These are really the thoughts of all men in all ages and lands, they are not original with me. If they are not yours as much as mine, they are nothing, or next to nothing.—Walt Whitman.

THE purpose of this chapter is methodological, and mainly to suggest that the anthropologist is rather too much inclined to consider the peculiarities of "primitive people—Naturvölker—in isolation, neglecting the possibility or probability that these peculiarities may not be of local origin, but may represent only provincial or peripheral survivals of theories held by some or all of the more sophisticated communities from which the primitive peoples may have declined.

The first example will be that of the belief of some Pacific and Australian peoples in a spiritual paternity. The subject is so well known to anthropologists that it will suffice to cite from a recent article by Dr. M. F. Ashley Montagu, who remarks that "practically everywhere in Australia . . . intercourse is associated with conception, but not as a cause of conception or childbirth. . . . The belief is rather that a spirit-child has entered into her . . . it is the official doctrine of spiritual conception that looms largely in their thinking . . . intercourse serves to prepare the woman for the entry of the spirit-child." Further, with reference to Roheim's data, Professor Montagu remarks that "it would seem probable that until the native is initiated into the social interpretation of the

nature of things he is under the impression that intercourse is closely connected with childbirth; when, however, he has been initiated into the *traditional teachings* he discovers his former elementary knowledge to have been incomplete, and he gradually shifts the emphasis from a belief in material reproduction to one in favour of spiritual reproduction."

In these citations mark the words "associated with . . . but not as a cause," "official doctrine," and "traditional teachings." Before we proceed further it should be noted that it is evidence of a rather considerable intellectual development to be able to distinguish a post hoc from a propter hoc, concomitance from causation. Nor is this by any means the only available evidence of the "intellectuality" of the Australian aborigines. But are they any more likely than any other peoples to have invented, in any datable sense, their own "official doctrines"? Or should an explanation of such phenomena as the universality of the Symplegades motive be sought in the motion of the "common denominator"? One might as well try to account for the cognate forms of words in related languages as to try to explain the distribution of cognate ideas in that way!

The Pacific doctrine of spiritual conception is anything but an isolated phenomenon. For example, it is explicitly stated in the Buddhist canonical literature that three things are necessary for conception: the union of father and mother, the mother's period, and the presence of the Gandharva<sup>3</sup>—the divine and solar Eros. The Gandharva here corresponds to the divine Nature that Philo calls "the highest, elder and true cause" of generation, while the parents are merely concomitant causes; and to Plato's "ever-productive

Nature "5 and to St. Paul's "Father" ex quo omnis paternitas in coelis et terra nominatur.6 It would be difficult to distinguish these formulations from that of the Australian aborigines with their initiatory "official doctrine" in which sexual intercourse is associated with conception, but not as its cause. would be equally difficult to distinguish the Australian from Aristotle's doctrine that "Man and the Sun" generate man,"8 or from Dante's designation of the Sun,7 a pregnant light, as "the father of each mortal life," whose reglowing rays enable each to say, Subsisto.9 These formulations, in turn, correspond to those of the Satapatha Brāhmana where it is inasmuch as they are "kissed," that is breathed upon, by the Sun7 that each of the children of men can say "I am" (asmi) or, in the Commentator's words, "acquires a self."10 Again, the Australian distinction of the mediate from the first cause of conception is closely paralleled in the Jaiminiya Upanişad Brāhmaņa: "When the [human] father thus emits him as seed into the womb, it is really the Sun<sup>7</sup> that emits him as seed into the womb . . . thence is he born, after that seed, that Breath."11 One cannot, indeed, distinguish him "who puts the seed in plants, in cows, in mares and in women "12 from Dante's "Sun," or from the "fertility spirit " of the " primitives."

In greater detail, "Say not, 'From semen,' but 'from what is alive' [therein]"; 18 that is, "He who, present in [tisthan=instans] the semen, whom the semen knoweth not . . . whose body [vehicle] the semen is . . . the Immortal"; 14 "it is that prescient-spiritual-Self [prajñātman, the Sun] 15 that grasps and erects the flesh." This, or in other words that "Light is the progenitive power" are familiar Christian

doctrines. "Present in the semen," for example, has its equivalent in St. Thomas Aquinas: "The power of the soul, which is in the semen through the Spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body," and so "the power of generation belongs to God," and in the words of Schiller, "Es ist der Geist der sich den Körper schaft." 20

Similarly, St. Bonaventura wrote: "Generatio non potest fieri in materia generabili et corruptibili secundum rationes seminales nisi beneficio luminis corporum super caelestium, quae elongatur a generatione et corruptione, scilicet a sole, lune et stellis'; and, Jalālu'd Dīn Rūmī: "When the time comes for the embryo to receive the vital spirit, at that time the Sun becomes its helper. This embryo is brought into movement by the Sun, for the Sun is quickly endowing it with spirit. From the other stars this embryo received only an impression, until the Sun shone upon it. By which way did it become connected in the womb with the beauteous Sun? By the hidden way that is remote from our sense-perception."22

It would be possible to cite still more material from other sources, for example, from the American Indians, in whose mythologies "virgin" is expressed by "nonsunstruck." But enough has been said to show that there is, or has been, a more or less general agreement that Spiritus est qui vivificat, caro non prodest quicquam; 23 and even to-day there are many who can take seriously the commandment: "Call no man your father on earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven." 1t is difficult to see how these distinctions of social from spiritual paternity differ essentially from the "official doctrine" of the Australian aborigines.

It seems to me that one cannot claim to have

considered their "traditional teachings" in their true perspective if their universality is ignored. In any case, for so long as their beliefs are considered somewhat strange and peculiar, and as the products of an alien type of mentality, the question, How is it that so many and different kinds of men have thought alike? will also be ignored. And is not this a question of the most absorbing interest, and one that is most essentially "anthropological"? If it be true, as Alfred Jeremias said, that the various human cultures are really only the dialects of one and the same spiritual language<sup>25</sup> it is surely proper for the student of man to ask himself when and where this spiritual language may have originated. In any event, how much easier it becomes to understand another people's culture, how much easier to recognize their full humanity, to think with them rather than merely of or even for them, if the scholar realizes that their "official doctrines" are the same as those that have long been current and even now survive in his own environment!

