of the Khoja's tomb in the late seventeenth century, precisely when institutional Sufism arrived in China, was a pivotal moment in this history. Long celebrated in Daoism, Coiled Dragon Mountain was transformed into an Islamic pilgrimage site over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was during this time that the Muslim community, in drawing on and reinventing long-standing local traditions related to Daoism and *fengshui*, began to promote the mountain's continued religious powers in the wake of their stewardship, particularly for the civil service examinations and rain-making efficacy. This early "model" of institutional establishment and corporate growth was then replicated at other Sufi tombs located in county and prefectural seats across the northwest.³⁴

³³) For an overview of Chinese Islamic texts that draw on Buddhist and Daoist concepts, see Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light*, 5-35.

³⁴) Dru Gladney observed many Daoist and geomantic practices among Sufi shrines of the northwest. Dru C. Gladney, "Muslim Tombs and Ethnic folklore: Charters for Hui Identity," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46 (1987): 495-532. Specifically, Gladney observed the following: Although Hui do not have any known institutionalized practice of geomancy (*fengshui*) with professionals skilled in selecting sites for buildings and graves, it is interesting that many of these tombs are placed in a similar location. Hui graves are distinguished by lying on a north-south axis, with the entrance to *gongbei* tombs almost always to the south. The body lies with the head to the north, the feet to the south, and the face turned west, toward Mecca. Many Hui graveyards and tombs follow standard *fengshui* principles: they are placed on the side of a hill with a stream or plain below. *Ibid.*, 515. With the records of many of these Sufi tombs now available, we may note that Sufis were actively engaging with *fengshui* from the time of their arrival in China, with Baoning's Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination an early documented case. Of course, Muslim engagement with Daoism in China pre-dated institutional Sufism: Stephen Jones has cited evidence for Muslims in Gansu engaging in Daoism as early as the Song dynasty (960-1279). Stephen



Figure 2: Tomb Complex of the Qādiri Saint and Disciples; Langzhong's Coiled Dragon Mountain



Figure 3: Carved Relief of Coiled Dragon Mountain on a Wall of the Shrine

Before analyzing the aforementioned powers of the Islamic shrine, it is necessary to provide the historical context of the mountain from which it drew some of these powers. Centuries before the creation of the Islamic shrine, the mountain was associated with famous Daoist leaders and court astronomers. Zhang Daoling 張道陵 of the Eastern Han (25-220 CE), the semi-mythical founder of China's first institutional Daoist movement, the Celestial Masters, and his purported grandson Zhang Lu 張魯 (d.u.-215 or 216), the Daoist enfeoffed by great warlord and founder of the Wei 魏 state, Cao Cao 曹操 (115-220 CE), as the Marquis of Langzhong (Langzhonghou 閬中侯), were closely tied to the mountain.³⁵ The great astrologer Luoxia Hong 落下閎 (156-87 BCE) was recorded as having lived on the mountain, and the Tang Daoist and geomancer Yuan Tiangang 袁天罡 (7th c. CE) was said to have conducted astronomical surveys from his residence there.³⁶ Reflecting this esteemed heritage, Baoning's Star Gazing Platform ("Astronomical Observatory"; Guanxingtai 觀星台), which for centuries was located on Coiled Dragon Mountain and administered by state-employed *Yin-yang* masters,³⁷ was rebuilt by northern Sichuan's circuit attendant in 1819 and named one of the eight great sites of Baoning prefecture upon the publication of the *Baoning Prefectural Gazetteer* in 1843.³⁸

The mountain's geomantic significance was traced to the Tang (618-907): Langzhong's gazetteer describes how, during the Zhenguan-era

Jones, *In Search of the Folk Daoists of North China* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 107-8.

³⁵ Franciscus Verellen, "The Twenty-four Dioceses and Zhang Daoling," in *Pilgrims and Place: Localizing Sanctity in Asian Religions*, ed. Phyllis Granoff and Koichi Shinohara (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 2003), 15-67. Gazetteers go so far as to claim Zhang Daoling as a local, noting that he made astrological observations on Langzhong's Mount Yuntai 雲台山. *Tongzhi zengxiu Nanbu xianzhi* 同治增修南部縣志, ed. Xihua shifan daxue quyu wenhua yanjiu zhongxin and Nanbuxian difangzhi bangongshi (1870; rpt. Chengdu: Ba-shu shushe, 2014), 357-58. For early Daoism's links to northern Sichuan, see Terry Kleeman, *Celestial Masters: History and Ritual in Early Daoist Communities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 2016).

³⁶ He Yimin 何一民 and Fan Ying 范瑛, *Langyuan xianjing: Lishi wenhua mingcheng Langzhong* 閬苑仙境: 歷史文化名城閬中 (Chengdu: Ba-shu shushe, 2005), 55.

³⁷ *Yin-yang* masters were employed by *yamens* and licensed by the state to accurately practice *fengshui*, divination, and astrology, see Tristan G. Brown, "The Deeds of the Dead in the Courts of the Living: Graves in Qing Law," *Late Imperial China* 39 (2018): 109-55.

³⁸ *Daoguang Baoning fuzhi* 道光保寧府志 (1821), *tukao* 圖考 section, 4.

(627-649), an “inspector of *qi*” (*wangqizhe* 望氣者), a literary term for a diviner or geomancer, was dispatched by the court to the southwest in search of places manifesting “royal *qi*” (*wangqi* 王氣).³⁹ References to “royal *qi*” in gazetteers often refer to sites once enfeoffed to imperial princes in pre-Qing times. The geomancer discovered Coiled Dragon Mountain pulsating with a concentration of such *qi* and the emperor thereafter ordered people to settle there.⁴⁰ Recorded legends conveyed that, as Baoning began to form, the mountain was chiseled, at which time water sprang forth like blood.⁴¹ These actions were said to have formed the topography of Baoning, wherein the peninsula of the town—surrounded by the Jialing River on three sides at its east, west, and south—is guarded by Coiled Dragon Mountain at its sole terrestrial entrance in the north. The summit’s *fengshui* was so important locally that gazetteer renderings of the area directly showcased the Dragon vein (*longmai* 龍脈) of Coiled Dragon Mountain. Dragon veins are a core concept in *fengshui* that topographically denotes a mountain range or watershed pulsating with *qi*. In the illustration of the mountain range of Coiled Dragon Mountain below, the Pavilion of Lingered Illumination is situated at the end of the Dragon vein that was thought to protect Baoning.⁴²

The mountain’s name “Coiled Dragon” evokes the geomantic concept of a coiling Xuanwu (“Zhenwu”), a Chinese mythological figure imagined as a serpent wrapped around a tortoise. Xuanwu, in geomantic terms, marks the northern direction, and indeed, like the Forbidden city’s northern “Prospect Hill” (Jingshan 景山), Coiled Dragon Mountain was located precisely to the north of Baoning’s walled town. Accordingly, the mountain was associated with the water element, denoting north in the

³⁹ *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi*, 1:3. *Qi* refers to the vital force that made up all matter in the cosmos.

⁴⁰ For one recent discussion of the term “royal *qi*,” see Chuck Wooldridge, *City of Virtues: Nanjing in an Age of Utopian Visions* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2015), 12.

⁴¹ *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi*, 1:3.

⁴² Dragon veins were central to imperial discourses of *fengshui*. For some examples, see Stephen Whiteman, “Kangxi’s Auspicious Empire: Rhetorics of Geographic Integration in the Early Qing,” in *Chinese History in Geographical Perspective*, ed. Yongtao Du and Jeff Kyong-McClain (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), 33-54 and Philippe Forêt, *Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai’i Press, 2000).



Figure 4: Map of Coiled Dragon Mountain Walled Town of Baoning at Bottom Center. Note: *Minguo Langzhong xianzhi* 民國閬中縣志, *Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng: Sichuan fuxian zhiji* 中國地方志集成. 四川府縣志輯, Vol. 56, ed. Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng bianweihui (1926; rpt. Chengdu: Ba-shu shushe, 1992), 634. This precise image appears in studies of *fengshui* and is cited by scholars as a classic example of a geomantic rendering of land. Han Baode 漢寶德, *Fengshui yu huanjing* 風水與環境 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2002), 38.

mutually-generating Five Phases (*wuxing* 五行) of wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.

The mountain's geomantic significance was well-cited during the Ming. Baoning's Daoist Palace of Great Clarity (Taiqinggong 太清宮), also called the Hall of the Perfected Warrior, was constructed under Yang Zhan 楊瞻 (d.u., 1519 *jinshi* 進士), the Sub-Provincial Administrative Commissioner (*anchasi qianshi* 按察司僉事) of northern Sichuan in

1534. In a stele inscription erected in front of the shrine, he provided the rationale for the site selection of the Hall of the Perfected Warrior on Coiled Dragon Mountain:

The Prefectural Town [of Baoning] faces numerous peaks and is taken as *yang*; thus, in the Five Phases it is taken as fire. When fire becomes too concentrated, there will be a fire-related disaster caused by the God of Fire that will be hard to avoid throughout the year. I constructed the Hall of the Perfected Warrior [on Coiled Dragon Mountain] to suppress this [fire]. The Perfected Warrior [Zhenwu] refers to Xuanwu, but the character “Xuan” became taboo because of Tang Xuanzong’s (r. 712-756) Temple name and it was thus changed to Zhenwu. The Perfected Warrior resides in the northern Pole and in the Five Phases is taken as water. With the balance of fire and water, nothing will not grow, the people will not be unhealthy, the seasons will not be inharmonious, no harvest year will be infertile, and the fire spirit⁴³ will depart from this place.

府城，面諸峰爲陽，在五行爲火。火盛則回祿之災，歲或不免。余爲創建真武殿以壓之。蓋真武，玄武也。唐避玄宗廟號，改真武，位北極，在五行爲水。水火既濟，則物無不育，民無不康，時無不和，歲無不豐，而宋無忌當遠遁矣。⁴⁴

The Daoist shrine’s auspicious qualities enhanced through its strategic geomantic placement on Coiled Dragon Mountain were said to decrease the risk of dangerous fires in the prefecture’s wood-built town. As we will see in the following section, the Islamic Pavilion of Lingerling Illumination inherited such powers during the Qing, when the shrine, seen in the image below, was constructed amongst some of the most important structures of the region: the prefecture’s largest Daoist abbey, the Hall of the Perfected Warrior, the Star Gazing Platform used by the prefecture’s *Yin-yang* masters to interpret astrological portents, and the most esteemed Confucian academy of Baoning, Brocade Screen Academy.⁴⁵

⁴³ Song Wuji 宋無忌, sometimes written as 宋毋忌, was identified as a fire spirit from antiquity and appears in the *Bowuzhi* 博物志. *Bowuzhi*, ed. Zhang Hua 張華 and Zhu Hongjie 祝鴻杰 (c. 290 CE; rpt. Taipei: Wunan tushu chubanshe youxian gongsi, 1997), 38-39.

⁴⁴ *Ba-shu daojiao beiwen jicheng* 巴蜀道教碑文集成, ed. Long Xianzhao 龍顯昭 and Huang Haide 黃海德 (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 216.

⁴⁵ There were also other Daoist shrines located at the base of Coiled Dragon Mountain: the Hall of the Eastern Peak (Dongyuedian 東嶽殿), the Hall of the Southern Peak (Nanyuedian 南嶽殿), and the Hall of the Thunder Patriarch (Leizudian 雷祖殿). Among the many powers of the Thunder Patriarch was summoning rainstorms, which partially explains its position



Figure 5: Gazetteer Illustration of the Base of Coiled Dragon Mountain, North Side of the Prefectural Town of Baoning (1851). Note: *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi*, yutu section: 1-6.