A second example is that of the "puppet complex." Dr. Margaret Mead makes use of this expression in her account of Balinese character, where she remarks: "The animated puppet, the doll which dances on a string, the leather puppets manipulated by the puppeteer, and finally the little girl trance dancers who themselves become exaggeratedly limp and soft as they dance to the commands of the audience, all dramatize this whole picture of involuntarylearning, in which it is not the will of the learner, but the pattern of the situation and the manipulation of the teacher which prevail"; and speaks of "the fantasy of the body made of separate independent parts... the nation that the body is like a puppet, just pinned

together at the joints."26 It is implied that these are especially Balinese peculiarities. Although the observation is unrelated to any governing first principle, and so not fully understood, it is excellent in itself: for it is realized that the dancer's puppet-like relaxation is that of an obedient pupil, who would be guided not by her own will, but by a teacher's. One cannot but recall the words of Christ: "I do nothing of myself," and "not what I will, but what thou wilt."27 So said Boehme: "Thou shalt do nothing but forsake thy own will, viz. that which thou callest 'I,' or 'thyself.' By which means all thy evil properties will grow weak, faint, and ready to die; and then thou wilt sink down again into that one thing, from which thou art originally sprung."28 The dancer is not, in fact, expressing "herself," but altogether an artist, inspired, ενθεος: her condition is quite properly described as one of trance or ecstasy. The whole procedure is a carrying over into art of the vital principle of resignation. Religion and culture, sacred and profane, are undivided.

Actually, this "complex," "fantasy," or "notion"—terms that are employed all too condescendingly—is nothing peculiarly Balinese, but typically both Indian and Platonic, and almost as certainly of Indian origin in Bali as it is of Platonic-Aristotelian derivation in Europe. It is, moreover, bound up with and implies two other doctrines, those of Līlā<sup>29</sup> and the Sūtrātman, 30 and with the traditional symbolism of the theatre. 31 Plato sees in puppets (θαυμάτα) with their automatic, autokinetic motions, a typical example of the wonder (τὸ θαυμάζειν) that is the source or beginning of philosophy: it is "as regards the best in us that we are really God's toys" and ought to dance

accordingly, obeying only the control of that one cord by which the puppet is suspended from above and not the contrary and unregulated pulls by which external things drag each one to and fro in accordance with his own likes and dislikes.<sup>32</sup> For as Philo also says. "our five senses," together with the powers of speech and generation, "all these, as in puppet-shows are drawn by cords by their Director [ηγεμονιχός],33 now resting, now moving, each in the attitudes and motions appropriate to it."34 For a puppet to behave as it might like were indeed against nature; the movements that are induced by personal appetites are not free, but uncalculated and irregular. But "Nous is never wrong,"35 and "the Daimon always holds me back from what 'I' want to do, and never eggs me on ":36 and its truth, unlike that of this man Socrates. is irrefutable.37

Dr. Margaret Mead refers to the puppet's joints, and these are indeed to be regarded as the cogwheels of a mechanism of which the pins are axles. 38 But what is more important in the puppet symbolism is the thread on which its parts are strung and without which it would fall down inanimate, as actually happens when one "gives up the ghost" and is "cut off" The "notion that the body is like a puppet" does not depend upon a merely external resemblance but far more upon the relation of the guiding thread or threads that the hand of the puppeteer controls, as reins are held by the driver of a vehicle. "Bear in mind that what pulls the string is that Being hidden within us: that makes our speech, that is our speech, our life, our Man . . . something more Godlike than the passions that make us literally puppets and naught else "39

The analogy is formulated in the Mahābhārata thus: "Human gestures are harnessed by another, as with a wooden doll strung on a thread."40 And so the question is asked—" Do you know that Thread, by which, and that Inner Controller by whom this world and the other and all beings are strung together and controlled from within, so that they move like a puppet, performing their respective functions?"41or, to ask the same question in other words, know Him questi nei cor mortali è permotore?42 know Him questi la terra in se stringe? 43 "Elegant wooden shafts well and newly painted, fastened by threads and pins . . . such is the likeness of these limbs of ours."44 "Who made this (wooden) doll? Where is its maker? Whence has it arisen? How will it perish?"45 The answers to all these questions had long since been given: "The Sun is the fastening to which these worlds are linked. . . . He strings these worlds to himself by a thread, the thread of the Gale."46 So it is that "all this universe is strung on Me, like rows of gems on a thread ";47 and, "verily, he who knows that thread. and the Inner Controller who from within controls this and the other world and all beings, he knows Brahma, he knows the Gods, the Vedas, Being, Self and everything." 48 This is the background of the "puppet complex" of the Balinese, apart from which it cannot be said that their "character" has been explained, however carefully it may have been observed. 49

Puppets seem to move of themselves, but are really activated and controlled from within by the thread from which they are suspended from above, and only move intelligently in obedience to this leash: and it is in this automatism, or appearance of free will and

99 H

self-motion, that the puppet most of all resembles man. Puppets are "automata," yes; but actually no more than any other machines able to move without a power put into them or continuously transmitted to them by an intelligent principle distinct from any or all of their moving parts.<sup>50</sup> Could they also speak the language of the traditional philosophy they would say, "It is not my self, that of these wooden parts, but another Self, the Self of all puppets, that moves me; and if I seem to move of my own will, this is only true to the extent that I have identified myself and all my being and willing with the Puppeteer's 51 who made and moves me." Man-made automata are imitations of the creations of the mythical craftsmen, δημιουργοί, such as Maya, Hephaistos, Daedalus, Regin; and if one is not to misunderstand their significance, it must always be borne in mind that "automatic," which nowadays implies an involuntary and merely reflex activity, had originally an almost exactly opposite meaning, that of "acting of one's own will" or that of "self-moving."52 The "automatic doors" of the Janua Coeli,53 the Symplegades generally, and their "automatic" janitors, will be misinterpreted if it is not realized that it is meant that they are "alive," an animation that is explicitly denoted by the representation of the doors as winged in the iconography of the Sundoor on Babylonian seals.

One may now be in a position to understand the transparent myth of the City of Wooden Automata in the Kathā Sarit Sāgara.<sup>54</sup> Here the hero, Naravāhanadatta—"Theodore"— reaches a marvellous city (āścaryam puram) in which the whole citizenry (paurajanam) consists of wooden engines or automata (kāṣthamaya-yantram) all behaving as if alive (ceṣṭam-

ānam sajīvavat<sup>55</sup>) although recognizable as lifeless by their want of speech; and this arouses his wonder (vismayan =  $\theta a \tilde{v} \mu a$ ). He enters the palace, and sees there a comely man (bhavyam<sup>57</sup> purusam) enthroned and surrounded by janissaries and female guards: this man is the only consciousness (ekakam cetanam<sup>58</sup>) there, and is the cause of motion in the insensible folk, "even as the Spirit overstands the powers of perception and action "-indrivanam ivātmānam adhisthātrtavā sthitam. 59 In reply to questions, the King explains that he. Rājvadhara—the royal power—is one of the two sons of King Bāhubala-" Armstrong"-and that his brother Pranadhara—the pneumatic power having robbed his father's treasury and dallied with his fortune, both have fled. "Both of us," he says, "are carpenters,51 expert in the making of artful wooden and other automata-or engines, like those produced by Maya "60-taksanau . . . māyā-pranīteva darvādimaya-yantra-vicakşanau. Rājvadhara continues in saying, "I finally reached this empty city [sūnyam puram] and entered the palace." There in the heart of the palace he is fed by invisible hands: and "all these automata [yantra] are no mere products of my imagina-It is by the will of the Disposer tion, for I made them. that I, even being a carpenter, have come here, and am enjoying the sport of a king, as a God all alone by myself" (ihāgatya takṣāpi devaikāki karomy aham rājño līlāvitam), 61

No one at all familiar with the traditional Trade of Greek psychology will doubt that the trade of Wooden. Automata is macrocosmically the vold and microcosmically man—the man whose "perfort policy political body." The "golden palace" is the

"heart" of the "Golden City," the centre from which all its operations are directed. To Rājyadhara his retainers, the psychic powers of perception and action, like the subjects of earthly kings, bring all kinds of food by which the Spirit is nourished when it thus comes eating and drinking.63 That his food of all kinds is thus served by invisible hands, and that he repeoples a Waste Land (sūnyam puram), is a reminder that he is effectively the "Rich King" of a "Grail Castle." As the "sole consciousness" in the City of Wooden Automata, Rājyadhara corresponds to the "Only Thinker, your Self, the Inner Controller, Immortal" of the Upanisads.64 The original "robbery" referred to is that of the sources of life, the Indian Rape of Soma and the Greek Promethean theft of fire; it is only by such a "theft" that the world can be quickened, but it necessarily involves the separation or exile of the immanent principles from their transcendent source. Rājyadhara rightly speaks of himself as a God.

If there could be any doubt that these are the real meanings of the story of the Golden City (hemapura) or that this would have been obvious to almost any Indian hearer, it can be dissipated not only by a consideration of the parallel wordings of the scriptural passages already cited, but also by a comparison with the Tripurā Rahasya, 65 where it is again the question of a "city" and its citizens, and it is told that the Migrant or Procedent (pracāra), 66 though single, "multiplies himself, manifests as the city and its citizens and pervades them all, protects and holds them," and that "without him they would all be scattered and lost like pearls without the string of the necklace," 67 and it is perfectly clear that, as the text

itself later explains, the Migrant is the Breath or Life—prāṇa—and the city the body, of which the parts are strung on Him.

All these formulations, furthermore, clarify the meanings of the term sūtra-dhāra as stage manager and carpenter or architect; for these are one and the same in divinis, and so far as the puppet play is concerned may be one and the same in human practice. One does not have to suppose with Pischel<sup>68</sup> that the Indian drama originated in a puppet play of unknown antiquity; or, on the other hand, that the sūtradhāra is a "carpenter" merely because he carries a measuring line. The origins of drama and of architecture are mythical, and both are equally "imitations" of divine prototypes. 69 It is because, whether as the Artist who makes or as the Controller who manages his "toys," as Plato calls them, the All-Maker. Visvakarmā, is the "Holder of every Thread" (viśvasūtra-dhrk).70 that the human artist and the stage manager are, in the likeness and image of God, equally "Holders of a Thread."71

Enough has been said to show that the doctrine of "spiritual paternity" is nothing peculiarly Pacific or Australian, and that the so-called "puppet complex" is nothing peculiarly Balinese; enough also to show that the Australian "official doctrine" is an intellectual formulation rather than a proof of nescience, 72 and that the expression "complex," implying a psychosis, is quite irrelevant to describe what is in fact a metaphysical "theory." Such formulations cannot be properly evaluated or seen in any true perspective as long as they are treated as purely local phenomena to be explained in some evolutionary or psychological way on the sole premise of the environment in which

they happen to have been observed; but only if they are related to the whole spiritual-cultural horizon into the pattern of which they naturally fit, and of which they may be only the peripheral "superstitions," in the strictly etymological sense of this excellent but much abused term. The student of "primitive beliefs" and of "folklore" must be, if he is not to betray his vocation, not so much a psychologist in the current sense as he must be an accomplished theologian and metaphysician.

These general considerations are also of the highest importance if anthropology is to amount to anything more than another satisfaction of our curiosity; if, that is to say, it is to subserve the good of mankind by enabling men to understand one another, and even to think with one another, rather than merely of one another as strangers. For example, Marsilio Ficino, Meister Eckhart, William Law, and Hāfīz are thinking with one another when all employ the figure of the "hook" with which the Fisher King angles for his human prey;74 or the Celt is thinking with the Buddhist when both are agreed that "He who would be chief, let him be your bridge." Even so the Australian is thinking with Christ when in fact, having been initiated, he too calls "no man father on earth." And so, as was previously indicated, there is a real connection, though it may have been prehistoric, between Margaret Mead's observation "limp and soft," Jacob Boehme's "weak, faint and ready to die," and the fact that "all scripture cries aloud for freedom from self." It is because of their acceptance of this point of view that, to the modern mentality to which it is so repugnant, the members of traditional and "unanimous" societies seem not vet to have distinguished

themselves from their environment; and the irony of the situation is this, that the modern proletarians, to whom the notions of individuality and self-expression are so important, are themselves of all peoples the least individualized and the most like a herd.<sup>76</sup>

A culture such as the Balinese is so completely moulded and pervaded by its inherited "official doctrine" that a "correct" or "orthodox" deportment in any given situation has become a second nature: it is now no longer necessary to remember the rules of the game because the habit of the art of life is now engrained." In "forsaking her own will, viz. that which thou callest 'I,' or 'thyself.'" the Balinese dancer in her rapt ecstasy is not a product of any peculiarly Balinese "complex," but of the *Philosophia Perennis*.