The continued Daoist presence on the mountain is evidenced in the 1926 edition of the county's gazetteer, with five priests recorded in residence during that time across the various shrines pictured in the image above.⁴⁶

In brief, the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination was established at a specific time and in a particular place. During the Ming-Qing transition, the area of northern Sichuan experienced significant devastation that left many important buildings and significant religious sites dilapidated and desolate. The Qādirīyah arrived in China during this political transition and spread through the teachings of Khoja 'Abd Allāh, who was invited to Baoning by Qing officials stationed in the area. Arriving in the region with some financial capital and well-placed political connections, the Sufis helped Baoning rebuild by restoring the past

near Coiled Dragon Mountain. It will not be lost on readers examining the map in Fig. 6 that the "Muslim Temple" came to stand above all of these shrines on the southern slope of the mountain.

⁴⁶ *Minguo Langzhong xianzhi*, 682.

pre-eminence of Coiled Dragon Mountain through the construction of the tomb shrine of a Muslim saint. By the late seventeenth century, this famed Daoist mountain in northern Sichuan was transformed, with state and local consent, into an Islamic pilgrimage site that nonetheless remained a central religious site for the locality. The shrine expressed its significance through cosmological discourses surrounding the examinations and rain-making rituals.

The Shrine, Islam, and Chinese Popular Religion

Shortly after its construction, the mausoleum around the grave of Khoja 'Abd Allāh became associated with supplications both for success in the imperial examinations and for rain-making. As related above, Coiled Dragon Mountain had already possessed fire-quelling geomantic powers for centuries. But rain-making rituals and the holding of civil service examinations were also central roles of the imperial state. The imperial government's endorsement of the Islamic tomb's efficacy—that is, its ability to aid the state in its pursuit of good governance—was quickly identified and celebrated by the Qādiri community as they extended ownership over the area around the mountain. Qing officials were supportive of these overtures, and in turn stressed the site's efficacious power as a reason for their patronage.

Stone inscriptions placed at the shrine's entrance capture this transformation. The earliest surviving documentation on the mountain includes epigraphic biographies of the saint from 1691 and 1719, as well as a tax record of the estate from 1735, after the region's sole significant cadastral survey of the Qing was conducted.⁴⁷ An inscription from 1747 conveys the positive effects that the shrine's creation had on the region's *fengshui*. It introduces the Khoja not as an Islamic cleric, but as a skilled diviner, with the ability to calculate the correct geomantic applications of the Five Phases in identifying auspicious sites.⁴⁸ The inscription

⁴⁷ Madeleine Zelin, *The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-century Ch'ing China* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984) and *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 413-14; 489-91.

⁴⁸ *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 491.

continues that towards the end of his life, the Khoja divined that the finest place for burial in Baoning was along the slope of Coiled Dragon Mountain. The inscription emphasizes that the Khoja was said to have been able to discern the site's ancient significance on his own.

Fengshui is a cosmological system dating from Chinese antiquity designed for identifying auspicious elements of the land. As such, *fengshui* was closely interwoven with understandings of geography (*dili* 地理), with which the practice often shared the same name. Following the rise of Neo-Confucianism from the Song (960-1279) to Ming dynasties, *fengshui* became a cornerstone of imperial Chinese law for claiming land, regulating development, projecting status, and managing resources.⁴⁹ Geomantic information rooted in identifying currents of *qi* flowing through the “veins of the earth” was often included in genealogies, contracts, lawsuits, and on inscriptions erected in front of significant properties, and buildings perceived as inauspiciously situated could be vulnerable to litigation in imperial courts.⁵⁰ A section from a 1747 inscription at the entrance to the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination read as follows:

The Regional Commander of (Northern) Sichuan was surnamed Ma, named Zi-yun, and he admired the virtue of the ancestral teacher (i.e., Khoja ‘Abd Allāh), so Ma welcomed him in 1684 to the *yamen* as a distinguished guest....[There, the teacher] studied deeply the transformations of the *taiji* and the profundities and subtleties of the adjoined “two” (*yin* and *yang*), and the “five” (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water). Later, when he came to the end of his life, he saw that he would leave the mortal world and be transformed into the afterlife. And thus, he divined that the finest place of Baoning was at the base of Coiled Dragon Mountain. The town gentry were all happy to obey this suggestion and invited the teacher to foster the auspicious *qi* of the town there. In 1689, on the twenty-fifth day of the third month, the teacher was buried. And just a few years later the local culture and literacy rose and the number of people who performed well in the civil service exams grew. The people and myriad things in the town all started to see great improvement. If our teacher did not have the brilliance by which he viewed and under-

⁴⁹) Tristan G. Brown, “The Veins of the Earth: Property, Environment, and Cosmology in Nanbu County” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia Univ., 2017).

⁵⁰) Churches were often the targets of *fengshui*-related litigation in the nineteenth century. Ernest P. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 32; 47.

stood the abstruseness of the patterns of heaven and identified suitable veins of the earth, how could this place have produced such talent and success?

有川台鎮台，諱子云馬公，慕師祖之德，於甲子歲迎師祖於官署，以師理 [禮] 事之…理究太極之化育，神合二五之精微。迨後迴光內徹，自知將其脫塵而化也。因預卜佳城於蟠龍山之麓。郡中士大夫咸欣然樂從，願請師祖以培風氣焉。爰於己巳歲三月二十五日，師祖瘞塚。未及數載，人文蔚起，甲弟鱗鱗，四境民物駸駸乎有起色矣。若非師祖之英風爽氣，有以察天文之奧因地脈之宜，焉能鐘靈毓秀至斯乎？⁵¹

The Khoja's burial on the mountain improved the region's performance in the civil service examinations by fostering the town's *fengshui*. Typical claims involving *fengshui* and the civil service examinations in inscriptions or gazetteers slightly differ from the content of the narrative above. In many late imperial records, it was common for local gentry to voice concern about *fengshui* after several rounds of poor regional examination showings or in the aftermath of an inauspicious event, such as an earthquake. Such campaigns galvanized locals to construct pagodas dedicated to Wenchang 文昌, the god of the examinations, or other edifices with the aim of improving *fengshui*. Yet here, the Muslim community boldly claimed that the Khoja's tomb had already improved the *fengshui* of the town, and that gentry had born witness to that fact. The Muslims were directly addressing the wider community of Baoning and emphasizing their contributions to the town, as evidenced by the erection of the shrine's inscription in public view. Further evidence for this is the fact that Islam is only referred to once in passing in the inscription, as *qingzhenjiao* 清真教, while *fengshui* and Chinese cosmology are cited throughout the text. Indeed, prior to the popularization of the name "Pavilion of Lingering Illumination" for the site during the eighteenth century, the complex was identified simply as the "Eight Trigram Pavilion" (Baguating 八卦亭), as were other Sufi tombs in the northwest.⁵² The fact that the Muslim community claimed that the *fengshui* was improved by the shrine suggests that there was a consensus in the town that it was so. At the very least, the non-Muslim gentry, impressed

⁵¹ *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 491-92. The *taiji* referenced here refers to "the Supreme Ultimate," which marks the union of *yin* and *yang*.

⁵² Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 241.

by the saint's divinatory skills, had consented to his burial on the mountain.

Why was there such an emphasis on *fengshui* in the shrine's public records from the Qing? The legal implications of *fengshui*, which was often invoked in property disputes across China, explain the reason. Ethnographic accounts reveal that non-Muslim populations in the northwest at times attacked Islamic shrines on the suspicion that they hurt the *fengshui* of an area.⁵³ The Muslim community of Baoning may have been preempting such accusations through their engagement with Chinese cosmology. *Fengshui* provided a vehicle through which this Muslim community exerted a claim to land that addressed the sympathies of a wider, non-Muslim community, which saw the mountain as connected to the fortunes of the entire prefecture through the examination system and rain-making. Some locals may have been initially troubled at the prospect of the historically Daoist mountain coming under Muslim ownership. And yet, it was precisely this strategy in real estate acquisition that appears to have been essential to the Qādirīyah's and other Sufi networks' successes in the northwest. Existing accounting records of these shrines dating from the eighteenth century through the 1940s reveal extensive landholdings near Daoist abbeys, Tibetan monasteries, and Buddhist temples.⁵⁴ One example inscription from a saint's tomb located in the "finest" location of Huangzhong (Qinghai province) reads as follows:

In the administrative seat of Huangzhong, there is a mountain to the southwest. This mountain is [a place] of residing phoenixes, and thus its name is "Phoenix Mountain." It is the crown of Huangzhong's landscape. To the north, it faces the mountain of "Soil Tower," which towers endlessly, and to the south it is opposite to "Pine-Bearing" Literary Peak. In front of the mountain is the Buddhist hall of a

⁵³) Some Islamic structures were cited as having harmful effects on *fengshui*, while others—like the Baoning shrine—were celebrated for supporting *fengshui*. These discourses heavily depended on the power relations of a locality. Gladney conveys that locals in northwestern counties cited Sufi shrines as temples dedicated to "Muslim (Hui) spirits," while Buddhist temples were dedicated to Han spirits. Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1991), 162.

⁵⁴) For the tax records of the shrine, see *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 413-14. For a Republican-era administrative record, see Langzhong Municipal Archive: 345.758.04. See also the information indexed in Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 386-87.

Chan temple; behind the mountain is the tomb of the Saint, a Descendant of Muhammad (Lit. "The Sage of Arabia").

湟中郡城，西南有山，其山落鳳，即名鳳凰山，為湟中勝境之冠。北望萬重土樓，南對鬆擁文峰，前有禪寺佛殿，後即天方聖裔爸爸[巴巴]墓焉。⁵⁵

These records suggest that Sufi communities closely aligned their shrine placements within the existing administrative and religious geographies of imperial frontiers—likely influencing them over time. These shrines also probably profited from existing trade networks that aligned closely with pilgrimage routes. As the Muslim adoption of elements of Daoism and *fengshui* is so prominent in the history of the Chinese northwest, one might wonder if that engagement arose from the need to stake legible property claims and project authority within the process of transforming the religious, economic, and political landscape of the region.⁵⁶

An alternative version of the shrine's founding story is found in the nineteenth-century Sufi hagiography, *The Root of Islam*.⁵⁷ The biography of the saint, clearly written for a Muslim audience, claims that the Khoja had the ability to make the tower of the Buddhist Temple of the Iron Pagoda permanently incline simply by placing his hand on it.⁵⁸ This impressed Baoning's gentry to the extent that they insisted the Khoja per-

⁵⁵ *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 553. This saint was said to have died during the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271-1368). The Hongwu Emperor of the Ming and Kangxi and Qianlong Emperors of the Qing are all said to have bestowed generous gifts to the shrine. The inscription above was compiled from previous sources and erected in 1947. For yet another example of an auspiciously-situated Sufi shrine from a Qing source, see Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 302.

⁵⁶ For a relevant example of the negotiation of sacred space between religious groups, see James Robson, *Power of Place: The Religious Landscape of the Southern Sacred Peak (Nanyue) in Medieval China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 2009).

⁵⁷ A discussion of these stories from *The Root of Islam* is found in Tiffany Cone's recent monograph. Tiffany Cone, *Cultivating Charismatic Power: Islamic Leadership Practice in China* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 44-47.

⁵⁸ Muslim connections to the Buddhist Temple of the Iron Pagoda were recorded in local gazetteers. During the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820), a Muslim miller surnamed Liu 劉 found an inauspicious stone—thought to be a meteorite—on his property. After consulting with local gentry, a decision was made to enshrine the stone in the Temple of the Iron Pagoda, after which time the inauspicious effects were no longer felt. While we do not have any surviving Islamic source concerning this event, the gazetteer underscores the links between the Muslim community and the Buddhist temple where the Khoja once resided. *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi*, 17:34.

sonally divine an auspicious gravesite worthy of such a powerful person. This narrative harkens back to late imperial popular Muslim miracle tales that emphasized the superiority of Islam over Buddhism or Daoism. Naturally, this detail is absent from the public inscription.

In addition to contributing to the region's *fengshui*, the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination was also instrumental in rain-making, which was of course linked to the same imperial cosmology as *fengshui*. In 1694, during a regional drought, a rain-making ritual was performed at the grave of the Khoja by the Baoning Prefect and Jiangsu native An Dingchang 安定昌 (d.u.), from which time on the shrine came to be publicly celebrated for its abilities in combating drought.⁵⁹ The official's desire to offer the rain-making rituals at the shrine may have been connected to the much longer tradition of associating Coiled Dragon Mountain with the water element of the Five Phases in Chinese cosmology, and hence rain-making potency. State rain-making was an important duty of imperial Chinese governments and it is evident that claims about rain-making efficacy were made by the Muslim community shortly after its construction.⁶⁰ The rain-making potency of the shrine was also recorded in *The Root of Islam*, which claims that the saint's disciple Qi Jingyi was able to summon rain by supplicating at Coiled Dragon Mountain during a drought.⁶¹ Other shrines associated with rain-making capabilities were constructed by the Qādiriyyah in Sichuan's Guangyuan 廣元, Qingchuan 青川, and Pingwu 平武 counties.⁶² It is perhaps unsurprising that the hagiographic records of the shrine convey that Muslim religious leaders could summon rain; more surprising is the Qādiriyyah's public advertising that Qing officials, such as An Dingchang, could themselves successfully summon rain when visiting these shrines.⁶³

⁵⁹ Ma, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe*, 269. Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 282.

⁶⁰ Jeffrey Snyder-Reinke, *Dry Spells: State Rainmaking and Local Governance in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 2009).

⁶¹ Cone, *Cultivating Charismatic Power*, 48–49.

⁶² Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 125.

⁶³ An Dingchang is listed as having served as the prefect of Baoning in the eighteenth century history, *Records of the Yongzheng Reign* (*Yongxianlu* 永憲錄). Xiao Shi 蕭爽, *Yongxianlu* (1752; rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chubanshe, 1959), 38.

Here, it is necessary to ask how typical these practices of the Baoning Sufi shrine were in light of the spectrum of Chinese Islam in the late imperial period. One might be tempted to assume these practices were unique to Baoning or distinct to the Chinese Qādirīyah. And yet, while the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination was distinctive for its remarkable degree of imperial patronage, significant wealth, and vast size, newly available archival materials make it clear that the Baoning shrine was absolutely not unique among Muslim institutions for engaging Chinese popular religion. Genealogies and contracts composed by Muslims from Sichuan and elsewhere reveal great concern over auspicious lands, proper timing, and *fengshui*.⁶⁴ This appears to have been the case for Muslim communities in the northwest as well as those in the southern provinces such as Guizhou, Yunnan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong.⁶⁵ At the very least, by the Ming dynasty it was entirely common for a mosque's contractual record to explicitly state that the site had been chosen through careful site selection and at an auspicious time—details included to prevent litigation from potentially troubled neighbors.⁶⁶ Furthermore, much like the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination, many mosques appear to have been constructed out of the structures of, or near to, Daoist abbeys, Buddhist temples, or sold off governmental *yamen*. These sites, much like Coiled Dragon Mountain, would have been known for possessing good *fengshui* well before Muslim communities acquired them.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ For instance, one of the mosques of Yanting 鹽亭 county in Sichuan was constructed in 1812 with explicit reference to the geomantic orientations of Azure Dragon (*qinglong* 青龍) and White Tiger (*baihu* 白虎). *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu qingzhensi ziliao xuanbian*, 61–62.

⁶⁵ *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu jingji shangmao ziliao xuanbian* 中國南方回族經濟商賈資料選編, ed. Duan Jinlu 段金錄 and Yao Jide 姚繼德 (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 2002), 155–65. See also *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 680 and *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu guji ziliao xuanbian buyi*, 4–5; 233–34; 395–96; 424.

⁶⁶ For instance, in 1586, a mosque was established in Gansu's Hui County 徽縣 with the following terms: “Thereupon, upon divining an auspicious site to the left of the (Daoist) Palace of the Three Principles in the eastern suburbs, the whole community put forward funding for the purchase and establishment of the mosque in this place” 遂卜吉於東郊三元宮之左，僉施金貨置而創立焉。 *Zhongguo Huizu jinshilu*, 189. Baoning's main mosque was constructed out of the old Ming prefectural *yamen*, which was purchased by the Muslim community in the early Qing.

⁶⁷ Some Islamic scholars addressed geomancy directly in their writings. Ma Zhu, in his *Guide to Islam*, warns against the practice of *fengshui* but did so with a narrow definition of geomantic practice. Muslims were not to use burial as a means to manipulate fate, which

Further participation in local rituals can be seen in Muslim communities across western China providing livestock for the biannual Spring and Autumn sacrifices and other state-organized festivals. A lawsuit from Sichuan's Ba county concerning the improper slaughter of a cow raised by Muslim butchers that was intended for the state sacrifices opened with the phrase: "The teachings of the Hui (Islam) and the teachings of the Han are in charge of performing the Spring and Autumn sacrifices" 回漢兩教承辦春秋大典.⁶⁸ It was locally understood that non-Muslims provided the pigs and Muslims provided the lambs and cattle. The Spring and Autumn sacrifices, which marked key moments in the agrarian cycle, required the presentation of cattle, goats or lambs, and pigs as ritual offerings. The Baoning Muslim community based around the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination was described in local gazetteers as being closely associated with butchery, and the regional animal trade was centered around Baoning's main mosque.⁶⁹ As we have previously seen, this trade was deeply interwoven with mer-

was taken to be in the hands of God. Further, Muslims were not to delay burial, which Islamic law required to be completed ideally within a day of death. These admonishments echo the general warnings against excessive geomantic practices found in the *Great Qing Code* (*Daqing lüli* 大清律例). Ma, *Qingzhen zhinan*, 261-62.

⁶⁸) Ba County Qing Archive: 06-50-39210. Muslims distinguished their practices from those of the Han by referring to the latter broadly as "the Teaching of the Han" (*Hanjiao* 漢教). For a recent discussion of this term, see Unno Noriko 海野典子, "Chūgoku musurimu no 'seishin' ishiki to jita ninshiki: Nijū seiki shotō no Kahoku chiiki ni okeru harāru mondai to 'Kai' 'Kan' kankei" 中国ムスリムの「清真」意識と自他認識: 二〇世紀初頭の華北地域におけるハラール問題と「回」「漢」関係, *Isurāmu chiiki kenkyū jānaru* イスラーム地域研究ジャーナル 8 (2016): 12-24.

⁶⁹) *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi*, 3:34. Sources commenting on Muslim participation in butchery are numerous. For a discussion of this subject, see Frederick J. Simoons, *Eat Not This Flesh: Food Avoidances from Prehistory to the Present* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 124. Simoons writes, "... many Chinese refused to become butchers, and, at least in some places, slaughter of cattle became the work of Moslems." *Ibid.*, 124. Vincent Goossaert discusses the tensions between pork-eating non-Muslims and beef-eating Muslims in his study on beef. As bovines were needed for agricultural labor, beef was seldom consumed by the public, though Muslims' roles as herders, traders, and butchers won them a position in which they could abstain from the general avoidance of eating beef. Vincent Goossaert, *L'interdit du bœuf en Chine: agriculture, éthique et sacrifice* (Paris: Collège de France, Institut des hautes études chinoises, 2005). See also Vincent Goossaert, "The Beef Taboo and the Sacrificial Structure of the Late Imperial Chinese Society," in Roel Sterckx, ed., *Of Tripod and Palate, Food, Politics, and Religion in Traditional China* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), 237-48. Goossaert records that, among many non-Muslim families, the only beef available would often have been meat left over from the biannual sacrifices to Confucius

chant networks that saw Muslims transport wool and livestock southward through the chain of Muslim communities in Sichuan for eventual sale. In Baoning, Muslims likely raised and presented the cattle needed for a variety of sacrifices, including those to the town's patron deity, the famed Shu 蜀 General Zhang Fei 張飛 (d. 221 CE). Zhang Fei was granted the title of "Great Sovereign Marquis Huan" (*Huanhou dadi* 桓侯大帝) in the wake of northern Sichuan's White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804)—an ascension which formally routinized presentation of meat offerings at his shrine.⁷⁰ Baoning's local culinary specialty, now termed "Zhang Fei Beef" (*Zhang Fei niurou* 張飛牛肉), was invented in the late eighteenth century by Baoning Muslims.⁷¹ Since Buddhist and Daoist ritual specialists were forbidden from performing blood sacrifices and Muslims were important participants in butchery, it is unsurprising that Muslim communities came to play such a prominent role in animal sacrifices for the imperial state cult. Muslims aligned their butchery with the needs of the imperial state cult so as to publicly legitimize the religious and economic needs of their own communities.

Though animal meat was needed for many popular rituals and the state cult, Chinese society was influenced by moral notions of karmic retribution for the killing of life, and officials often stressed the importance of cattle for agriculture.⁷² During droughts, county magistrates often issued bans on the slaughter of animals while instituting a fast of contrition (*jintu zhaijie* 禁屠齋戒) to encourage rainfall.⁷³ Archives from

(*dingji* 丁祭); beef was sometimes simply called *dingjirou* 丁祭肉. Ibid., 246. In much of Sichuan, this meat would have likely been provided by Muslim butchers.

⁷⁰ *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi*, 2:16-17.

⁷¹ He and Fan, *Langyuan xianjing*, 96-97.

⁷² According to Terry Kleeman, meat offerings were and "remain the dominant means by which the Chinese people interact with the sacred realm." Terry F. Kleeman, "Licentious Cults and Bloody Victuals: Sacrifice, Reciprocity, and Violence in Traditional China," *Asia Major* 7 (1994): 185. Daoism and Buddhism rejected blood sacrifice, but the sacrifice of animals was too deeply rooted to eradicate it. In ancient China, meat came to be associated with the official class, which was called *roushizhe* 肉食者 ("meat eaters"), and the gods, who mirrored the official class, were conceived as meat-eating. Hence, while ritual animal sacrifice remained important for the state cult and family rituals, most of China's organized religions distanced themselves from blood sacrifices with one notable exception: Muslims.

⁷³ For more on this subject, see Vincent Goossaert's work on Qing "morality books" (*shanshu* 善書): Vincent Goossaert, *Livres de morale révélés par les dieux* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012).

Sichuan's Nanbu 南部 county, under Baoning prefecture's jurisdiction in imperial times, and Chongqing's Ba 巴 county reveal that, when these bans were issued, exceptions for ritual purposes were sometimes granted for Muslim communities.⁷⁴ The reason for this was threefold. First, Muslim communities depended on butchery as a major source of their income.⁷⁵ Second, Muslim communities were bound to perform the ritual slaughter of animals on, for example, Eid al-Adha.⁷⁶ And third, in at least some regions, the imperial state often purchased its needed animals for sacrifices—pigs excepted—from Muslim communities like the one in Baoning.⁷⁷ We might even surmise that among the reasons abstaining from eating pork remains so important for Muslims in China is not simply because of a strict reading of Islamic law, but also because that precise status legally and ritually accorded Muslims their

⁷⁴ The Yongzheng Emperor took up this precise issue in 1729, when Beijing Muslims began spreading rumors that the ban on cattle slaughter could be ignored. Yongzheng pushed back against these rumors and re-issued the ban, citing the agricultural necessity of cattle. The imperial state could not publicly create a separate blanket policy for Muslims, and any room for maneuvering was found in ritual sacrifice, not commercial sale. The Emperor declared: "As for the needs of the present court, with the exception of the sacrifices conducted in accordance with precedent, we do not use beef for any other purposes" 今朝廷所需，除祭祀照例供用，其餘亦一概不用牛肉矣。Yongzheng's edict makes clear that the way around the ban for Muslims was to align their sacrificial needs with those of the imperial state. *Qingshilu: Yongzhengchao* 清實錄：雍正朝 (1936 rpt.; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 82: 91-2.