Plato says that it is as regards the best in human beings that they are most really God's playthings. And this notion, that what is called "their" life is really a divine sporting, in which their part is free and active only to the extent that their wills are merged in his who plays the game, is one of man's deepest insights. As Jalālu'd Dīn Rūmī states, "Who so hath not surrendered will, no will hath he." So says also Angelus Silesius:

Dieses Alles ist ein Spiel, das ihr der Gottheit macht; Sie hat die Kreatur um ihretwillen gedacht.

Whoever accepts this point of view will feel that he "ought" to act accordingly; and as the expression "walking with God," Plato's  $\theta \epsilon \tilde{\varphi}$  fundabeîn, Skr. brahmacarya, implies, this is for the puppet his true Way. The only alternative is that of a passive subjection to the "pullings and haulings" of the "ruling

passions," rightly so called when they become the determinants of conduct. "Ought" is expressed in Greek by  $\delta\epsilon \hat{\iota}$ , from  $\delta\epsilon \omega$ , "bind," the root in  $\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\delta s$ , that is, the "bond" by which, as Plutarch says, Apollo binds  $(\sigma\nu\nu\delta\epsilon \hat{\iota})$  all things to himself and orders them. That bond is precisely Plato's "golden cord" by which the puppet should be guided if it is to play its proper part, avoiding the disorderly movements that are provoked by its own desires; and the "rein" by which the sensitive steeds must be controlled if they are not to miss the way. This is the "clue" to which one must hold fast, if one is to play the game intelligently, and spontaneously, or "automatically."

In the Tripurā Rahasva<sup>80</sup> the picture is drawn of an ideal city-state, that of a characteristically Indian Utopia and at the same time very like Plato's Republic. The Prince, instructed by his wife, has become a free man (iīvan-mukta) liberated in this life, here and now from all the "knots of the heart" and above all from the strongest of these, that of the "identification of the flesh with the Self, which identification in its turn gives rise to the incessant flux of happiness and misery," and being liberated, he performs his royal duties efficiently but absent-mindedly and "like an actor on the stage" (natavad rangamandale). Following his example and instruction, all the citizens attain a like liberty, and are no longer motivated by their passions, although still possessing them. The consequences are by no means "antisocial"; on the contrary, worldly affairs are still carried on in this ideal free state, in which its citizens continue to play their parts, by force of former preoccupation, but now "without thinking of past good or evil fortune, or counting on future joys

or pains;<sup>81</sup> in their everyday life laughing, rejoicing, wearied or angered, like men intoxicated and indifferent to their own affairs.<sup>82</sup> Wherefore Sanaka and other sages who visited there called it the 'City of Resplendent Wisdom,'"

That in this ideal City of God it is the actor that represents the norm of conduct is especially pertinent in the present context. Here "all the world's a stage," without distinction of action as conduct from action as drama, and everyone still plays the part that he "ought" to play, if the city is to prosper. The true actor, then, whether in life or in his own profession, "acts without acting" in the sense of the Bhagavad Gītā and the Taoist wei wu wei doctrine. He does not identity himself with the part, and is not infected (na lipyate) by what he does on the stage: his role, as men regard it, may be that of either saint or sinner, but like God he remains himself and untroubled by the thought, "Thus I did right," or "Thus I did wrong," being above the battle. So

So the Balinese dancer, who is not "expressing herself," but playing her part impersonally, is by no means the victim of a "complex," but merely a perfect actress: and the members of any other society, all of whom have their part to play but for the most part want to be "stars," might learn from her, if they would, what is the distinction of acting from merely behaving, which is that of spontaneity from licence. It is not enough to have "observed," however accurately: it is only when the anthropologist has profoundly understood what he sees, when he has really entertained the ideas of which the spectacle is a demonstration, that it can become for him a serious experience.86

#### REFERENCES

- <sup>1</sup> Montagu, M. F. Ashley, "Nescience, Science and Psycho-Analysis," *Psychiatry* (1941) 4.45-60. References to the literature will be found in this article.
- <sup>2</sup> The italics here are original. Those in the two following quotations are mine.
- <sup>3</sup> Majjhima Nikāya I:265-266. Gandharvas and Apsarases are the rulers with respect to progeny or lack of progeny—Pañcavimśa Brāhmaṇa IX:3.1.
  - <sup>4</sup> Philo Judaeus, Quis rerum divinarum heres 115.
  - <sup>5</sup> Plato, Laws 773 E.
  - <sup>6</sup> Ephesians iii.15.
- <sup>7</sup> In all these contexts in which "Sun" has been capitalized the reference is, of course, to the "inward Sun" as distinguished from "the outward sun, which receives its power and lustre from the inward "-Boehme, Jacob, Signatura rerum XI:75, to the "Sun of the Angels" as distinguished from the "sun of sense"—Dante, Paradiso X:53-54; compare Convito III:12, 50-60. This "Sun of the sun "-Philo Judaeus, De specialis legibus I:279; compare De cherubim 97-Apollo as distinguished from Helios-Plato, Laws 898 D. Plutarch, Moralia 393 D, 400 C, D-is not "the sun whom all men see" but "the Sun whom not all know with the mind "-Atharva Veda X:8.14, " whose body the sun is "-Brhadāranyaka Upanisad III:7.9. The traditional distinction of intelligible from sensible, invisible from visible "suns" is essential to any adequate understanding of "solar mythologies" and "solar cults."
  - 8 Aristotle, Physics II:2.
  - Dante, Paradiso XXII:116 and XXIX:15.
- 10 Satapatha Brāhmana VII:3.2.12. See Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., "Sunkiss," JAOS (1940) 60:46-67; and "Primitive Mentality," Quarterly Journal of the Mythological Society (1940) 31:69-91. To the Sunkiss corresponds "the caress of Zeus by his on-breathing"—Æschylus, Suppliants; 344-345—P. W. Smyth's version.