⁷⁵ Nanbu County Republican Archive: 13-2-2007-01 to 13-2-2007-06. This Republican-era file suggests Muslims had been customarily granted ritual exceptions for butchery by the state.

⁷⁶ From the Yuan dynasty, the imperial state has been aware of the distinctive requirements for the Muslim slaughter of animals. Qubilai forbid Muslims to slaughter animals in the Islamic fashion in an edict in 1280: Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988), 199-201. Such a ban was not re-issued during the Ming or Qing dynasties, when Islamic slaughter became integrated into wider Chinese life; today, the ubiquitous presence of *qingzhen* (Ar. *ḥalāl*) food branding is a legacy of this. Every year, on the days commemorating Qi Jingyi's birth and death, the Great Shrine in Linxia ritually slaughters thirty cattle and 300 lambs: Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 389.

⁷⁷ There is evidence for this practice having been quite widespread. For a lawsuit referencing Yunnanese Muslims participating in the Spring and Autumn sacrifices from 1800, see *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu qingzhensi ziliao xuanbian* 中國南方回族清真寺資料選編, ed. Chen Leji 陳樂基 (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2004), 333. A 1947 article in an Islamic periodical relates how the county government of Zhijiang 枝江 in Hubei province had banned Muslims from slaughtering both sacrificial and consumable cattle. *Hubei Huizu guji ziliao jiyao* 湖北回族古籍資料輯要, ed. Da Zhenyi 答振益 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2007), 108.

distinguished channel into the sacred realm and the state cult in imperial times.⁷⁸

Since their economic activities often stood in tension with imperial bans on animal slaughter, Muslim communities in Sichuan may have been targeted for discrimination by locals disturbed by the impurity or bad fortune associated with butchery. This may be one reason that Muslims in Sichuan, the Sufi shrine of Baoning included, routinely advertised their abilities in rain-making: that is, to counteract concerns that their participation in butchery hindered good rainfall. Admittedly, this could not have been the only motive, as Muslims in China are recorded as engaging in rainmaking in a wide range of contexts, including to attract converts to Islam.⁷⁹ Sources concerning the rain-making capabilities of mosques and Islamic clerics are particularly abundant for the Qing period. One Qianlong-era (1736-1795) episode from Sichuan's Peng 彭 county relates how after *ahong* (Pr. *akhünd*; Muslim religious leader) Zhang 張 wrote Qur'anic verses on stone tablets and threw them into a spring in the county town, rain fell from the skies.⁸⁰ Casting tablets in springs and pools for the summoning of rain was very common in Chinese popular religion by the late imperial period; the practice seems to have derived from the rare medieval rite of "casting dragon tablets"

⁷⁸ For a discussion of related themes in the PRC, see Maris Boyd Gillette, *Between Mecca and Beijing: Modernization and Consumption among Urban Chinese Muslims* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000). See also Tristan G. Brown, "Imagining Consumers: Print Culture and Muslim Advertising in Early Twentieth Century China," *The Muslim World* 3 (2014): 336-53.

⁷⁹ Ma Laichi, the Chinese disseminator of the Khufiyya Sufi network in China, was said to have successfully summoned rain before a Tibetan lama, gaining numerous converts in the process. Ma, *Zhongguo Yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilüe*, 163-64. It appears that many Sufi groups in northwest China engaged in rainmaking through the early twentieth century. Rain-making rituals were performed in Ningxia's Tongxin 同心 county through at least the late 1930s. Li Xinghua 李興華, "Weizhou yisilanjiao yanjiu" 韋州伊斯蘭教研究, *Huizu yanjiu* 回族研究 2 (2008): 87.

⁸⁰ The following passage was the most commonly cited Qur'anic verse for rain-making: And it is He (God) who sends down the rain after they had despaired and spreads His mercy, and He is the Protector, the Praiseworthy.
Wahuwa al-ladhīyunazzilu al-ghaytham ba'di ma qanaṭū wayanshuru rahmatahu, wa huwa al-waliyu al-hamīdu.

Al-Quran 42: 28. This verse appears on surviving examples of "Dragon Tablets." One specimen is displayed at the Yunnan Nationalities Museum in Kunming.

(*toulongjian* 投龍簡).⁸¹ The presiding magistrate, praising the efficacy of *ahong* Zhang's technique, presented the mosque with a dedication celebrating the community's achievement for obtaining rain for the county.⁸² Such episodes were evidently so common that local gazetteers and literati writings often simply took note of such practices without comment, as seen in the following description concerning a Muslim community also based in the southwest:

East of the provincial capital, approximately twenty *li* out of Aoxiu Gate, there is a Black Dragon cavern. The water of the cavern is clear, and it is said that there is a black dragon that coils there ('Coiled Dragon'). During times of extreme drought, if one fastens a tiger skull and brings it into the cavern, it is possible to summon rain. Moreover, there is a mosque there of the Muslims that possesses an iron placard; if the *ahong* of the mosque entreats the placard and inserts it into the cavern, rain will fall immediately.

⁸¹ The ancient practice of casting prayers inscribed on stone or metal into waterways was explored in great detail by Édouard Chavannes, who translated a ritual manual by Du Guangting's 杜光庭 (850-933). Édouard Chavannes, "Le jet des dragons," *Mémoires concernant l'Asie orientale*, Vol. 3, ed. E. Senart and H. Cordier (Paris: E. Leroux: 1919): 55-220. See also Shih-shan Susan Huang, "Daoist Visual Culture," in *Modern Chinese Religion I: Song-Liao-Jin-Yuan (960-1368 AD)*, ed. John Lagerwey and Pierre Marsone (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 986. Muslim popular writings on rain-making rituals can illuminate some of their underlining dynamics:

The Hui (Muslim) request for rain, in this case, required taking a dragon tablet into the pool.... Applied in the form of a tablet, during the rain-requesting rite, Allah's words open the door and defeat the ancient Chinese god of rain, the Dragon King. The next Rain Dragon is a Muslim.

Li and Luckert, *Mythology and Folklore of the Hui*, 197.

⁸² *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu qingzhensi ziliao xuanbian*, 59-60. The inscription reads as follows:

In Qianlong 32 (1767), a Gansu person, *ahong* Zhang, took up operations of the East Mosque. Because the area had been experiencing a drought for a long time, the land was cracking, and so *ahong* Zhang wrote Qur'anic verses on stone tablets and threw them into "Three-Eyed" spring north of the walled town. From the heavens fell welcome rain, and the county magistrate Xie Shengjin manifested a great admiration to Zhang and gifted our mosque with an inscribed board that read "[officials] with the people together witnessed [this talent]."

乾隆三十二年，甘肅人張阿訇在清真東寺住持教務，因內久旱無雨，田地裂口，張阿訇用選寫經文的石磚投入城北三眼泉；天降甘霖，使縣令謝生晉五體投地，並送匾一道，上書“與民共見”四字。

We may notice the detail that conveys how the Muslim *ahong* of Peng county visited a spring to the north of the walled town to summon rain. Accordingly, the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination was due north of Baoning's walled town.

省城之東，出鰲岫門二十里許，有黑龍潭。潭水清澄，相傳有黑龍蟠焉，極旱時，以繩繫虎顱入內，能致雨。又回教清真寺有鐵牌，其阿渾請之，插入潭，雲雨立致。⁸³

Reminiscent of the rain-making abilities of the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination, the description above of another Muslim “Coiled Dragon” site in Yunnan reveals a non-Muslim writer confirming the effectiveness of a Muslim community’s specific ritual practice for summoning rain-fall, even if the writer did not endorse Islam per se. More critically, the non-Muslim scholar observes that mosques were actively advertising these rain-making abilities.

Situated under the umbrella of Chinese popular religion, rain-making, in Jeffrey Snyder-Reinke’s words, operated “under the principles of magic.”⁸⁴ These principles were essential to the governance of a vast agrarian empire, where rainfall determined the fortunes of famine or bounty. Sites associated with “Coiled Dragons,” Xuanwu, or “Black Dragons” (*heilong* 黑龍) were thought to possess rain-making ability, and mosques and Islamic shrines established near such sites accordingly advertised their efficacious abilities to the broader Chinese public and the state.⁸⁵ These rain-making activities were neither simply customary arrangements nor local deviations from accepted *Sharī‘ah*-based orthodoxy: rain-making ceremonies were traditionally found across the Islamic world.⁸⁶ The great Islamic scholar of Yunnan, Ma Dexin 馬德新 (1794-1874), who would have witnessed a diverse spectrum of Islamic practices during his long journey for the Hajj in 1841, provides some insight into how these ceremonies were conceived of by Muslims in imperial China.⁸⁷ Through identifying select Chinese deities such as the Dragon King with Islamic jinn⁸⁸ and angels (Ar. *mala’ikah*), Ma Dexin

⁸³ *Yunnan shiliao congkan* 雲南史料叢刊, ed. Fang Guoyu 方國瑜 (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2001), 12.138.

⁸⁴ Snyder-Reinke, *Dry Spells*, 183.

⁸⁵ For more on the “Black Dragon King,” see Chau, *Miraculous Response*.

⁸⁶ For one of many examples, Sufis in Yemen were famous for their rain-making abilities. Alexander D. Knysh, *Ibn ‘Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam* (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1999), 228-29.

⁸⁷ Kristian Petersen has discussed Ma Dexin’s mapping of the Earthly Branches of Chinese cosmology onto the Islamic zodiac. Kristian Petersen, *Interpreting Islam in China: Pilgrimage, Scripture, and Language in the Han Kitab* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017), 184-85.

⁸⁸ Jinn, which in the work of Ma Dexin are translated as *shen* 神, refer to invisible beings created by God out of smokeless fire.

rationalized, though not directly endorsed, the ubiquitous practice of Muslim rain-making:

The Dragon is also the Spirit King of the water: wherever he goes, the wind turns to water; therefore, the movement of the Dragon will produce rain, but the traces and movements of spirits are difficult to fathom.... There are nine ranks of human [officials], just as there are nine ranks of angels.⁸⁹ Each angel his duty in carrying out the will of heaven, arranging for life and death, turning the celestial sphere, sending the sun and the moon, administering the wind and the clouds, managing the thunder and lightning, and sending great rains.

龍亦水中之神王也，所到之處，風化為水，故龍行必雨，而神化莫測... 人品有九，天仙之品亦有九，各司其職，傳行天命，辦理生死，運轉乾輪，送運日月，掌管風雲，司持雷電，降施雨雷。⁹⁰

We may take note here that Ma Dexin seamlessly mapped the hierarchy of angels in Islamic thought within the nine-ranks of the Chinese civil and celestial bureaucracy. Ma even identified the rain-making Chinese deity, the Dragon King, as the chief spirit for influencing rainfall. Unsurprisingly, ethnographic accounts of Chinese Muslim “folklore” collected by ethnographers in the 1950s spoke widely of “Muslim” Dragon Kings.⁹¹ To many Muslims in the late imperial period, Islam existed not simply in harmony with the classical Confucian textual tradition but, more importantly, was also compatible with the very cosmology that gave order and meaning to the imperial polity and its civil and celestial hierarchy. Muslims did not abandon fundamental tenets of monotheism while making religious and political sense of the deeply-rooted cosmological worldview around them, and many Muslims probably assumed that some of the deities worshipped by their non-Muslim neighbors—the Dragon King, Zhang Fei, and so on—were in actuality jinn or the angelic servants of the one “true” God. Muslims’ abilities to perform acts of *du‘ā*

⁸⁹) Classical Islamic texts frequently mention the existence of “seven” heavens (Ar. *Samāwāt*). Islamic interpretations differed on whether this was a literal number or simply a denotation of “many” heavens. Medieval Sufi thinkers, perhaps influenced by Ibn Sīnā (980–1037 CE), often referenced the existence of nine celestial spheres. Richard Todd, *The Sufi Doctrine of Man: Ṣadr Al-Dīn Al-Qūnawī’s Metaphysical Anthropology* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 71–73. The tradition of nine heavens was prevalent in Chinese Islam: Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light*, 27.

⁹⁰) Ma Dexin, *Sidian yaohui* 四典要會 (1858; rpt. Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1988), 24.

⁹¹) Li and Luckert, *Mythology and Folklore of the Hui*, 194–98.

(Ar. “invocation”) in supplicating the one God for angelic assistance were perceived by Muslim leaders as making their prayers and rituals uniquely efficacious within the diverse landscape of Chinese popular religion. Hence, Muslims presented lawsuits to the imperial state claiming that Islamic butchery was essential for the Confucian sacrifices and the state cult, while mosques advertised rain-making techniques directed towards their non-Muslim neighbors.

In sum, without deviating from core Islamic doctrines, Muslim communities across China’s western regions routinely participated in popular religious techniques, and it is clear that Muslim religious leaders—not simply laity—were the ones responsible for performing and endorsing efficacious rituals. Communities that conducted well-regarded, effective rituals could have those practices endorsed by imperial officials and incorporated into local governance.

This section has explored how the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination legitimized its transformation of a Daoist mountain into an Islamic pilgrimage site through engagement with Chinese popular religion and the state cult. This engagement wove the Islamic shrine into the local administration and ritual calendar of Baoning to meet the needs of a diverse local population. Evidence from the shrine and other mosques across Sichuan and beyond suggests that what facilitated this incorporation was not a rigorous intellectual defense of the tenets of Islam, as Ming-Qing Muslim intellectuals often imagined in their writings. Of course, miraculous deeds of the Qādiri saint that depicted the superiority of Islam over other traditions were found in Sufi hagiographies. But in the public record, the Sufi community of Baoning and Muslim communities elsewhere in the northwest and southwest advertised their participation in public practices like rain-making, ritual sacrifice, and *fengshui*—arenas that were not exclusively identified with Buddhism or Daoism. In other words, there was space in Chinese religion and cosmology for Muslim communities to creatively participate as imperial subjects without sacrificing fundamental monotheistic tenets of Islam. This engagement, far from directing their assimilation into the “Han,” enabled Muslims to remain Muslims while living and participating in Chinese society.

State Patronage for the Shrine

The diverse religious practices at the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination are reminiscent of some Sufi shrines in South Asia that incorporated non-Islamic symbols and terminology into their practices. Yet, unlike the dynamics of sainthood-kingship seen in South Asia from the time of the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) through the Mughal empire (1526-1857)—manifested in Akbar's (1542-1602) devotion to the Chishti Sufi group for instance—the Qing court did not patronize particular Islamic movements or Sufi groups.⁹² More accurately, Ming and Qing emperors, as non-Muslims, patronized specific mosques and shrines. Muslim communities often cited such patronage as proof of the imperial court's support for Islam or their particular spiritual lineage. Ancient mosques in Nanjing and Xi'an could be traced back to pivotal moments in the long history of Islam in China and attracted imperial favor over the centuries.⁹³ The degree of state patronage to the Islamic shrine of Baoning is all the more remarkable in light of the significant rebellions that took place in the northwest during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This section explores the factors that led the shrine to become so heavily patronized, identifying three key elements. First, the shrine managed to attract the attention of the Qing imperial family early in the dynasty; this in turn led to significant patronage by provincial and local officials. Second, as we have seen, the shrine made claims that it aided the locality in the examinations and rain-making; this was cited as a major reason for state patronage. Third, the conquest of Xinjiang, frontier military campaigns, and rebellions through the nineteenth century gave new incentives to patronize the institutions at which many Muslim soldiers worshipped. Of course, Muslim officials provided patronage as well.

Imperial patronage began shortly after the shrine was created in the late seventeenth century. In 1710, at the front entrance to the road

⁹² Muzaffar Alam, "The Mughals, the Sufi Shaikhs and the formation of the Akbari Dispensation," *Modern Asian Studies* 43 (2009): 135-74 and A. Azfar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012).

⁹³ Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, "The Marrano Emperor: The Mysterious Bond between Zhu Yuanzhang and the Chinese Muslims," in *Long live the Emperor: Uses of the Ming Founder Across Six Centuries of East Asian History*, ed. Sarah Schneewind (Minneapolis: Society for Ming Studies, 2007), 275-308. See also Nancy S. Steinhardt, "China's Earliest Mosques," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 67 (2008): 330-61.

leading up to the shrine, a Manchu Imperial Prince of the Blood to the Third Degree, titled the Right Chamberlain of the Imperial Clan (Zongrenfu youzongzheng Duoluo beile wang 宗人府右宗正多羅貝勒王), inscribed the phrase *Qingxiu* 清修 (“Quiet cultivation”) on a large wooden panel.⁹⁴ The term *Qingxiu* alluded to the ruling dynasty, the “Great Qing Empire” (*Da Qingguo* 大清國), as well as the religion of Islam (*qingzhenjiao*). This recognition from the imperial court began when a person identified as belonging to the Qiang 羌 people of the Songpan 松潘 region of Sichuan converted to Islam through the teachings of the Khoja. After he offered rare medicines to the imperial court, the Manchu Prince expressed his gratitude to the Qādirīyah by composing the shrine’s entrance panel, which announced the efficacy of the gifted medicines and endorsed the shrine as a place of authentic “cultivation” by the state.

Some scholars have argued that the existing documentation from the shrine and the *Imperially Ordained Comprehensive History of the Eight Banners* (*Qinding baqi tongzhi* 欽定八旗通志) reveals that the unnamed royal donor was Yanshou 延綬 (1670–1715), a second-generation member of the Prince Wen peerage (*Duoluo wenjunwang* 多羅溫郡王).⁹⁵ Yanshou’s rank and biography does correspond well with the title provided on the panel, and his identification as the donor lends another layer of meaning to the gift. Yanshou’s grandfather Hooqe (Haoge 豪格, 1609–1648) defeated the rebel armies of Zhang Xianzhong 張獻忠 (1606–1647) in Xichong 西充, a county in Northern Sichuan. Hooqe then returned to Baoning, where he appointed officials to posts for the interim provincial government based there before returning to Beijing, ultimately dying in prison the following year.⁹⁶ It is conceivable that Yanshou’s family retained a connection to northern Sichuan, the town of Baoning, or possibly even Coiled Dragon Mountain, where military encampments were located in the early Qing.

⁹⁴ Liu Xiancheng 劉先澄, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin* 閬苑：匾聯集錦 (Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe, 2010), 199–200.

⁹⁵ Ma Wenkui 馬文奎, “Sichuan babasi ‘qingxiu’ bianti kuankao” 四川閬中巴巴寺‘清修’匾題款考, *Zhongguo Musilin* 中國穆斯林 5 (2018): 46–48.

⁹⁶ Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2011), 17–18.




Figure 6: “Quiet Cultivation” (Qingxiu) Panel Bestowed by a Manchu Imperial Prince to the Shrine in 1710

Although precise documentation for this royal gift is scant in the central archives of Beijing or Taipei, there are further reasons to believe a member of the imperial family patronized the shrine. As we will shortly see, high-ranking Qing officials and local literati referenced the Manchu prince's patronage when bestowing their own gifts to the shrine in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In addition, this imperial patronage occurred shortly after Baoning had served as the provincial capital of Sichuan during the early years of the dynasty, and we may infer that this window, though brief, profoundly impacted the region for the rest of the Qing dynasty. No shrine of Baoning would have likely received such elite patronage had the provincial administration of Sichuan not been based there during the mid-seventeenth century. From the time of its construction, the shrine held regular offertory prayers and sacrifices for the emperor and the dynasty. One early panel of Baoning's Muslim community commemorating the celebration of Kangxi's thirtieth birthday praised the appropriate rites offered to the One God (*zhenzhu* 真主) as well as the correct obeisance given to the dynasty (*huangtu* 皇圖).⁹⁷ That is, even prior to the patronage of the imperial family in 1710, places of Muslim worship in Baoning were recognized as sites where offerings were made directly to the Qing emperors.

State support for the Khoja's shrine occurred at important junctures in imperial religious patronage broadly as well as the relationship

⁹⁷ The panel read: “[Our] dignified rites and special actions praise the One God and sages with unwavering sincerity. We bow our heads in obeisance to wish the dynasty longevity” 禮儀威儀贊主聖一誠不懈，稽首頓首祝皇圖萬壽無疆。Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 235.

between Muslims and the imperial state. In general, the early Qing saw a lessening of state support for Daoist cults like Zhenwu's, which had been greatly patronized by the Ming.⁹⁸ Early Qing officials may have seen good reason to permit the transfer of influence and territory from the Hall of the Perfected Warrior to the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination. More specifically, the Baoning shrine was constructed under the auspices of Qing officials precisely during the outbreak of Mongol Khan Galdan's (1644-1697) war with the Qing under the Kangxi Emperor in 1687.⁹⁹ The Kangxi Emperor, who stressed the geopolitical importance of Baoning for pacifying Sichuan and the west, believed that Galdan had converted to Islam and was explicitly courting "China's Muslims" to overthrow Manchu rule.¹⁰⁰ The Baoning shrine was not alone among Sufi shrines in claiming generous imperial support: at least one of Hezhou's central mausolea, aptly termed "The State Shrine" (Guogongbei 國拱北) was said to be established under direct orders of the Kangxi Emperor.¹⁰¹ The documentation of this state sponsorship is said to have been destroyed during the nineteenth-century Gansu uprisings, but we might consider the possibility that early Sufi movements in China, which arrived precisely in the wake of the Manchu conquest and expansion westward, found favor with Qing officials keen on stabilizing frontier regions. From this perspective, the 1710 royal donation to the Pavilion Lingerin Illumination may document an imperial acknowledgement of the roles that Sufi networks played in the consolidation of the early Manchu state along the empire's western frontier.

Not long after the Baoning shrine's construction, in 1694, Kangxi issued an imperial edict (*shengzhi* 聖旨) for the protection of Muslims across the country which, like the Hongwu Emperor's (1368-1398) edict praising the Prophet Muhammad at the start of the Ming dynasty, came to be displayed in many large mosques. Though conceived initially to

⁹⁸) For a discussion of the Ming court's patronage of Zhenwu, see Stephen Little and Shawn Eichman, ed., *Taoism and the Arts of China* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 291-311. See also Richard G. Wang, *The Ming Prince and Daoism: Institutional Patronage of an Elite* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012), 175.

⁹⁹) Galdan was a Dzungar-Oirat Khan with longstanding ties to Tibetan Buddhist and Muslim communities who emerged as a perceived threat to Manchu rule during Kangxi's reign. For more information, see Michael Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006), 211-12.

¹⁰⁰) Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009), 191.

¹⁰¹) Li and Ma, *Gansu Linxia menhuan diaocha*, 298-99.

warn Han officials against abusing Muslims in the capital, the imperial edict recognized that Islam inherently aimed to “propagate the *Dao* (Way),” which is a point Muslim authors writing in Chinese often stressed in efforts to legitimize their faith.¹⁰² The edict reads as follows:

I, the Emperor, have evaluated the ancient and present classics of the Han and the Muslims: both from the onset aim to propagate the Way. There are all kinds of sects (lit. “seventy-two”) for becoming an immortal or a Buddha that try to turn truth into heterodoxy. All kinds of illegal heresies thus appear. [The illegal heresies of] the past will not be punished; but those who again commit the same crime will be executed. The Han ministers and officials in various posts and duties receive their salaries on time from the Emperor, and at the designated times they have audiences at court. As for the Muslims, they praise the One God and sages five times every day, and even without eating my salaries, they know to repay their ultimate benefactor. In this regard, the Han are not comparable to the Muslims! Announce this edict to all the provinces: if there are officials or people who because of small matters and resentments bring false accusations that Muslims are plotting rebellion, the presiding official should execute them first and then alert the court. The Muslims Under Heaven all follow [the teaching] of *Qingzhen*, so they cannot be disobedient to the state; do not turn your backs to the favor of the Emperor who has shown his affection for the Way. This edict was composed personally by the Emperor and should be carried out [by officials] as such.