11 Jaiminīya Upanisad Brāhmaņa III:10.4. Compare Pañcavimsa Brāhmana XVI:14.5.

12 Rgveda VII:102.2. One hardly needs to say or seek to demonstrate that the Christian and pagan solar symbolisms are homologous. An illustration can be cited, however, in St. Ambrose's Hymnus Matutinus:

> Verusque sol, illabere Micans nitore perpeti; Iubarque Sancti Spiritūs Infunde nostris sensibus

which is an almost literal equivalent of the Vedic Gavatri. Rgveda III:62.10.

18 Brhadāranyaka Upanisad III:9.28.

<sup>14</sup> Reference footnote 13; III:7.23.

15 This equation is explicit in Aitareya Aranyaka III:2.3, where also Keith remarks that this is "the most common doctrine in the Upanisads." The "Sun" in question is the Sun of Rgveda I:115.1, "the Spiritual-Self [ātman] of all that is mobile or immobile."

16 Kausītaki Upanisad III:3.

- 17 Taittirīya Samhitā VII:1.1.1, Satapatha Brāhmaņa VIII:7.1.16. Cf. John i.4 "the life was the light." From the same point of view: Prima substantiarum est lux . . . Unumquodque quantum habet de luce tantum retinet esse divini-Witelo, Liber de intelligentiis, VI, VIII.
- 18 Summa Theologica III:11. This is essentially Pythagorean doctrine: "the seed is an efflux of brain containing hot vapour (θερμον ἀτμόν) within it . . . soul and sensibility are from the vapour within " (Diogenes Laertius VIII.28). Here  $d\tau\mu\delta s = \pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\nu}\mu\alpha = \text{spirit}$ , and etymologically Skr. ātman.

<sup>19</sup> Reference footnote 18; I:45.5. <sup>20</sup> von Schiller, Johann C., Wallenstein III:13.

21 St. Bonaventura, De reductione artium ad theologiam 21: cf. Philo Judaeus, Ouis rerum divinarum heres 115, "Are not the parents, as it were, concomitant causes only, while [the divine] Nature is the highest, elder and true cause

of the begetting of children?" I add "the divine," only to remind the reader that Philo's "Nature" is not the visible and objective world, but that aspect of God's power by which he creates, Plato's αἰειγενὴς φύσις, "the eternal Nature" that we acknowledge in the begetting of descendants—Laws 773 E.

It comes to the same thing to say that "the Breath is the progenitive power" and so that "man is propagated from the Breath"—Pañcavimśa Brāhmaṇa XVI:14.5, since the Breath—prāṇaḥ—is commonly identified with the Sun, the pneumatic with the luminous principle.

<sup>22</sup> Jalālu'd Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī I:3775-3779.

23 John vi.63.

<sup>24</sup> Matthew xxiii.9.

<sup>25</sup> Jeremias, Alfred *Handbuch der Altorientalischen Geistes-kultur* [2nd ed.]; Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1929 (xvii and

508 pp.); in particular, the Foreword.

<sup>26</sup> Bateson, Gregory, and Mead, Margaret, Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis, New York, New York Academy of Sciences, 1942 (xvi and 277 pp.), pp. 17 and 91.

<sup>27</sup> John viii.28; Mark xiv.36.

<sup>28</sup> Boehme, Jacob, "Discourse Between Two Souls,"

Signatura rerum, New York, Dutton, n. d. (288 pp.).

<sup>29</sup> Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., "Līlā," JAOS (1941) 61:98-101; and "Play and Seriousness," Journal of

Philosophy (1942) 39:550-552.

<sup>30</sup> Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought, 1946, reference footnote 30, p. 236; "Symbolism," Dictionary of World Literature; "The Iconography of Dürer's 'Knots' and Leonardo's 'Concatenation,'" Art Quarterly (1944) 7:109-128. See also Sankarācārya, Sataślokī 12 and 55: man is a bead strung on the thread of the conscious Self, and just as wooden puppets are worked by strings, so the world is operated by the Thread-Spirit.

31 Cf. Guénon, René, "Le symbolisme du théâtre," Le Voile

d'Isis (1932) 37:65-70.

32 Plato, Theatetus 155 D; and Laws 644 and 803-844.

33 Dux, Duke, Leader, Guide; the solar Leader; netr of Rgveda V:50.1 and "Self of self, the Immortal Leader" atmano' tmā netāmrtaḥ, of Maitri Upaniṣad VI:7.

34 Philo Judaeus, De opificio mundi 117.

- 85 Aristotle, De anima III:10, 433 A.
- 36 Plato, Apology 31 D; and Phaedrus 242 B.
- <sup>37</sup> Plato, Symposium 201 C.
- 38 It is not so much the function of the pins to hold the joints together as to enable the limbs to move freely. Pegs (γόμφοι, Plato, Timaeus 43 A)—on which the joints (ἄρθρα) move, and comparable to the hinges (γόμφοι) of doors (Parmenides in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus dogmatos III) -are, indeed, employed; and these are also called pivots (στρόφιγγες), but the limbs are bound together by the sinews (νεῦρα) that tighten and loosen round the pivots. and so move the parts of the body as if on hinges—Timaeus 74 B. These sinews are the physical counterparts of the psychic "bonds of life"—Timaeus 73 B—that are dissolved at death-Timaeus 81 E; Philo Judaeus, Quis rerum divinarum heres 242, Brhadāranyaka Upanisad II:7.2; Maitri Upanisad 1:4. It is by the "thread" that the parts are really co-ordinated and moved: as in man "it is by the Breath that the joints are united," prānena sarvāni parvāni samdadhāti, the vital Breath that is called the "Thread-Spirit," sūtrātman, "that links up [samtanoti] this world" -Aitareya Aranyaka I:4.2,3. See other references in reference footnote 30.

<sup>89</sup> Marcus Aurelius, X:38 and XII:19; cf. II:2, III:16,

VI:16, VII:3, VII:29.