朕評漢回古今之大典，自始之宏道也。七十二門修仙成佛，誘真歸邪，不法之異端種種生焉。已往不咎，再違犯者斬。漢諸臣官分職，時享君祿，按時朝參；而回，逐日五時朝主拜聖，並無食朕俸，亦知報本，而漢不及於回也。通曉各省：如官民因小不忿，藉端虛報回教謀反者，職司官先斬後奏。天下回民各守清真，不可違命；勿負朕恩有愛道之意也。欽此欽遵。¹⁰³

Here, Kangxi conveys a fundamental point that should be kept in mind for the history of the Baoning shrine and beyond: though Muslims increasingly came to be legally distinguished as a distinct group within Chinese society in the second half of the eighteenth century, Islam was and remained through the end of the dynasty a legal, imperially-recognized “teaching.”¹⁰⁴ Such recognition was not granted by the court

¹⁰² Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad*, 163–213.

¹⁰³ *Zhongguo nanfang Huizu guji ziliao xuanbian buyi*, 173. In Hubei’s Wuchang Mosque, this edict was inscribed on a stone stele and placed directly next to an inscribed version of the Ming Hongwu Emperor’s “Hundred Character Eulogy” (*baizizan* 百字贊) for the Prophet Muhammad.

¹⁰⁴ The first statutory distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Qing law code was made in 1762, just three years after the Qing conquest of Xinjiang: Jonathan N. Lipman, “A Fierce and Brutal People’: On Islam and Muslims in Qing Law,” in *Empire at the Margins*:

lightly or commonly, as the experiences of numerous “illicit cults” (*yinci* 淫祠) and even Catholicism attest to.¹⁰⁵ Of course, there was no official consensus over the precise contours of Islamic orthodoxy within the imperial state, which generally preferred a strategic ambiguity regarding such details in public.¹⁰⁶ As such, emperors and officials bestowed favor through the patronage of mosques in local settings. In the late Kangxi reign in particular, there were several potential reasons—many related to geopolitical stability—for the court to support, directly or indirectly, the growth of pro-Qing Islamic institutions in the northwest. Further indicative of Kangxi’s support for Islamic institutions, Chinese Muslim records from the eighteenth century, like the *Huihui yuanlai* 回回原來 (*The Origin of Muslims*), explicitly depicted a close relationship between the Kangxi emperor and Muslim generals over the subject of Islam.¹⁰⁷

Imperial patronage for the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination further legitimized the shrine’s inheritance of Coiled Dragon Mountain’s efficacious powers in the eyes of locals. In the decades following the royal gift to the shrine in 1710, local gentry and officials contributed donations and dedications that celebrated the shrine’s geomantic powers and general significance. In 1727, a local who received the *juren* 舉人 degree contributed a dedication reading *Langfeng* 閩風, which in addition to denoting the “auspicious *qi* of Langzhong” (*Langzhong zhi fengqi* 閩中之風氣) is also the exact name for a summit of the Kunlun Mountains 崑崙山—a legendary location in Central Asia associated with the origin point of the great Dragon veins that stretched across the country in

Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Crossley et al. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2006), 94.

¹⁰⁵ Barend J. ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History* (Leiden: Brill, 1992). Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, “La trinité antichrétienne: essai sur la proscription du catholicisme en Chine, en Corée et au Japon (XVIIe - XIXe siècles)” (Ph.D. diss., École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2013). This is not to discount the fact that one Qing official, Lu Guohua 魯國華, petitioned—unsuccessfully—for the Yongzheng Emperor to ban Islam and the addition of discriminatory sub-statutes against Muslims in later decades: Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*, 97–98.

¹⁰⁶ For just one example of this lack of consensus on the ground in the northwest, see Haiyun Ma, “Fanhui or Huifan? Hanhui or Huimin?: Salar Ethnic Identification and Qing Administrative Transformation in Eighteenth-Century Gansu,” *Late Imperial China* 29 (2008): 1–36.

¹⁰⁷ Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, “Hijra and Exile: Islam and Dual Sovereignty in Qing China,” in *The Scaffolding of Sovereignty: Global and Aesthetic Perspectives on the History of a Concept*, ed. Zvi Ben-Dor Benite et al. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2017), 279–302.

Chinese cosmological thought. Readers will recall that Langzhong's gazetteer explicitly illustrated the Dragon vein of Coiled Dragon Mountain, which was thought to connect Baoning to the broader cosmology of the empire itself. During certain examination years, local scholars visited Coiled Dragon Mountain prior to the autumn examinations to supplicate for passing results at the shrine. During these visitations, provincial officials, including the Sichuan governor Ding Baozhen 丁寶楨 (1820–1886), celebrated the shrine's contributions to the moral cultivation of the town through gifts of calligraphy.¹⁰⁸

Literati explicitly celebrated the shrine's status as a site of imperial patronage and as the resting place of a great religious figure holding significance for the whole town. During the first half of the eighteenth century, one of Baoning's most esteemed Qing poets and local gentlemen, Xie Jialin 謝家麟 (1724 *juren*), who composed poems for the town's famous sites such as the Phoenix Tower (Fenghuanglou 鳳凰樓) and the Hall of the Perfected Warrior, wrote the following poetic description of the shrine later preserved in a local gazetteer. The author's word choice provides some insight into how the Khoja's shrine may have been popularly received by gentry in the eighteenth century:

This excellent cottage is built in a crevice of Coiled Dragon Mountain. It is said that this is the place where a transcendent's discarded bones rest.

His complexion glows in the *Qingxiu* ("Quiet Cultivation") panel bestowed by the imperial family.¹⁰⁹ The "Lingering Illumination" Pavilion opened when the transcendent obtained *tathatā* (Skt. "suchness").¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ On an auspicious day in 1875, the Assistant Instructor of Baoning prefecture's Guangyuan 廣元 county's Confucian academy contributed a dedication board reading, "Traces of the Transcendent of Coiled Dragon Mountain" (*Panlong xianji* 蟠龍仙蹟). Governor Ding Baozhen visited the shrine before the provincial exams of 1879 and bestowed an inscription that read: "Kind and Charitable Acts Can Be Models [for the People]" (*leshan kefeng* 樂善可風). Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 216.

¹⁰⁹ The "Forbidden Garden" (*jinyuan* 禁苑) refers to the abode of the Qing imperial family. From its first appearance in the *Shiji* 史記, it referred to the gardens attached to the imperial palace. *Shiji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 30.1425. By the Qing period, it was often employed metaphorically to refer to the palace and by extension the imperial family. For more on this word's usage in the Qing, see *Qingdai biji xiaoshuo leibian: Shixiangjuan* 清代筆記小說類編：世相卷, ed. Lu Lin 陸林 and Tang Huaquan 湯華泉 (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1994), 416–17.

¹¹⁰ For a discussion of this Buddhist concept of "suchness," see Jacqueline I. Stone, "The Contemplation of Suchness," in *Religions of Japan in Practice*, ed. George J. Tanabe, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1999), 199–209.

The top of the mountain has become a house of ancestral wisdom. The (transcendent's) written teachings remain here in bird script.¹¹¹

Let me send words to later worshippers: it is appropriate to speak of “profound emptiness” from this place.¹¹²

蟠龍曲處構精廬，云是仙人蛻骨居。

顏煥清修頒禁苑，亭開久照獲真如。

雲根已作靈根宅，手跡猶存鳥跡書。

寄語後來崇奉者，好從此地語玄虛。¹¹³

In this dedication, Xie Jialin uses Daoist and Buddhist imagery to refer to the resting place of Khoja ‘Abd Allāh while noting that a Manchu Imperial Prince had patronized the site—a reference to the aforementioned 1710 inscription, *Qingxiu*. Such a distinguished inscription from the imperial family was not present at any other religious institution in the county or the prefecture and raised the profile of the shrine. Most importantly, this dedication provides insight into how the mountain shrine was seen by local gentry, who had long been aware of the mountain's connections to the early Daoists, court astrologers, and elite geomancers such as Yuan Tiangang.¹¹⁴ To the literati of the region, the Khoja was another teacher in the great and ancient intellectual heritage of Baoning: in Xie's poem, the “cottage” grave of the Khoja evoked the past residences and resting places of the great astrologers who were associated with the mountain.

¹¹¹ In the Spring and Autumn Period (771–476 BCE), Bird Script (*niaozhuan* 鳥篆) was a seal script that took the form of birds. Rong Geng 容庚, “Niaoshu kao 鳥書考,” *Yanjing xuebao* 燕京學報 16 (1934): 195–203. In his famous poem, “On Visiting Mount Tai” (You Taishan 游泰山), the Tang poet Li Bai encounters an immortal on the mountain who bequeaths him writing composed in Bird Script, which the poet observes is challenging to read. Li Bai's poem was likely alluded to here by Xie Jialin and may have served as an oblique reference to the beautiful Arabic calligraphy ascribed to the saint at the shrine.

¹¹² The poet juxtaposes two concepts—one Buddhist, *zhenru* 真如, and one Daoist, *xuanxu* 玄虛—in order to convey the essence of the transcendent's teachings.

¹¹³ *Langzhong lidai shicixuan* 閩中歷代詩詞選, ed. Yang Linyou 楊林由 (Yili: Yili renmin chubanshe, 2001), 200.

¹¹⁴ Many local gifts stressed the shrine's Daoist and popular religious elements. In 1743 for instance, Langzhong's county magistrate Wang Wenhuan 王文煥 financed the repair of one of the shrine's doorways, over which he wrote, in reference to the shrine's association with rain-making, “The flowers and rains emit fragrance” (*huayu chuixiang* 花雨吹香). In 1752, a Daoist named “the Old Man of Nanqu” (*Nanqu laoren* 南渠老人) praised the qualities of the “cloudy forest” (*yunlin* 雲林) of the shrine in running script (*xingshu* 行書). Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 191.




Figure 7: A Chinese and Manchu Dedication from the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination (1850)

Many of the literary sources hitherto discussed are dated from the eighteenth century. Elite patronage continued well into the nineteenth century, even during the Muslim uprisings of that era. Sources from this time tend to more explicitly reference the shrine's Islamic identity than those of earlier periods.¹¹⁵ Donations included a number of prominent Manchu-language gifts, which came from Banner elites during public celebrations at the shrine. One Manchu-Chinese bilingual dedication, created in 1850, was presented to the shrine by an officer named Su Hengfu 蘇恆甫. The dedication reads in Manchu as *Bolgo jengge* (Ma. "Pure Truth")¹¹⁶ alongside its Chinese counterpart, *jingzhen* 淨真, which denotes Islam as an alternative rendering of *qingzhen* 清真.¹¹⁷ This suggests that Banner elites in the mid-nineteenth century were aware of the site's Islamic identity and even celebrated it. Qing officials continued to patronize the shrine throughout periods of unrest to convey the state's continued support for the elements of the Muslim community that had not joined the fighting.

¹¹⁵ Records from Langzhong's 1851 county gazetteer show that in the years before and during the Muslim rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century, the structure was called for a time the *Huizisi* 回子寺, which we might render as "the Muslim Temple." *Xianfeng Langzhong xianzhi, yutu* section: 1-6. This title does not appear in eighteenth-century records.

¹¹⁶ For a discussion of *bolgo* in its Manchu context; see Jonathan Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing Rule* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2017), 121-22.