The puppet symbolism is closely related to the Indian, Platonic, Neoplatonic, and later symbolism of the chariot, of which the steeds are the sensitive powers that seek their own pastures and must be curbed and guided by the knowing driver, the Reason, who only knows the Way or "Royal Road."

- 40 Mahābhārata, Udyoga Parvan 32:12.
- 41 Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad III:7.1; cf. 4.1, combined with Sankara's commentaries.
  - 42 Dante, Paradiso I:116: corresponding to Maitri

Upanisad II:6, "from within this heart of ours, the Mover," asmād-dhrd-antarāt pracodayitr.

43 Dante, reference footnote 42, I:117.

44 Therigāthā 390, 391.

45 Samyutta Nikāya I:134.

46 Satapatha Brāhmana VI:7.1.17 and VIII:7.3.10.

47 Bhagavad Gītā VII:7; compare Tripurā Rahasya, Jñāna Khanda, V:110-124—reference footnote 65.

48 Brhadāranyaka Upanisad III:7.1.

49 The reviewer of another work of Dr. Margaret Mead's, The American Character, one of the Pelican Books, justly remarks on "the danger of . . . providing psychological, or even biological reasons for traits which should be treated metaphysically "—New English Weekly (1944) 25:132. The "psychological" explanations themselves will be inadequate if the traditional psychology, for example, that of Philo and the Bhagavad Gītā, is overlooked. In this traditional psychology it is maintained that there can be no greater error or source of evil than to conceive that "I am the doer." From the point of view of anyone who accepts this axiology, the behaviour of the Balinese dancer is simply natural, and that of the modern, self-expressive "artist," unnatural.

50 For example, when La Mettrie says, "The human body is a machine that winds its own springs," he is "explaining" a phenomenon by something else of a sort that never was on sea or land, something as inconceivable as "the son of a barren woman." When he continues by saying that "the soul is but a principle of motion or material and sensible part of the brain," he is propounding two entirely different theories, of which the first is Plato's, and the second reverts to his own unthinkable "machine." My citation of La Mettrie is taken from Urban, Wilbur Marshall, Language and Reality, New York, Macmillan, 1939 (755 pp.); in particular p. 314.

In what sense man can be properly compared to a machine is discussed by Schrödinger, Erwin, What is Life?, Cambridge, Macmillan, 1945.

51Skr. sūtra-dhāra, "holder of the thread," and so

"puppeteer," "stage manager," and "carpenter." It is not insignificant, also, that the puppets are "wooden"; the "primary matter" of which the world is made being a "wood"— $\tilde{\nu}\lambda\eta$ , Skr. vana—and the maker therefore a "carpenter."

103, where the term is used of persons or personified powers. Aristotle, Physics II:6, indeed, interprets "automaton" to mean "in itself to no purpose," and so "accidental" or "random"; but this is inconsistent with the meanings already cited and with the use of αὐτόματον with φύω, "grow"—cf. Skr. svaruḥ = αὐτοφυής—and according to most scholars the root meaning is that of "acting of one's own will." The true analogy is with τὸ ἐαυτὸ κινείν, "self-motion," which is the highest kind of motion—Plato, Phaedrus 264 A, Laws 895. The problem turns, as usual, upon the question, What or which is the "self" implied, outer mortal or inner immortal?—the latter being the true ἡγεμονικός.

53 Iliad V:409; compare Suparnādhyāya XXV:1, and the

"Active Doors" of Celtic mythology.

54 Kathā Sarit Sāgara VII:9.1-59—tar. 43, see Penzer, N. M., Ocean of the Streams of Story (1925) 3: begin p. 280, and further 3:56 and 9:149; Penzer discusses automata, but he has not the least conception of their theory.

55 Cestamānam corresponding to cestate in the Mahāb-

*hārata*, reference footnote 40.

<sup>56</sup> Such "wonder" as is the beginning of philosophy, Plato, Theatetus 155 D, and Aristotle, Metaphysics 982 B.

- <sup>57</sup> Bhavya, future participle of bhū, "become," takes on the sense of "comely" in the same way that English "becoming" takes on the meaning "suitable," "as it should be."
- 58 The formulas here are very closely related to those of *Maitri Upaniṣad* II:6 and *Bhagavad Gītā* XVIII:61. In the *Upaniṣad*, Prajāpayi, "from within the heart," animates and motivates his otherwise lifeless offspring, setting them up in possession of consciousness (*cetanavat*). In the Gītā Śrī Krishna, speaking of himself, says: "The Lord, seated

in the heart of all beings, maketh them all, by his art, to wander about, mounted on their engines," sarvabhūtānām hrddeśe . . . tisthati, bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūdhāni māyayā.

59 This is, again, a statement of the traditional psychology that everywhere underlies the "puppet complex" and the

chariot symbolism: cf. reference footnote 49.

<sup>60</sup> The Titan Maya, who may be compared to Hephaistos. Daedalus, Wayland, and Regin, is the great Artist whose daughter, in the Kathā Sarit Sāgara VI:3, Penzer 3:42, Somaprabhā, exhibits a variety of engines or automata, and explains that these artful and self-empowered wooden dolls. these crafty mechanical works of art (kāṣṭhamayiḥ svamāyā-yantra-putrikāh . . . māyā-yantrādi-śilpāni) were originally "emanated (srstāni) by my father of old," and that there are five sorts corresponding, like "that great engine, the world " (cf. Marsilio Ficino, Symposium IV.5, "machino del mondo"), to the five elements, "but the Wheel that guards the Water of Life, that he alone, and no other, understands."

61 On this royal "sport" see reference footnote 29, and cf. also Clement of Alexandria, Instructor I; chapter 5: "O wise sport, laughter assisted by endurance, and the king as spectator . . . and this is the divine sport. 'Such a sport of his own, Jove sports, says Heracleitus. The King, then, who is Christ, beholds from above our laughter, and looking through the window, views the thanksgiving and the blessing." Clement's "spectator" corresponds to the preksaka of Maitri Upanisad II:7.

"But the Nitva and the Lila are the two aspects of the same reality. . . . The Absolute plays in many ways: as Isvara, as the gods, as man, and as the universe. The Incarnation is the play of the Absolute as man . . . The formless God is real, and equally real is God with form."— The Gospel of Srī Rāmakrishna, New York, Rāmakrishna-Vivekananda Centre, 1942 (xxiii and 1063 pp.), pp. 358-359.

62 This assumes the etymology of purusa as given in Brhadāranyaka Upanisad II:5.18, and the connection of sī with κεῖσθαι. I have dealt more fully with the Indian and

corresponding Greek concept of man as a City of God—brahmapura, Hieropolis, Civitas Dei—in my "Civilization" in the Albert Schweitzer Jubilee Volume (ed. A. Roback,

Cambridge, 1946).

63 "That Golden Person in the Sun, who from his golden place looks down upon this earth, is even He who dwells in the lotus of the heart, and eateth there of food," Maitri Upaniṣad V:I; cf. Rgveda X:90.2, "When He rises up by food." "He, indeed, is the great, unborn Spiritual-Self, who is the Discriminant amongst the powers of the soul. In the ether of the heart reclines the Ruler of All, the Lord of All, the King of All," Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV:4.22; cf. Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII:I.1-6. "To this same Life [prāṇa] as Brahma, all these divinities bring tribute unasked," Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad II:I, cf. Atharva Veda X:7.39 and 8.15. In all these contexts, as for Plato, "food" is whatever aliment nourishes the physical or psychic powers, body or mind.

64 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III:8.23; "He who sets up this body in possession of consciousness, and moves it,"

Maitri Upanisad 11.6.

65 Jñāna Khanda V:119-124—Iyer, M. S. Venkatarama [tr.], Jñāna Khanda. Quart. J. Myth. Soc. (1937) 28:170-219, 269-289; (1938) 29:39-57, 189-207; (1939) 29:329-351, 466-499—the text in the Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, Number

15 (1925-1933).

66 In theology, "procession" is the coming forth or manifestation of the deity as or in a Person. This appearance on the stage of the world is a "descent"—avatarana—strictly comparable to that of the actor who emerges from the greenroom to appear in some disguise. The reference of the text is to the procession of the Spirit, prajūātman or prāna.

67 As in the Bhagavad Gītā VII:7. Cf. reference footnote

30

68 Pischel, Richard, *Die Heimat des Puppenspiels*, Halle, Hallesche Rektorreden II, 1900; for the English version refer to Tawney, Mildred C., *The Home of the Puppet Play*, London, Luzac, 1902 (32 pp.).

69 "Human works of art are imitations of divine prototypes." Aitareya Brāhmaṇa VI:27.

70 This term occurs with reference to Vishnu as the

Creator.

71 It has been well said by the late Professor Arthur Berriedale Keith that "it is indeed to ignore how essentially religion enters into the life of the Hindu to imagine that it is possible to trace the beginnings of drama to a detached love of amusement."—The Sanskrit Drama, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924 (405 pp.), p. 52. In dealing with any traditional civilization it must always be realized that no real distinction can be drawn there as of culture from religion or profane from sacred. Such distinctions, like that of utility or value from meaning or beauty, are the products of a modern schizophrenia.

<sup>72</sup> A blind faith in "progress" makes it all too easy to accuse the "backward races" of ignorance or a "prelogical mentality." "Lorsque nous ne comprenons pas un phénomène iconographique, nous sommes toujours tentés de dire que nous comprenons fort bien—mais que c'est indigène qui est maladroit ou n'a pas compris," Hentze, Carl, Objets rituels, croyances et dieux de la Chine antique et de l'Amérique, Anvers, "De Sikkel" Editions, 1936 (119 pp., 230 figs., 12 plates); in particular p. 33. "Das Märchenhaft-Wunderbare muss daher mit ganz anderen Augen als mit unseren naturwissenschaftlich geschulten angesehen werden," Preuss, K. Th., in Thurnwald, R., Lehrbuch der Völkerkunde (1939), p. 127.

73 "Backward communities are the oral libraries of the world's ancient cultures" (Chadwick, N. K., Poetry and Prophecy, Cambridge University Press, 1942 [xvi and 110 pp.], xv). "These beliefs of theirs have been preserved until now as a relic of former knowledge" (Aristotle, Metaphysics XII:8.10). "La mémoire collective conserve quelquefois certains détails précis d'une 'théorie' devenue depuis long-temps inintelligible . . . des symboles archaïques d'essence purement métaphysique"—Eliade, Mircea, Les livres populaires dans la littérature roumaine," Zalmoxis (1939) II:78. If the fundamental sources of custom and belief are those of

a metaphysical tradition, the anthropologist in search of explanation and understanding must be familiar with this tradition.

<sup>74</sup> Marsilio Ficino, ". . . . the soul inflamed by the divine splendour . . . is secretly lifted up by it as if by a hook in order to become God." Opera Omnia, p. 306, cited by Kristeller, P. O., The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. New York, Columbia University Press, 1943 (xiv and 441 pp.) half title: "Columbia Studies in Philosophy," Number 6; D. 267. "For love is like the fisherman's hook"—Pfeiffer. Franz, Meister Eckhart, Göttingen, Vandenhoek Ruprecht, 1924 (x and 686 pp.), p. 29. "Love is my bait . . . it will put its hook into your heart," William Law, cited by Stephen Hobhouse, William Law, 1943, p. 109. Hāfīz, "Fish-like in the sea behold me swimming, till he with his hook my rescue maketh," Leaf, Walter, Versions from Hafiz (1898) n:XII. All implied by Mark i.17, "I will make you fishers of men." There are but few doctrines or symbols that can be adequately studied on the basis of single sources to which they seem to be peculiar if their universality is overlooked.

75 See Coomaraswamy, Doña Luisa, "The Perilous Bridge of Welfare," HJAS (1944) 8:196-213. Cf. the Roman

Imperator, who was also the Pontifex Maximus.