¹¹⁷ Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 201-2. In it, Su Hengfu ascribed his promotion to Provincial Military Commander of Sichuan to the Khoja's miraculous intervention.

Another example of a significant dedication from Banner officials related to a military campaign in Xinjiang occurred following the Aqtaghliq Rebellion by the exiled Jahangir of Kokand, who established a temporary state in Kashgar between 1820 and 1828.¹¹⁸ The Aqtaghliqs, popularly known as the “White Mountaineers” (*Baishanpai* 白山派) were a faction of political Sufis who struggled for influence in the Tarim Basin during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹¹⁹

In 1828, following the Qing victory over Jahangir, a ceremony was held at the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination to commemorate the loss of twenty-six Green Standard soldiers during the military campaign against the Sufi-led state in Kashgar.¹²⁰ High-ranking imperial officials left their names in the following inscription, the first part of which is found below:

Universally Merciful.

Grand Guardian of the Imperial Heir Apparent, “Flaunting Strength” General, Grand Secretary of the Literary Flower Hall and the Great General of Yili, Chang[ling] (長齡 1759-1839; Mongol Plain White bannerman).

Grand Guardian of the Imperial Heir Apparent, Grand Minister Consultant, First-Ranking Baron, the Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu, Warrior of Strength and Courage, Yang [Yuchun] (楊遇春 1761-1837).

Grand Guardian of the Imperial Heir Apparent, Grand Minister Consultant (Ma. Hebei Amban), Governor of Shandong province, Decorated Warrior, Wu[longa] (武隆阿 d.u.-1831; Manchu Plain Yellow banner).

¹¹⁸ For a discussion of this rebellion, see James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007), 112-15.

¹¹⁹ David Brophy has recently revised our understandings of “White Mountaineers” and “Black Mountaineers” under Qing rule by showing how they referred to a schism that emerged in the wake of Khoja Āfāq’s death rather than two distinct traditions. David Brophy, “Confusing Black and White: Naqshbandi Sufi Affiliations and the Transition to Qing Rule in the Tarim Basin,” *Late Imperial China* 39 (2018): 22-65. For more on the differences between the two groups, see Alexandre Papas, *Soufisme et politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan: étude sur les Khwajas Naqshbandis du Turkestan oriental* (Paris, Jean Maisonneuve, 2005).

¹²⁰ Writings by the guests of William Cassels (1858-1925), who founded a branch of the China Inland Mission in Baoning, described the Sufi shrine as a Muslim “seminary” and assumed, in light of its state patronage, that it was the resting place of a decorated Qing general. W.L. Pruett, *The Provinces of Western China* (London: A. Holness, 1906), 190. Such impressions were not completely mistaken as several Muslim generals and officials were buried around the shrine, but their misinterpretation of the shrine’s actual purpose underscores the degree to which the site was associated, even by foreigners, with martial and military power during the Qing.

普慈。太子太保揚威將軍文華殿大學士伊犁將軍長、太子太保參贊大臣一等男陝甘總督勁勇巴圖魯楊、太子太保參贊大臣山東巡撫阿勒精阿巴圖魯武。¹²¹

These military officials, who had led Qing military contingents in Xinjiang, here commemorated the fallen Muslim soldiers from Baoning who had fought on behalf of the Qing. In addition to the loss of life, we cannot dismiss the potential symbolism in these commemorations: the shrine was administered by the Qādirīyah, which claimed spiritual descent, via Qi Jingyi, directly from Khoja Āfāq—the ancestor of the “White Mountaineers” who militarily occupied Kasghar in the 1820s. The limitations of our hagiographic and dedicatory sources preclude any stronger conclusions regarding whether Qing officials were aware of these connections, but we should countenance the possibility that the officials were celebrating a “legitimate” branch of Islam against elements that were perceived to threaten imperial rule. At the same time, the existence of sources like this suggests that imperial officials were aware of the Qing military’s reliance on Muslim soldiers, particularly in the western regions.

Records of the Baoning shrine through the nineteenth century reveal certain patterns in imperial patronage. From the beginning of the Qing dynasty through the end of the nineteenth century, members of the imperial family, high-ranking Manchu and Mongol bannermen, and provincial governors recognized the importance of the shrine and endowed it with an impressive level of support. While sometimes this patronage was inspired by efficacious rituals or the shrine’s auspicious location, by the nineteenth century, patronage increasingly highlighted the site’s connection with Islam and its relevance to Muslim soldiers who populated Qing frontier military garrisons in regions like Xinjiang. It may be that official invectives against “new teaching” Sufis were in fact met by augmented official support for some Muslim institutions that allied with the Qing state, which appears to have been instrumental for the early establishment of some Sufi networks in the country. Some of this

¹²¹ Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 211–13. Many of the Banner officials mentioned in this dedication are discussed in detail in Laura J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, 1760–1860* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 106–17. “Universally Merciful” is the Chinese translation of *Ar-Rahīm*, one of the ninety-nine names of God in Islam. Ma Zhu discusses the meaning of this name and its Chinese translation: Ma, *Qingzhen zhinan*, 284–85.

support came from Muslim officers and generals, but a remarkable amount came from non-Muslims. It is also possible that the rebellions in the northwest and southwest led to increased state monitoring of Sichuan's Muslims specifically, who lived between the two regions. As the case study of the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination is but one window into this complex social history, future scholarship will have to draw out the implications of this for understanding the nineteenth-century histories of the western frontiers.

Conclusion

The history of the Sufi shrine on Coiled Dragon Mountain began in the wake of the devastation wrought by the Ming-Qing transition in the seventeenth century. A Khoja of the Qādirīyah Sufi path arrived in Baoning just after that conflict, when the town had served as the temporary administrative capital and examination center of Sichuan province. Through impressing local scholars with his knowledge of astrology, *fengshui*, and medicine, the Khoja was able to secure a valuable mountain in the town for the Qādirīyah, which in turn helped the area recover financially through Muslim merchant investment. The shrine attracted official recognition—including support from the imperial court itself—which in turn led to more patronage over time from military officers, civil officials, and local gentry. A survey of the surviving archival documents, local records, and dedicatory gifts to the shrine reveals that, at various points in the shrine's history, widely recognized efficacious powers, such as rain-making, were essential to its survival and success. By the High Qing's eighteenth century, the mountain bore connections to Tang dynasty lore, Ming dynasty town planning, and Manchu cosmopolitanism. Under the management of a large Sufi network, the mountain's carefully-cultivated backstory, channeled along a critical administrative and transport node of the vast Qing empire, enabled Daoist sages to remain celebrated there, even as a Muslim saint became the central focus of popular devotion.

By the end of the dynasty in 1912, the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination, a Muslim Sufi shrine, boasted more official gifts and dedications than any other religious structure in the entirety of Baoning prefecture,

in spite of the fact that the vast majority of the prefecture's population was non-Muslim.¹²² The wealth of its great collection of official gifts could even rival the most famous Buddhist temples and Daoist abbeys of the provincial capital in Chengdu. How was the shrine so successful in becoming what locals sometimes simply called the “Temple of Bao-ning”? We can conclude that the shrine's power came from Muslims' appeals to the long and rich cultural heritage of the region dating from well before its founding as well as its ability to take advantage of the politics of empire during the Qing, from the dynasty's early decades under the Kangxi Emperor to its collapse in the early twentieth century. In fact, many mosques in late imperial China received generous support and recognition from officials of the imperial state.¹²³ Future research should investigate how such patronage compared in scale and frequency with Buddhist and Daoist institutions, but for now we might speculate that it may have been Muslims' concerns in evading labels of heterodoxy that galvanized frequent appeals to imperial authorities to recognize the legitimacy of their mosques and religious institutions.

In spite of its mass appeal, the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination was a thoroughly Islamic site: it held the tomb of a great Sufi saint, the graves of many prominent Muslims, and the gifts of high-ranking Qing officials who were, to varying degrees, aware of the shrine's legal guardianship by a Muslim community, and some of whom were Muslims themselves. The findings here should in no way undercut the shrine's Islamic identity, and readers should bear in mind that an analysis of marriage rites, funerary rituals, or *dhikr*¹²⁴ recitations among Qādirī adherents surely evidence that more recognizably Islamic practices took place there as

¹²²) This is not a conjecture. It is well-known today that the Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination has more official dedications than any other structure in the area: Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 187–230. Liu Xiancheng has specifically written: “The place in Langyuan (Langzhong) with the richest collection of inscribed wooden boards is the famous Pavilion of Lingerin Illumination of the Shrine of the Wiseman (*Babasi*)” 閬苑匾聯最富集的一處名勝巴巴寺之久照亭. Liu, *Langyuan: Bianlian jijin*, 3.

¹²³) Tristan G. Brown, “Muslim Networks, Religious Economy, and Community Survival: The Financial Upkeep of Mosques in Late Imperial China,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 2 (2013): 241–66.

¹²⁴) *Dhikr* (Ar. “mentioning” or “remembrance”) is a devotional act of silent or vocalized glorification of God.

well.¹²⁵ But the body of evidence concerning the ways in which the shrine presented itself to the wider community and the ways in which diverse authors wrote about it suggests that, over its history, while doctrinally sanctioned Islamic practices mattered sometimes, at other times, rain-making, local history, *fengshui*, or animal sacrifices mattered more, varying tremendously with context. This is not to overlook the branches of Islamic thought in many parts of the world that encompassed miraculous and unorthodox practices; indeed, it is likely that the distinctly accommodating nature of Sufism was partially responsible for the degree of integration seen in Baoning.¹²⁶ The point in concluding here is to say that Islam in China was still Islam, and that it remained so precisely by becoming a local, popular, and ultimately, an imperially-recognized, religion.¹²⁷

There is no doubt that the powerful capabilities of the shrine addressed the concerns of non-Muslim residents and that this in turn gave Muslims enlarged roles in the ritual life of the region. This is not to say that inter-community tensions were unknown in Baoning, nor to suggest that the Muslim uprisings of the nineteenth century should be easily dismissed; the critical point is to rather suggest that such violence was not singularly representative of the nuanced historical relationship between Muslims and the imperial state—manifested through archival records of everyday life, from celebrations of examination success to commemorations of soldiers slain in the service of the state. Here, the Baoning shrine may be less exceptional than it may at first seem: many of the attendant popular religious practices performed at the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination were not unique to the Sichuan Sufi community or the Qādirīyah. Local expressions of Islam that proliferated across China were recognized and patronized by the imperial state, which had

¹²⁵ Guangtian Ha's research provides great insight into devotional practices among the Sufis in China's northwest today: Guangtian Ha, "Dialectic of Embodiment: Mysticism, Materiality, and the Performance of Sufism in China," *Performing Islam* 3 (2014): 85-101.

¹²⁶ Shahab Ahmed, *What is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2015).

¹²⁷ Eugenio Menegon's discussion of Christianity as a "local religion" in China highlights the use of divinatory practices by Catholic friars, who were sometimes patronized by non-Christians: Eugenio Menegon, *Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Asia Center, 2009), 229-30. For his discussion of the community's relationship to *fengshui* in Fujian prior to and after 1860, see *ibid.*, 361-62.

many reasons to do so. A number of key patterns emerge from the shrine's archival collection: the overlapping of pilgrimage and trade routes, the links between mosques and the Green Standard army, and the intricate connections between Muslim meat-markets, state sacrifices, and prayers for rain. These patterns, seen in Baoning and beyond, suggest that Muslims were constantly adapting Islam to address the intertwined political, religious, commercial, and legal forces that shaped late imperial Chinese society.

This evidence also improves our understanding of the Qing state's complex relationship to Islam. Throughout all the public records and inscriptions examined in this article, several key words were noticeably seldom mentioned: the Qādirīyah, the name of Khoja 'Abd Allāh, or the Prophet Muhammad. These were found in the religious texts and hagiographies of the Qādirīyah. But seldom did local officials or gentry appear interested or even aware of the precise affiliation of the shrine, or even the identity of the person interred in it. Official knowledge of what precisely constituted Islamic orthodoxy was limited. When questions regarding the affiliation of mosques and Muslim tombs arose, it is likely that official understandings of Islam did not extend much further than the division between "old teaching" and "new teaching," just as official perceptions of Sufi alliances in Central Asia were defined by an oversimplified "White Mountaineer" and "Black Mountaineer" binary, as David Brophy has recently shown. Indeed, it may be that imperial Muslim civil and military officials were agents of great power in this dynamic as cultural translators and mediators between Muslim communities and state institutions.

For now, we can conclude that the Qing did not specifically patronize the Qādirīyah's version of Islam; it patronized a shrine that had specific relevance and importance to a geopolitically important area. Patronage had an uncanny ability to beget more patronage, as newly deployed officials to the region wished to add their names to an institution that a Manchu prince had once praised. The practice of supporting specific religious institutions appears to be a continuation from previous dynasties, when courts occasionally recognized the importance of particular mosques. Such an approach gave the imperial state flexibility to periodically adjust the administration of diverse Muslim communities living across the Qing empire. This is not to deny that popular attitudes to

Islam likely shifted somewhat over the course of the dynasty, as the changing geo-political conditions of the empire sometimes contributed to a less tolerant atmosphere on the ground. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination received official patronage through the end of the Qing—by non-Muslim officials who bestowed it with gifts of praise and by Muslim soldiers and officers who served the dynasty through its final days.

These findings also enrich our understandings of global Sufism, which as scholars have noted, found creative ways to speak to non-Muslims in regions where Sufis sought to spread Islam. Just as Sufi shrines in South Asia made room for Hindu practices, Sufi shrines in China protected *fengshui*, secured good examination results, and facilitated bountiful rainfall. Strategies used by Muslims elsewhere to propagate Islam into non-Muslims regions were evident in China. Though Ming-Qing Muslim intellectuals such as Wang Daiyu 王岱輿 (c. 1590-1658)¹²⁸ envisioned Muslims as winning heavy intellectual debates against their Buddhist and Daoist neighbors through the teachings of the Prophet and the Qur'an, archival records show that Islam was very successful in the late imperial period in publicly situating itself along an important spectrum of Chinese religious practice—rainmaking, animal sacrifices, and *fengshui*—that was not explicitly dominated by Buddhists or Daoists. In other words, while generally enjoying the imperial state's relative tolerance for their minority faith—established during the Ming and Qing through the edicts of strong emperors, Hongwu and Kangxi, each ruling towards the beginning of the dynasties—Muslims made their rituals, trades, markets, shrines, and tombs legible and relevant for the broader communities they lived in.¹²⁹

As an important point for further research, we may observe that although Islam may have never found its way into the ruling imperial ideology of the Manchu emperors, in some regions of China it did integrate into the practice of the state cult on the county, prefectural, and provincial levels.¹³⁰ This involved the willing participation of both Mus-

¹²⁸) Scholars have ascribed a range of dates for the life of Wang Daiyu. Here, I have followed Kristian Petersen's dating. Petersen, *Interpreting Islam in China*, 62.

¹²⁹) James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1998).

¹³⁰) Pamela Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*

lims and the imperial state. Islam did not have to be perfectly incorporated into the elite governing ideology of the Qing in order to be deemed broadly compatible with the ancient imperial cosmology of sacrifices, examinations, calendars, astrology, *fengshui*, medicine, rain-making, and the general social order as an imperially-recognized *jiao* (“teaching”), capable of, in Kangxi’s own words, “propagating the Way.”¹³¹ This imperial cosmology was flexible and diverse in its own right, and Muslims clearly advertised their contributions to its component fields while stressing key historical moments involving the imperial recognition of Islam.¹³² This was done by Muslims not out of a desire for “assimilation” into the broader culture but rather to maintain their distinct identity and promote their interests while carving out property claims, engaging in trade, and performing ritual services.

The movements and ideologies of the twentieth century have obscured much of the history conveyed here. Today, few Muslims in the region wish to emphasize the shrine’s historical connections to *fengshui* or rain-making, in no small part because the Chinese state ceased to endorse those practices with the collapse of the imperial system. During the Republican period (1912–1949), resident Protestant missionaries in Baoning explicitly targeted Muslims for conversion, leading local authorities to perceive the two communities as practicing potentially related “foreign” religions. A local government survey from 1935 classified the shrine and other mosques as “churches” (*jiaotang* 教堂) alongside Christian institutions.¹³³ After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination was deemed a national heritage site of the Hui *minzu* 民族 (“state-recognized ethnic

(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 44. Pamela Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” *Late Imperial China* 11 (1990): 1–35.

¹³¹ Richard J. Smith, *Mapping China and Managing the World: Culture, Cartography and Cosmology in Late Imperial Times* (London: Routledge, 2013).

¹³² Islamic contributions to Chinese sciences, including astrology and medicine, were and are well-recognized for the Mongol Yuan period (1271–1368). Kiyoshi Yabuuchi, “The Influence of Islamic Astronomy in China,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 500 (1987): 547–59.

¹³³ Langzhong Municipal Archive: 345.758.04. This phenomenon was not limited to Muslims in Baoning, as mosques across China in the early twentieth century often became labeled as “churches.” *Minzu wenti wenxian huibian* 民族問題文獻匯編, 1921.7–1949, ed. Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhanbu 中共中央統戰部 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 393.

minority group"). During the Cultural Revolution, an *ahong* saved the shrine from destruction by writing the phrase "Long Live Chairman Mao" (*Mao Zhuxi wanshou wujiang* 毛主席萬壽無疆) on the front entrance of the tomb. From the 1980s onwards, the shrine has regained prominence in the locality. In 2013, the Chinese state recognized the area around the shrine as an unusually well-preserved national forest (Langzhong Panlongshan guojia senlin gongyuan 閬中盤龍山國家森林公園), an oblique official nod to the *fengshui* that was once protected by the mountain shrine.¹³⁴ Today, although locals know of Coiled Dragon Mountain as an important site, not everyone knows about its Islamic history. For some locals, especially Muslims, the tomb remains one of the most important sites in a vast Islamic pilgrimage network. But for many, the shrine and its mountain are simply proud symbols of the town, which is increasingly keen on developing tourist infrastructure. Immediately adjacent to the newly-created national park is the largest public cemetery (*gongmu* 公墓) in the area—with the priciest grave plots in the municipality, for both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

The shrine's continued local relevance is a living legacy of the remarkable ability of Baoning's Muslims to weave it into the fabric of the ritual, administrative, and cultural life of imperial China. While its complex history is but the story of a single site in the Qing empire, there were thousands of "Coiled Dragon" mountains scattered across the "Nine Provinces Under Heaven" (*Tianxia jiuzhou* 天下九州; "China") just as there were hundreds of Sufi tombs dotting the landscape of the western frontier. The massive challenges facing Muslims today in their relation to the Chinese state make it imperative for scholars to excavate the common languages that once made communication possible. While images of the violent uprisings of the nineteenth century have colored impressions of Chinese Islam since scholarly interest in the subject first arose in the West,¹³⁵ it may be that the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination, which survived those uprisings intact when so many other Sufi shrines of the northwest did not, provides us with a far more prosaic—and rep-

¹³⁴) The character *pan* 盤 is today used more often than *pan* 蟠, which was more common in imperial times.

¹³⁵) The earliest book-length treatise on Islam in China, which contains extensive reporting on the rebellions, is Marshall Broomhall's 1910 volume. Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China: A Neglected Problem* (London: Morgan & Scott, 1910).

representative—window into what Islam's historical practice in China looked like on the ground.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, Matti Zelin, Jianping Wang, Jonathan Lipman, David Brophy, Myron Cohen, Kristian Petersen, Mahmood Kooria, Tiffany Cone, Adam Chau, Joe McDermott, David McMullen, Richard Smith, Stephan Feuchtwang, Hans van de Ven, Roel Sterckx, Cécile Wang, Justin Winslett, Charles Aylmer, Haiyun Ma, Włodzimierz Cieciora, Andrea Janku, Lars Laamann, Sixiang Wang, Alex Statman, Huiyi Wu, Danni Cai, Daniel Burton-Rose, Yanjie Huang, Sungoh Yoon, John Chen, Guy St Amant, Emily Dawes, two anonymous reviewers, as well as the participants in a 2016 Islam in China Workshop at Harvard University, including Noriko Yamazaki-Unno, Jomo Smith, Eric Schluessel, Hale Eroglu Sager, and Joshua Freeman, for their help improving this paper. All errors are my own.

Abstract

Near the beginning of the Qing dynasty (1636-1912), the mausoleum of a Sufi saint, the Pavilion of Lingering Illumination, was constructed on an ancient Daoist mountain in the town of Baoning, Sichuan province. Over the following centuries, the shrine became one of the most heavily patronized religious sites in the province. There, state officials oversaw rain-making rituals, local gentry supplicated for success in the civil examinations, and Manchu bannerment bestowded dedications celebrating the empire's military campaigns in Xinjiang. While Qing officials recognized it as an Islamic site, many of the town's residents treated it like any other Chinese shrine, emphasizing its connections to the region's *fengshui* and its efficacy for rain-making. Through exploring the shrine's history, this article provides a new window into Islam as a "local religion" in China, a survey of the flexible religious contours of the imperial state, and a richer understanding of Qing patronage for the institutions of minority groups. It argues that this Islamic site played a central role in the wider social life and governance of the area.

Résumé

Au début de la dynastie des Qing (1636-1912), le mausolée d'un saint soufi, le pavillon de l'Illumination persistante, a été construit sur une ancienne montagne taoïste de la ville de Baoning dans la province du Sichuan. Au cours des siècles suivants, la tombe est devenue l'un des sites religieux les plus fréquentés de la province. Au sanctuaire, les fonctionnaires de l'État supervisaient les rituels de prière pour la pluie, les élites locales suppliaient les saints pour la réussite aux examens civils, et les hommes des bannières mandchoues décernaient des dédicaces célébrant les campagnes militaires au Xinjiang. Alors que les fonctionnaires des Qing reconnaissaient la nature islamique du site, de nombreux habitants de la ville ont souligné les liens du site avec le *fengshui* de la région et son efficacité pour la production de pluie. Ce site islamique a joué un rôle central dans la vie sociale et politique de la région. En explorant l'histoire du sanctuaire, cet article ouvre une nouvelle fenêtre sur l'islam en tant que religion locale en Chine, mène une enquête sur la politique religieuse pragmatique de l'État impérial et offre une meilleure compréhension du patronage de l'État Qing envers les institutions des groupes minoritaires.

提要

久照亭 —— 一位伊斯蘭教蘇非派聖徒的陵寢 —— 在清朝前夜建造於四川保寧的一座古代道教名山。在之後幾個世紀中，這一祠廟成為了該省最受資助的宗教場所之一。政府官員在此觀看降雨儀式，本地精英在此祈求科舉成功，滿洲旗人則在此授予貢品以慶祝帝國對新疆的武功。儘管清朝官員意識到這裡是穆斯林場所，許多本地居民卻將之與任何其他的中國祠廟視若等同，強調其與地域風水的聯繫以及其降雨的成效。通過探究這一祠廟的歷史，本文提供了將伊斯蘭教視為中國“本土宗教”的新視角，對靈活多變的帝國宗教景觀的觀察，以及關於清朝如何資助少數群體機構的更豐富的理解。本文認為，這一穆斯林場所所在該地域更廣泛的社會生活和統治管理中扮演了中心角色。

Keywords

Islam in China – Sufism – Daoism – *Fengshui* – Sichuan province – Rain-making – Qing dynasty