<sup>76</sup> Nothing, of course, is stranger or more unwelcome to the modern mentality than is the idea of "self-naughting." Liberty of choice has become an obsession; the superior liberty of spontaneity is no longer understood. For those who are afraid I cite: "I can no more doubt... what to me is fact, perceived truth; namely, that any person would be infinitely happier if he could accept the loss of his 'individual self' and let nature pursue her uncharted course." Hadley, Ernest E., Psychiatry (1942) 5:131-134; p. 134. Cf. Sullivan, Harry Stack, Psychiatry (1938) 1:121-134. "Here (in the emphasized individuality of each of us, 'myself') we have the very mother of illusions, the ever pregnant source of preconceptions that invalidate all our efforts to understand other peoples. The psychiatrist may, in his more objective moments, hold the correct view

of personality, that it is the hypothetical entity that one postulates to account for the doings of people . . . in his less specialized moments the same psychiatrist joins the throng in exploiting his delusions of unique individuality. He conceives himself to be a self-limited unit that alternates between a state of insular detachment and varying degrees of contact with other people and with cultural entities. He arrogates to himself the principal role in such of his actions as he 'happens' to notice." To believe in one's own or another's "personality" or "individuality" is animism. In the traditional philosophy it is emphasized that "personalities" are inconstants, ever changing and never stopping to "be"; "we" are not entities, but processes. Dr. Sullivan's words are—whether or not by intention—an admirable summary of the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. An attachment of permanent value to personality will be impossible for anyone who has seen things "as become"yathā-bhūtam, objectively, as causally determined processes. The first step on the way to a liberation from "the mother of illusions," and so toward an "infinite happiness," is to have realized by a demonstration that "this (body and mind) is not my Self," that there is no such thing as a "personality" anywhere to be found in the world. Life in a world of time and space is a condition of incessant change; and, as Plato asks, "How can that which is never in the same state be anything?"—Cratylus 430 E. Almost the first step in clear thinking is to distinguish becoming from being. The important thing is to know what "we" really are; but this is a knowledge that can only be acquired to the extent that "we" eliminate from our consciousness of being, all that We are not. This is the Platonic κάθαρσις, Skr. śuddha karana.

77 Contemporary western dancing is hardly more than a kind of calisthenics, and a spectacle; in the traditional art, which survives elsewhere, "all the dancer's gestures are signs of things, and the dance is called rational, because it aptly signifies and displays something over and above the pleasure of the senses."—St. Augustine, De ordine 34: cf. Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., and Duggirala, G. K., Mirror

of Gesture, New York, Weyhe, 1936 (81 pp. and 20 plates). Physical exercise, the type of the former, while it may induce a certain kinesthetic enjoyment, does not, in its net effect, go far beyond the muscles, the lungs, the circulatory system, and so on. Play activity, on the other hand, has as a result a restoration of what we may generally term a rational balance [note: Andrae's 'polar balance of physical and metaphysical']. It is true that, in so far as play is recreation, it is escape. It is an escape from the relative chaos of ordinary experience to a world where there is a rational and moral order, plainly visible, and not simply the object of faith. The play is, then, like art, a clarification of experience . . . almost identical with a sense of freedom. The real hindrance to freedom is not rules but chance; the rules and the game make possible the freedom within its framework."—Seward, George, Journal of Philosophy (1944) 41:184. It is just this "clarification" that the anthropologist misses, when he merely "observes" with scientific objectivity" and "detachment," hardly to be distinguished from condescension. "This, in fact, is the Western way of hiding one's own heart under the cloak of so-called scientific understanding. We do it partly because of the misérable vanité des savants which fears and rejects with horror any sign of living sympathy, and partly because an understanding that reaches the feelings might allow contact with the foreign spirit to become a serious experience."- Jung, C. G., and Wilhelm, Richard, Secret of the Golden Flower, London, Kegan, Paul, 1932 (ix and 151 pp., 10 plates); in particular p. 77. I say that anthropology is useless, or almost useless, if it does not lead to any "serious" experience.

It hardly needs to be said that I am not accusing either of the two authors cited of "vanity" or want of "living sympathy." Professor Ashley Montagu, at any rate, has said that "in spite of our enormous technological advances we are spiritually, and as humane beings, not the equals of the average Australian aboriginal or the average Eskimo—we are very definitely their inferiors." Montagu, M. F. Ashley, "Socio-Biology of Man," Sci. Monthly (1940)

50:483-490. It is to such writers as Sir J. G. Frazer and Lévy-Bruhl that Jung's critique really applies.

Cf. J. Layard, Stone Men of Malekula, p. 701, on

"spurious scientific objectivity."

<sup>78</sup> On this passive subjection compare *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII:1.5 and Philo Judaeus, *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 186. The distinction involved is that of will from desire: "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." To do as one "likes" is the antithesis of free will; the free man much rather likes what he does than does what he likes.

79 Plutarch, Moralia, 393 f., and cf. references in footnote 30.
80 Jñāna Khanda X:43-62; reference footnote 65.

<sup>81</sup> In other words, "letting their dead bury their dead," and "taking no thought for the morrow"; living as nearly

as possible in the eternal now.

<sup>62</sup> The method in their madness being that they still lived naturally, placing no forcible restraints on their feelings and so, as another translator adds, "dissipating their latent tendencies." One may recall Blake's saying, "Desires suppressed breed pestilence."

<sup>83</sup> The persons mentioned include the princes, men, women, young and old, actors, singers, fools, professors,

ministers, artisans and hetaerae.

84 Brhadāranyaka Upanisad IV:4.22.

85 It is expressly said that the Prince regarded gain and loss, friend and foe, impartially: as in the Bhagavad Gitā the principle is enunciated, "Thy concern is with the action only, not with the result." One remembers, with Walt Whitman, that "battles are lost in the same spirit in which they are won"; and that the soldier's vocation does not require him to hate, but only to fight well. This last is admirably illustrated by the well-known story of 'Ali who, engaged in single combat, was on the point of victory, but when his opponent spat in his face, withdrew, because he would not fight in anger.

86 On the distinction of understanding from psychological analysis, see Urban, Wilbur Marshall, *The Intelligible World*, London, Allen and Unwin, and New York, Macmillan, 1929 (479 pp.), pp. 184, 185. Understanding

requires a recognition of common values. For so long as men cannot think with other peoples they have not understood, but only known them; and in this situation it is largely an ignorance of their own intellectual heritage that stands in the way of understanding and makes an unfamiliar way of thinking seem to be "queer." It lies peculiarly within the province of anthropology to enable men to understand one another.